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Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,

Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,
v.

Case No. CV-OC-0723232

AFFIDAVIT OF CHRIST TROUPIS
IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTERPLAINTIFFS/COUNTER
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
RECONSIDER

CONNIE WRIGHT l'
T AYLOR, flk/a
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR,
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.

Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss:
)

AFFIDAVIT OF CHRIST TROUPIS IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTERDEFENDANTS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER- Pg 1
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CHRIST T. TROUPIS, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

Your Affiant is co-counsel of record in this matter and the Ada County Case No. CV DC
OC
04-00473D. Your Affiant makes this Affidavit in support of Plaintiffs/CounterDefendants' Motion to Reconsider. That the information and facts set forth herein are
based upon your affiant's personal knowledge and/or observations and can testify as to
the truth of the matters asserted herein if called upon as a witness at the trial of this
matter.

2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy ofthe initial Complaint and
Demand for Jury Trial filed in Ada County Case No. CV OC 04-00473D, Taylor vs Maile
filed January 23, 2004 and the same is made part hereof as if set forth in full herein.

3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy ofthe Verified Answer and
Counter-claim filed in Ada County Case No. CV OC 04-00473D, Taylor vs Maile filed
February 23, 2004 and the same is made part hereof as if set forth in full herein.

4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "C" is a true and correct copy of the Answer and Counter
Claim re: Plaintiffs Amended Complaint by Beneficiaries filed in Ada County Case No.
04-00473D,
CV OC 04-0047
3D, Taylor vs Maile filed March 21, 2006 and the same is made part

hereof as if set forth in full herein.
5.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "D" is a true and correct copy of the Order Regarding
Plaintiffs' Motion f()r Summary Judgment filed in Ada County Case No. CV OC 04
0400473D, Taylor vs M~aile filed February 13,2006 and the same is made part hereof as if

set forth in full herein.

AFFIDAVIT OF CHRIST TROUPIS IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTERDEFENDANTS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER- Pg 2
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6.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "E" is a true and correct copy of the Plaintiff Beneficiaries'
Motion for Summary Judgment executed on filed in Ada County Case No. CV DC 04
0400473D, Taylor vs A/aile filed February 13, 2006 and the same is made part hereof as if

set forth in full herein.
7.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "F" is a true and correct copy of the Registry of Actions in the
Matter of the Registration of Trust of Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust in Ada
County Case No. CV TR-2004-2218 and the same is made part hereof as ifset forth in
full herein.

DATED thisd:_~dayof

~~~~y'

,2010.

CHRIST TROUPIS, o-counsel for Plaintiffsl
Counter-defendants

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORJ\J TO BEFORE ME, a Notary Public in and for said State,
ofXP.-\ '.
thisz..YJ day of?.kP-\
,2010.

it~~
it~~

Notary Public fi r Idaho
Residing at G:P-§~ Ill)
My Commission Expires
1\~ ll-\~
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 28 th day of September, I caused a true and correct
eorrect
copy of the foregoing (1) PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
RECONSIDER, (2) AFFIDAVIT OF CHRIST TROUPIS IN SUPPORT
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER, together with (3)
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO RECONSIDER, to be delivered, addressed as follows:

r-- ..
Connie W. Taylor

I

CLARK and FEENEY
P.O. Drawer 785
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160
Thomas G. Maile, IV.
380 W. State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001

II

(X)
( )
( )
((
))

u. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

,

I

I

I
I

( )
( )
(X)
( )

U. S. Mail
u.

I
II

Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

i

I

I
I

C£::i)~
&;:i)~
CHRIST T.

TRO~

.

Plaintiffs/Counter-Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-

Defendants

AFFIDA
VIT OF CHRIST TROUPIS IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER
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CONNIE W. TAYLOR
CLARK and FEENEY
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1229 Main Street
P. O. Drawer 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208)743-9516
ISB No. 4837

.

,
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•

t ..
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10
11

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COlJNTY OF ADA

REED TAYLOR,DALLANTAYLOR,
and R. JOHN TAYLOR,

12

Plaintiffs,

13

Ys.
VS.

14

15

THOMAS MAlLE, IV and COLLEEN
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY,
and BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC,

16
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

('\I
r\l

DC
OC 04004730

Case~. _ _ _ _ __
Case~.

COMPLAINT
AND DEMAND FOR
JURY TRlAL
TRIAL
Fee Category: A.l.
A.1.
Fee Amount: $77

17

18
COME NOW the Plaintiffs by and through their undersigned counsel of record, Cormie

19
W. Taylor of the Law Offices of Clark and Feeney, and for a cause of action and claim for relief

20
against the Defendants, complain, state, and allege as follows:

21

1. PARTIES
22

23

1.1

Reed and R. John Taylor are residents ofNez
of Nez Perce County, Idaho; Dallan Taylor

is a resident of Ada Coun1y Idaho. All ofthe
of the plaintiffs are residual beneficiaries of the Theodore

24

25
c:6
t:6

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND
FOR JURY TRIAL

-1
-1-

COpy
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L. Johnson Trust. They bring this action on their own behalf and also as assignees of certain other
beneficiaries or residual beneficiaries of said trust.

1
1.2

Thomas Maile, IV (herein after Thomas Maile) is engaged in the practice of law

2
at 380 W. State Street, Eagle, Ada County, Idaho. Defendant Thomas Maile is a licensed real

3

A Thomas Maile Real Estate Company. Thomas Maile and Colleen Maile are
estate broker DIBI
D/B/A

4
of herein were for the benefit ofthe marital community.
husband and wife and a.ll acts complained ofherein

5
They were at all times relevant hereto believed to be residents of Ada County, Idaho.

6
1.3

The Defendant Berkshire Investments, LLC is an Idaho limited liability company

7
which was forn1ed by the Defendant Thomas G. Maile.
8

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

9
2.1

This court has jurisdiction over the person and subject matter of the above-

10
captioned matter by virtue ofthe fact that all ofthe acts and/or omissions complained of occurred

11
within Ada County, Idaho and relate to real property located in Ada County.

12
III. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

13
3.1.

The Defendant Thomas Maile, acting in his capacity as an attorney with offices in

14
Eagle, Idaho, represented Theodore Johnson on a variety of matters for a period ofrnany years.

15
The attorney client relationship continued until Mr. Johnson's death on September 14,2002.

16
After Mr. Johnson's death, the Defendant Thomas Maile continued to act as the attorney for the

17
Theodore L. Johnson Trust and the Theodore L. Johnson Estate.

18

19

3.2. During the course ofthe attorney client relationship, Thomas Maile represented and
advised Mr. Johnson in relation to the potential sale of 40 acres of property near Eagle, Idaho.

20
Mr. Maile advised Mr. Johnson not to accept an offer to purchase the property, then within

21

22
23

approximately two months Thomas and Colleen Maile entered into an earnest money agreement
to purchase the 40 acre.; for the price of $400,000.00.

24

25
L6

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND
FOR JURY TRIAL

-2-2
LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK

AND

FEEN EY
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LEWISTON, IDAHO 83~;Ol
83~;Ol

I·\.
3.3

The Defendants Maile formed a limited liability company, Berkshire Investments,

LLC, and assigned their rights under the eamest money agreement to Berkshire Investments, LLC,

1
which subsequently purchased the property from the Johnson Trust.

2
3

IV. COUNT ONE - BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY, SELF-DEALING
4.1.

By virtue of the attorney client relationship, the Defendant Thomas Maile was

4
required to fully disclose his interest in the transaction, to deal fairly with Theodore Johnson, and

5
to advise Theodore Johnson to consult independent counsel before entering into the transaction.

6
4.2.

J olmson and the Theodore
The Defendant breached his fiduciary duty to Theodore Jolmson

7
J olmson Trust by self dealing which included but is not necessarily limited to:
Jolmson

8
(a) Paying less than the fair market value for the purchase of the property

9
(c) Offering to purchase the property on terms which were unfavorable and inappropriate

10
given Mr. Johnson's advanced age and the fact that he had cancer which was known to be

11
tem1inal

12
(d) Failing to deal fairly with Mr. Johnson

13
(e) Failing to advise Mr. Johnson to consult independent counsel before entering into the

14
transacti on

15
direct and proximate result ofthat breach, the Johnson Trust and beneficiaries
4.3. As a direc1

16
of that trust were dam2.ged in an amount which will be proved at trial, but which exceeds the
17

jurisdiction of the Magistrate Court. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on the basis of that
18
information and belief allege that these damages will be not less than $600,000.

19
20
V.

COUNT T\VO

21

BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY OF REALTOR / BROKER

22
23

5.1.

By virtue of his position as a real estate broker and the relationship between the

parties, the Defendant Thomas Maile had an ethical obligation and a fiduciary duty t8 treat Mr.

24

25

Jolmson honestly.

That duty was breached by the Defendants' purchase of Mr. Johnson's

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND
FOR JURY TRIAL

-3-3
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LEWISTON,

I·
propeliy for an amount which was considerably less than fair market value for the highest and
best use of that property.

1

2
3

5.2.

As a direct and proximate result of said breach, the Jolmson
J olmson Trust and the

beneficiaries of that tmst
trust were damaged in an amount which will be proved at trial but which
exceeds the jurisdiction ofthe magistrate court.

4
5
6
7

8
9
10
11

12

13
14

15

VI. COUNT THREE - NEGLIGENCE
6.1.

Defendant Thomas Maile, in his capacities as an attorney and as a real estate

broker, had a duty to exercise reasonable care, skill, and diligence on Mr. Jolmson's behalf.
6.2.

The Defendant breached that duty, which breach included but is not necessarily

limited to the following acts:
6.2.1. Failure to inform Mr. Johnson ofa conflict of interest;
6.2.2. Failure to advise Mr. Johnson to obtain an appraisal of the real property
for development, its highest and best use, rather than as agricultural property;
6.2.3.

Advising Mr. Johnson to reject an existing offer for the property, then

personally making an offer for purchase which was substantially the same as the prior offer;
6.2.4.

Failure to inform Mr. Jolmson that he should seek independent legal

16
counsel before entering into the transaction with the Defendants;
17

6.2.5.

Failure to advise Mr. Johnson that the $400,000 purchase price was less

18
than the fair market value of the property;

19

20
21

6.2.6. Failure to advise Mr. Johnson to retain the property in the tms::
trus:: until after
his death to avoid taxation of the capital gain.
6.2.7. Failure to comply with the Idaho State Bar Rules ofProfessional
of Professional Conduct

22
and the Code of Ethics ofthe National Association of Realtors.

23
24
25

26

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND
FOR JURY TRIAL
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6.3. As a result of said Defendant's negligence, the plaintiffs, as beneficiaries of the
Johnson Trust were da::naged in an amount which will be proved at trial but which exceeds the

1

jurisdiction of the magistrate court.

2
3

4

VII.
The Defendants should take notice that the Plaintiffs may file a pretrial motion pursuant
to statute to amend the: complaint to include a prayer for punitive damages. The Defendants

5
should conduct their trial preparation accordingly.
6

VIII.

7

ATTORNEY FEES

8
As a direct result of the Defendants' actions, the Plaintiffs have been required to institute
9
and prosecute this action and has incurred costs and attorney fees. The Plaintiffs have employed

10
the law firn1 of Clark and Feeney and have agreed to pay said firm a reasonable

attom~ys fee
attom~ys

and

11
are entitled to be reimbursed for said fees under the statutes and case law of the state ofIdaho,
specifically Idaho Code 12-120(3), 12-121 and 12-123, as well as under the terms of the contract
for purchase of the real property which is at issue in this matter.
The sum of $5,000.00 is a reasonable attorney fee for instituting and prosecuting this

15
action in the event of default and no appearance by Defendants, and no other complications. In

16
the event this matter is contested, a greater sum would be reasonable for such attorney's fees.
17

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for relief and for judgment, order and decree ofthis court

18
against Defendants as follows:

19
1. For compensatory damages for the difference between the $400,000 paid and the fair
20
market value of the property purchased by Defendants;

21
2.

For the disgorgement of any profits derived from the use of said real property;

22
3. For recision of the real property transaction and the return of said real property to the

23
beneficiaries of the Theodore Johnson Trust;

24

25
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND
FOR JURY TRIAL
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4. For the imposition of a constructive trust on the real property pending a resolution of
this matter;

1
2
3

4

5
6
7

8
9

10
11

5.

For an order quieting title to the real propeliy in the name of the Theodore L. Jolmson

Revocable Trust;
6.

and. post judgment interest at the statutory rate until fully paid;
For pre ancj

7.

For all costs of this action;

8.

For attorneys fees incurred by the plaintiffs in prosecuting this action under Idaho

Code 12-120,12-121, 12-123;
9. For attorneys fees under the Earnest Money Offer and Acceptance contract dated July
27,2002;
10.

cther and further
furtber relief as the court deems just and equitable.
For such ether

' '1

DATED this r-J-day
~-day of January, 2004.
CLARK and FEENEY

B

-'-..

BY_~::--:~~----':"'------..L...,-~---::--:~~::---·_------
_
-y--~----~~--~~~----~-=------------rotcConnie W. ylor, a member of1h
Atto
for Plaintiffs.

14

15
16
17

18

19
20
21
22

23
24

25
COMPLAINT AND DEMMW
FOR JURY TRIAL

-6
-6LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK AND FEEN EY
LEWISTON.
LEWISTON, IDAHO 8350!
83501
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DEMAND FOR JURY TRlAL
1

Plaintiffs demand a jury trial of all issues in this cause and state pursuant to Rule 38(b)

2

of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure; that said plaintiffs will not stipulate to a jury ofless than

3

twelve (12) persons in number.

4

DATED this

1~day of January, 2004.
CLARK. and FEENEY

5

6

By_
_--==~..e:...:--~-::..----b-----.---By______
~~--~--~--~--------------JOr-Connie W.
ylor, a member of e firm
Attorn
for Plaintiffs.

7

8
9

10
11

12
'.3

14

15
16
17

18
19
20

21
22

23
24

25
j

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND
FOR JURY TRIAL
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AND
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LEWISTON. IDAHO 8350!
83501
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\f
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Nez Perce

1

2
3

)
)ss.
)

I, Reed 1. Taylor, being first duly swom on oath, deposes and says:
That I am one of the Plaintiffs in the above-entitled action; that I have read the foregoing
Complaint and lmow the contents thereof and believe the same to be true.

4

5
6
7

8
9

Notary Pub /)n ~pd for the State ofI.daho
therein.
Residing at JIJtl h. I (V~.
.
My Commission expires:
r123)/

10

eJk

11

12

:3
14
15
16
17

18

19
20
21

22
23
24

25
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND
FOR JURY TRIAL
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AND
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LEWISTON. IDAHO 83501
LEWISTON,

-'

-
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001715

FEB ~~!~ 3 2004

Samuel A. HoaglaIlld, Esq.
HOAGLAND, DOMThTICK & HICKS
ATTORNEYS AT LAW, PLLC
Shoreline Center, Suite 100
1471 Shoreline Drive
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone (208) 343-9111
Facsimile (208) 386-9944
ISB No.: 2985
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR ADA COUNTY

REED T
AYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR,
TAYLOR,
and R. JOHN TA YLOR,
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,
Plaintiffs/C
ounter-Defendants,

Case No.: Case No. CV OC 04-00473D

versus
THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN MAILE,
husband and wife, THOMAS MAILE REAL
COI\1PANY, and BERKSHIRE
ESTATE CO!\1PANY,
Tiv1ENTS,
INVES Tiv1ENT
S, LLC,

VERIFIED ANSWER and
COUNTER-CLAIM

Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
Defendants/Counter
-Claimants.

The Defendants/Counter-Claimants, THOMAS G. MAILE and COLLEEN MAILE, husband
INVESTlv1ENTS, L.L.c., by and through their attorney, SAMUEL A.
and wife, and BERKSHIRE INVESTiv1ENTS,
HOAGLAND of Hoagland, Dominick & Hicks, Attorneys at Law, PLLC, hereby answer and respond
to the Plaintiffs' Complaint and, as a Counter-Claim against the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, and
aJ]ege as follows
each of them, complain and allege

VERIFIED ANSWER AND COUNTER-CLAIM
Pag'2 I

001716

NON-WAIVER OF MOTIONS FOR CHANGE OF VENUEI MOTION TO DIS]\,IISSI
DIS]VIISSI
MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRA TION ORDERIMOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFFS'
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL FILED CONCURRENTLY HEREWITH
The Defendants have filed concurrently herewith certain Motions, to wit: Motion for Change
of Venue, Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to LR.C.P. Rules 12 & 17, Motion To Compel Arbitration
Order, and Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Demand for Jury Trial. The following pleadings are asserted
herein for purposes of fulflIling
fulfliling the Defendants' obligations to file responsive pleadings to the
Plaintiffs' Complaint, and are not to be construed nor are the pleadings considered a waiver of the
Defendants' Motions filed concurrently herein. The allegations contained in both the Verified Answer
and Counter-Claim are asser1ed without waiving the rights and defenses in the accompanying Motions
nor the Affirmative Defenses set forrh herein. The aforementioned Motions are incorporated by
reference herein as if set forrh in nIl!.
nIlI.

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

The Defendants, by and through their attorney, SAMUEL A. HOAGLAND, in response to
Plaintiffs' Complaint, hereby admit, deny an affirmative allege, as follows:
1.

Defendants' deny each and every allegation of Plaintiffs' Complaint which

IS

not

specifically admitted herein.
2. Defendants' admit the allegations contained in paragraphs 1.2, with the exception that
Defendants' deny the actions complained of were for the benefit of the marital community, and
fuliher admit paragraph 1.3 of Plaintiffs' Complaint.
3. Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 1.1, 2.1, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 4.1,4.2,

43,5.1,5.2,6.1,6.2 (and all sub-paragraphs thereunder), and paragraphs VII & VIII., of Plaintiffs'

Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial.

FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to state a cause of action against Defendants upon which reliefmay
be granted.
VERIFIED ANSWER AND COUNTER-CLAIM
Page 2

001717

SECOND AFFIRlVIATIVE
AFFIRlVIA TIVE DEFENSE
Defendants affirmatively allege that the proper Venue for the current action is Canyon
County, Idaho, based upon Exhibits "A" & Exhibit "B" which are attached hereto and incorporated
herein as if set forth in fijI!.

THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Defendants affirmatively allege that the Plaintiffs have no standing to bring this action and are
not the "Real Parties In Interest" pursuant to Rule 17, of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and the
current Complaint should be summarily dismissed.

FOlTRTH
FOURTH AFFIRlVIATIVE DEFENSE
Defendants affirmatively allege that the claims alleged set forth in the Plaintiffs' Complaint
arise from a certain Earnest Money Agreement to Purchase Real Property, dated July 25, 2002, by
and between Defendants Thomas Maile & Colleen Maile, husband and wife, as buyer, and the
Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, as seller, which is annexed hereto as Exhibit "A" and made a
part hereof as if set forth in full herein. The terms and conditions of said Agreement require the
parties to submit any controversy to binding arbitration, to wit "the parties agree to submit to binding
arbitration in lieu of court proceedings concerning the terms and conditions herein, consistent with the
American Arbitration Association." The current proceedings should be suspended in light of the of
the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and thereafter, if necessary, the parties should be ordered to
binding arbitration consistent with the terms and conditions of the Agreement above referenced.

FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Defendants affirmatively allege that the Plaintiffs are barred from requesting a jury trial as the
same was waived by the parties to the Earnest Money Agreement to Purchase Real Property, dated
July 25, 2002, by and between Defendants Thomas Maile & Colleen Maile, husband and wife, as
buyer, and the Trustee of the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, as seller, which is annexed
hereto as Exhibit "A" and made a part hereof as if set forth in full herein. Thus, the Plaintiffs'

VERlFIED ANSWER AND COUNTER-CLAIM
P,,~e
P"oe
,., 3

001718

Demand for Jury Trial should be stricken.

SLXTH AFFIRlVIATIVE DEFENSE

Defendants affirmatively allege that the Plaintiffs claims are barred due to lack of
consideration as between the Plaintiffs and the Defendants.

SEVENTH A
FFIRM ATIVE DEFENSE
AFFIRMATIVE

Defendants affirmatively allege that the Plaintiffs claims are barred due to lack of contractual
privity with the Defendants as required by law.

EIGTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Defendants affirmatively allege that the Plaintiffs claims are barred based upon the doctrine of
"Latches" to wit: The Plaintiffs were provided all information and facts relating to that certain Eamest
Earnest
Money Agreement to Purchase Real Property, dated July 25, 2002, by and between Defendants
Thomas Maile & Colleen Maile, husband and wife, as buyer, and the Trustee of the Theodore L.
Johnson Revocable Trust, as seller.

In addition the Plaintiffs had knowledge of a subsequent

fJ-om the MaiJes to Berkshire Investments, L.L.c., captioned "Assignment of
assignment of interests fl-om
Earnest Money Agreement to Purchase Real Property," dated August 20, 2002, and specifically
approved to by the Trustee of the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, as seller. Said assignment
is annexed hereto as Exhibit "B" and made a part hereof as if set forth in fuJI
full herein. Thereafter the
Plaintiffs', individually and/or through their attorney Connie Taylor, obtained information that
indicated that Berkshire Investments L.L.c., was undertaking to acquire new construction financing
for the subject real property which would result in paying off the Deed of Trust, payable to the
Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust That Plaintiffs chose not to pursue any litigation until the
Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust was paid in full on or about January 4, 2004 and thereafter in
attempt to seek leverage and "cloud title" to Berkshire Investments' legal ownership to the real
property, filed the present litigation and caused to be filed a Lis Pendens affecting the real property
The Plaintiffs have plead for a res::ission of the contract and imposition ofa constructive trust on the

VERIFIED ANSWER AND COUNTER-CLAIM
Page .t-1

001719

real property. That Plaintiffs actions in delaying the fIling of their Complaint and the Lis Pendens
after the purchase price was paid in full constitutes "Laches."

NINTH AFFllUvIA
AFFIIDvIA TIVE DEFENSE

Defendants affirmatively allege that the Plaintiffs claims are barred based upon the doctrines of
Equitable Estoppel and/or Quasi-Estoppel, based upon the allegations herein set forth.

TENTH AFFIRMA TIVE DEFENSE

Defendants affinnatively allege that the Plaintiffs failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate
their claimed or alleged damages, if any.

ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Defendants affirmatively allege that the Plaintiffs claims are barred based upon the doctrine of
"Unclean Hands" and Plaintiffs herein should forfeit any rights to monies alleged owing

The

allegations relating to the requested rescission of the contract and the restoration of the title to the
alleged
Plaintiffs and/or the Theodore Johnson Revocable Trust constitute "Unclean Hands," any al1eged
damages due and owing to Plaintiffs should be offset by Defendants/Counter-Claimants' damages set
forth hereinafter.

TIVELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Defendants affirmatively allege that the Plaintiffs claims are barred because there is a binding
Release & Reconveyance whereby the Defendants/Counter-Claimants and Trustee of the Theodore
Johnson Revocable Trust released one another from any and all claims and demands, which is binding
Plaintiffs.
upon the Plaintiffs

THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Defendants affirmatively all ege that the Plaintiffs claims are barred because there is an Accord
and Satisfaction by and between the Defendants and the Trustee of the Theodore Johnson Revocable,

ANI> COUNTER-CLAIM
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which is binding upon the Plaintiffs.

REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES

As a result of the filing of
Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants have been required to retain legal
ofPlaintiffs'
counsel to defend said action, and are entitled to recover attorneys fees and costs by reason of the
provisions contained in Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 12-121, and 12-123 and Rule 11 of the Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure. Also, Defendants are entitled to recover attorneys fees and costs by reasons of
the provisions contained in Exhibits "A" and "B" and Idaho Code § 45-600, et. seq. The sum of
$7,500.00 is a reasonable amount for attorneys fees if this matter is uncontested and a greater
reasonable fee is warranted if contested.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, rhese answering Defendants pray that Plaintiffs' Complaint be dismissed with
prejudice, that Plaintiffs take nothing hereby, that Defendants be awarded their costs and attorney's
fees incurred, and for such other and further relief as the Coun
Court deems just and equitable in the
premIses.

COUNTER-CLAIM

The Defendants, THOMAS G. MAILE and COLLEEN MAILE, husband and wife, and
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, L.L.c. (hereinafter referred to as "Counter-Claimants"), by and
A. HOAGLAND of Hoagland, Dominick & Hicks, Attomeys
through their attorney, SAMUEL A
Attorneys at

Law, PLLC, without waiving their right/or the Court to consider the Motionsfiled concurrently
herewith, and as and for a Counter-Claim against Counter-Defendants, and each of them, complains

and alleges as follows:
All allegations offactual matters of the Answer are included herein as additional facts support

fonh.
for the all egations herein set forth.

VERIFIED ANSWER A;'\fD COUNTER-CLAIM
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COUNT ONE
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT

I.
].

Counter-Claimants fe-allege the allegations contained in all of the

paragra:~hs

of above

referenced Verified Answer herein.

2.

Counter-Claimants, Thomas Maile and Colleen Maile, and Berkshire Investments, LLC.,

and Theodore Johnson, as Trustee of the Theodore Johnson Revocable Trust, entered into a certain
real estate contract, and subsequent assignment wherein the Counter-Claimants were to receive
certain real property and Theodore Johnson Revocable Trust, was to receive payment from the sale of
the subject property.

:3.

At all relevant times herein, the Trustee of
the Theodore Johnson Revocable Trust knew that
ofthe

of establishing a home
homethe Counter
-Claimants intended to purchase the real pro perty for the purposes ofestablishing
Counter-Claimants
site for Thomas Maile and Colleen Maile, and the children of the Mailes, and further knew that to do
so, would require that the subject real property be developed consistent with Ada County zoning law
and other regulatory rules and laws for the creation of a subdivision. That all such facts were known
to the Tnlstee prior to closing the real estate transaction.

4.

Counter-Defendants, individually, and/or through their attorney undertook a course of
The Counter-Defendants.

action to interfere with and an attempt to cause a breach ofcontract
of contract between the Counter-Claimants
and the Theodore Johnson Revocable Trust relating to the subject property and/or attempt to cause a
breach ofcontract between the Counter-Claimants and Counter-Claimants' new lending institution.

5.

The Counter-Defendants.
Counter-Defendants, individually, and/or through their attorney, were informed that the

w::)Uld pay the
Counter-Claimants would be re-financing the loans on the subject real property and w.::)Uld
balance of the Deed of TnJst due and owing to the Theodore Johnson Revocable Trust The
Counter-Claimants informed the Trustee of the Theodore Johnson Revocable Trust, that the Counter-

VERIFIED ANSWER AND COUNTER-CLAIM
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Claimants would be re-financing, unless the Theodore Johnson Revocable Trust would like to
maintain the loan and release lots in the seven (7) lot subdivision as sales developed. That in orderto
do so, the Counter-Defendants knew or with reasonable diligence should have known, that the
Counter-Claimants would enter into a commercial loan with another lender, for the purposes of
fulfilling the Counter-Claimants' obligation with the Theodore Johnson Revocable Tf1lst and woulrj
be acquiring a new commercial loan to continue to develop a subdivision on the subject real property.

6.

The Counter-Cla.imants incurred expenses and costs associated with securing financing on the

subject real property to pay off
the obligation to the Theodore Johnson Revocable Trust, on or about
offthe
January 4, 2004.

The loan requires Counter-Claimants to avoid the placement of any liens or

encumbrances on the subject real property to convey clear title to potential purchasers, and as a result
of the filing of the Complaint and the Lis Pendens, the Counter-Claimants are unable to proceed with

}

.

the improvement of the subject property and will default under the terms and conditions ofthe current
real estate commercial loan.

7.

The Counter-Defendants, individually, and/or through their agent, and acting in concert and

of action in the filing of
conspiring with each other, maliciously and intentionally undertook a course ofaction
the Complaint and the "Lis Pendens" that was calculated and determined to adversely affect the
Counterinterests of the Counter-Claimants and to tortiously interfere with the contract between the Counter
Claimants and the new commercial lender, and/or the contract between Counter-Claimants and the
Theodore Johnson Revocable Trust.

8.

The action and the wrongful conduct on the part of the Counter-Defendants' and/or the

Counter-Defendants agent demonstrates an intentional course of action to seek to increase profits
1

and/or income to the Counter-Defendants' individually and/or to obtain the real property at a
foreclosure sale based upon wrongful motives and design, including but not limited to the following:
a. wrongfully pursuing a course of conduct between the beneficiaries and/or the
residual beneficiaries of the Theodore Johnson Revocable Trust, to cause the

VERIFIED ANSWER AND COUNTER-CLAIM
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_.
filing of the present action and filing of the "Lis Pendens;"
b. Undertaking a course of action to cause a breach by the Counter-Claimants
with the commercial lender on the subject real property, for personal gain and/or
benefit of the individual Counter-Defendants;
c. wrongfully conspiring to circumvent the Counter-Claimants'
Counter -Claimants' rights to future
profits and share in the future gains associated with the real property in which
Theodore Johnson Revocable Trust previously had an interest;
d. using their position as residual beneficiaries and/or assignees of other
beneficiaries of the Theodore Johnson Revocable Trust to promote self dealing
and profiting at the expense of the Counter-Claimants.

9.

The acts of the Counter-Defendants, having devised such scheme, motive or artifice to cause a

default and foreclosure of the contract between the Counter-Claimants and the new commercial
lender and/or the

interfi~rence
interfi~rence

of the contract between the Counter-Claimants and the Theodore

Johnson Revocable Trust, which would cause irreparable damage to the Counterclaimants and unjust
enrichment to the Counter-Defendants, to wit: In addition to having caused the Counter-Claimants to
lose their equity in the subject property, the Counter-Claimants will be damaged with other costs and
fees associated with the development of the real property and the ultimate profits from the sale of
subject real property, while the Counter-Defendants seek to unjustly benefit from the Counter
CounterClaimants' labor and efforts.

10.

That Counter-Claimants, as a sole, direct and proximate result of the action above alleged,

sustained damages and will sustain damages in the following manner:
a. The expected loss of the subject real property in which Counter-Claimants are
obligated to pay the new commercial lender for
tor and/or preventing the Counter
CounterClaimants from continued marketing of the property which has now been cloJded
by the Counter-Defendants' action; the Counter-Claimants' loss of equity in the
real property thereon;

VERIFIED ANSWER AND COUNTER-CLAIM
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b. The Counter-Claimants' loss of 0ppoI1unity
oppoI1unity to obtain revenues and profits
associated with the real property and loss income,
c. The Counter-Claimants' expenses incurred and/or paid to date for
engineering, architectural fees, fees and costs associated with vanous
governmental agencies, professional services, materials purchased for the
construction to date on the property, labor paid to date on the subject real

property, assessment fees, taxes, cost of interest paid to the Theodore Johnson
Revocable Trust and other institutions and entities; the cost of appraisals, title
reports, closing fees, attorneys fees etc.
d. The Counter-Claimants loss of the opportunity to retain portions of the
subject to allow the Counter-Claimant Mailes and theMailes.children to build
their homes on the subject property and to the enjoy the peace and enjoyment of
the subject real property;
e. The Counter-Claimants' incurring costs and attorneys fees to defend against
the Complaint and the Lis Pendens filed by the Counter-Defendants and the costs

and attorney fees to quiet title to the subject real property;
f

Counter-·Claimants' loss of income and/or profits associated with the time
The Counter-Claimants'

taken for the development of the property and the loss of opportunity to obtain

revenues and profits associated with the real property.

11.

As a result of the aforementioned, Counter-Claimants have sustained such losses and have

of the District Court, together
been damaged in a princi:Jal sum which exceeds the jurisdictional limits ofthe
with interest at the rate of twelve (12) percent per annum from the date of loss to the date of

Judgment, as set forth herein.

12.

Counter-Claimarts have been forced to retain the professional services of Samuel Hoagland,

to prosecute this claim and are entitled to reasonable costs and attorneys fees incurred pursuant to
12Exhibits "A" & "8" annexed hereto and pursuant to Idaho Code, Sections 12-120 and 12-121, 12

VERIFIED ANSWER AND COUNTER-CLAIM
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123, Rule 11 of
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. That the sum of$7,500. 00 is a reasonable sum if
ofthe
this matter is uncontested, and a greater sum if contested.

COUNT TWO
TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE OF PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC:
ADVANTAGE AND/OR OPPORTUNITY
1.

The Counter-Claimants re··allege the allegations of all the Paragraphs, of Count One as if set

forth in filII herein.

2.

The Counter-Defendants set upon a course of conduct and intentionally
intentionaJJy interfered with a

prospective economic advantage of the Counter-Claimants to secure profits and income relating to
the real estate contract between the Counter-Claimants and the Theodore Johnson Revocable Trust
and/or the Counter-Claimants and the new commercial lender of the subject real property
property.

3.

The Counter-Defendants maliciously, deliberately and intentionally interfered with the

Counter-Claimants' rights set forth in paragraph 2 herein.

4

The Counter-Defendants knew of the existence of the Defendants/Counter-Claimants'

economic expectancy related to the development of the subdivision of the subject rea: property.
property

5.

The conduct on the part of the Counter-Defendants is intentionally interfering and inducing

termination of the Counter-Claimants' prospective economic advantage and/or opportunity ..

6.

The Counter-Defendants are interfering for an improper purpose and/or for improper means.

7.

That Counter-Claimants have sustained damages and will continue to sustain damages due to

the Counter-Defendants' intentional interference with the Counter-Claimants prospec(ve economic
forth.
advantage and/or opportunity as herein set forth

VERTIFIED ANSWER AND COUNTER-CLAIM
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COUNT THREE
SLANDER OF TITLE
1.

The Counter-Claimants re-allege the allegations of all the Paragraphs 0 f Count Two herein as

if set forth in full herein.

2.

The Counter-Defendants caused a "Lis Pendens" against the subject real property to be

recorded and published in the Ada County Recorder's Office based upon allegations which are false
and frivolous and in violation of Counter-Claimants' rights.

J.

The Counter-Defendants recorded the "Lis Pendens" with malice and/or reckless disregard for

the truth, which Counter-Defendants knew or should have known with reasonable diligence that such
statements were false and frivolous, because attached hereto as Exhibit "C" is a true and correct copy

of a certain letter transmitted from the Theodore Johnson Revocable Trust, by Beth Rogers, trustee,
ofa
instructing the agent for the Counter-Defendants that the trust was carrying out the wishes of the
trustor in selling the subject real property to the Counter-Claimants, that there was no merit to the
claims of the Counter-Defendants, and the Trustee did not desire to pursue any c1airr:s
clairr:s against the
Counter-Claimants. Said letter is incorporated by reference herein as if set forth in fuJI
full herein.

4.

The Defendants/Counter-Claimants have been damaged as herein set forth.

COUNT FOUR
WRONGFUL CLOUD ON TITLE
PRELIMD'lARY INJUNCTION - QUIET TITLE
1.

The Counter-Claimant BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS L.L.c., re-alleges the allegations ofall
ofal!

the Paragraphs of Count Three herein as if set forth in full herein.

'7

The actions of the Counter-Defendants in filing the Complaint and the recording of the "Lis

VEHIFIED ANSWER AND COllNTER-CLAIM
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Pendens" amount to a wrongful "cloud on the title" on the title held by Berkshire Investments LLC

3.

anel recording of the "Lis Pendens," the Counter
CounterBy virtue of the tiling of the Complaint and

Defendants have alleged that the property is subject to litigation and/or the potential ofre-classifying
Counter
the legal title holder to the real property is in litigation. By virtue of the same, the CounterDefendants claim an interest in and to the subject property, and that any right, title, claim or interest
of Counter-Claimants and/or potential subsequent purchasers (or any other interested party or person
claiming and interest in and/or to the subject property), may be junior and/or subservient to the
interests of Counter-Defendants in the subject property.

4.

The Counter-Claimants have no adequate remedy at law.

5.

The Court should enter a Preliminary Injunction to strike the "Lis Pendens" and enjoining the

Counter-Defendants from filing another or defining the legitimate rights and interests ofthe
of the Counter
CounterClaimants and/or the Counter-Defendants in the subject property and establishing that Counter
CounterDefendants, and each of them, have no interest in the property

6.

The Court should enter a declaratory judgment affirming and quieting the title to the subject

real property to Counter-Claimant Berkshire Investments L.L.c., establishing its' title and ownership,
and enter an Order that Counter-Defendants, and each of them, have no right, title or interest in said
real property.

COUNT FIVE
CIVIL CONSPIRACY

1.

The Counter-Claimants re-allege the allegations of all the Paragraphs
Paragrap hs of Count Four herein as

if set forth in full herein

7

The Trustee of the Theodore 10hnson
Johnson Revocable Trust denounced the attempts by the

Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants to pursue the current action, as shown in Exhibit
VEIUFIED ANSWER AND COUNTER-CLAIM
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3.

The Counter-Defendants and not the Real Parties in Interest," and lack standing to pursue the

remedies which they allege are available.

4.

The Counter-Defendants' wrongful conduct in opposition to the wished of the Trustee

demonstrate an improper purpose and unjust proceeding.

5.

The actions of the Counter-Defendants constitute a civil corispiracy against the
t he rights and

of tile
interests of the Counter-Claimants, which demonstrate that an agreement between two or more ofthe
Counter-Defendants, and/or the Counter-Defendants' agent and/or assignors, etisted to accomplish
an unlawful objective and/or an attempt to accomplish a lawful objective in an unlawful manner.

6.

The Counter-Claimants have incurred damages, as previously alleged, as a result of the civil

conspiracy and concerted action of the Counter-Defendants, and each of them, and their agents and
assignors, resulting in joint and several liability of each Counter-Defendant, their agents and assignors,
for the whole of the damages caused.

COUNT SLX

BREACH OF CONTRACT
1.

The Counter-Claimants re-allege the allegations of all the Paragraphs of Count Five herein as

if set forth in full herein.

2.

The conduct of Counter-Detendants above-alleged constitutes a breach of contract as to the

terms and conditions contained in Exhibits "A" and "B."

3.

Counter-Defendants
Counter
-Defendants breached the terms of the contracts and have failed to allow the terms and

conditions of the contracts to be final as agreed and/or implied in law and the such conduct
constitutes a breach of contract.

VERIFIED ANSWER AND COUNTER-CLAIM
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COUNT SEVEN
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL

1.

The Counter-Claimants re-allege the allegations of all the Paragraphs of Count Six herein as ifset

forth in fi.!11
fi.I11 herein.

2.

The conduct of Counter-Defendants was a course of conduct to induce Counter··Claimants to

enter into a contractual relationship with a new commercial lender to pay otfthe amour.t owed to the
Trust, which the Counter-Claimants have now done.

3.

Counter-Defendants should be equitably estopped from asserting rights inconsistent therewith

and for not allowing the title to the real property to remain in the legal holder, Berkshire Investments

L.L.c.
COUNT EIGHT
QUASI ESTOPPEL
I.
1.

The Counter
-Claimants re-allege the allegations ofall
of all the Paragraphs of Count Seven herein as if
Counter-Claimants

set forth in full herein.

2

The Counter-Defendants have engaged in a course of conduct that is inconsistent with the

intention of the Counter··Claimants
Counter··C1aimants and the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust.

3.

In entering into the contractual relationship with the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust

and/or entering into a contractual relationship with a new commercial lender, the Counter-Claimants
relied to their detemlent upon such assurances of
the sanctity ofthe
of the contractual terms and conditions,
ofthe
and the Counter-Defendants should be estopped from asserting rights inconsistent therewith.

COUNT NINE
BREACH OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING

VERTIFfED ANSWER AND COUNTER-CLAIM
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1.

The Counter-Claimants re-allege the allegations of all the Paragraphs of Count Eight herein as if

set forth in full herein.

2.

Counler-Defl~ndants, above-referenced constitute a breach of the covenant of
The conduct of Counler-Defl~ndants,

good faith and fair dealing which is implied, as a matter oflaw, in every contract.

RESERVATION TO AMEND PLEADINGS
0 f COUli will be
That by reason of the acts complained herein of Counter-Claimants, leave of

requested pursuant to Idaho Code section 6-1604, for the Court's ruling on the a:leged issue of
afildavits, depositions, etc., filed of record or as
exemplary/punitive damages in light of the pleadings, affIdavits,
may hereinafter be provided to the Court.

PRA YER ]FOR
lFOR RELIEF ON COVNTERCLATlVIS

WHEREFORE. Counter-Claimants pray for Judgment against the Counter-Defendants, and

foJ[ows:
each of them, as follows:

1.

of tile jurisdictional amount of the District Court for items of damages set
For damages in excess oftile

forth above, together with twelve (12) percent interest from the date of loss to the date of Judgment,
and thereafter at a highest legal ra1 e until paid in full, or such additional sums as may later be proved,
and leave of Court is requested to amend said Complaint as soon as the same becomes known to
Counter
-Claimants.
Counter-Claimants.

2.

That a Declaratory Judgment be entered by this Court quieting the title as to the legitimate rights

and interests of Counter-Claimant Berkshire Investments LLC
LLC. in the subject property and that
Counter-Defendants, and each of them, have no interest in said real property.

3

'5
For an Interim Order and/or c. Preliminary Injunction affirming Berkshire Investments LLC 's

VJEHllFIED ANSWER AND COUNTER-CLAIM
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title and ownership of the above-referenced real property and affirming that Counter-Defendants. and
eJch of them, have no interest in said real property.

4.

For Counter-Claimants' reasonable attorneys fees in the amount of $7,500.00 jf this matter is

uncontested, pursuant '~o I.C §§ 12-120,
12-] 20, 12-121,
]2-121, 12-123, I.RCP. Rule 11, and further pursuant to
Exhibits "A" and "B" attached hereto, and a further amount as may be awarded by the Court if this
matter is contested, together with such costs as may be awarded by the Court pursuant to Rule 54( e)
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

5.

For such other and further reliefin law or equity that the Court may deemjust and proper under
/

the circumstances.
clrcumstances.

/

/

!
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SAMUEL... OA'GLAND
SAMUEL·
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'--Attorney for Defendants/Co'unter-Claimants
--".'.
--"'-

\

VERIFICA TION

STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss:
County of Ada
)
THOMAS MAILE AND COLLEEN MAILE, husband and wife, being first duly sworn upon
oath, depose and state that they are the Defendants/Counter-Claimants in the above-entitled action,
they have read the foregoing AN'SWER AND COUNTER-CLAIM, know the contents thereof, and
belief
believe the same to be true and correct to the best of their knowledge and belief.
DATED This ~~ day of FebruarY, 2004.

THOMAS MAILE

VERIFIED ANSWEH
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/

COLLEEN MAILE
;'
S~~_CRlBED
S~~_CRlBED

/

Al'W SWORN TO BEFORE IvlE, a Notary/Public in and for said State,

----Z2)<'9~-?~,Fe-bCUary, 2004.
this --'Z2)<'9~-?~,Fe_bcuary,
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Residing at Boise, Idaho,,
My Commission Expires:',04115/05
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VERIFICA TION
VERIFICATION
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss:
)

BERKSHIRE I1'fVESTIvlENTS,
I1'[VESTIvlENTS, LLC., an Idaho limited liability company, by and through
it's manager, THOMAS MAlLE, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states that it is one of
the Defendants/Counter-Claimants in the above-entitled action, that the undersigned as manager has
Al'-JSWER AND COUNTER-CLAIM, knows the contents thereof and believes
read the foregoing Al\JSWER
the same to be true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.

/
rlatary Public in and for said State,
Sl)BSCBJBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE .ME, a Jotary
thjs~~aY of February, 2004,
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Notar]
Notar)j Public for Idaho
--.Restai~Q at Boise Idaho
--.---.Restai~Q

\

-~----.
-~------

- -..

,,-'
--.'

,

My Commission Expires:

/,1

/

/'

4-/" (/, (: ",
;;'

VIERIHED ANSWER AND COUNTER-CLAIM
r<l~<;'
r<J~<;'

IS

001733

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2/-~/JJ-'-dayof
T served the foregoing
.2/-~/JJ-·-dayof February, 2004, T
ANSWER AND COUNTER-CLAIM by having a true and complete copy personally delivered or by
facsimile and/or by depositing the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid thereon, and
addressed to:

Mr. Jonathan David Hally, Esq
Ms. Connie W. Taylor, ESt]
CLARK AND FEENEY
1229 Main Street
Post Office Drawer 285
Lewiston, Idaho 8350]

.---------.---------
-----.
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EARNEST l\IONEY AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE REAL Pl\OPEHTY
AGREElv[ENT TO PURCHASE REAL PROPERTY ("Agreement") is made as cf
THIS AGREElvlENT
c:f
this

day of July, 2002, by and between by and between Thomas G. Maile IV & CoJ/een
Colleen Maile,

husband and wife, and/or t11eir assigns hereinafter referred to as ("Buyer") and Theodore L.
JollJ1sol1
1260 I West Hope Road, Star, IdallJ,
Jolll1son Revocable Trust, whose office address is 12601
hereinafter referred
referrcd to as ("Seller");
I.

Consideration: In consideration of the acceptance of this Agreement,

Buyer shall deposit the sum of£2,500.00 with designated escrow agent in said agent's trust
account, all in accordance with the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth.
2.

Terms & Conditions: The property located in Ada County, Idaho

generally
gcnerally described as a 40 Jcre parcel located immediJtely east of Linder ROJd, Eagle, Idaho and
fUl1her described in
approximately
Jpproximately 1/4 mile north of Beacon Light ROad, Eagle, Idaho, and as funher
Exhibit "A" annexed hereto and incorporated by reference herein as ifset forth in fulj
full herein.
(A) Seller shall assign and transfer any and all mineral, and water rights relative to the
above described property and covenants to execute any and all documents necessary to effectuate
sai d transfer.
2.

Purchase Price. The sum

0

f£400,000.00 subject to the terms and conditions set

forth in the attached Exhibit "A", which is annexed hereto and made a part hereof as if set forth in
full herein.
3.

Convevim! Documents. Title and Title Insurance.

(a)

The

Pro~erty

shall be conveyed by a General Warranty Deed in a form reasonably
reasonabl),

acceptable to Buyer subject only to those certain exceptions, easements, and restrictions approved

001735
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by Buyer prior to closing.
(b)

The Seller shall pay for title insurance policy il1
in the amount of the sell ir g price

showing mar:(etable title
tile current
cllrrent
titlc in Seller's Dame. That immediately upon the execution of the
Ag:"eement,
repoli, naming the Buyers as
Ag:-eement, Seller shall direct title insurer to issue a preliminary title repori,
the prospective insured, showing the purchase price as the policy amount.
4.

Closim! Date & Possession Date. see Exhibit "A"for terms and conditions_
conditions.

Possession will be granted to Buyer upon closing of real property_
property.
5.

Occupancy and Leases. See Exhibit "A"for terms and conditions.

6.

Time of Essence. Time is of the essence of this Agreement. Any
AllY reference

he~ein

to time periods of less than six (6) days shall ill
in the computation thereof exclude Saturdays,
Sundays and legal hoi idays, and any time period provided for herein \'.'hich
\vhich shall end on a
Saturday, Sunday or legal hol:day shall extend to 5:00 p.m. on the next full business day.
7.

Documents for Closing. Seller shall provide marketable title at closing.

8.

Anornev
A
norney Fees and Costs. All matters pertaining to this Agreement (including its

interpretation, application, validity, performance and breach), shall be governed by, construed and
enforced in accordance with the laws of the State of/daho. The parties herein waive trial by jury
and agree to submit to the

~JersonaJ
~Jersonal

jurisdiction and venue of a court of subject maner
matter jurisdiction

located in Canyon County, State of Idaho. In the event that litigation results from or arises out of
this Agreement or the performance thereof, the non prevailing party shall reimburse the prevailing
party's reasonable attorney's fees, court costs, and all other expenses, whether or not taxable by the
court as costs, in addition to any other relief to \vhich the prevailing party may be entitled,
including at1orney's fees and costs associated with any appeal. In such event, no action shall be
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entertoilled by SJid
morc tlun one
Olle )'cJr
soid court or any
311y COLnt of competent jurisdiction if filed Jl10rc
),cJr
bseq Lie nt to the date
dote the cJLlse(s)
cJLlse( s) of 3cti on 3et
3Ct uall
u311 y accrued re g3rd Jess 00 f whether dall1ages
d:11ll3ges we I"e
su bseqLie
otherwise as of said time calculable. The parties agree to submit to binding arbitration in lieu of
cOllsistent with the Arrerican
Arrerical1
court proceedings concerning the terms and conditions herein, consistent
Arbitration Associatioll.
Association.
9.

Def3ult. If Buyer fails to perform this Agreement \vithin the time specified, the

p3id by the Buyer aforesaid may be retained by or for the 3ccount of Seller as liquidated
deposits paid
damages (subject to Buyer's due diligence provisions), consideration for the execution of this
set1lement of any claims; whereupon all parties shall
sh311 be relieved of
of311
all
Agreement and in full sct1lement
oblig3tions
"A".
obligations under this .Agreement, subject to the conditions set forth in Exhibit "A",
If, for any reason
re3SOil other than failure of Seller to render his title marketable
m3rketable after diligent
eflOl1, Seller fails, neglects or refuses to perlorm
perform this Agreemcnt, the Buyer may seck specific
effori,
lor
performance or elect to receive the return of their deposits without thereby waiving any action for
perlormance
damages resulting from
frorn Seller's breach.
J0
10

Convevance. Seller shall convey title to the property by statutory warranty deed

subject only to mat1ers contained in Paragraph 3 hereof and those otherwise 3ccepled
3ccepted by Buyer.
Personal property shall, at the request of the Buyer, be conveyed by an absolute bil]
bill of sale with
warranty of title, subject to such liens as may be otherwise provided for herein.
J 1.
II.

Other Af!reements.
AQ'reements. No prior agreements or representations shall be binding upon

any of the parties
panies hereto

t.:~nless
l~nless

incorporated in this Agreement. No modifications or changes in

this Agreement shall be valid or binding upon the panies
parties hereto unless in writing, executed by the
panies
parties to be bound thereby.
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12.

Binding AoreemEnt.
Zlgrccmel1t:;h::111 be bindillg
billdillg
A o reel1lEnt. The pJrtiEs hereto agree thJt this Zlgrccmel1t:;h::lil

upon tll(~ parties, their
thetr heirs, devisees, assignees, transferees, etc.
The parties ackno\Vledge
d/b/a) Thomas Maile Real Est::te
Est~te Company,
Compal1)" is
acknowledge that Thomas Maile d/b/aJ
a licensed Real Estate Broker and is representing himselfand
hilllselfand Colleen Birch Maile, husband and
wife, and/or their assigns in this transaction, (hereinafter referred to col!ectively
collectively as Buyer).
Dated this'-:7
/~da)20f July, 2002
this ~7/~d1y20f
/;-/;---

.

THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUST, by:

, c.:=zi2r->-'2cr:;:p
C.:7QI->~ :l ~i
's-;C'GL~
c;I)jp
's-;C'GL~

THEODORE L. JOHNSO~,
JOHNSO~, Trustee, SELtER

<2 l.-..
Dated this __
day of July, 2002
1/
__

// ~"--:=J
..... ----:J
/ //

cS
L

/;J

~v('-:v~k~
~v('-:v~k~

BUYER

~

Dated this ~_ day of July, 2002.
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ADDENDUM TO REAL ESTATE AGREENIENT
BETWEEN THOMAS & COllEEN
COLLEEN MAllE AND JOHNSON REVOCABl E TRUST

Undersigned parties agree to the additional terms to the above referenced and attached
Ernest Money Agreement as follows:
ldallo
(1) The parties acknowledge that the real property located in Ada County, Idallo
generally described as a 40 acre parcel located immediately east of Linder F~oad, Eagle,
Idaho and approximately 1/4 mile north of Beacon Light Road, Eagle, Idaho with a legal
description of "Northwest 1/4 of the Southwest 1/4, Section 36, Township 5 North, Range
1 VVest,
West, Boise, Meridian, Ada County, Idaho.
(2). The parti,~s
parti,~s shall equally pay all the expenses of closing costs and escrow,
however, Seller shall pay for the CCJst of title insurance.
(3) The parties acknowledge that the property is subject to a currer,t year crop
lease and the Seller warrants that no other lease or agreements affect the real property,
past the current crop ~(ear(V;lrl(1,'"Z-D0::S}';)
!J7,,'
f.£[}c(. Q'\./
df\./ .--h-,J
Jr-,J
~(ear(V;lrlC!\"?-D03}~) ["v !Jh"
j.£[}c(.
I((-SV~..,.,
':A
I((-SV~..,., 7:0.1.:2)
7:OJ.:v r
{rv
~

rv

(r
Zr/2,

$400,000,00 will be paid as foIl00s:'
(4) The purchase price of $400,000.00
foll00s:'

.

(a) Buyer to provide immediate earnest money payment of $2,500.00; at
closing Buyer to provide the sum of S97,500.00, as additional down-payment.
(b) As to the balance of the purchase price, to wit: $300,000.00, Eluyer shall
be obligated to Seller for said principal outstanding balance, together with 7% percent
interest per annum thereon from the date of closing until paid in full, amortized over fifteen
(15) years. Buyer shall ,~e obligated to Seller for a minimum payment of $32,357.00 (which
principal1 and interest), payable each year from the anniversary date of
would include principa.
closing, and each year thereafter, until the 5th anniversary of the closing date, at which the
full remaining principal and interest shall be paid in full, subject to the following terms and
conditions. VVith each payment, the parties acknowledge interest to be paid first and the
balance to be applied to principal. Buyer is entitled to pay the entire balance or such
additional sums at any time without pre-payment penalty.
(c) Buyer and Seller acknowledge that payment from the Buyer to Seller for
purer-,ase price of the property shall be secured by Buyer executing a
the balance of the purcr-,ase
standard Deed of Trust, incorporating the terms herein, to be placed if! escrow at Alliance
Title, of Boise, Idaho, with both parties sharing evenly in the cost of the escrow charges.
Seller agrees to the assignment of interests in the real property by Buyer (legal entity
established by Buyer) before or after closing and further to the assjgnmen'~
assignmen'~ of the
obligation under the Buyer above referenced, conditioned upon Seller's written approval,

001739
"A"oj
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE EXHIBIT ''A"-1
TA'H\lII~D::R\E:ARr'H:ST.CI_
G\WPJA TA'H\lII~D::R\E:ARI'H:ST.CI_
1

which approval shal' not be unreasonably withheld. A true and correct cop)' of the Deed
of Trust form is annexed hereto as Exhibit "A-2" and incorporated by referel-Ice hereili as
if set forth in full herein.
(d) The Buyer agrees that the failure to abide by above performance requirements
shall constitute a de:'ault, entitling the Seller to foreclosure.
(4) The Parties acknowledge that this agreement, together with Buyer's obligations
are conditioned upon Buyer undertaking "due diligence" review within the next thirty (30)
days after the Buyer receives Seller's preliminary title report, prepared by Alliance Title,
for purposes of determining the financial feasibility of the project, including but not limited
to research involving development costs, engineering, water feasibility, water rights with
the Department of Water Resources, electrical costs, road costs, developmerlt costs, site
review, all governmental entities approval and issuance of all necessary permits to allow
the Buyer's development, by any governmental agencies, including but limited to the City
of Eagle, Ada County Highway District, and County of Ada approving Buyer's proposed
development, and the potential of granting to Buyer all necessary perr:lits for the
commencement of said project. The contract is also contingent upon i:he Buyer's
rest(ction which
verification that the proP2rty is not subject to any other encumbrances or restfction
would prohibit the Buyers plans, etc.
The contract is also contingent upon the Buyer's verification that the property is not
in any designated wetlands, nood
way, etc. In addition after the
fiood plain and/or flood way.
execution of this real estate purchase agreement the Buyer shall be afforded the right to
have certain tests periormed with the aid of construction equipment to determine the
existence of bedrock and/or determination of sewer depths, ground water, and/or irrigation
requirements, which may impair the construction of certain improvements.
Said testing and "due diligence" shall be performed within thirty (30) days after the
receipt of the preliminary title report and if determined that any impairment exists will
impair Buyer's development,
development. buyer in buyer's sole discretion, shall have the right to cancel
this agreement and the parties agree to the return of the earnest money deposited to the
Buyer, with each party bearing their own costs and fees.
Buyers' testing for the existence of groundwater or bedrock that may impair
construction, described herein, shall be accomplished in such manner as to cause the
least practicable amount of disruption of the surface of the land, and all holes shall be
renlled
remled and leveled at E\uyers' expense promptly upon completion of the testing. All entry
upon the lands of Sellers by Buyers or Buyers' agents and contractors for such purposes,
and all testing activities, shall be done solely'at
solely' at the risk of Buyers and Sellers shall have
carryin~~ on such
no duty to warn of possible dangers or to make the premises safe for carryin~~
testing activities. Buyers shall be solely liable for payment of all claims for worker's
compensation made by parties who enter upon the lands of the Sellers in connection with
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sLich
such testing and/or surveying activities.
Said testing and "due diligence" shall be performed within thiliy (30) days after the
receipt of the preliminary title report and if determined that any impairment exists Will
impair Buyer's develDpment, buyer in buyer's sole discretion, shall have the right to carleel
this agreement and the parties agree to the return of the earnest money deposited to the
Buyer, with each paliy bearing their own costs and fees.

(5)
Buyer covenants to utilize Buyer's best efforts to seek all governmental
approval on the subject property by all governmental agencies. Buyer to be solely
responsible for all costs associated with governmental approval of said development and
will not incur any exr:;ense in vvhich seller shall be responsible.
(6) Closing and possession shall occur on or before September 15, 2002. The
Buyer sha.11
shall be obligated for insurance and real estate taxes pro-rated after closing and all
such insurance payments, taxes, water assessments, etc, thereafter.

(8) The currerlt offer to purchase shall expire if not accepted by 5:00 :J'clock pm.
on July 25, 2002.
(9) The Buyer has the right to waive any of the above conditions and cl:Jse the real
property under the terms above referenced, regardless of any grant or denial of the
proposed zoning changes by the governmental authmities.
authOl"ities.
(10) The parties Ilereto
[Iereto agree that this agreement shall be binding upon the parties,
their heirs, devisees, assignees, transferees, etc.
(11) The panies
pariies acknowledge that Thomas Maile d/b/a/ Thomas Maile F\eal Estate
is a licensed Real Estate Broker and is representing himself and his wife.
The parties agree that a!l
all terms contained in the purchase agreement above
referenced are incorporated by reference herein as if set forth in fuJI herein.
Dated this

~=- day of July, 2002,
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUST, by:

~(L~ i/kJ~

tHEODORE L. JOHr;JSON, Trustee, SELLER
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Dated this

~Z:2---

day of July, 2002

Dated this _____ day of July, 2002.
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DEED OF TRUST
THIS DEED OF TRUST, made and entered into this _ _ day ofS,~ptember,
ofS,~ptel11ber, 2002, by and
between THOMAS G. MAILE, IV and COLLEEN MAILE, husb,:md a.nd
a.l1d wife, ClndJcr
Cind/er their assigns,
whose address is 885 Rush Lane, Eagle, Idaho, hereinafter called "Grantor", and Alliance Title
Tille of
Id3.ho, hercin3fter called "Trustee", and Theodore L. JolU1son
Jolmson Revoc3ble
Revocable Trust, whose office 3ddress
is 1260
J 260 JI West Hope
I-rope Road, Star, Idaho, hereinafter called "Beneticiary".
"WITNESSETH
'WITNESSETH
Grantor does hereby irrevocably GRANT, BARGAIN, SELL AND CONVEY TO
TRUSTEE, IN TRUST, WITH POWER OF SALE, that cerlain
certain properly located il~ Ada Counly,
County,
Stale
attached herelO and incorporoled
incorpor.Jted herein
Slale ofldaJlO, more pal1icuiarly
pal1icularly described on Exhibit "A", att3ched
by this reterence as if set forth in full herein, which property is loc3led
located either within an incorpor3ted
city or village al
at the date hereof.
If all or part of the subject real property or any interest thereill is sold, transferred, or
transrerred in the tuture
(uture by agreement without the Beneliciary's
contracted to be sold or transi"erred
Beneticiary's prior written
consent, excluding a transfer by devise, descent or operation of low upon the death o:'the
0:' the Grantor,
then the Beneficiary
Beneticiary may, at Beneticiary's option, declare all sums secured by this Deed of Trust to
be immediately due and payable. Irthe Beneliciary shall waive the option to acceler3te as provided
by accepting in \\Titing an aSsWllption agreement of the successor-in-interest, Geneliciary
Beneticiary shojI
si1.Jllti1en
then
of Trust and the Promissory Note, TOGETHER \VITH the rents,
release Grantor under this Deed ot"Trust
renls,
issues and profits thereof SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority hereinafter given
to and conlerred
protits, fOJ
fOj the purpose
conJerred upon Beneticiary to collect and apply such rents, issues and prolits,
of securing payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a Promissory Note of even date herewith
executed by Grantor in the sum of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND HUNDRED DOLLARS
(};300,000.00),
(1300,000.00), with lina! payment due thereon on September 17,2007, and to secure pc:yment of all
such further SWllS as may hereafter be loaned or advanced by the Beneficiary herein to G:~antor
G:~antor herein
while record ovmer of present interest, tor any purpose, and of any notes, drafts or other instruments
representing such further loans, advances or expenditures together with interest on all such sums at
the rate therein provided. Provided, however, that the making of such further Joans,
loans, advances or
expenditure shall be optional with the Beneficiary, and provided, further that it is the express intention
of the parties to this Deed of Trust that it shall stand as continuing security until paid for all such
advances together with interest thereon. Said assignment of rents to Beneticiary by Grantor is an
ABSOLUTE ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS AND PROFITS.
orSak
Request is hereby made that a copy orany Notice of Default and a copy of any Notice ofSak
hereunder be mailed to the Grantor as his address hereinbefore set forth.
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DA TED This _ _ cay of September, 2002.
GRANTOR:

THOMAS G. MAILE, IV

COLLEEN MAILE

STA TE OF IDAHO
STATE

)
) ss:

County o(
o( Ada
Adil
COUIlIY
On this _ _ day of September, 2002, before me, a Notary Public in and for said State,
personally appeared THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN MAILE, husband and \vife, known
to me to be the person(s) whose name(s) is/are attached to the foregoing instrument, and

acknowledged to me

th~y

executed the same.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and atfixed my of1icial seal the day
and year in this certiticate tirst above written.

Not3l)' Public for Idaho
Notary
Residing at - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -----------------------------My Commission Expires _____________________
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.·\SStCN:-'IE\iT OF EARNEST l\10NEY AGREEMENT
TO PURCHASE REAL pnOPERTY

rr1GillJ.S (j,
Cj.

...\ssie:>,nors:
.-\ssie:>,nors:

Collecl:
Colkcl:

rvrdc, iV, and

~\l;jile.lIusb~llld
~\l;ji1e.lIusb~llld and

wife

Berkshire: ]mestmellts,
]mestments, LLC.,
an rdaho
Idaho Limited Liability
LiJbility Company

Assignee:

; ,- i il) .\SSlC
t'< ~.i :~.».JT
RE.A.L
.\SSlC!'<
:~,)-.JT OF L:!\R~[ST
L:!\R~[ST t--.l0NE'r'
t'-.10NE'r' .-\GREEMENl TO PURCHASE RLA.L
PROrLKTY.
'::~l[Cfed into this
day at'
ot' do.y
doy of August, 2002, by zlild
ZlilU between
PROrLKTY, made ai:(;
aj:(; ':::l[cred
di1Y
Tl JU;\lAS
husbond illld wife, of EJgle, Ado.
Ado County. IdJJlO.
JdJJlO.
11
IU;\lAS G.
G, ~tI\ILE.
~1.'\ILE. IV, J,nu
J.nu COLLEEN I'vlAILE, husbo.nd
hL'r:.:in,diC'r
to as "Assignors" Jnd
liZibility
I1cr;:in,dic-r relerreu
relerred 10
and BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC., 0.0 limited JiZibility
comp:1l1Y \\
it)) its rrincip;d plJce of busincss
Ado County,
County. Idl1ho,
Jdl1ho, hereimfler
hercimf1er referred to as
\\ilh
business in Ado.
".·\ssignC'e":
hereinLlf1cr refen'ed
reren'ed to JS
as
".·\ssignc-e": ,JI1J
;JI1J lI-lEODOR[
lI-lEODORr-: ff.... JOHNSON REVOCABLE TRUST, hereinLlflcr
kr",
"Sci kr".

\VITNCSSETH:
UZ I~!\.s,
WH UZI~AS.

f\_ssi~~nors
!\_ssi~~nors

are fJurchasing
f1urchasing cCI10in
cCI1o.in real property from TH EO
DO RE L.
.I 0 HNSO N
afe
EODORE
L..I0
ofJn
the terms of
In ··[o.mest
"Comest Money Agreement [0
to Purchase Re31
Real
Jlro;:cny" ;lI1J
~lI1J the ",\JdlTlcLm
",\JdeTlcLm [0
EsIJte Agreement Between Thomo.s
Jlro;:cny"
to Real EslJ[e
Thomos o.nd
ond Colken Mo.ik
Moik .:mcl
':lncl
lhc\lc!orc 1.. .Illhl~St)1l
.l()hl~St)1l Re\'\'c;Jok
Re\'\'c;lok Trust'·
Trust" liJtcd
dJ\cd July 25. 2002 and mode 0.0 pJrt hereof (IS
lhc(lciorc
i1S if set forth in
'-ull
re:ll rrlljJCrty
aen:s alld
and described as:
1-1I11 ilerein.
herein. ,(lr
;(11' [il:]t
th:.1! Cerl~l:n I'c:ll
rrl'jJCrty consisting of 40 acn:s
R]::V()C.·\FlLl~
RI::V()C.·\FlLl~

nn:ST

1~ILlrSL!:.1nt [0
1~ILlr:;L!:]nt

The \:,,:1h\\(':;l
\:":1h\\(':,l 1/-1
I/-1 of the South\\"est J 14.
/4. Section :;6, Township 5
~Z:ll~e II \\/e:;1.
f\'kridian, AdJ County,
0unh. ~Z:ll~C
\Ve:;!. Buise. 1\·kridian,
County. Ido.ho.
Idoho.
WI-llRE.AS. Ass;~~n(Jrs.
Ass;~~n(Jrs. Thum3s G.& Colleen Maile, Llrc willing to assign all Iheir
WJ-llRE.AS.
their right. title
l1nd interest in clild
c\lld [0
to s~,icl contract
C(1nlrac[ :md the real property therein described proviJed the Assignee
111ld
o.ssumc the cntin: biJbr.cc
biJ1c.Jr.cc of said contract payable to Seller, subject to the following terms and
ossumc
conditions,
conditions.
CONS]DERA TION: For and in consideration of the po.yment
poyment by Mailes to Assignee of S J ,00
.00 and
CONSIDERA
Jnd \'aluahle
\'aluahJe consideration, the Assignors do hereby assign, grant, convey and set over
other good and
lilltu Assigilce Llll of Assignors' right. title
rille and interest in nnd to the real eSlnte
lilltll
estnte COl1lro.ct
controct aoove
identified i1nd
(lnd the rcJ.]
rCJ.l pwperty therein descrihed, Slioj~ct
to
the
following
terms
nnd
conditiom,
SllO.i~ct
cOl1ditiom.
Thi~:

Assign111t:!lt tugc,ther
tuge·ther with the dEed from Seiler to Assignee sho.ll
AssignmC!lt
sholl be fileci with the escrow
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thcrcJIlcr trC:.lt Assigncc
Assignee JS h:.lving succeeded to Assignors' right. tit>: llnd iIlt(:rcst
holder who Ivill thcrcJlkr
int(:rcst
estdte cOlltrJct
CO:ltrJct :.lS
origin:lIiy e:\ecuted
pmcJnjcr
in :lnd
zlnd to s~lid re:.ll estJtc
JS though they h2d origin:lIly
c\ecuted the Sllll1C
SZl!l1C :.lS
JS the [JllrcJn;cr
tll\::rein
IL.1I11CU.
Assignee
J~'rees
to
JSSUl11e
the
iuentificd
contrJct
and
will
pJy
the
unpJid
bZlbnce
of
tll\::reill I L1IllCU.
:.l~'rees
:.lSSUl11e
iuentified contr:.lct J.Ild
PdY
purci1Jsc price in :.lccorcbnce
311 of the othu terms
the purchJsc
Jccorcbnce 'yvith
v\'lth the terms of said contrJct and perform all
required of the Buyers therein.
TJ,\cs. including 10C:11
loc;}1 improvements and other special assessments, shall be prorJted
pror:.lted as set
TAXES: TJ,\cs,
ht::reJner. the Assignor paying any such ta.'\es
ta:\es and assessments levied, :.lssessed,
Jssessed, becoming due
forth ht:reJfter.
p,:riod of time prioc
prioi' to the promtion
proration dJte,
date, and the Assignee p3)!ing
pa)!ing any such
Zlny p':riod
or JttributJble to any
assessments levied, Zlsscssed,
Zlsscssed. becoming due,
due. or 3t1ribut3ble
at1ributable to, any
oftimc
Ll.'\es ::md 3ssessmcnts
Jny period of
time :.d'ter sZlid
dJte, promplly Jnu
zmu before the S::lmc
S:1mt: become delinquent. Assignee sldl
sh211 be oblig::ltcd
obligakd to IllJ).;e
L111
dJte.
mJKe lllJ
r~l)l1leilts 011 all
terl11 of the contrJct herein. QS
JS is St:t
further
fJ~1)n1ents
311 1:.l:\cs
l:.l:\cs during the terlll
set forth hereafter and
iJnd fllnher
COI'el1:1111S TO prol'ide the escrow holuer
hollkr with proof of payment of said tJ.'\es
tJ:\es as e:lch
ezlch and el'ery
every tax
tJX
cOI'enJnts
heCClJ'
hcel) II :cs
:(:s due :.lIlU
:.ll1U p~Y:..Ibie.
p:.JyJ bie. ,Ifill
lInd furtlll.T
furthl..T co\cn;JJllS
co\cnJJllS to provide said proof ofpJyment
of p2yme n t ofsQic!
0 f so.i cl ta.';es
ta.';CS within
wi lh i n
[\.'11 (10) dJys at'lcr
at"1er the [,1.'
1l'1l
[:1:\\ h,,::coilles
h,'::col1lcS due.
r:SCIZO\\':
r:scrzo\\':

The originJi
orthis
pl:lceJ ill
in escrolV with ;\LU;.\NCE
origillJI of
this ,\ssignlllellt
,\ssignmcnt shJl1
sh:..I11 be p!:lceJ
f\LLI/.\NCE TITLE &
rJnics specifically
designate ALLIANCE llTLE.
lJTLE. Ihe
r::SCFO\\'. The rQrtics
spcCitiCZllly o.ulilorize.
JlHhorize. empower and designJ!e
escrow hl1luL'r
hllluL'r hercQrtcr.
hercJt'tcr. or cO:lCurrcntly.
upon by the pJnies,
po.rties. ZlS e\'iuenced
eviuenced by C.\cclltioll
C.\ecLition by
escrol\'
cO:1Currcntly, agreed
ZlgrecJ UpOIl
lhe
r~lrties o(e~cr()\\
oi'e~cr()\\ ins:ruclions.
ins:rllclions. to substitute
suhstitute Assignee as
o.s buyer under the deed of
ortrL/stunder
tht::
the r~lrties
trust under thc
l:.:rll1S of
or the
rcl~'renccd rCJ\
COlltro.cl. THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVQCABL[
REVOCABL[
l:..:rms
th~ :.lL'O\e
JL'O\e rcl~'renced
rCQ! estJie
est:..Ite COlllrJCl.
Jutlwri7es s~lil~
s,lil~ escrow hold':r
hold,-.:r to convey by WJrrJnty
Worranl), Deed to Assignee,
Assigl1ee. and
al1d further
ll<' LIST :..Iut]wri7es
JCk!H1IllcclgL'S
:\c;si~n:.:e lIill be ohligJlc'd
ohligalc'd under the Deeu
Dceu on'rust anne:-.:cd
rcal csute
CSUlc conlr:lct
contr:lct
JCK!Hl\llccl.~L's :\c;si~n:..:e
Zlnne\cd III the rczll
in:;tc:.!u
oi'the
/\S::ii~n0r,
ill;)te~J of
the .I\S::ii~n0r,
:\~D ~OTIC[:
~OTIC[: The [xlrtics further J~ree
Zl~rec thJt
that Assignee shall bc
be rcsponsiblc
rt::sponsiblc 10 p:l)'
flil), :..III
Jil
DF:TAULl :\~D
oi'Trust ,mJ
anJ flay
thereon. pllrSU<lIllIO
pLirSlIJllt to the terms set forth
sums due unJcr
pay thcreon.
tanh therein.
unJer the f)L'Cc! o(Trust

TO :\SSIG~':\l[;\T
:\SSIG~':\I[;\T A\'D
A\,j) NOVATION: The pJrties funher agree thJ(
t!1J( the
undcJ':;igl1eu THEOL)OI\E L. JOJli<SON
JOIIi<SON IZEVOCAGLE TRUST agrees to releJse Assignors from
undcrsigncc.1
alll'L1IUrl'
red estate
soid obligz.llions
oblig:.llions JJld
JIII'L1lur(' liability
li:1bility lIl1ch
lIn(h the reI!
estJte contract
contrJct substituting Assignees lor SJid
J.nd further
rUr1h~r
1.I!llb<r;IT;'J
rll;]t A.::~i:;'leD';
A.::~i:;'leD'; 5h:~I! b~ !('~r(\!:si)le:o
!('~r(\!!si)le:o pJ;' all Sl~!m
SL~!!lS due l,,,Je,
Ll'!Je; the D':~d (lfTr'.!5
()fTrl,~51.1
3!;11::\~'d
'.[lllb<r;lT;,J 11);]t
. 3r~!1::':~'d
to the rCJI
feJ I c.c;tJte
l?c;tJtc.' contract
Zlnu puy thereon,
thcr,,:on. pursunnt
to the terms set forth therein
the rei n as ifset
if se t tonh in full
10
COlllrJCI am]
purSllnntto
herein.
I\(j
I\G f\U':f\lf\
R.U':f\lf\ T

Assignment. this \\Tittcn
\ITittcn
Exccrt as otherwise expressly noted in this Assignment,
ENTIRE AGREEMEl'\T: Except
,l\ssignI1l('nt contains the entire agreement between the pLlrties
parties and all prior oral (lnd
(Jnd written
,'\ssignl11t.'nt
l:l!::!rt:emellts 3re mergccJ
mergcu krein.
l:lgrcements
D[;\DING
G[;\;DING ON HEIRS, ETC.: This Assignment shall be binding on, and inure to the benefit of, the

transferee, successo;-s
sliccessors in interest and persona) representZltives
representJtives of
the parties.
oflhe
heirs, assigns, Ir,lllsferce,
have e:.:ecuted
e:.:ecLlted this Assignment the day and year first
IN WIl:'!ESS \VHEREOF, the pm1ies hJve

ASSIGNi\IE;\T - 2

'jl'''IlI.R,\S."c;·,\1I:V''I'Il·\u~u''
ll\:'".R,\S.'IC;'.\1i:"'·"IJ ·\u~u" 1.,.\1 cO()~

r',\\I',)\TA
r',\\",)\TA Ii
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THOMAS G. MAltE, IV

~/i~;~(:;
~/i~;~cl

<<

COLLEEN tvlAILE
tv/AILE

ASS[C;NEE:
Brr~\KSHIRE
INVEST~'lENTS~ LLC.

13\.·

~)l'

:/ ,')

0;2

. THOMAS G. K'!.'\IL -.. I\.j;j~oger

f/"}

"

~I(~

IJ

•.---

!\rrROVEO:
!\PPROVEO:
TIJEODORE
T1JEODORE L.

JOlf~SON REVOCAFlU~
REVOCAFlU~
JOlf~SON

TRUST

STATE 0
Or-r- lD.\J-lO
lD.\HO

or Auo.
ALb

)

COUIlI)'
COUlll)' oj'

-.is

On this
dJ) of &qtU;[:2002.
undersigned, a Notary Public in and
&qtt.J.;[:2002. before me, the undersigned.
Cor s:lid SWIC.
MAflE, husb:md
husDo.nd and
SWlC. pcrsc)I1~lly
pcrsc)I1~]ly arpcarcdt:{HOMAS
arpcarcdl:{HOMAS G. MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN MAILE,
wi fe. kllown or o.ClllO\\
no.me(s) is/are subscribed to the
OClllO\\ Ic;d=~cJ
lcd,=~eJ to me to bc the person(s) whose nome(s)
within and foregoing inc;tn:mc:lt and acknowledged to me that they executed the same.
sclnW.
l~
J:1J
J:lJ )'l'Ll!'
)'l'L}!"

WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the dJy
do.y
in this Cel1ificJte
cel1ificJte lirst :lbove \\Titten.
\\Tilten.
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.,
"

,

h~;p·
h~p
~~--f{C-c-.t-'99
~~---,'{'---c-.

I-lOI
d-'::a1Z-1
-1-'
I-lOr
d-'::aiZ-l
-1
-------00'--------

RCSldll1g at:
Qt:

_r-~_.'
_r-~-.'

,

~dV
~dV

My Commission Expires: / () ",it:}
".it:} -()t',;:,
-()t'7'

: ] ; II
tl ;: ~' .

STATE OF IDAHO )

) ss:
::is:
)

County of :\JJ
:"-cia

/jjj-

On [his
eLl}"
me. the undersih'lled, a Not:Jry
NotJry Public in :lnd
and
CLlY o,t2<!ti!/dt2002.
o.t'Z(ti!Ut2002. before me,
lor :;JiJ
acknov.ledged to me to be
SJiJ St3[e:. persomlly
persomlIy ClppeJrc&tHOf'vL.3..S
ClPPc'arc&tHOtvL.3..S G,
G..,!vLL\ILE.
!vLL\ILE. IV, known or ackJlovvledged
,hi.: \~:"jl~:':~
I-~C,.
iUdilo limi(eu iiability
cornpJlly. and
anci lhe
\~:"iI~:':~ 01·3;::?J:;;;;:;.::::
01·3;::?JS;j;~.:::: :>:VEST\-rE~~TS,
:>:VEST\-rE~~TS. I-~C
.. Ut; [udilo
jiaDtji[; cornpJllY.
pc::r:,on(s) whose: nJJTIe(s)
wirhjn and foregoing instrument and
Jnd acknowledged
n::une(s) !s/:lJc
!s/:.lJc subscribe:d to Ulc wilhjn
to me
jiabiliry comp:l1lY
compJJ1y
ille' lh~[ he C.\t:culed
e\cculed [he SJi11c on behJlf
behalf of such limited )jabiliry

il!ld
il:ld \
,,

1>1 V/ITNESS
I have hereunto set my h:l1ld
hJJ1d 3lld
311d affixed my official seal the day
V/lTNESS \\'HEREOF, 1have
car in [his
this c~r1itica[e" ti!'s[
ti!'sl :1bove
:lbove \\Tinen,
\\Tinen.
'j

""

... I t ·

\"owsy Pu ic f9r Idaho
Residing : &(tiV . .
,\1>' Commission Expires: / 0 -d~

,

{;0

STATE OF IDAHO
j :;s:
5S:

(oum::
(oum!' of ,-\da
.-\da

StJlte of Idaho
State

s.s.

County of Ada

1~
ZO~

of'--':~=;~C+"':'-d--\-t-------:' in(~ :wOf

On this
0.:---- day of ---'-~~~"----'---.r--H--.A-'in (~
,before me, DaneUe M,
,before
M.
,
Green, a notary pubiic, personally a
Gr::en,
me on the basis of satisfa ry evid:nc:: to bl: the pmon(s) wh e nam::(s) is/are subsc"ibed
proved to m:::
subsc-ibed TO
insrrum~.
the v.ithin insrrum~,
'. wledgl:d that he/she exe::ured
exe:::ured the same,

l:~ ~jRE$-t
f~:tl'
'~Y~
f~/':2'<').'
'~Y
~
€~: :2'<').",
(;

: c.: '

tI'
~

,, "-,.......

2

~J V71~
v71~

_W',~ i~
~

N "' ..' pUblic
PUblic '.
ReSIding at: Balfe;.;
R:::slding
BaLfe;.; ill
ID
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July 22,2003
Connie Taylor
Cbsk md Feeney
C!J.sk
1229 Main St
5t
83501I
Lewiston. Idaho 8350
Re: Theodore L
L. Johmon Trust
Deaf Connie,
withdr:lw [rofT} all
Andy md I, acting as
a.s the trustees of the Theodore L
L. Johnson Trust, wish to wilhdr:lw
o[CI:1[k;md Feeney against Thomas G. Maile,
fv!a.ile. and
proceedings of the law ~rm o[C/:1[k;md
tvbile. Colleen fvla.ile.
Berkshire [nve:;lments,
Investments, LLC. !tIt is our judgement that this suit hJ.S not the merit to benefit the
purcha..::;e of the Linder property proceed as in the currenl
current contract \vith
trust. We desire to let tle purcha.se
lull.
Maile/ Berkshire Develo[Jment until SJiJ property is paid orr in fuJl.
We know we ha\e J liduciJry duty (0
the {rust
to the beneJiciJries
beneliciJries of
Olthe
trust to Jct in their oest behJIf.
Jlso kel
reel we hJ\'[:
hJ\'\: JJ nHlr:11 obligJtion to lollow
\\-Jy in which he
hut \ve J1so
Oul
Jollo'" Unclt: Ted's wishes in the \VJY
entrustcd us to do.
entrusted
lJ"you
iJuise in the n\.'Jr futun.:,
futun.:. give us a call. Jnd
JnJ we \\..
\\;ill
I(you un Cl)nle to Guise
ill schedule a I'Jmil:'
fivc bcneficiJries
beneficiJrics in :lttcndmce.
meeting having
Jt leJsl
having:ll
leJSl one rerresentJtive
rerresentJlive from each ol'the five
3ltcndmce.

Sincerely.

(

/l

-.
'f.... /,
(
/','I.\'././

II

,.. ,""1/ '. ~'--V

.

I

7

j'

,)~
/.' c.:.CL. ~_.A'J! /(; I ~ (>L. -!---'" .,
Andrew T. Rogers
[3cth J, Rogers
Co-Trustees oflhe
ortbe Theodore L. Johnson
Johllson Trust
cc:

Helen TQylor
Ha.zel fisher
Fisher
Joyce Seely
Garth Fisher
Dallan
Dal Ian Taylor
Ruth Stephens
Scott Johnson
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EXHIBIT "C" TO AFFIDAVIT OF CHRIST TROUPIS IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER

001750

"-;,.'
'--'

..... ,..;'L '_

____

•••

,"<
",

,, _ _ _ ._ •• .v . . . . __ ~."

.',

.~j

,_,~_,

•• _ . , _ .............. " . _

.--..

-.-.----~-~-- '-'-"'

TI-IOI'v'1AS
Tl-IOI\'1AS G. MAILE, IV
Atlorney at Law
380 West StaLe Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 939-1000
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001
Idaho State Bar No. 2378
Attorney for Colleen Maile and Berkshire Investments

IN TI-IE
THE DISTRICT COURT OF TI-IE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TI-IE COUNTY OF ADA

REED TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN )
TA
YLOR, an individual; R. JOHN TA
YLOR,)
TAYLOR,
TAYLOR,)
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
)
REVOCABLE TRUST,
)
Plaintiffs/Counter·-Defendants.
vs.
THOMAS MAILE IV. and COLLEEN
MAILE, husband and wil~~, and
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC.,

)
)
)

Case No. CV OC 04-05656D
ANSWER AND COUNTER CLAIM

)

RE: PLAINTIFFS AMENDED

)

COMPLAINT BY BENEFICIARIES

)
)

)

Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
)
._----)
COMES NOW the Defendant/Counter-Claimants, Berkshire Investments, L.L.C., and
Colleen Maile, and Thomas Maile as and for their answer and counter-claim by and through their
attomey
aHomey of record, hereby incot'!'orate
incorporate by reference all answers and counter-claims previously
ANSWER AND COUNTER CLAIM RE: PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMPLAINT BY
BENEFICIARIES - 1
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asselied in their Verified Amended Answer and Amended Counter-Claim
Counter-Claimllled
filed of record herein as
if set forth in full herein. That the Verified Answer to the
tbe Amended Complaint dated January 18,
2006 which filed by Jack Gjording on behalf of Defendant Thomas Maile, is incorporaled by

reference herein, and should be considered an answer by the remaining Defendants and the
tbe Amended
Answer and Amended Counter-Claim previously of record is incorporated by referenceberein as if
set 1'orth in full herein.
DATED this

2J _day of March, 20
E, IV
Attorney for Colleen aIle & Berkshire
Investments, LLC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~) day of March, 2006, I served the foregoing
ANSWER AND COUNTER CLAIM RE: PLAINTIFFS AMENDED COMPLAINT
COMPLA!NT BY
BENEFICIAIUES by having a true and complete copy personally delivered or by facsimile and/or
by depositing the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid thereon, and addressed as follows:
Dennis M. Charney
Attorney at Law
951 East Plaza Drive, Suite 140
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Fax # (208) 938-9504

(X)
()
()
()

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
I-land
Hand Delivery
Ovemight DelivelY

Paul T. Clark

(X)

U. S. Mail

ANSWER AND COUNTER CLAIM RE: PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMPLAINT BY
BENKFICIARIES - 2
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Clark and Feeney
1229 Main Street
Post Office Drawer 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Fax # (208) 746··9160

(())
(())
(())

Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

Mr. Jack S. Gjording
Gjording and Fouser
509 West Hays Street
Post Office Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Fax # (208) 336-9177

(X)
()
()
()

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight DeliveJy
DeliveJY

ANSWER AND COUNTER CLAIM RE: PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMrLAINT BY
BENEFICIARIES - 3
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EXHIBIT "D" TO AFFIDAVIT OF CHRIST TROUPIS IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER
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NO.
NO.----~;;n_---_+_
AM------~Fll=.ED~~'-d----~
AM
FILED, d
---FM~'____
~
.. ----P.M'"-"o
--1


FEB 13 2006

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JlJDICIAL D
2

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY 0

3

4

T AYLOR,
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR,
and R. JOHN TAYLOR,

5

Plaintiffs/ Counter-Defendants,

Case No. CVOC0400473D

6
7

ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

vs.

8
9
10

THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, and
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC,

II
11

Defendants/ Counter-Claimants.

12
13

THEODORE 1. JOHNSON
RECOYABLE
RECOY ABLE TRUST,

14

Plaintiff,

15
16

17
18

vs.

THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS
MAlLE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, and
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENT, LLC,

19

20

Defendants.

21
22

This matter came before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. The

23

motion was argued before the Court on November 10, 2005. On December 23, 2005 the Idaho

24

Supreme Court issued its decision in the companion case of Taylor v. Maile (2205 Opinion No.

25

135) and remanded that case.

On the same day, this Court ordered the parties to submit

26
ORDER REGARDING PLAJNTlFFS'
PLAJNTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 1
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supplemental briefing on the effect of the remanded case on the entire litigation. On January 23,
2006 the parties filed supplemental briefing.

The Court considered the matter fully under

2
3

advisement on that date. The defendants/counterclaimants ("Defendants") take the position that the

4

remand has no effect on the issues pending before the Court in the instant case. The

5

plaintiffs/counterdefendants ("Plaintiffs") have now moved to amend their Complaint in this case

6

so as to conform it to the Supreme Court decision.

7

After considering the briefs and arguments of the parties, Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Swnmary

8

Judgment is hereby granted in part and denied in part.
9

I. BACKGROUND
10

Il
11

Thomas Maile, IV was Theodore L. Johnson's attorney. Maile's representation included

12

drafting the trust agreement for the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust and overseeing the

13

administration of the trust.

14

underlying transaction in this case is a land sale between Johnson, then trustee and settlor of the

15

Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, and Maile. Maile and Johnson entered into an earnest

16

After Johnson's death, Maile represented Johnson's estate.

The

money agreement for the purch~se of 40 acres in Eagle, Idaho.

17

On January 23, 2004, Plaintiffs, certain residual beneficiaries of the Theodore L. Johnson
18

Trust, filed a lawsuit, alleging three causes of action and seeking damages and/or rescission of the
19

20

21

sale. On April 23, 2004, this Court dismissed the claims of the Plaintiffs based upon a lack of
standing. That case was remanded by the Idaho Supreme Court as mentioned above.

22

On July 22, 2004, Plaintiffs filed a new action against Defendants after the original trustees

23

purportedly transferred their status as trustees to the Plaintiffs. On November 10, 2005, this Court

24

heard oral arguments on Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, in which Plaintiffs sought to

25

summary judgment on all of
IOf Defendants' counterclaims and affirmative defenses.
26

ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Pag~ 2
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II. -FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment is "rendered forthwith

2
3

if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that

4

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

5

as a matter of law." See also First Sec. Bank of Idaho, NA. v. Murphy, 131 Idaho 787, 790, 964

6

P.2d 654, 657 (1998). I.R.C.P. 56(e) provides that an adverse party may not simply rely upon mere

7

allegations in the pleadings, but must set forth in affidavits specific facts showing there is a genuine

8

issue for trial. See Rhodehouse

V.v.

Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 211,868 P.2d 1224, 1227 (1994). The
Stults,

9

affidavits either supporting or opposing the motion must set forth facts that would be admissible in
10

I1

e).
evidence and show that the affiant is competent to testify. See id.; I.R.
LR. C.P. 56(
56(e).

12

To withstand a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party's case must be

13

anchored in something more than speculation; a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a

14

genuine issue. Zimmerman v. Volkswagon ojAmerica,
oj America, Inc., 128 Idaho 851, 854, 920 P.2d 67, 69

15

(1996). Liberal construction of the facts in favor of the non-moving party requires the court to draw

16

all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Williams v. Blakley, 114
17

Idaho 323,324,757 P.2d 186,187 (1988); Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho 253, 255, 698 P.2d 315,317
18
19

20

(1985).
A. Counterclaim I - Tortious Interference
with Contract

21

The Idaho Supreme Court in Idaho First National Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc. set forth
22

23
24
25

the elements for tortious interference with contract: (1) the existence of a contract; (2) knowledge of
the contract on the part of the defendant; (3) intentional interference causing a breach of the
contract; and (4) injury to the plaintiff resulting from the breach. 121 Idaho 266, 283-284, 824 P.2d

26
ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 3
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841,858-859 (1991). After the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, "the burden is on the
2

defendant to prove justification." Id.
In regard to the land sale contract between Defendants and the Trust, the Court finds that the

3
4

Defendants have failed to set forth any evidence that the land sale contract was breached.

5

Therefore, the motion for summary judgment is granted with respect to that portion of

6

Counterclaim I.L

7

In regard to the commercial loan contract between Defendants and their lending institution,

8

the Court finds there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Plaintiffs interfered
9

with this loan contract. Therefore, the motion for summary judgment is denied with respect to that
10
II

.. r.

r.
portion of Counterclaim 1.
Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on Counterclaim I is granted in part and denied in

12

131 part.
14

15

B. Counterclaim II - Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage
The Idaho Supreme Court in Idaho First National Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc. defined

16

the elements of the tort of interference with a prospective economic advantage as follows:
17
18
19

20

21
22
2J

24

A plaintiff, in order to establish a prima facie case, must show that any claimed
intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage resulting in injury to
the plaintiff "is wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the interfi:rence
intem:rence
itself." The plaintiff must establish that the intentional interference resulting in
injury was wrongful, which may be shown by proof that either: (1) the defe:ndant
had an improper objective or purpose to hann the plaintiff; or (2) the defendant used
a wrongful means to cause injury to the prospective business relationship.
121 Idaho 266, 286,824 P.2d 841, 861 (1991) (citations omitted).
The Court finds that the Defendants have failed to set forth more than a scintilla of evidence
that Plaintiffs' conduct in this case was "wrongful," and therefore, summary judgment on

25

Counterclaim II is granted.
26
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E. Counterclaim V - Civil Conspiracy

The Court finds that civil conspiracy is not itself a claim for relief. See McPheters v. Maile,
2
3
4

138 Idaho 391,395,64 P.3d 317,321 (2003) ("Civil conspiracy is not, by itself, a claim for relief.")
(citations omitted). Summary judgment on Defendants' Counterclaim V is therefore granted.

F. Counterclaim VI - Breach of Contract

5
6

7

Defendants have failed to set forth even a scintilla of evidence that Plaintiffs have breached
Defendants Counterclaim
the terms of the land sale contract, and therefore, swnmary judgment on Defendants'
1

8

VI is granted.
9

G. Counterdaim VII and VIII - Equitable Estoppel and Quasi-Estoppel
10

II

Consistent with its earlier findings in its Memorandum Decision & Order addressing

12

Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, the Court finds that there remains a genuine

lJ
13

issue of fact as to the availability of the equitable claims brought in Counterclaims VII and VIII.

14

15
16

H. Counterclaim IX - Good Faith and Fair Dealing
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied into every contract. Luzar v. W
Surety, 107 Idaho 693, 696, 692 P.2d 337, 340 (1984). However, "[a] violation of the implied

J7
17

covenant is a breach of the contract. It does not result in a cause of action separate from the breach
]]88

]]99
20

Nat"'I Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 289, 824
of contract claims." Idaho First Nat

P.2d 841, 864 (1991 ) (citations omitted).

21

Accordingly, sumrnary judgment on Counterclaim IX is granted.

22

I. Counterclaim X - Fraudulent Transfer

23
24

Counterclaim X alleges that Plaintiffs fraudulently distributed the corpus of the Theodore
Johnson Trust in order to subvert any award that Defendants may ultimately receive in this dispute.

25

See generally I.C. § 55-913.
26
ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 6
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The Court finds that the Defendants, as tort claimants, are "creditors" ofthe Trust as defined

2
3

under Idaho's Unifonn Fraudulent Transfer Act. See

I.e. § 55-910(3), (4) (stating that a person has

a "claim" if they have any "right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment"). The

4

Court finds further that there remains a genuine issue of material fact regarding Plaintiffs' alleged

5

fraudulent intent. See I.e. § 55-908 (stating that the question of fraudulent intent "is one of fact, and

6

not oflaw"). Accordingly, summary judgment on Counterclaim X is denied.

7

J. Counterclaim XI - Uniust Enrichment

8

Count XI of the Defendants' counterclaims alleges unjust enrichment. Defendants claim that
9

if the Plaintiffs prevail in this lawsuit entitling them to recover the Linder Road Property, it would
10
II
12
13

14

be inequitable to allow Plaintiffs to retain the benefits of Defendants labor, time, and expenses
spent to enhance the value of the Property.
The Court finds that there remains a genuine issue of material fact with respect to this
counterclaim, and therefore, summary judgment is denied.

15

K Counterclaim XII - Indemnification Agreement

16

Counterclaim

xn

challenges the tenus of the Disclaimer, Release and Indemnification

17

Agreement in which the Plaintiffs agreed to indemnify all the trust beneficiaries from any and all
18
19

20
21

22
23

24

claims or damages that might arise from this litigation.
The Court finds that this issue is not ripe for judicial intervention, and therefore, summary
judgment on Counterclaim XII is granted.

L. Counterclaim XIII- Breach of Peace and Quiet Enjoyment
Defendants have failed to set forth even a scintilla of evidence that Plaintiffs have interfered
with their right to use their property; instead, Defendants allege only that they have not been able to

25

26
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sell the property or build on it. The Court finds that this is not the kind of interference that amounts

2

to a nuisance. Summary Judgment on Counterclaim XIII is therefore granted.

M. Counterclaim XIV - Breach of Warranty Deed

3
4

5

6
7

8

The Idaho Supreme Court in Koelker v. Turnbull described the nature of an action for breach
of covenants of title as follows:
[I]t is axiomatic that the plaintiff in an action for breach of covenants of title has
the burden of proving that he was evicted or prevented from using the conveyed
plaintiffs .... "[A]
property by a person asserting title paramount to that of the plaintiffs....
covenant of warranty of title does not extend to apparent or unfounded titles in
land, but only against hostile titles, superior in fact to those of the grantor."

9

127 Idaho 262, 265, 899 P.2d 972, 975 (1995) (citations omitted).
10

II
11

The Court finds that Defendants have failed to set forth even a scintilla of evidence that

12

Plaintiffs have asserted a claim of superior title, and therefore, summary judgment on Counterclaim

13

XIV is granted.

14

15

N. Counterclaim XV - Continuing Tort
The Court finds that there is no separate cause of action for a "continued tort," and

16

therefore, summary judgment on Counterclaim XV is granted.
17

O. Affirmative Defenses
18

19

20

In addition to the above counterclaims, Plaintiffs also seek rulings on the following
affirmative defenses asserted by Defendants.
i. Failure to Join Indispensable Parties

21

22

23
24

The burden of demonstrating the indispensability of a party rests on the moving party.
Jolley v. Puregro Co., 94 Idaho 702, 705, 496 P.2d 939, 942 (1972). Defendants initially asserted

this affirmative defense in the original lawsuit, arguing that the Trust was an indispensable party in

25

the litigation.
26
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Because the Trust is a party in the second lawsuit, which has been consolidated with the
original lawsuit, the Court finds that Defendants have failed to set forth even a scintilla of evidence
2
3
4

that an indispensable party has not been joined in this litigation. Plaintiffs' motion to strike this
affirmative defense is therefore granted.
ii. Laches

5
6
7

8

9

The necessary elements of a laches claim are:
(1) defendant's invasion of plaintiffs rights, (2) delay in asserting plaintiffs rights,
(l)
the plaintiff having had notice and an opportunity to institute a suit, (3) lack of
knowledge by defendant that plaintiff would assert his rights, and (4) injury or
prejudice to defendant in event relief is accorded to plaintiff or the suit is not held to
be barred.

10
II
11

12

13

Finucane v. Village ofllayden, 86 Idaho 199,206,384 P.2d 236, 240 (1963).
The Court finds there remains a genuine issue of fact on the issue of laches, and therefore,
the motion to strike this affirmative defense is denied.

iii. Failure to Mitigate

14
15
16

The Court finds that there remains a genuine issue of fact on the affinnative defense of
failure to mitigate damages; the motion to strike is therefore denied.

17
\7

v. Unclean Hands
18

The motion to stJike this affirmative defense is denied.
19

vi. Release and Reconveyance/Accord and Satisfaction

20
21

Defendants assert that the Accord and Satisfaction and the Release of Reconveyance

22

provisions of the Linder Road Property purchase agreement bar's any tort claims brought by or on

23

behalf of the Trust.

24

25

26
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In accordance with the Idaho Supreme Court's recent decision in this litigation, this Court
finds that the terms of the purchase agreement do not bar Plaintiffs' fiduciary duty cl aim as a matter
2
3

of law.

III. CONCLUSION

4

5

The Court finds that genuine issues of material fact exist with respect to some of the

6

Defendants' counterclaims; therefore, Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is denied in part.

7

With respect to several other counterclaims, the Court finds that there are not genuine issues of

8

material fact and that Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
9

10
II

12

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this

1.3

~r--

day of February 2006.

13
14
15
16

I7
18

19

20
21

22
23

24

25
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7
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11
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( ) Overnight Mail
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PAUL THOMAS CLARK
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR
1 CLARK and FEENEY
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
2 The Train Station, Suite 201
J 3th and Main Streets
3 P. O. Drawer 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
4
Telephone: (208)743-9516
ISB#
1329
5

5

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

6

7

8

REED TA YLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR,
and R. JOHN TAYLOR,

9

Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,

10
11

12
13

vs.
THOMAS MAILE, TV and COLLEEN
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS
MAILE REAL EST ATE COMPANY,
and BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC,

14

Defendants/Counter-Claimants.

15
16

THEODORE 1.
L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUST,

17

18

Plaintiff,
vs.

19
20

THOMAS MAILE, TV and COLLEEN,
MAILE, husband and wife, and
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC,

21
Defendants.

22
23

24

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV OC 0400473D

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON BENEFICIARIES' CLAIM

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

COME NOW Plaintiffs Reed, Dallan, and John Taylor (hereafter referred to as "the
Beneficiary Plaintiffs"), by and through their attorney of record, Paul Thomas Clark of the firm of

25
... _6
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n.

Clark & Feeney and, pursuant to l.R.c.P. 56(b), move this Court for an order granting summary
1

judgment in favor of the Beneficiary Plaintiffs on their claim against the Defendants.

2

This motion is made upon the pleadings and records of the above-entitled action and

3

Plaintiffs', Motion for Summary Judgment filed concurrently herewith.
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs

4

Oral argument is requested.

5

()"
{/'

f_

DATED this __ day of February,
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Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
-------·-·1

~ERKSHlRE
INVESTME~TS, LLC, an
~ERKSHlREINVESTME~TS,
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
BIRCHMAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH
MAILE, husband and wife,

CV -OC-0723232
Case No. CV-OC-0723232

MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN

SUPPORT OF
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,
v.

PLAINTIFFS/COUNTERPLAINTIFFS/COUNTER
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
RECONSIDER

CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
. POSSESSION.
Defendants/Cowlter-Claimants.
Defendants/Collilter-Claimants.

-- -_

'L.....- - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _- --J
l_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

COMES NOW tht: Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants by and through their undersigned
counsel of record, Christ T. Troupis, and provides this Honorable Court with the following
memorandum brief in support of Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants' Motion to Reconsider, as

001772

follows.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants are requesting that this court reconsider the following
interlocutory Orders and Judgments: (1) Memorandum Decision & Order entered July 2,2009,
(2) Order Denying Plaintiffs Summary Judgment entered July 20, 2009, (3) the Judgment
Dismissing Plaintiffs Claims entered 07/20/2009, together with (4) the Order Denying Plaintiffs'
Motion for Summary Judgment on the Defendants' Counterclaims entered on 06/23/2009.
This motion for reconsideration is based on the recent decision rendered in the: Idaho
Supreme Court case captioned, Taylor v. McNichols, 36130, 36131 (IDSCCI),
(lDSCCI), decided on
September 3, 2010, which established new law with respect to when claims may first be brought,
that are based on the conduct of parties and their attorneys in litigation.
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants submit that the recent Supreme Court ruling conflicts with
this Court's prior interlocutory Orders and Judgment. When considering a motion to reconsider
under I.R.C.P. II(a)(2), the district court "should take into account any new facts presented by
the moving party that bear on the correctness ofthe interlocutory order." Coeur d'Alene Mining
Co. v. First Nat'l Bank ofN. Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990). Spur

Products Corp. v. Stoel Rives LLP, 143 Idaho 812,153 P.3d 1158 (Idaho 2007). It is the
position ofthe Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants the legal positions ofthe parties to this action have
significantly been altered based upon this new Law, and, in the interests of justice and judicial
economy, these issues should be addressed and resolved by this Court prior to trial.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The decision to grant or deny a request for reconsideration generally rests in the sound discretion
MEMORANDUM BRII~F
BRIl~F IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'
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of the trial court. Campbell v. Reagan, 144 Idaho 254,258, 159 P.3d 891, 895 (2007); Carnell v.
Barker Mgmt. Inc., 137 Idaho 322, 329,48 P.3d 651, 658 (2002). I.R.C.P. Rule 11(a)(2)
provides:
Successive applications for orders or writs - Motions for reconsideration.
Applications .... Nothing in this rule shall prevent a party or the
(A) Successiv{: Applications....
attorney from renewing a motion or an application to the same judge, or a newly
appointed judge, in an action after such motion or application was originally
denied; but this provision and this rule shall not create the right to file a motion
for reconsideration except as provided in subsection (B) of this rule. Nothing in
this rule shall prevent a party or an attorney from renewing a motion or an
application for a constitutional writ to the same judge, or a newly appointed
judge, in an action after such motion or application was originally denied.
(B) Motion For Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration of any
interlocutory orders of the trial court may be made at any time before the entry of
final judgment but not later than fourteen (14) days after the entry of the final
jUdgment.
judgment. A motion for reconsideration of any order of the trial court made after
entry of final judgment may be filed within fourteen (14) days from the entry of
such order; provided, there shall be no motion for reconsideration of an order of
the trial court entered on any motion filed under Rules 50(a), 52(b), 55(c), 59(a),
59(e), 59.1, 60(a), or 60(b).
The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is similar to a Rule 59(e)
59( e) motion to alter or
amend a judgment. It affords "the trial court the opportunity to correct errors both of Hlct or law
that had occurred in its proceedings; [and] thereby provides a mechanism for corrective action
short of an appeal." Lowe v. Lym, 103 Idaho 259, 263, 646 P.2d 1030, 1034 (Ct. App.1982)
(discussing Rule 59(e) motions). The court further held that new or additional information is not
necessary for a motion for reconsideration. "[A]
"[A] rule requiring new evidence on a motion for
reconsideration would be a cause for concern. It would prevent a party from drawing the trial
court's attention to errors of law or fact in the initial decision, precluding correction of even
flagrant errors except through an appeal." Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 473, 147 P.3d
100, 105 (Ct.App. 2006) Since a final judgment has not been entered in this case, the court's
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO RECONSIDER- Pg 3
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-orders granting summary judgment to Taylors' with respect to the Plaintiffs' claims is an
'interlocutory order' subject to a motion for reconsideration. See, e.g., Barmore v. Perrone, 145
Idaho 340, 179 P.3d 303 (2008).

LEGAL ARGUMENT
The Claims of
the Plainti/ft
ofthe
Plaintiffi are not ba"ed by Res Judicata.
This Court previously ruled that the claims set forth in the multiple count amended
complaint asserted against the Defendants should have been raised in the prior litigation known
as Taylor v. Maile, and because they were not, the Plaintiffs' present claims were barred by the
doctrine of Res Judicata. The September 3, 2010 decision ofthe Idaho Supreme Court in Taylor
v. McNichols, 36130, 36131 (IDSCCI) (2010), is contrary to this Court's ruling.
The Taylor v. McNichols decision states:
"As in cases for legal malpractice based on conduct occurring during the
course of a trial, in order to bring a malicious prosecution claim there must be
of which
damages and it must be determined that the suit was groundless, neither ofwhich
ofthe
is possible prior to resolution of
the case.
The theme in our analyses in these two comparative causes of action is
that Idaho courts take into consideration the significant complexities involved in
application of law, such as trial strategies and negotiation tactics, and wait until
all those complexities have resolved themselves prior to hearing a claim. Only

when a case has been concluded may one truly identify whether or not a
prosecution has be(~n malicious, whether an attorney has committed malpractice,
or, in the case at hand, whether an attorney has actedfraudulently
actedfraudulently or solely for
his own benefit. Therefore, we conclude that a cause ofaction
of action against one
party's opponent's attorney in litigation, based on conduct the attorney
ofthat
committed in the course of
that litigation, may not be properly institutedprior
instituted prior to
ofthat
that litigation, even where the allegedly aggrievedparty
aggrieved party
the resolution of
believes that the attorney in question has been acting outside the legitimate
ofrepresent,rtion
solelyfor
represent'ltion and solely
for his own benefit. Under this same
scope of
reasoning, the allegations of aiding and abetting in the commission of tortious
acts, although marginally pled, must await resolution of the Underlying Case.
Until the Underlying Case is resolved a court cannot determine whether any

MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'
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..tortious act was committed, let alone acts constituting the aiding and abetting of
those alleged tortious acts."
Based on the Supreme Court's holding in Taylor v. McNichols, res judicata did not apply
to bar the Plaintiffs' claims in this case. The Plaintiffs' claims, that Taylors committed perjury
and a fraud on the court in the prior litigation, were not ripe for judicial determination in that
action. As the Court held in Taylor v. McNichols, no cause of action could be filed until after that
lawsuit was ended, and the Plaintiffs sustained damages. In the present matter, the plaintiffs
sustained damages directly related to the tortious conduct of the defendants.
The Plaintiffs' claims were based solely on the conduct of Taylors during the prior
litigation. In essence there are ten (10)
(l0) key components alleged against the defendants in the
present matter that are proved by the defendants' own admissions. The following list sets out
these key components.

1. The Taylors in their individual capacity of beneficiaries of the trust filed their lawsuit
in January 2004 against Berkshire Investments, LLC, Thomas G. Maile, IV., and Colleen BirchMaile. On April 23, 2004" the Honorable Judge Ronald Wilper entered his Order Granting
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. The Taylors and the Rogers (successor trustees) and the

beneficiaries entered into a global "Disclaimer, Release & Indemnification Agreement" which
was dated July 15,2004. Under the terms of the Agreement the Taylors released the trustees
Beth and Andy Rogers from all liability relating to the administration of the trust. The
Agreement further provide:d that the Taylors would be appointed as successor trustees.
(Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part 2 Exhibit "B" referencing Agreement).
2. Defendant Connie Taylor authored a letter to Bart Harwood on April 14, 2004 which

MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTERDEFENDANTS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER- Pg 5
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-

stated, "The Taylors are not willing to give up theft rights as beneficiaries of the trust unless Beth
will affinn her prior factual statements in the fonn of an affidavit and agree to cooperate in the
action against Mr. Maile. If we aren't able to reach an agreement on that, they will see:k a full
accounting of the trust and a copy of the trust and estate tax returns" (Affidavit of Thomas Maile
Part One deposition of Beth Rogers Exhibit "B" referencing deposition exhibit 39).
3. Anned with the "Disclaimer, Release & Indemnification Agreement", the Taylors
acting as trustee of the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust filed a second lawsuit on July 19th,
2004. Berkshire Investment and the Mailes filed their motion to dismiss/motion for summary
judgment on October 20, 2004 alleging that the Taylors had not properly obtained jud:icial
appointment as successor trustees. In response to the motion before Judge Wilper, the: Taylors
filed their verified petition in the probate court on November 12, 2004, requesting the probate
court to appoint them as successor trustees of the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust. The
petition was executed by R. John Taylor as a verification of the facts contained in the petition.
Page 2 of the verified petition stated under oath, "the petitioner's 88-year-old mother., Helen

Taylor, is the sole remaining benefICiary ofthis
of this trust by virtue ofthe
of the terms ofa
of a Dis(~laimer,
Release and Indemnity Agreement." The pleading was prepared by Connie Taylor, attorney for
the plaintiffs. (Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part Two Exhibit "I") (emphasis added).
4. At the probate hearing on May 2, 2005 before the Honorable Judge Beiter, Mr. R.
John Taylor was sworn under oath and provided testimony before the Honorable Judge Beiter on
May 2,2005 and testified: page 14, In 4: Q. Will you explain to the court just briefly why it is
that you want to serve? 6 A. "Well, primarily, to pursue the claim for the trust. We have
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always thought it was a valid claim because I think that, for the benefit -- my mother is the
beneficiary of the trust, and we expect that we will eventually win on this claim." During that
same hearing Mr. Clark provided in his closing argument before Judge Beiter on June 5, 2005
provided: page 17, In 12:

MR. CLARK: "Yes. Just briefly, Judge. It seems to me that, based

upon, first, the agreement of the beneficiaries -- they have all indicated that the Taylors should
serve as co-trustees. The Taylors, pursuant to that same agreement, have a guarantee in the
disclaimer. So they have some interest in the proceeding. Their mother stands to gain and,
thereby, they have an interest in the proceeding." (Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part One transcript
of probate court hearing Exhibit "A").
5. The Honorable Judge Wilper entered his order granting in part and denying in part the
Berkshire Investments and the Mailes' Motion to Dismiss/Summary Judgment. The district
court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order on July 28, 2005 allowing the trust to amend
its complaint after the successor trustees received the required appointment by the probate court.
The district court did grant Berkshire Investments' and Mailes' motion in part ruling that the
Taylors and the trust had waived rights to rescind the contract as "once a party treats a contract
as valid after the appearance of facts giving rise to a right of recision, the right of recision is
waived." The District Court further found that the "Plaintiffs (Theodore L. Johnson Revocable
Trust and the Taylors), now with standing as trustees, did not act promptly to pursue rescission
once the grounds for it arose. Therefore, the Court hereby grants Defendants' motion with
respect to this claim" (Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part Two Memorandum Decision arld Order
on July 28,2005 Exhibit "K").
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6. The Idaho Supreme Court issued its decision in Taylor v. Maile I on December 23,
2005.
7. On March 9,2006, the Verified Amended Complaint was filed by the Taylors, and
prepared by the co-defendant attorneys. Page 1 of the Verified Amended Complaint stated under
oath, "Reed and R. John Taylor are residents of Nez Perce County, Idaho; DaHan Taylor is a

of the plaintiffs are residual benefICiaries ofthe
ofthe Theodore
resident of Ada County Idaho. All ofthe
L Johnson Trust." (The verified Amended Complaint is annexed to Amended Complaint and

Demand for Jury Trial as Exhibit "B") (emphasis added) .
8. The Taylors acting with and through their attorneys on February 13,2006, filed their
Motion For Summary Judgment On Beneficiaries' Claim. The first sentence of the motion
states, "Come Now Plaintiffs Reed, Dallan, and John Taylor hereafter referred to as "the
BenefICiary Plaintiffs". The Taylors again referring to themselves as plaintiffbenefidaries filed

the Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on Beneficiaries'
Claim on February 13,2006.
9. Ultimately the district court entered the" Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim" on
June 7, 2006 (emphasis added) (The Judgment is annexed to Amended Complaint and Demand
for Jury Trial as Exhibit "C").

1O. The individual Taylors and their counsel of record acting in unison as co-defendants
1O.
attempted to take advantage of Taylor v. Maile (1) by wrongfully asserting the Taylors were still
beneficiaries of the trust. The reason why the Taylors misrepresented their status as
beneficiaries is clear. Judge Wilper had declared "Once a party treats a contract as valid after the
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appearance of facts giving rise to a right of rescission, the right of rescission is waived". The
District Court further found that the "Plaintiffs (Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust and the
Taylors), now with standing as trustees, did not act promptly to pursue rescission once: the
grounds for it arose. The trust could not have rescinded the contract.
Berkshire and Mailes filed the complaint in this action alleging claims based on the
conduct of Taylors' and their counsel in the prior litigation. This Court granted the Taylors'
motion to dismiss those claims on the basis that res judicata applied and barred the plaintiffs'
claims. The Court's holding in Taylor v. McNichols stands for the proposition that res judicata
does not bar a suit against prior adversaries and their attorneys of record for conduct that
occurred in the prior litigation. The plaintiffs have alleged sufficient allegations that Connie
Taylor and Clark & Feene:y Law Firm were not attorneys who were acting within the scope of
their representation of their clients, but were acting for their sole benefit. They actively
participated and/or encouraged a "fraud upon a court", perjury and subordination of perjury.
(~ntered its "Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim", solely upon the direct
The district court (~ntered

material misrepresentations of the Taylors and their counsel of record. There is no dispute that
Connie Taylor's office, notarized her husband's signature on November 14th 2004, wherein her
then husband stated under oath in the verified petition before the probate court, at page two "the
petitioner's 88-year-old mother, Helen Taylor, is the sole remaining beneficiary of this trust by
virtue of the terms of a Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity Agreement"( attached as Exhibit "B"
to Affidavit of Thomas Maile). All defendants had actual knowledge of the true facts as to who
was the beneficiary of the trust.
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The amended complaint alleges that defendants, Connie Wright Taylor, f/k/a
flk/a Connie
Taylor, and Paul T. Clark, and Clark and Feeney, a partnership participated, directly or
indirectly, and engaged in multiple instances of "theft", "false pretense", and "peIjury"in
violation of Idaho Law. Specifically, the allegations of the complaint assert the defendants
engaged in multiple instances of "false pretense", "theft" and "peIjury" in violation ofIdaho
Code Sections 18-2403 arId 19-2116. Idaho Code Sections 18-2401, 18-2403, 18
182407(l)(a)(2)(3)(b)(l), 18-7803, 18-5401, 18-5410, 18-5406, 18-5408, I.C. 19-1430, 19-1431
2407(1)(a)(2)(3)(b)(1),
18-2403,18-2407(l)(a)(2)(3)(b)(l), and Section 19
(peIjury) and Idaho Code Sections 18-3401 18-2403,18-2407(1)(a)(2)(3)(b)(1),
192116 (theft-obtaining property by false pretense) Code Sections 18-2403.
The contention is simple; that the Taylors and their counsel of record committed multiple
criminal acts and committed fraud in representing the Taylors' status as beneficiaries which was
the very foundation'to the ultimate "Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims". The Taylors'
counsel was not acting in a "legitimate representation" role of their clients when they actively
participated in the illegal activity alleged in the present matter. As stated in Taylor, supra, "an
attorney engaging in fraud is likewise acting in a manner foreign to his duties as an attorney"
(Taylor v. McNichols" supra @ p. 13).

Moreover, the attorney co-defendants were acting for their own benefit and not in their
client's interests in perpetrating this fraud. They had entered into a contingent fee agreement
with the Taylors to share in the proceeds of any settlement, judgment or proceeds. (Affidavit of
Thomas Maile Part 4 filed
filecl February 2,2009). The attorneys attempted to increase their potential
recovery by perpetrating the fraud. The defendants in the underlying case were advancing the
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theory for damages that the 40 acre parcel was valued at $800,000.00 instead of the $400,000.00
valuation arrived at by an independent real estate appraiser. The property in 2006 allegedly was
worth $1,800,000.00 in value. What would be better to obtain a 1/3 interest in property allegedly
valued at $1,800,000.00 or a 1/3 interest in $400,000.00?

CONCLUSION
Based upon the re(;ent
re<;ent ruling of the Idaho Supreme Court in Taylor v. McNichols, the
Plaintiffs' claims in this case were not barred by res judicata, and could properly be asserted.
Further, there can be no abuse of process or tortious interference of prospective business
advantage in light of the filct that the Plaintiffs' claims were viable, and legally recognizable
claims against the defendEmts at the time that they were brought.
Therefore, the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants respectively request the Court to reconsider
(1) Memorandum Decision & Order entered July 2, 2009, (2) Order Denying Plaintiff's
Summary Judgment entered July 20,2009, (3) the Judgment Dismissing Plaintiffs Claims
entered 07/20/2009, together with (4) the Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary

06123/2009 in light of the new Law
Judgment on the Defendants' Counterclaims entered on 06/23/2009
rendered in the Idaho Supreme Court case captioned, Taylor v. McNichols, 36130, 36131
(IDSCCI), decided on September 3, 2010
DATED this 28 th clay of September, 2010.

Attorney for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
<correct
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 28 th day of September, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing (1) PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
RECONSIDER, (2) AFFIDAVII
AFFIDAVII OF CHRIST TROUPIS IN SUPPORT
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER, together with (3)
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO RECONSIDER, to be delivered, addressed as follows:
i Connie W. Taylor
I
!

I

I

CLARK and FEENEY
P.O. Drawer 785
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160

Thomas G. Maile, IV.
380 W. State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
~imile: (208) 939-1001

(X)
( )
( )
( )

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

( )
( )
( X)
()

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

l

t1b22 jJ
t!b22

TR~

CHRIST T.
Plaintiffs/CounterCo-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter
Defendants
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Attorneys for Defendants Connie Wright Taylor fka
T. Clark
Connie Taylor, Clark and Feeney, and Paul 1.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,

Case No. CV-OC-0723232

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
MOTION TO RECONSIDER

Plaintiffs,
vs.
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, fka CONNIE
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN TAYLOR,
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a
T. CLARK, an individual;
partnership; PAUL 1.
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUST, an Idaho revocable trust; JOHN
DOES 1-JOHN
I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL
PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR CLAIMING
ANY RIGHT TO POSSESSION,
Defendants.
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Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants filed a motion to reconsider this Court's
Memorandum Decision and Order of July 2,2009, and other associated orders and judgments
denying plaintiffs' summary judgment motion and dismissing plaintiffs' claims. The basis for
the motion to reconsider is one paragraph of the 31-page Idaho Supreme Court opinion in Taylor
fi led September 3,2010.
3, 2010. Plaintiffs argue that this Court's finding that resjudicaro
res judicata
v. McNichols, filed

ban-ed their claims was incon-ect because, according to the Taylor v. McNichols, opinion, their
claims could not have been raised in the case decided by Judge Wilper.
The Court's Memorandum Decision and Order was correct. Taylor v. McNichols
and other recent Idaho Supreme Court cases actually provide additional support for this Court's
decision.
ARGUMENT
I.

TAYLOR V. A-fCNICHOLS
ft,fCNICHOLS DOES NOT AFFECT THE ANALYSIS OF THIS

COURT'S SUMMARY DECISION.
Plaintiffs' brief can be summed up by the following quotation:
The Court's holding in Taylor v. McNichols stands for the
proposition that that res judicata does not bar a suit against prior
adversaries and their attorneys of record for conduct that occurred
in the prior litigation. The plaintiffs have alleged sufficient
Finn were
allegations that Connie Taylor and Clark & Feeney Law Firm
not attorneys who were acting within the scope of their
representation of their clients, but were acting for their sole benefit.
representatLon
They actively participated and/or encouraged a "fraud upon a
court", perjury and subordination of perjury."
Memorandum Briefin Support of Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants' Motion to

Reconsid~r,

p. 9.

Taylor v. lvlcNichols did not stand for the proposition that plaintiffs espouse.

Rather, the Supreme Court did not address whether the claims were barred by resjlldicata
because they were premature. Instead, the court went on to rule that the complaints in that case
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were barred by the litigation privilege, failed to state a claim of malpractice because of a lack of
standing and failed to state a claim of fraud against the attomey defendants. Of the four reasons
identified in the court's conclusion for dismissal of the lawsuit, only the fourth reason, that the
claims were not ripe for litigation, remotely related to a res judicata analysis.
This Court's Memorandum Decision and Order is surprisingly consistent with the
\'. McNichols decision that came along more than a year later. Page 9 of
o[the
Tavlor v.
the
Memorandum Decision and Order accurately pointed out to plaintiffs that it was not the legal
theory espoused that controlled the claim preclusion analysis. Yet, plaintiffs continue to rename
their standing issues in an attempt to claim that they have not had the opportunity to litigate the
issues. As this Court stated on page 10 of the Decision, a comparison of the facts alleged in the
present case to the facts alleged in the prior cases, "leaves no doubt that these claims relate to the
same transaction that gave rise to the first cases." The issues regarding the beneficiaries of the
trust were extensively litigated in the prior cases.
Plaintiffs' argument raised in their motion to reconsider is the same argument
raised previously, as shown by the following quotation from page 11 of the Court's
Memorandum Decision and Order:
Although the argument is not always easy to follow, Berkshire's
claims presented here all hinge on the assertion that the Taylors
and their counsel committed a fraud on Judge Beiter by filing a
petition for appointment as Trustees that contained a false
statement. This statement somehow led Judge Beiter to appoint
the Taylors as Trustees, giving them standing to bring the suit
which ultimately led to Judge Wilper's determination that the
underlying real estate transaction was void. This led to the loss of
the property. The loss of the property, in tum is what caused the
damages in this case. Since those damages only arose after Judge
Wilper's final judgment, this action could not have been brought
WiJper's
earlier. Therefore, it is not barred by res judicata. In other words,
the loss ofthe prior suit gives rise to the cause of action in this
case.
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Now, the Taylor v. McNichols case simply provides plaintiffs with another
citation for their argument that, "the loss of the prior suit gives rise to the cause of action in this
case. "
The Court's decision correctly concluded that the plaintiffs' claims in this case
involve the same transaction that was conclusively decided in the prior lawsuits. An attempt to
avoid the application of res judicata by alleging "fraud on the court" is exactly the type of evil
that this Court and the Idaho Supreme Court in Compton v. Compton feared.
The independent action in equity is a most unusual remedy,
available only rarely and under the most exceptional
circumstances. It is most certainly not its function to relitigate the
issues determined in another action between the same parties, or to
remedy the inadvertence or oversight of one of the parties to the
original action. It will lie only the presence of an extreme degree
of fraud.

COlllptonv. Compton, 101 Idaho 328, 335,612P.2d
335, 612 P.2d 1175,1182(1980).
The same issues, disguised only slightly, were raised and litigated in Judge Wilper's court. This
Court should not relitigate them.
II.

TAYLOR V. AfCNICHOLS SUPPORTS THIS COURT'S DECISION.

The Idaho Supreme Court in Taylor v. McNichols contained a lengthy discussion
of
judicial notice and invited error before it broke new ground concerning the law on the
ofjudicial
litigation privilege. In doing so, the court discussed the same tactics that plaintiffs in this case
are attempting. The court was concerned about protecting attorneys from actions by their
opposing parties, whose real purpose may be to deter the effective representation of the adverse
party. The Supreme Court, at page 18 of its Opinion, adopted the litigation privilege as an
absolute privilege that only applied to an attorney acting within the scope of his or her
employment and not solely for the attorney's personal interest.
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Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration alleges, without any factual support, that the
attorneys were 110t
not acting within the scope of their representation of their clients, but were acting
for their sole benefit. They cite the contingent fee agreement and conclude their argument with
the following question:
What would be better to obtain a one-third interest in property
allegedly valued at $1,800,000 or a one-third interest in $400,000?
If this question was an attempt at an argument, the argument would be that an attorney with a
contingent fee agreement is acting solely for his or her own benefit, rather than the benefit of the
client. It ignores the fact that the client would receive the other two-thirds 00 f the recovery and
thus would be twice as interested in a large recovery. The "argument" also implies that a
plaintiff has no interest in increasing the size of a judgment. Plaintiffs lack support for their
argument and actually support the opposite conclusion. Attorneys on contingent fees share the
same interest as their clients. Maximizing a recovery not only benefits the attorney, bLlt also
benefits the client. The litigation privilege adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court in Taylor v.

McNichols supports this Court's Memorandum Decision and Order granting summary judgment.
The majority of the court in Taylor v. McNichols addressed several other issues
that Judge Hosack deemed unnecessary in his concurring opinion. The court held that a legal
malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty claim could not be brought by someone who did not
have an attorney-client relationship with the defendants. The court also found that Reed Taylor
had failed to adequately plead the nine elements of fraud. Berkshire also attempts to bring a
bad
legal malpractice and fraud claim against attorneys who did not represent Berkshire. Berkshire
has failed to allege or support several of the nine fraud elements. In fact, after repeatedly
pointing out the alleged inconsistency concerning the trust beneficiaries, there is no possibility
that Berkshire could prove that it was ignorant of the falsity of the statement, that it relied upon
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the statement, or that its reliance was justifiable. Even without applying res judicata principles,
this Court should have dismissed Berkshire's claims of fraud for failure to state them with
particularity.

III.

RECENT CASES PROVIDE ADDITIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE COURT'S
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER.
In two recent cases, the Idaho Supreme Court has dealt with "fraud upon the

court" allegations. Waller v. State, 146 Idaho 234, 192 P.3d 1058 (2008); Rae v. Bunce, 145
.3d 654 (2008). Both cases involve independent actions to reverse earlier
Idaho 798, 186 P
P.3d
decisions. Both cases cited Compton v. Compton and affim1ed dismissals of the actions. In

Waller, the court held that Waller was not entitled to equitable relief because his failure to
present a defense was the result of his own neglect. 146 Idaho at 240. In Rae, the COlift held that
there was no factual basis for the allegations of fraud upon the court. The court went on to state
that the allegedly wrongful conduct was known by Rae prior to the adverse decision, could have
been contested by affidavits setting forth her version of what occurred, and could have been the
subject of a motion to amend the findings or a motion to reopen the case to take additional
evidence. Finally, the court stated that:
An independent action to set aside a judgment based upon alleged
fraud upon the court is not a substitute for actions that could have
been taken in the trial court to correct prejudice from allegedly
wrongful conduct.
145 Idaho at 805.
Berkshire is simply attempting to substitute an independent action for fraud for
arguments that it raised or could have raised in Judge Wilper's court. Berkshire's request that
this Court substitute its opinion for Judge Wilper's opinion should once again be rejected.
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IV.

CONCLUSION

Taylor v. A1cNichois does not invalidate the Memorandum Decision aI:id
aGd Order,

but supports it. Additional cases also support the decision. Therefore, plaintiffs' motion for
reconsideration should be denied.
DATED this

J.'M. day of October, 2010.
-.I'M
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED
,-"
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"

I

/./1
./
/ ../1
./
By
v-2//
v-2/r
Mark . Prusynski - of the r~l
Attorn ys for Defendants Con l1ie Wright
Taylor fka Connie Taylor, Clark and
Feeney, and Paul T. Clark
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 12th day of October, 2010, I caused a tme and
correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO
RECONSIDER to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Thomas G. Maile IV
LA W OFFICES OF THOMAS G MAILE IV, P.A.
S1.
380 W. State St.
Eagle, ID 83616-4902
Facsimi
Ie (208) 939-1001
Facsimile
Christ T. Troupis
TROUPIS LA W OFFICE, PA
P.O. Box 2408
Eagle,lD 83616
Eagle,ID
Facsimile (208) 938-5482
Connie W. Taylor
CLARK & FEENEY
S1., Suite 201
1229 Main St.,
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, ID 83501-0285
Facsimile (208) 746-9160

(;) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(;)U.S.
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

((.1U.S.
.1'U. S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
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(

?,U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
) Hand Delivered
) Overnight Mail
) Facsimile

~lt~&~1
~lt~&~1
MarkS. Pmsynski
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549 fda county CIerI,
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE
'
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130
PO Box 2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone:
208/938-5584
Facsimile:
208/938-5482
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com
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OCT 2 1 20110
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
By J. RANDALL
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Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
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---- ---_
._
I BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
· Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
Case No. CV-OC-0723232
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCHBIRCH
MAILE, husband and wife,
REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF

Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,
· v.

IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTERPLAINTIFFS/COUNTER
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
RECONSIDER

CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a
I CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR,
TA
YLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR,
TA
YLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
· REVOCABLE TRUST, ~m Idaho revocable
-J01-IN DOES X; AND
trust; JOHN DOES I -J01lN
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
, CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
'-----------------~-----.------------.'-----------------~--------------------

COMES NOW the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants by and through their undersigned co
cocounsel of record, Christ T. Troupis, and provides this Honorable Court with the following reply
memorandum brief in support of Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants' Motion to Reconsider" as
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follows.

LEGAL ARGUMENT
of action based upon the
The Taylor v. McNichols decision held that a cause ofaction
of opposing counsel during litigation accrues only after the
fraudulent condut:t ofopposing
underlying litigation is concluded.
In their opposition, Taylors miss the entire point ofthe Taylor ruling. They compare
inconsequential factual differences from that case to ours in an attempt to obfuscate the fact that
the Taylor decision is controlling law here. The Defendants assert (1) that Berkshire and Mailes'
dismissed claims were for legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty, and (2) that the only
basis for the contention that Taylors acted for "their sole benefit" was their contingent fee
interest. The Defendants' contentions entirely misconstrue the basis for this motion to reconsider.
The Plaintiffs claims are based on the fact that (1) Taylors' and their counsel perpetrated
a fraud upon the court during the prior litigation and obtained their judgment on the basis of that
fraud, (2) that their fraudulent misconduct could not in any way be considered proper
representation of the client, Helen Taylor, the sole beneficiary of the trust, and (3) Berkshire and
Mailes' claims for this misconduct could only be brought in a subsequent lawsuit. The:
contingent fee simply provides additional evidence of the Defendants' personal interest in
perpetrating the fraud in order to obtain a judgment.
The Court in Taylor refers to an underlying case brought by Reed Taylor against AlA
Services and other individual defendants. The Taylor suit was a second lawsuit that allieged
alIeged
misconduct of opposing counsel in the underlying lawsuit. Reed Taylor brought this second
lawsuit while the Underlying lawsuit was pending. The Court noted:
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"Reed asserted claims against Respondents for: (1) aiding and abetting
assisting others in the commission of tortious acts in the Underlying Case;
conversion and misappropriation of the AlA Entities' corporate assets;
violations of Idaho's Consumer Protection Act, I.e. § 48-601 et seq.; and
professional negligence and/or breach of fiduciary duties."

or
(2)
(3)
(4)

The Defendants argue that this Court correctly concluded that the Plaintiffs' claims about
the Defendants' misconduct during the prior litigation "involved the same transaction," Def.
Memo, p. 4, and therefore should have been brought in that litigation. They also argue that this
Court's ruling is consistent with the Court's holding in Taylor v. McNichols.
For the Supreme Court's decision in Taylor to be consistent with this Court's
Memorandum Decision, the Supreme Court would have held that Reed Taylor was required to
bring his claims for litigation misconduct against opposing counsel in the Underlying lawsuit.
That was not the Court's ruling. Contrary to the Defendants' analysis, the Taylor decision
created new law not only on the scope oflitigation privilege, but also on where and when a
lawsuit may be brought against an attorney for misconduct during litigation. The Taylor decision
delineates clearly that a cause of action based on an attorney's misconduct during litigation does
not accrue until the underlying case is concluded, because that is when damages are incurred.
Therefore, a claim for litigation misconduct cannot be brought either in the underlying litigation,
or prior to the time that litigation is concluded. The Court noted:
The circumst,mces of this case raise an important question. Where the
conduct of opposing counsel falls outside the protection of the litigation privilege,
when may a cause of action be instituted against that attorney? As we apply the
modern litigation privilege for the first time in this case we have no precedent
directly on point, and instead consider analogous actions -- those for legal
malpractice and malicious prosecution.
The Taylor Court spent a considerable time analyzing prior cases that it found analogous
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to the Taylor's claims. It discussed legal malpractice for guidance, but held that the same
principles also applied to malicious prosecution, or any fraudulent conduct by an attorney during
the course oflitigation. The Taylor Court stated:
We have previously indicated, in a case dealing with legal malpractice, that, as
objective proof in support of actual damages is required for recovery, the statute
of limitations for a legal malpractice claim does not begin to run until the
litigation forming the basis of that claim has concluded. City ofMcCall
of McCall v. Buxton,
146 Idaho 656, 661, 201 P.3d 629, 634 (2009). The clear reasoning behind this
decision was that the cause of action cannot arise until damages are incurred, and
the attorney's conduct can be reviewed under the totality ofthe case. See id.
The elements that must be shown to recover on the basis of malicious prosecution
are found in Badell v. Beeks, specifically: "(1) That there was a prosecution; (2)
That it terminated in favor of the plaintiff; (3) That the defendant was the
prosecutor; (4) Malice; (5) Lack of probable cause; and (6) Damages sustained by
the plaintiff." 115 Idaho 101, 102, 765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988) (emphases added).
As in cases for legal malpractice based on conduct occurring during the course of
a trial, in order to bring a malicious prosecution claim there must be damages :md
,md
it must be determined that the suit was groundless, neither of which is possible
prior to resolution of the case.
The theme in our analyses in these two comparative causes of action is that Idaho
courts take into consideration the significant complexities involved in application
of law, such as trial strategies and negotiation tactics, and wait until all those
complexities have resolved themselves prior to hearing a claim. Only when a case
has been concluded may one truly identify whether or not a prosecution has been
malicious, whether an attorney has committed malpractice, or, in the case at hand,
whether an attorney has acted fraudulently!l!. solely for his own benefit (emphasis
added).
The plaintiffs in the present case have alleged a claim of abuse of process against the
Taylors and their attorneys in affirmatively making false statements under oath to obtain the
"Judgment on Beneficiariles' Claims". The defendants are alleged to be joint tortfeasors,
improperly using the judieial system by perpetuating false verified pleadings and submitting
other pleadings before judicial tribunals that were materially false in light of the judicial
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admissions of both the defendant attorneys and their clients.
1 Am. Jur. 2d Abuse of Process § 21 Attorneys provides:
A non-client may bring a cause of action against an attorney for abuse of process.
The absolute privilege that protects attorneys from liability for defamation
occurring in the course of a judicial proceeding does not provide an attorney with
an absolute defense to liability for abuse of process. Thus, an attorney may be
liable for damages for abuse of process where the acts complained of are personal
acts, or are the acts of others wholly instigated and carried on by the attorney.
Observation: The scope of an attorney's implied authority as an agent should not,
as a matter oflaw, extend to acts which constitute an abuse oflegal process. In
order to state a claim for abuse of process against an attorney, a plaintiff must
establish that the alleged misconduct resulted primarily from the attorney's
ulterior motive or malice. However, the mere institution of legal action by an
attorney does not constitute abuse of process, even where it is purportedly done
with an improper purpose or motive; there must be a showing that the attorney
performed some additional act in the use of the legal process that is not proper in
the regular prosecution of the proceedings.
The facts of record establish that the defendant attorneys participated before the probate
court in submitting a verified petition that judicially admitted that Helen Taylor was the "sole
beneficiary ofthe trust". Judge Wilper would not have entered the Judgment but for the
affirmative perjured statements that" All of the plaintiffs are residual beneficiaries of the
Theodore L. Johnson Trust." The Taylors acting with and through their attorneys on February

13,2006, filed their Motion For Summary Judgment On Beneficiaries' Claim. The first sentence
of the motion states, "Come Now Plaintiffs Reed, Dallan, and John Taylor hereafter referred to
as "the Beneficiary Plaintiffs". Those statements based upon their prior verified petition and
other declarations against interest, amount to perjury, subordination of perjury, and obtaining
property by false pretenses, which is more than fraud. It constitutes criminal conduct.
The global "Disclaimer, Release & Indemnification Agreement, provides: "1.2

REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTERDEFENDANTS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER- Pg 5

001796

Disclaimer of All Other Interests
.... 1.2.3 : Reed Taylor, Dallan 1. Taylor..., R. John Taylor....,
Taylor.. .. ,
Interests....
compromising all of the children of Helen Taylor, hereby disclaim all interests whatsoever in the
Trust, in favor of their mother, Helen Taylor, and hereby approve immediate distribution to
Helen Taylor." The Agreement further provided that the Taylors would be appointed as
successor trustees and that they disclaimed any and all rights as beneficiaries.
an rights as
Prior to the Taylors executing the Disclaimer agreement abdicating any and aU
beneficiaries, Defendant Connie Taylor authored a letter to Bart Harwood on April 14, 2004
th'e trust
which stated, "The Taylors are not willing to give up their rights as beneficiaries of th,e
unless Beth will affirm her prior factual statements in the form of an affidavit and agree to
cooperate in the action against Mr. Maile. If we aren't able to reach an agreement on that, they
will seek a full accounting of the trust and a copy of the trust and estate tax returns". The letter of
Connie Taylor of April 14, 2004 is critical in understanding how the Taylors truly disclaimed
disdaimed
their interest as residual heneficiaries of the trust.
The allegations set forth in the amended complaint show that peIjury and subornation of
peIjury was committed in obtaining the "Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims". The verified
pleading in probate prepared by the defendant attorneys, executed by co-defendant R. John
Taylor and notarized by the co-defendants' employees established that Helen Taylor is the sole
beneficiary of the trust. Some 14 months later, the verified amended complaint filed before
Judge Wilper's district court prepared by the defendant attorneys, executed by co-defe:ndant R.
John Taylor and notarized by the co-defendants' employees asserted the Taylors are residual
beneficiaries of the trust. The judicial admissions and declarations against interest establish that
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there is a showing that the: attorneys performed "some additional act in the use of the legal
process that is not proper in the regular prosecution of the proceedings". Perjury and/or
subornation of perjury is an improper purpose in the regular prosecution of the proceedings.
Per;ury
Perjury and/or subordination ofper;u" is not an act performed in the proper course of
legitimate representation ofa client. (Taylor v. McNichols).

The Defendants argue that the Court's holding on litigation privilege in Taylor v.
McNichols supports this Court's Memorandum Decision. That is not correct. If, as we have
alleged and the facts show, the Defendants acted fraudulently during the prior litigation, that
conduct is clearly not protected by the litigation privilege. Moreover, that conduct gives rise to a
claim that, per the Taylor v. McNichols holding, can only be brought in a second subsequent
action.
As noted above, the Plaintiffs' claims were not for legal malpractice, but abust: of process
and fraud. Moreover, the same conduct gives rise to causes of action under other legal theories,
including negligence. Generally, one owes a duty to every person in our society to use
reasonable care to avoid injury to the other person in any situation in which it could be
reasonably anticipated or foreseen that a failure to use such care might result in such injury. Doe
v. Garcia, 131 Idaho 578, 581, 961 P.2d 1181, 1184 (1998) (quoting Alegria v. Payonk, 101

Idaho 617, 619, 619 P.2d 135, 137 (1980)) (emphasis in original). There is a "general rule that
each person has a duty of care to prevent unreasonable, foreseeable risks of harm to others." Id.
(quoting Sharp v. WH Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297,300,796 P.2d 506, 509 (1990). This
principle of law is independent of any allegation of legal malpractice.
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In addition, the Plaintiffs alleged that the Defendants' fraudulent conduct in thi~
th~ prior
litigation violated the Idaho Racketeering Statute. The Idaho Racketeering Statue sets forth
remedies that specifically provide that property may be restored to anyone that has been
subjected to violations of Title 18, Chapter 78 of the Idaho Code. The facts establish that an
enterprise was created by the co-defendants to obtain an interest in real property (Affidavit Part 4
Exhibit "W" Contingent Fee Agreement between the attorneys, Clark and Feeney, and Taylors).
The activities of the defendants in committing perjury, suborning perjury, obtaining money by
false pretenses, and filing false pleadings to the courts, asserting the Taylors as residual
beneficiaries, amounts to violations ofldaho
ofIdaho Law and racketeering activity. I.C. 18-7804
provides that is it is unlawful "for any person who has received any proceeds derived directly or
indirectly from a pattern of racketeering activity in which the person has participated, to use or
invest, directly or indirectly, any part of the proceeds or the proceeds derived from the
investment or use thereof in the acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation
of, any enterprise or real property". Through the combined efforts of the co-defendants, can be
no dispute that real properlty was acquired as a result of the alleged criminal activity.
The Plaintiffs in this case did not sustain damages until the "Judgment on Beneficiaries'
Claim" was entered and re,corded
re'corded in the prior action. The cause of action they alleged in the
present case did not exist until those damages had accrued, which was after the prior case was
concluded. So, it was impossible for the Plaintiffs here to bring these claims in the prior case.
Claim preclusion does not bar causes of action that were not ripe for judicial determination.

Nat!' Bankv. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 283-84,824 P.2d 841,858-59
Idaho First Natl.
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(1991).
The plaintiffs nevt::r had a cause of action against the defendants until the wrongful
actions of the defendants resulted in the loss of the real property. The time of taking occurs, and
hence the cause of action accrues, as of the time that the full extent of the plaintiffs loss of use
and enjoyment of the property becomes apparent. McCuskey v. Canyon County Commissioners
128 Id. 213,128 Idaho 213 (1996). In the present case, the doctrine of res judicata does not
apply, since the plaintiffs had no cause of action that stemmed from the same operative facts of
the 2002 real estate transaction. See generally Sagewillow, Inc., v. Idaho Dept. o/Water
Resources, 138 Idaho 83 t, 835-36, 70 P.3d 669, 673-74 (2003). The plaintiffs were damaged
solely by the wrongful conduct of the defendants in 2006 during the prior litigation. The
plaintiffs' claims for relief are unrelated to the real estate closing in 2002. The operati ve facts
involved in the prior litigation were an alleged breach of fiduciary duty by the property
purchaser, and whether tht:: successor trustee's alleged conflict of interest gave rise to a
requirement of notice in 2002 to beneficiaries of the trust. The present action is based upon the
wrongful conduct of the ddendants in the misuse of the judicial process itself which occurred in
2006.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court held in Taylor v. McNichols that a claim for litigation misconduct
against opposing counsel cannot be brought in the underlying lawsuit because of litigation
privilege, and cannot be brought until the prior action is concluded because damages have not
accrued until the underlying action is concluded. The Defendants have not advanced any
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argument or presented any authority to show that the Plaintiffs' claims do not fit within this
ruling. The Plaintiffs hav~: set forth various claims for relief for damages in addition to the
equitable relief requested based upon fraudulent misconduct by the Defendants and their counsel.
The defendants have not argued in opposition to any of the claims of damages asserted by the
plaintiffs. There needs to be a substantive analysis of the claims in light of the Idaho Supreme
Court case captioned, Taylor v. McNichols, 36130, 36131 (lDSCCI),
(IDSCCI), decided on September 3,
2010. It is respectfully submitted that the Court's prior Memorandum Decision should and
Judgment should be withdrawn based upon these facts.
DATED this 20 th day of October, 2010.

tJ0)~
&d2~

TRO~o-counsel
TRo~o-eounsel

CHRIST T.
Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants

for
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Facsimile:
208/938-5482
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com
Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

I BE~SHI~
BE~SHI~ INVm;-Th-IE~-TS-,-LL-C-,-an---.--·---------------
LL-C-,-an---.-----------------. Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
BIRCHMAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH
. MAILE, husband and wife,

Case No. CV-OC-0723232
CV -OC-0723232

CORRECTION TO REPLY
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN'
SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTERPLAINTIFFS/COUNTER
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
RECONSIDER

Plaintiffs/Counte:r-Defendants,
v.

£'kIa
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, £'k/a
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
individual;. R. JOHN
TAYLOR, an individual;,
individual:. CLARK and
TAYLOR, an individual:,
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
, an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable

trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
, POSSESSION.
III

L . . . . ._

_

Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
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COMES NOW the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants by and through their undersigned co
cocounsel of record, Christ T. Troupis, and submits the following correction to the Reply
Memorandum Brief in support of
ofPlaintiffsiCounter-Defendants'
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants' Motion to Reconsider, as
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208-938-5482

Christ Troupis

Oct 26 10 09:12a
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follows.
Memorandum. Plaintiffs incorrectly stated that Helen Taylor, the sole
In their Reply Memorandum,
beneficiary of the trust, w.as the client of the Defendant attorneys in the prior lawsuit. As the

Court is aware, the Defendant attorneys did not represent Helen Taylor in the prior action. The
mistake in making that statement was inadvertent and due to counsel's drafting error.
DATED this 26th day of October, 2010.

/!L/}~

~

/.. /' ."

T. TRO~

CIDuST
Cl-OOST
co-counse:l for
Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130
PO Box 2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone:
208/938-5584
Facsimile:
208/938-5482
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com
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OCT 2 9 2010
NAVARI~O, Clerk
J. DAVID NAVARI~O,
8yJ. RANDAU
ByJ.
DEPUTY

Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
------------

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
BIRCH
, MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH, MAILE, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Count~~r- Defendants,
Plaintiffs/Count~~r-

CV -OC-0723232
Case No. CV-OC-0723232
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTERPLAINTIFFS/COUNTER
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
REPLY TO COUNTERCLAIM AND
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

v.
flkla
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TA YLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR,
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
. REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
: trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
. ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMn"fG ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
co
COMES NOW the Plaintiffs/Counter-defendant by and through their undersigned cocounsel of record, Christ T. Troupis, and pursuant to Rule 15 of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure, moves this Court for an Order allowing Plaintiffs to amend their Reply to
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Counterclaim and Demand for Jury Trial to assert additional affirmative defenses, to clarify
certain defenses in light of the recent decision rendered in the Idaho Supreme Court case
captioned, Taylor v. McNichols, 36130, 36131 (lDSCCI),
(IDSCCI), decided on September 3,2010, which
established new law with respect to claims that are based on the conduct of parties and their
attorneys in litigation and for other reasons.
This Motion is supported by the Affidavit of Christ Troupis, filed concurrently herewith,
and upon the file and record in this matter.
ORAL ARGUMENT is requested upon the motion.
DATED this 29th day of October, 2010.

C~R:?-=IS=--'

CHRIST T. TRO IS, - - - - - 
Plaintiffs/CounterCo-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter
Defendants
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Connie W. Taylor
CLARK and FEENEY
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549
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Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STA
TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE
,--'---'" . - - -
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, BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCHi MAILE, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,
i

v.

I

.----_
- ,

...• - .

CV -OC-0723232
Case No. CV-OC-0723232
AFFIDAVIT OF CHRIST TROUPIS
IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTERPLAINTIFFS/COUNTER
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
REPLY
REPL Y TO COUNTERCLAIM AND
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

TAYLOR,
f/k/a
CONNIE WRIGHT TA
YLOR, flkla
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
: TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
• CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
i

!

I

Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss:
County of Ada)
CHRIST T. TROUPIS, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

co-·counsel of record in this matter and the Ada County Case No. CV OC
Your Affiant is co--counsel
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ofPlaintiffs/counter04-00473D. Your Affiant makes this Affidavit in support of
Plaintiffs/counter
defendants' Motion to Reply to Counterclaim and Demand for Jury Trial. That the
information and facts set forth herein are based upon your affiant's personal knowledge
and/or observations and can testify as to the truth ofthe matters asserted herein if called
upon as a witness at the trial ofthis matter.
2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of the of Plaintiffs' proposed
Amended Reply to Counterclaim and Demand for Jury Trial regarding Counterclaimants
Clark & Feeney, is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by this
reference.

3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy of the of Plaintiffs' proposed
Amended Reply to Counterclaim and Demand for Jury Trial regarding Counter-claimants
Taylors is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by this reference.
DATED this 29th day of October, 2010.

CHRIST TROUPIS(co-counsel for Plaintiffs/
Plaintiffsl
Counter-defendants

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME, a Notary Public in and for said State,
this 29 day of October, 2010.
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130
PO Box 2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone:
208/938-5584
Facsimile:
208/938-5482
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

· BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
·. Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCHBIRCH
: MAILE, husband and wife,

CV -OC-0723232
Case No. CV-OC-0723232

I

Plaintiffs,
v.

ru;PLY
PROPOSED AMENDED ro;PLY
TO AMENDED ANSWER OF
CONNIE TAYLOR, CLARK AND
FEENEY AND PAUL T. CLARK
AND COUNTERCLAIM

f/k/a
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, flk/a
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR,
TA
YLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR,
TA
YLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
•: an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, fm Idaho revocable
·. trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
Defendants.
I

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _- - 1 - - . - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - .-1'

COMES NOW the above named Plaintiffs/Counter-defendant by and through their
undersigned co-counsel of record, Christ T. Troupis hereby provide their Amended Reply to
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Defendants' Amended Answer of Connie Wright Taylor, Clark and Feeney and Paul T. Clark
and Counterclaim and further complain and allege as follows:
1. Plaintiffs' deny each and every allegation of Defendants' Amended Answer of Connie
Wright Taylor, Clark and Feeney, and Paul T. Clark Trust and Counterclaim which is 110t
specifically admitted herein.

2. Plaintiffs admit the allegations set forth in paragraph I of the Counter-Claim.
3. That based upon information and belief, plaintiffs admit paragraph 2, that under the
fee agreement all defendants assert an ownership interest in Linder Road real property.
4. Plaintiffs specifically deny paragraphs 3,
3,4,5,6
4,5,6 of the Counter-Claim.

FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiffs affirmatively allege that the defendants have been required to return the
purchase price of $400,000.00 by previous court proceedings. The same remains unpaid,
including interest thereon ,md the plaintiffs are entitled to a "vendee's lien" on the subject real
property pursuant to the previous court proceedings and further pursuant to Idaho

Codt:~

section

45-804. That in addition, the plaintiffs herein have previously filed their Lis Pendens in the prior
proceedings which remains of record with the Ada County Recorder's Office, as further
Jlien. That such liens are superior to the Lis Pendens herein ,md as
protection of the vendee's llien.
such the Lis Pendens filed herein has not impaired the title to the subject real property ,md as
such the claims set forth in the counter-claim are barred in the present action.

SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiffs have alleged allegations of wrongful conduct in violation of Chapter 18 Title 78
of the Idaho Code. That plaintiffs are availed of certain remedies set forth below including but
PROPOS]~D REPLY TO AMENDED ANSWER OF CONNIE TAYLOR,
EXIDBIT "A" PROPOS]~D
CLARK AND FEENEY AND PAUL T. CLARK AND COUNTERCLAIM - Pg 2
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not limited to:
18-7804 PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES -- PENALTIES.
(a) It is unlawful for any person who has received any proceeds derived
directly or indirectlly from a pattern of racketeering activity in which the person
has participated, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of the proceeds or
the proceeds derived from the investment or use thereof in the acquisition of any
interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise or real property.
Whoever violates this subsection is guilty of a felony.
18-7805 RACKETEERING -- CIVIL REMEDIES.
(a) A person who sustains injury to his person, business or property by a
pattern of racketeering activity may file an action in the district court for the
recovery of three (3) times the actual damages proved and the cost of the suit,
including reasonable attorney's fees.
(c) The district court has jurisdiction to prevent, restrain and remedy
racketeering after making provisions for the rights of all innocent persons affected
by such violation and after hearing or trial, as appropriate, by issuing appropriate
orders. Prior to a d,etermination of liability, such orders may include, but are not
limited to, entering restraining orders or prohibitions or taking such other actions,
including the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, in connection with
any property or other interest subject to damages, forfeiture or other restraints
pursuant to this sec:tion as it deems proper.
(d) Following a determination ofliability, such orders may include, but are not
limited to:
(1) Ordering any person to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in
any enterprise;

That such potential remedy, including the request for a constructive trust, authorizes the
filing a Lis Pendens herein and as such the claims set forth in the counter-claim are barred in the
present action.

TIllRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiffs allege the affirmative defense of equitable estoppel and quasi estoppd.

FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
EXlllBIT "A" PROPOSED REPLY TO AMENDED ANSWER OF CONNIE TAYLOR,
CLARK AND FEENEY AND PAUL T. CLARK AND COUNTERCLAIM - Pg 3
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Defendants failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate the claimed or alleged damages.
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Defendants are not entitled to all or part of the relief they seek by way of their CounterClaim for the reason that the damages alleged in their claim reasonably could have bet;:n avoided
by the counter-claimants.
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants assert the affirmative defense of litigation privilege
relating to the claims set forth in the Counter-Claim.
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants incorporate by reference their allegations in their Amended
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial as additional affirmative defenses as if set forth in full
herein, as affirmative defenses relating to the claims set forth in the Counter-Claim.
EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Pursuant to Rule 11 of the IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, all possible
affirmative defenses may not have been alleged and set forth herein because sufficient facts are
not available at this time to form an adequate factual basis for the defenses, after counterdefendants have made reasonable inquiry to obtain such facts. Therefore, counter-defendants
reserves the right to raise additional affirmative defenses as fact-gathering and discovery in this
matter progresses.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Plaintiffs demand a jury trial upon all facts triable by ajury.

EXHIBIT"A"
EXHIBIT"A" PROPOS:ED REPLY TO AMENDED ANSWER OF CONNIE TAYLOR,
CLARK AND FEENEY.AND PAUL T. CLARK AND COUNTERCLAIM - Pg 4
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REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS
Plaintiffs have engaged the services of counsel to defend this action and reasonable
attorney fees plus costs should be ordered against the Defendants and Idaho Code 12··120;
12-·120; 12
12121; 12-123.

PRAYER
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for Judgment as follows:
1

That Defendants' Counterclaim be dismissed against the Plaintiffs.

2

For Plaintiffs' reasonable attorney fees, plus costs.

3

For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable in the
premises.
DATED this 2frti-day
~day of

tf/. t.¥'

(j

,2010.

CHRIST T. TRO IS,
Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/CounterDefendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this rl-th
Ot.!l"W UI 0 ,,II caused a true
rl.-th day of OtJt"W
and correct copy of the foregoing (1) AMENDED REPLY TO COUNfERCLAIM, to be
delivered, to be delivered, addressed as follows:

EXlDBIT "A" PROPOSED REPLY TO AMENDED ANSWER OF CONNIE TAYLOR,
CLARK AND FEENEY AND PAUL T. CLARK AND COUNTERCLAIM - Pg 5
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''r-r-
Mark Stephen Prusynski
I PO Box 829
Boise, ID 83701
I Phone: (208) 345-2000
i Facsimile: (208) 385-5384
I

(X)
IN
)
I

i (

)

( ))
( )

I

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

-----1---------
I

, Connie W. Taylor
CLARK and FEENEY
P.O. Drawer 785
:i Lewiston, Idaho 83501
. Facsimile: (208) 746-9160
Thomas G. Maile, IV.
380 W. State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001

I
i (X)
II

(

)

( )
II

((

))

(X)
( ))
( ))
( ))

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

U. S. Mail
u.

Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

t'Jt1JQ
fJt:1JQ

TROOPiS, co-counsell for
CHRIST T. TROOPIS:
Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants

PROPOS]~D REPLY TO AMENDED ANSWER OF CONNIE TAYLOR,
EXIllBIT "A" PROPOS]~D
CLARK AND FEENEY AND PAUL T. CLARK AND COUNTERCLAIM - Pg 6
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130
PO Box 2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone:
208/938-5584
Facsimile:
208/938-5482
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IBERKSHIRE
~ERKSHlRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
• MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCHBlRCH
. MAILE, husband and wife,
!

Plaintiffs,

v.

Case No. CV-OC-0723232

PROPOSED AMENDED REPLY
TO AMENDED ANSWER OF
JOHN TAYLOR, DALLAN
TAYLOR, AND JOHN TRUST AND
COUNTERCLAIM

CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR,
TA YLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
i an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
I REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
i trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
i ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
i CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
i

Defendants.

COMES NOW the above named Plaintiffs/Counter-defendant by and through their
undersigned co-counsel of record, Christ T. Troupis hereby provide their Amended Reply to
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Defendant's Amended Answer of John Taylor, Dallan Taylor, and Johnson Trust and
Counterclaim and further complain and allege as follows:
1. Plaintiffs' deny each and every allegation of Defendant's Amended Answer of John

Taylor, Dallan Taylor, and Johnson Trust and Counterclaim which is not specifically admitted
herein.
2. Plaintiffs admit the allegations set forth in paragraph 1 of the Counter-Claim.
3. Plaintiffs specifically deny paragraphs 2,3,4, and 5 of the Counter-Claim.
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiffs affirmatively allege that the defendants have been required to return the
purchase price of $400,000.00 by previous court proceedings. The same remains unpaid,
including interest thereon and the plaintiffs are entitled to a "vendee's lien" on the subject real
property pursuant to the previous court proceedings and further pursuant to Idaho

Cod{~

section

45-804. That in addition, the plaintiffs herein have previously filed their Lis Pendens in the prior
proceedings which remains of record with the Ada County Recorder's Office, as furthe:r
protection of the vendee's lien. That such liens are superior to the Lis Pendens herein ,md as
such the Lis Pendens filed herein has not impaired the title to the subject real property and as
such the claims set forth in the counter-claim are barred in the present action.
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiffs have alleged allegations of wrongful conduct in violation of Chapter 118
]l8 Title 78
of the Idaho Code. That plaintiffs are availed of certain remedies set forth below including but
not limited to:
18-7804 PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES -- PENALTIES.
EXIDBIT "B: PROPOSI~D
PROPOSI~D AMENDED REPLY TO AMENDED ANSWER OF JOHN
TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, AND JOHN TRUST AND COUNTERCLAIM - Pg 2
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(a) It is unlawful for any person who has received any proceeds derived
directly or indirectly from a pattern of racketeering activity in which the person
has participated, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of the proceeds or
the proceeds derived from the investment or use thereof in the acquisition of any
interest in, or the e:stablishrnent or operation of, any enterprise or real property.
Whoever violates this subsection is guilty of a felony.

18
.. 7805 RACKETEERING -- CIVIL REMEDIES.
18··7805
(a) A person who sustains injury to his person, business or property by a
pattern of racketeering activity may file an action in the district court for the
recovery of three (3) times the actual damages proved and the cost of the suit,
including reasonable attorney's fees.
(c) The district court has jurisdiction to prevent, restrain and remedy
racketeering after making provisions for the rights of all innocent persons affected
by such violation and after hearing or trial, as appropriate, by issuing appropriate
orders. Prior to a determination of liability, such orders may include, but are not
limited to, entering restraining orders or prohibitions or taking such other actions,
including the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, in connection with
any property or other interest subject to damages, forfeiture or other restraints
pursuant to this section as it deems proper.
(d) Following a determination ofliability, such orders may include, but are not
limited to:
(l) Ordering any person to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in
any enterprise;
That such potential remedy, including the request for a constructive trust, authorizes the

filing a Lis Pendens herein and as such the claims set forth in the counter-claim are barred in the
present action.

TIllRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiffs allege the: affirmative defense of equitable estoppel and quasi estoppel.

FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Defendants failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate the claimed or alleged damages.
EXlllBIT "B: PROPOSED AMENDED REPLY TO AMENDED ANSWER
OF JOHN TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, AND JOHN TRUST AND
COUNTERCL~"-Pg3
COUNTERCL~"-Pg3
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FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Defendants are not entitled to all or part ofthe relief they seek by way of their CounterClaim for the reason that the damages alleged in their claim reasonably could have be{:n avoided
by the counter-claimants.

SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants assert the affirmative defense of litigation privilege
D)rth in the Counter-Claim.
relating to the claims set fi)rth

SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants incorporate by reference their allegations in their Amended
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial as additional affirmative defenses as if set forth in full
herein, as affirmative defenses relating to the claims set forth in the Counter-Claim.

EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Pursuant to Rule 11 ofthe IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, all possible
affirmative defenses may not have been alleged and set forth herein because sufficient facts are
not available at this time to form an adequate factual basis for the defenses, after counterdefendants have made reasonable inquiry to obtain such facts. Therefore, counter-defendants
reserves the right to raise additional affirmative defenses as fact-gathering and discovery in this
matter progresses.

DEMAND FOR JURy TRIAL
Plaintiffs demand a jury trial upon all facts triable by ajury.

REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS

EXHIBIT "B: PROPOSED AMENDED REPLY TO AMENDED ANSWER OF ~rOHN
TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, AND JOHN TRUST AND COUNTERCLAIM - Pg 4
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Plaintiffs have engaged the services of Thomas G. Maile, IV to defend this action and
reasonable attorney fees plus costs should be ordered against the Defendants and Idaho Code
12-120; 12-121; 12-123.
PRAYER

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for Judgment as follows:
1

That Defendants' Counterclaim be dismissed against the Plaintiffs.

2

For Plaintiffs' reasonable attorney fees, plus costs.

3

For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable in the
premIses.

DATED this

J3 _day of Ovf;~'V
Ovf;~'V

,2010.

Cfd::¥.T~-'----

Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter
Plaintiffs/CounterDefendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

U) 6
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this ~th day of OuI"t£/1
OuI"t£/I"/,4)

, I caused a true

and correct copy of the foregoing (1) AMENDED REPLY TO COuNTERCLAIM, to be
delivered, to be delivered, addressed as follows:
)'1

I

I
I

Mark Stephen Prusynski
PO Box 829
Boise, ID 83701
Phone: (208) 345-2000
Facsimile: (208) 385-5384

~
u.
I (X)
U. S. Mail
1
1

( )
(
)

( )
. ()
I (
( ))

Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

I

I

PROPOSI~D AMENDED REPLY TO AMENDED ANSWER OF JOHN
EXIllBIT "B: PROPOSI~D
TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, AND JOHN TRUST AND COUNTERCLAIM -Pg 5
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......

I

I

Connie W. Taylor
CLARK and FEENEY
P.O. Drawer 785
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160

, Thomas G. Maile, IV.
i 380 W. State Street
I Eagle, Idaho 83616
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001

I

(X)

I

(

)

!

(

)

)

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

(X)
()
()
()

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

,(
II

I

j

EXHIBIT "B: PROPOSE:D
PROPOSE~D AMENDED REPLY TO AMENDED ANSWER OF JOHN
TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, AND JOHN TRUST AND COUNTERCLAIM - Pg 6
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NOV 022010

Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130
PO Box 2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone:
208/938-5584
Facsimile:
208/938-5482
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com

iJAv IV i,,/"\'JKf'iI-tV.
'.;~~~ri;
,j. DAvij.}
j,,/"\'JMfil-tV, '.;l~~ri'
By I.,
\., AM~;~
AM~;-~
t1r-toij'ty
t1r-PI
J'ty

Co-counsel for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
- - -------------- --.
.-------------

I
j

I
I

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
BIRCH
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCHMAILE, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,

Case No. CV-OC-0723232

MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT
TO I.R-C.P. RULE 12 (b) (c) &/OR
MOTION IN LIMINE RE:
LITIGATION PRIVILEGE

v.
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/kla
f/k/a
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
i an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
, REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
iI ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
I CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
Defendants/Counter-Claimants.

---------------_
--_____________
-- - - 1 - - - -__
~

~

___ _

COMES NOW, the;: Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, by and through their co-counsel of
record, Christ T. Troupis, and moves this Honorable Court for entry of its Order dismissing the
Defendants/Counter-Claimants' Amended counter-claims pursuant to I.R.c.P. Rule 12 (b)(c)

001823

,.........

and/or prohibiting the counter-claimants' attorney and/or witnesses from advancing tf:stimony
and/or submitting exhibits relating to the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants conduct relating to the
claims set forth in the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial.
This Motion is made on the grounds and for the reasons that such testimony and/or
exhibits which may relate to the action and/or conduct of the Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants are
deemed protected by the litigation privilege in Idaho as most recently determined in the new Law
rendered in the Idaho Supreme Court case captioned, Taylor v. McNichols, 36130, 36131
(IDSCCI), decided on September 3, 2010, and is further made pursuant to the Memonmdum
Brief in Support of Motion in Limine, filed concurrently herewith and the record and :file
contained herein. This Motion is further made pursuant to I.R.C.P., Rules 12(b)(d) and pursuant
to 401, 402, and 403 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. Oral argument is requested.
DATED this

,J..y~~..,; ,2010.
Z, clay of ,J..y~~..,;

CHRIST T. TROUPI3',
Co-counsel for Counter-Defendants
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

till/~~ ,2010, I caused a true and
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this ~ day of tlllj~~
LR.C.P. RULE 12
correct copy of the foregoing (1) MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P.
(b) (c) &/OR MOTION IN LIMINE RE: LITIGATION PRIVILEGE and (2) MEMORANDUM
(b)(c)
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO LR.C.P. RULE 12 (b)(c)
(b) (c)
&/OR MOTION IN LIMn"l"E RE: LITIGATION PRIVILEGE, to be delivered, addressed as
follows:

MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. RULE 12 (b) (c) &/OR MOTION IN
LIMINE RE: LITIGATION PRIVILEGE - Pg 2
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i Mark Stephen Prusynski

( )

I PO Box 829
. Boise, ID 83701
Phone: (208) 345-2000
I Facsimile: (208) 385-5384

( )
( )

I

(X)

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

I
!

i Connie W. Taylor
, CLARK and FEENEY
I P.O. Drawer 785
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
! Facsimile: (208) 746-9160

I

Thomas G. Maile, IV.
380 W. State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001

( )

(X)
( )
( )

( )

(X)
( )
( )

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

(Jt...~~

_

CHRIST T. TROMPIS, co-counsel for
Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants

\

MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. RULE 12 (b) (c) &/OR MOTION IN
LIMINE RE: LITIGATION PRlVILEGE - Pg 3
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-'
Z 2010
NOV 0 Z2010
Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130
PO Box 2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone:
208/938-5:584
Facsimile:
208/938-5482
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com

.J, DAVID NAWI.h:.,V,
;.
NAWI.h:.,V. ""I~(Y
ay b.AM!!i
l.AM!!.>
By
DEPU'rv

Co-counsel for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
---------------

BERKSHIRE D'JVESTMENTS,
UI..JVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
BIRCHMAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH
MAILE, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,
v.

.. -.

Case No. CV-OC-0723232
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
DISMISS PURSUANT TO l.R.C.P.
RULE 12 (b)(c) &/OR MOTION IN
LIMINE RE: LITIGATION
PRIVILEGE

CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/kla
f!kla
· CONNIE TAYLOR,
TA YLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
· REVOCABLE TRUST, im Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
· ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
I
POSSESSION.
!

!

I

Defendants/Counter-Claimants.

'L.- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - "--J- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ ..
The counter-defendants by and through their undersigned co-counsel of record, and
provides this Memorandum Brief in support of their Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to I.R.C.P.
Rules 12 (b)(c)
(b) (c) &/or Motion in Limine Re: Litigation Privilege, as follows:

001826

-'
LEGAL ARGUMENT

The Counter-claimants have failed to allege sufficient facts in their amended
counter-claim to establish an exception to the litigation privilege.
I.R.C.P. Rule 12 (c) provides:
Rule 12(
c). Motion for judgment on the pleadings
12(c).
1. After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any
party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If on a motion for judgment on
the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by
the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed
of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
The specific allegations contained in the counter-claimants' amended complaint can be
summarized as follows:
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.

The Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants filed the instant lawsuit in spite of the fact that the
claims contained therein were totally barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
The Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants claims are devoid of factual support or if supportable
in fact, had no cognizable basis in law.
The Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants asserted claims which had previously been rejected by
the Idaho Supreme Court and misrepresent the decisions of the Supreme Court in
pleadings.
The Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants present false and misleading affidavits and pleadings
to the district court.
The Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants assert claims which were not well grounded in fact,
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law.

6.

7.
8.

9.

10.

The Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants assert claims which were interposed for a improper
use, such as to harass, to cause unnecessary delay or to needlessly increase the cost of
litigation.
The Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants assert baseless claims for the purpose of delay.
The Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants failed to release the lis pendens filed in Taylor v Maile
for six months after the Supreme Court decision affirming the district court order quieting
title in the Linder Road property to the Johnson Trust.
The Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants attempt to regain title to the Linder Road property
through improper means, by seeking to foreclose on a vendee's lien while concurrently
seeking to set aside the judgment upon which that lien was based.
The Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants repeatedly file duplicate motions and/or seek

MEMORANDUM BRIKF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO
(b)(c)
I.R.C.P. RULE 12 (b)
(c) &/OR MOTION IN LIMINE RE: LITIGATION PRIVILEGE -

Pg2
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-'
reconsideration of the rulings. (Amended Counter-claim filed June 25, 2010)
There are no allegations that the Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants committed any fraud upon
the Taylor litigants or the court. There are no allegations that the Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants
committed any acts of pet:jury or other criminal behavior. The litigation privilege controls in
Idaho, barring exceptional.
exceptional circumstances. The case, Taylor v. McNichols, 36130, 36131
(lDSCCI) (2010), has made a determination of the extent of the litigation privilege which is
available not only to the attorneys of record but to the parties themselves.
The Taylor, supra, decision provides:
(1). The litigation privilege is deeply rooted in the common law doctrine that
attorneys are immune from civil suits for defamation or libel when they arise out
of judicial proceedings.
of communications made in the course ofjudicial
(2). The term judicial proceeding is not restricted to trials, but includes every
proceeding of a judicial nature before a court or official clothed with judicial or
quasi judicial power, 53 C.J.S., Libel and Slander, § 104, page 169, and to be
privileged it is not absolutely essential that the language be spoken in open court
or contained in a pleading, brief or affidavit.
(3). The litigation privilege does not provide attorneys with blanket immunity
against all claims raised against them, merely because they are acting as an
attorney in litigation. However, where attorneys are being sued by the opponent of
their client in a current or former lawsuit, and that suit arises out of the attorneys'
legitimate representation of that client pursuant to that litigation, the privilege
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does apply.
privileg(~ is predicated on the long established principle that the efficient
(4). This privilegt!

pursuit of
justice requires that attorneys and litigants must be permitted to speak
ofjustice
and write freely in the course of litigation without the fear of reprisal through a
civil suit for defamation
defanlation or libel.
(4). Application of the litigation privilege varies across jurisdictions, but the
common thread found throughout is the idea that an attorney acting within the
law, in a legitimate effort to zealously advance the interests of his client, shall be
protected from civil claims arising due to that zealous representation.
(5). For Idaho, tht: litigation privilege is an absolute privilege, which only applies
when a specific condition precedent is met, namely, that an attorney is acting
within the scope of his employment, and not solely for his personal interests.
It is presumed that an attorney who is acting or communicating in relation to his
representation of a client is acting on behalf of that client and for that client's
interests.
(6). If any circumstances would support a finding that attorney actions are
pertinent to litigation then absolute immunity should protect the attorney.

(7). Allowing such a divided interest would run contrary to the Idaho Rules of
Professional Conduct, because, as noted by the district court judge below:
[w]hile attorneys must not knowingly counselor assist a client in committing
a crime or fraud, Idaho's Rules of Professional Conduct require an attorney to
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pursue matters on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction or personaJl
personall
inconvenience to the attorney, and require an attorney to take whatever lawful
and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client's cause or endeavor.
(8). This Court holds that, as a general rule, where an attorney is sued by the
current or former adversary of his client, as a result of actions or
communications that the attorney has taken or made in the course of his
representation of his client in the course of litigation, the action is presumed to
be barred by the litigation privilege. An exception to this general rule would
occur where the plaintiff pleads facts sufficient to show that the attorney has
engaged in independent acts, that is to say acts outside the scope of his
representation of his client's interests, or has acted solely for his own interests
and not his client's.
The counter-claimants have failed to assert any action or conduct by the counterdefendants that would amount to an exception to the litigation privilege as fully explained by
the Taylor case. All the specific allegations contained the amended complaint fail as a matter
of law to state a claim for relief under I.R.C.P. Rule 12(b)(6).
l2(b)(6). If, upon a motion to dismiss
filed under Rule 12(b)(6),
l2(b)(6), matters outside the pleading being challenged for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted are presented to and not excluded by the court, the

motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56.
Drennon v. Idaho State Correctional Institution, 181 P.3d
P .3d 524 (Idaho App. 2007); Hellickson
v. Jenkins, 118 Idaho 273, 276, 796 P.2d 150, 153 (Ct. App. 1990).
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As the Taylor case, makes clear there is a presumption that the litigation privilege exists
and there must be specific allegations which amount more than actions taken with the
legitimate interests of litigation. The amended complaint fails to assert any fraudulent action
or criminal behavior that could limit the litigation privilege from application to the counterclaimants' claims.
The counter-defendants advanced a claim to set aside the prior judgment, as well as a
claim for damages, based upon criminal behavior and fraud in obtaining the judgment.
jUdgment.
Claims brought under I.R.C.P. 60(b) are not barred by res judicata because they are one of
the recognized "avenues ... for attacking a judgment.
judgment."" Waller v. State, Dept. of Health and
Welfare, 146 Idaho 234,192 P.3d 1058 (Idaho 2008), Davis v. Parrish, 131 Idaho 595, 599,
961 P.2d 1198, 1202 (1998). The counter-defendants did raise a lack of standing in Taylor v.
Maile 2. The Idaho Supreme Court found standing based upon the Disclaimer Agreement
executed by the beneficiaries of the Theodore L. Johnson Trust. However, when an issue of
standing is raised, the focus is not on the merits of the issues raised, but upon the party who
is seeking the relief. Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 641, 778 P.2d 757, 763
(1989). Scona Inc. v.

Grel~n

Willow Trust, 133 Idaho 283, 286, 985 P.2d 1145, 1148 (1999).

As indicated in the Taylor, supra, case, a cause of action for litigation misconduct does
not accrue until there have: been damages and the underlying litigation is completed. In the
underlying litigation, Judge Willper ruled in February 2006 (Affidavit of Christ Troupis
Exhibit "D" which is the copy of the Order Regarding Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment filed in Ada County Case No. CV DC 04-00473D, Taylor vs Maile filed February
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13,2006 filed in the present matter on September 29,2010), that Berkshire Investment had
properly asserted a claim of quasi estoppel against the trust. The Taylors misrepresentation
that they were residual beneficiaries ultimately let to the "Judgement on Beneficiaries'
Claims". By their misrepresentation and criminal conduct, Berkshire Investment was
prevented from establishing facts that the trust was estopped from obtaining title to the real
property. The property was restored to the trust based upon the Taylors and their counsel
providing false verified amended complaint. Quasi estoppel prevents a party from asserting a
right, to the detriment of ,mother party, which is inconsistent with a position previously
taken. Floyd v. Bd. of [75 P.3d
P .3d 199] Comm'rs of Bonneville County, 137 Idaho 718, 726, 52
P.3d 863, 871 (2002) (citing E. Idaho Agric. Credit Ass'n. v. Neibaur, 133 Idaho 402, 410,
987 P.2d 314, 322 (1999)). Quasi estoppel applies when it would be unconscionable to allow
the party to be estopped to change positions from one they acquiesced in or from one they
accepted a benefit. Id. For quasi estoppel to apply, the party to be estopped must have either
gained some advantage against the other party, produced a disadvantage to the other party, or
the other party must have been induced to change positions. Id.
Without the Taylors active misrepresentation the Honorable Judge Wilper would not
have ordered the property restored to the trust. Judge Wi1per's Memorandum Decision and
Order, on July 28,2005 (attached to the Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part 2-Exhibit K),
establishes that the trust could not rescind the transaction since the action of the truste(:, Beth
Rogers demonstrated the trust had waived its right to rescind the sales transaction. Judge
Wilper had previously rul(:d
rult:d that Berkshire Investment could pursue its claims for quasi and
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-'
equitable estoppel and its claim of tortuous interference with contract claim (Judge Wilper's
Order Regarding Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, on February 13,2006). The trust
could not have had the property restored as it waived that right to restore the real property to
the trust. The trust was estopped from rescinding the sale transaction. The unlawful
objective was committed by the defendants in having the property restored by
misrepresenting their status as beneficiaries before the court in January 2006. By
misrepresenting their status as beneficiaries the court restored the property to the trust. The
plaintiffs were deprived by such actions of the defendants in putting forth their proof of
equitable issues as allowed by Judge Wilper and defending the monetary claims of the: trust.
Berkshire Investment had fully paid for the land, the trust fully received the agreed to
compensation, the prior Trustee, Beth Rogers had written a letter affirmatively telling
Berkshire Investments that the trust was standing by the contract, and Berkshire Investments
had invested approximately $260,000.00 in land improvements. Berkshire Investments was
prevented its day in court. The only trial which took place was the issue of unjust enrichment
on the improvements. There was no trial on the competing equities between the trust ~md
Berkshire as to who was entitled to the title to the real property. The misrepresentations by
the Taylors prevented that from being tried.
The counter-defendants were properly advancing their theories for equitable relief and
had established Idaho Law relating to such claims. The criminal actions of the Taylors and
their counsel prevented Berkshire Investments from having its day in court.
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The Idaho Supreme Court on April 2, 2010, issued a decision in the case of Weitz v.
Green, 33696 (IDSCCI) which provided:
As the finding of slander of title in this case was premised upon a
statement made in the complaint, a necessary first step in litigation, where
such statement was related to the underlying claim against Respondents, that
statement is deemed immune. Therefore, this Court reverses the district
court"s determination that Appellants committed slander oftitle against
Respondents. Accordingly, the award of $40,000 in attorney fees as special
damages under tht~ slander of title claim was improperly granted and is
reversed (emphasis added).
The Weitz, supra,

cas(~

has important implications in light of the new Law created by the

Taylor, supra, case. The counter-claimants' contentions relate to an alleged improper filing
of judicial process relating to allegations contained in
of Lis Pendens and the alleged misuse ofjudicial
the amended complaint filed by the plaintiff. As the Weitz & Taylor cases hold such
statements whether set forth in a lis pendens filed of record or contained in allegations of a
complaint are judicially immune from liability if they "had a reasonable relation to the cause
of action of that proceeding". In both cases whether protected under a vendee's lien or a
claim for a constructive trust, the pleadings and the Lis Pendens were reasonably related to
the claims for relief in properly pursued litigation in both cases.
Furthermore, the Honorable Judge Wilper did not find a basis for an award of sanctions
relating to the filing and/or attempt to enforce the vendee's lien, establishes that the plaintiffs
did not commit wrongful conduct and such action is immune under the Taylor case, supra. If
the filing of the Lis Pendens and/or the Vendee's Lien was wrongful as a matter oflaw,
Judge Wilper would have so found.
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-The case of Living Designs, Inc. v. E.!. Dupont de Nemours and Co., 431 F.3d 353 (9th
Cir. 2005) examined the litigation privilege in light of allegations of fraud in the preceding
litigation and held:
The district court also erroneously dismissed Plaintiffs' non-fraud claims on
the grounds of the litigation privilege. Matsuura III, 330 F.Supp.2d at 1128.
In Matsuura II, the Hawai'i Supreme Court stated that "Hawai'i courts have
applied an absolute litigation privilege in defamation actions for words and
writings that are material and pertinent to judicial proceedings." 73 P.3d at
692. The court examined the policy considerations behind the privilege and
decided not to expand the protection of the privilege to claims outside of
defamation actions, holding that ""[u]nder
[u]nder Hawai'i law, a party is not immune
from liability for civil damages based upon that party's fraud engaged in
during prior litigation proceedings." Id. at 700, 706. The court appears to
emphasize that many of the policies weighing against the application of the
privilege do so only when fraud was committed in the prior proceedings. Id. at
693-99. In accordcmce with the Hawai'i Supreme Court's analysis, so long as a
cause of action for fraud is asserted, the litigation privilege does not protect
subsequent litigation asserting other causes of action stemming from the fraud
allegedly committed in prior proceedings. Thus, we hold that Plaintiffs' non
nonfraud claims are not barred by the litigation privilege under Hawai'i law.
The common theme which is important for the court's analysis is the determination of
whether there is fraud and/or criminal behavior in considering the extent of the litigation
privilege. The counter-claimants have failed to allege any specific or general theories of
fraud perpetuated by the plaintiffs in their amended complaint. Just as in the Taylor, supra,
case, held "Reed's failure to make specific factual pleadings is particularly fatal here. It
appears most likely that RI~ed is alleging that the goal of the conspiracy was fraudulent, and
civil conspiracy must therefore be pled with particularity under Wasco Prods., Inc. v.
Southwall Techs, Inc., 435 F.3d 989, 990-92 (9th Cir. 2006)".
Without such allegations, the counter-defendants are entitled to the absolute litigation
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-"
privilege annunciated in the Taylor case. The counter-claim is defective as a matter of law
and must be dismissed.
2

The Court should bar the counter-claimants from introducing testimony
and/or evidence at trial relating to the actions of the counter-defendants as there are
no exceptions to the litigation privilege.
The counter-defendants should be prohibited from introducing testimony and/or

testimony surrounding any actions of the counter-defendants relating to prior litigation.
Whether the actions took place before Judge Wilper's proceedings or proceedings before this
court, the litigation privih::ge bars the counter-claimants from pursuing any testimony or
exhibits.
The relevant Idaho Rules of Evidence provide:
Rule 401. Definition of relevant evidence
"Relevant Evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence
inadmissible
All relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by these
rules or by other mles applicable in the courts of this state. Evidence which is
not relevant is not admissible.
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion,
or waste of time
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Any attempt to introduce testimony or exhibits relating to the prior litigation would
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fail to yield any admissiblle evidence. The amended counter-claim fails to set forth specific
allegations which would defeat the litigation privilege, consequently no testimony or exhibits
should be allowed.
CONCLUSION
The amended counter-claim filed by the counter claimants fails to advance any
legitimate claims in light of the litigation privilege. There are no allegations of fraud or
I.R.C.P. Rule 12, the
criminal conduct on the part of the counter-defendants. Pursuant to LR.C.P.
counterclaim has failed to raise any legitimate issues to be tried.
The court should enter an order prohibiting the counter-claimants from advancing any
testimony or exhibits without first establishing an exception to the litigation privilege at any
trial in this matter.
DATED this) ..t( day of November, 2010.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE
husband and wife,

Case No. CV OC 0723232

COUNTEROBJECTION TO COUNTER
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO AMEND REPLY TO
COUNTERCLAIMS

Plaintiffs,
vs.
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, et al.
Defendants.

The Counterclaimants in this matter object to the Motion to Reply to Counterclaims filed
on behalf of Berkshire Investment LLC, Thomas Maile, and Colleen Maile because (l) the
proposed amendments fail to state a valid claim, and (2) an amendment filed after the deadlines
for

disclosing

witnesses

and

initiating

new

discovery

substantially

prejudices

the

Counterclaimants' ability to address the amendments.
Objection to Motion to Amend
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1.

The Proposed Amendments Fail to State a Valid Claim.

In detennining whether an amend pleading should be allowed, the court may consider
whether the new claims proposed to be inserted into the action by the amendment state a valid
claim. Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat 'I Bank, 119 Idaho 171, 804 P.2d
900 (1991).

Where the record contains no allegations which, if proven, would entitle the

proponent to the relief claimed, the refusal to allow an amendment is not an abuse of discretion.

Wellsv.
(Ct.App.
Wells v. United States Lt(e
L£(e Ins. Co., 119 Idaho 160,804P.2d333
160,804 P.2d 333 (Ct.
App. 1991)
a.

Litigation Privilege.

The new proposed Sixth Affinnative Defense asserts the defense of "litigation privilege."
Counterclaimants respectfully request that the Court deny this requested amendment, as the
litigation privilege discussed in the September 3, 2010 Idaho Supreme Court decision in Taylor

v. McNichols/Hawley Troxell does not apply to a party (who also happens to be an attorney) who
is defending claims for conduct in his capacity as a party. The litigation privilege also does not
apply to an attorney who is acting pro se, representing himself, his wife, and/or a limited liability
company which he and his wife own. This issue is addressed in more detail in the memorandum
opposing the Counterd<;:fendant's Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion in Limine, which is
incorporated by reference.

b.

Incorporation of allegations from Amended Complaint.

The other requested amendment is the addition of a Seventh Affinnative Defense in
which the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants "incorporate by reference their allegations in their
Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial as additional affinnative defenses as if set forth
in full herein, as affinnative defenses relating to the claims set forth in the Counter-Claim."

Objection to Motion to Amend
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afjfIrmative defense; it is a transparent attempt to get in through the back
This is not an aHirmative
door claims which this Court dismissed in its July 2, 2009 Memorandum Decision and Order.
The Counterdefendants' Motion to Reconsider that decision was denied, and

th;~

request to

amend their Reply to add those claims as affirmative defenses is simply an effort to try to
convince a jury to
2.

revers(~

this Court's ruling. That is improper, and should not be allowed.

The proposed amendment is untimely and prejudicial.

The certificate of mailing of this motion indicates that it was mailed on October 28, the
day before it was signed by Mr. Troupis.

Despite being advised of counsel's new address in

Vancouver, Washington, it was addressed Clark and Feeney, and to Post Office Box 785 rather
than the correct box number of 285. The motion was first received by fax on November I st. By
discoveIY as well as
stipulation of the parties, that is also the deadline for the commencement of discovely
for the Counterclaimants' witness disclosures.

By waiting until those crucial dt:adlines
dE:adlines had

passed to serve this motion, and then scheduling the hearing on the motion for only 60 days
before the trial, the Counterdefendants have severely prejudiced the ability to address the
amendments through discovery, expert testimony, and/or a motion for summary judgment.
This matter has been pending since 2007, and the trial should not be vacated due to these
dilatory filings.

The Plaintiffs' claims were dismissed on July 2, 2009, and the Supreme Court

decision upon which the Seventh Affirmative Defense claims to be based (Taylor
v.McNicholsIHTEH) was issued on September 3, 20 I O.
v.McNichols/HTEH)

There is no just cause for waiting so

long to file this request for leave to amend.

Objection to Motion to Amend
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CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, The Johnson Trust, Dallan Taylor, and John Taylor
respectfully request that the Court deny the motion for leave to amend the Reply to
counterclaims.
DATED this

i$~ day of November, 2010.
J$~
HENDE

FIRM, PLLC

h

.

Connie . Taylor, a member of the firm.
Johnson Trust, DaHan Taylor, and John
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CONNIE WRIGHT TA YLOR, et al.
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Connie Taylor, being duly sworn, states as follows:
1.

I am the attorney for the defendants John Taylor, Dallan Taylor, and the Theodore
Johnson Trust.

2.

I am attaching true and correct copies of the following official documents
a.

Exhibit A: Annual report fonns
fonus for Berkshire Investments, LLC for the
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0, which were printed from the Idaho Secretary of
years 2003 through 20 1
10,
State's website on November 10,2010.
b.

Exhibit B: Relevant pages from February 1, 2005 deposition of Thomas
G. Maile, IV.

DATED this

1L
I"" day of November, 201

Subscribed and sworn to before me on November \~, 2010.

Notary Public for Washington St,\te
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\)~ wk
Residingin
Residing in \)~f----w---=--k-=-----_
expires:_\.k..loIf.l~-H.I't-'-I-\-l-----Commission expires:
I 4-l-----

-ll4-l3.J.. . .
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No. W20194
Return to:
SECRETARY OF STATE
700 WEST JEFFERSON
PO BOX 83720
BOISE,
BOISE. 10 83720-0080

Due no later than August 31, 2006
Annual Report Form
•• '..
'.. ..

•.

••

2. Registered Agent and Office NO PO BOX

.••

HOMAS G MAILE IV
80
80 W
W STATE
STATE ST
ST
GLE, ID 83616

.• -

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC
V'~ STATE ST
" 380 'l'~
5T
EAGLE,IO
EAGLE, 10 83616

(
3. New Registered Agent Signature

NO FILING FEE IF
RECEIVED BY DUE DATE

'

4. Limited Liability Companies: Enter Names and Addresses of Managers.
Office hekl
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g. .tU.tu1L .1 V
1homaC; g..

5. Organized Under the Laws of:

IDAHO

W 20194
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No.

Due no later than August 31, 2007
Ann..-I
Report Form
Ann.-I Re;rt

W20194

. Retum to:
.Retum
SECRETARY OF STATE
700 WEST JEFFERSON
PO BOX 83720
BOISE. 1083720-0080

INVESTMENTS, LLC
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS.
380 W STATE ST
EAGLE, to 83616
EAGLE.

,IV
~ 1h::o'4f.&.Mo.ile
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3. New Registered Agent Signature
(

9b:

Street or P.O. Address

.

THOMAS G MAlLE IV
380 W STATE ST
EAGLE. 10 83616

il4{W;.Jim ,liMi*,

Name

- - ....

2. Registered Agent and OffIce NO PO BOX

NO FILING FEE IF
RECEIVED BY DUE DATE
4.
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Limited Liability Companies: Enter Names and Addresses of Managers.
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SECRETARY OF STATE
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BOISE. 10
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n August 31, 2008
Due no lL\er 1'Mn
Ranort Form
Annual. ReDOrt

2. Registered Agent and Office NO PO BOX
THOMAS G MAlLAt.!Y
--380 W STATE 8T
--
EAGLE,IO
EAGLE.
10 83616

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LtC
380 W STATE ST
EAGLE, 10 83616
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.Annual Report for W 20194
.Annua1

No. W 20194

Due no later than Aug 31, 2009

Annual Report Form

Return to:
SECRETARY OF STATE
700 WEST JEFFERSON
PO BOX 83720
BOISE, ID 83720-0080

2. Registered Agent and Address
(NO PO BOX)
THOMAS G MAILE IV
380 W STATE ST
EAGLE ID 83616

Mililillq Addrt~s5:
Addrt~s5: Conect ill [hi~,
[hi~. II'"
rwc~(kd
1. M"ilillq
II." It :Wt~(kd
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC
THOMAS G MAILE, IV
380 W STATE ST
EAGLE ID 83616

3. New Registered Agent Signature:*

NO FILING FEE IF
RECEIVED BY DUE DATE
4. limited Liability Companies: Enter Names and Addresses of at least one Member or Manager.
Office Held
MANAGER

Name
THOMAS G MAILE IV

5. Organized Under the Laws of:
ID
W 20194
Processed 09/09/2009

Street or PO Address
380 W STATE ST

City
EAGLE

State

Country

ID

USA

Postal Code
83616

6. Annual Report must be signed. *
Signature: Thomas G. Maile, IV

Date: 09/09/2009

Name (type or print): Thomas G. Maile, IV

Title: Manager

* Electronically provided signatures are accepted as original signatures.

http://www.sos.idaho.goY/servlet/TransforrnXMLDoc?URL=%5C20090909%5CXMLPO...
http://www.sos.idaho.gov/servlet/TransforrnXMLDoc?URL=%5C20090909%5CXMLPO...
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11/9/2010

-

.Annual
.Annua1 Report for W 20194

No. W 20194

-,

2. Registered Agent and Address

Due no later than Aug 31, 2010

(NO PO BOX)

Annual Report Form

Return to:
SECRETARY OF STATE
700 WEST JEFFERSON
PO BOX 83720
BOISE, ID 83720-0080

]

Page 1 of 1

. . idil.iJl,J ;o'rLi!
. r""idil.iJl'J
;o'rL'il

,_,~)~;. (or"1
(or"! t:z't
t~c·t

;!~

! ;

~

'I i

>'

I'"

I'"

i.'
i"

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC
THOMAS G MAILE, IV
380 W STATE ST
EAGLE ID 83616

'cll
f' ( 'l 'C1l

THOMAS G MAILE IV
380 W STATE ST
EAGLE ID 83616

-:f

3. New Registered Agent Signature:*

NO FILING FEE IF
RECEIVED BY DUE DATE
4. Limited Liability Companies: Enter Names and Addresses of at least one Member or Manager.
Office Held
MANAGER

Name
THOMAS G MAILE IV

5. Organized Under the Laws of:

ID
W 20194
Processed 06/09/2010

Street or PO Address
380 W STATE ST

City
EAGLE

State
ID

Country
USA

Postal Code
83616

6. Annual Report must be signed. *
Signature: Thomas G. Maile, IV

Date: 06/09/2010

Name (type or print): Thomas G. Maile, IV

Title: Manager

* Electronically provided signatures are accepted as original signatures.

http://www.sos.idaho.gov/serv1et/TransfonnXMLDoc?URL=%5C20
http://www.sos.idaho.goY/serv
let/TransfonnXMLDoc?URL=%5C20 100609%5CXMLPO...
100609%5CXMLPO...
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11/9/2010

Exhibit B
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J
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

r"
I
I
I
I

COUN,]'Y OF ADA
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN'l'Y

REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR,
and R. JOHN TAYLOR,

Case No. CV OC 0400473D

Plaintiff/Counter-

Case No. CV OC 04-05656D

Defendants,

Volume I

vs.
THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY and
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC,

I
[

I
I
I
I
I
I
I.v.

Defendants/CounterDefendants/Counter

...'

.

.:

I

Claimants.

...

Continued ...

THE DEPOSITION OF THOMAS G. MAILE, IV
FEBRUARY 1, 2005

REPORTED BY:

MONICA M. ARCHULETA, CSR NO. 471
Notary Public

Court
Reporting
Se.rvicE~,
Se.rvicE~, Inc.
Since 1970
Registered Professio,nal Reporters

SOUTHERN'

1·800-234-9611
1-800-234-9611
• BOISE, 191...
208-345.,11
208-345",11

F~LLS,

• TWIN
10
208-734,,700
208.73418700

..

~

.0 .~,;

NORTHERN

1:800-879-1700

~Oi"l!'"
~OElJR
p.!ALENE.
~.O!,,!.. ..'. .h. ,.':;~.
p.!ALENE' 10
;
208-'r55i,j,700
208-'r55i1·700
• '~R' 01 .'
WA
.'".' . SpdlA~lf;
503-881-1700
509-455-4515
• p. OC.
jO,~
jO,~

10

t,;

•

503-881-1700
'i '

509-455-4515

/'1"0
/<.)"0

~fU1J
~iU1J

001856

. "

!I -PEARANCES:
-llEARANCES:
1
'-'
2
)
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR,
) Case No. CV OC 0400473D
3 For the Plaintiff: CLARK and FEENEY
and R. JOHN TAYLOR,
)I Case No. CV OC 04-05656D 4
Plaintiff/CounterPlaintiff/Counter
BY: Paul Thomas Clark
)
Volume I
Defendant s,
vs.
)
The
Train Station, Suite 201
5
THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN
)
MAILE, husband and wi fe, THOW\S )
13th and Main Streets
6
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY and
I)
)
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC,
P.O. Drawer 285
7
)
Defendants/CounterDefendants/Counter
)
Claimants.
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
8
)
Continued ...
9
THE DEPOSITION OF THOMAS G. MAILE, IV
10 For Thomas Maile GJORDING & FOUSTER
FEBRUARY 1, 2005
BY: Jack S. Gjording
11 as Attorney:
12
509 West Hays Street
REPORTED BY:
MONICA M. ARCHULETA, CSR NO. 471
Post Office box 2837
13
Notary Public
14
Boise, Idaho 83702
15
16 For Thomas Maile ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL
17 as Realtor/Broker: BY: Phillip J. Collaer
18
250 So. Fifth Street, Suite 700
Post office Box 7426
'19
20
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
21
22
23
24
25
-....-------,---... ---.---.. --.-----.-.-.-.--------·----·--'-----'·-Page-F-----·--------·--..
--------'-----'--Page-F--------------.
. -----.-',.-,·.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FO[lt:(TH
FOllt:(TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN ANI:
" THE COUNTY OF ADA

i

~.
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

'-'

------------,------------------~-------------------

[

I
I
I
I
I
I

1I·
"'I'
"'1'
I~..l
I~...!

~~['
4~/

~~:t
~~·t

I

..
.•

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Page 4

THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE )
TRUST,
)
Plaintiff,
)
vs.
)
THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN )
MAILE, husband and wife, and )
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, )

INDEX
1
2
3 TESTIMONY OF THOMAS G. MAILE, IV:
4 Examination by Mr. Clark
5
5
6
EXHIBITS
PAGE
7
N-O-N-E

Defendants.
)
Defendants.)

8

PAGE

8

9

)

9

10
10
'II
11
'11
'12
12
'l3
13
THE DEPOSITION OF THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, '13
.14
14 was taken on behalf of the Plaintiff at the law
'15
15 offices of Anderson, Julian & Hull, 250 South Fifth
!IS
'16
16 Street, Suite 700, Boise, Idaho, commencing at 2:45
p.m.
on
February
1,2005,
before
Monica
M.
[17
17
18
18 Archuleta, Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary
19
19 Public within and for the State of Idaho, in
20 the above-entitled matter.
2et:J
; ';.
21'
21
"7'
22
2'"'
~--~L4 '~"'h"
23" . u!
U ! II ''
23
.
J
,,-c.5~
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M & M COURT REPORTING SERVl<CEtJN(6]
SERVl<CEtlN(6]

i

001857

(208) 345·8800
345-8800 (fax)'

E

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

never taken one. Every two years you are required. 1 Nor do I own a controlling interest in it. But for
have a certain number of hou
f real estate
2 the sake of tryin~
tryin~ , understand your question I'll
to'
to'have
fundamentals, I think it is callel"-'f3ut there is no
3 include that. And there is a Macchu Pichu limited
appraisal portion of those classes. Training.
'4 family partnership.
Q Going back to your work as an attorney.
5
MR. COLLAER: Can you spell that?
Have you handled any litigation that has dealt with 6
THE WITNESS: M-a-c-c-h-u P-i-c-h-u. So
the issue of appraisals? Real estate appraisals?
7 those are all of the entities that I can think of.
A In what sense?
8
Q (BY MR. CLARK) How about Berkshire
Q Well, why don't you tell me if you have '9 Investments?
handled any first. And then I will -10
A Thank you. I forgot that. That also is
11
A Gosh, I have to go through 25 years of
11 owned wholly by my wife and 1.
I.
12 practice. I can't think of anything in a broad
12
Q And what type of business is that?
13 sense involving an appraisal. I know I have had 13
A Well, it is a limited liability company
14 cases where there has been appraisals involved in 14 that was formed for development purposes.
15 cases.
15
Q When was it formed?
16
Q Have you had cases where there have been 16
A Probably 2002. Perhaps July or early
17 disputes with respect to values e'stablished by one 17 August of 2002.
18 appraiser versus another?
'18
18
Q What assets did it have at the time of
19
A Now we know why we have computers. I 19
'19 Exhibit 12, the assignment of earnest money
20 can't think of a case where there have been legal 20 agreement, was executed?
21 issues, or contentions, or disputes over appraisals. 21
A The $100,000 either through a line of
22
Q In your work as a real estate broker have 22 credit or in cash. Or a portion in cash.
23 you had the experience in dealing with appraisers? 23
Q Anything else?
24
A I would have to say yes.
24
A No.
2~.,., ____Q
__H!l'y'~_YQ!!.I~!lm~g_i!lJh~._;!.Q::-_~Q}~lt::Yt::_<lJs
._Q__ A~l_~Q.lT~~J
A~l_~Q.lT~~J iI!_~I!.gerstLl.!1.QiI!~!h~!!Jb.~!_i.L._
il!_~!lgerstLl.!1.Qi!!~!h~!!Jb.~!_i.L._
Q__
H!l.Y.~_YQ!!.1~!lm~g_i!1Jh.t:l._;!.Q::-_~Q}~l~Y~_<lJs .QL_l~~____ ._Q__
?age 22

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
!0
11
12
13
14
\5
15
16
J7
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

,Page 24

being a broker in general terms how property is
1
appraised?
! 2
AYes. Sure.
3
Q And tell me what your unde:rstanding is in
4
that regard?
'5
A Well, with residential property, for
'6
example, comparables are probably the essential
7
approach that appraisers use. With commercial
8
property, I think, in my opinion, inc:ome approach
.' 9
might be the most widely accepted. Although,
10
comparables are used in that sense, as well.
11
Commercial property. You would have to use, here '12
again, a combination of comparable:s. And, of
i13
course, if the commercial property generates income i14
;I5
you would be able to utilize an income approach.
;15
116
Q Let's go back to your business interests
:16
in addition to your law office and real estate
.17
company that we have already talked about.
'18
,19
What other businesses, enterprises, do you
:19
20
own or own a controlling interest in'?
A Own or have a controlling i~&~rest in? We
21
have talked about Horizon Properties. Thomas Maile 22
l(j,w office that is a
Real Estate, LLC. We have a la.w
23
corporation, Subchapter S. I have Ll family-owned
24
corporation, Hope Development, w!iich I neither own. '25
",

was formed with the idea initially of acquiring the
property from the Ted Johnson Trust?
A As an assignment from the contract, yes.
Q Was it formed for any other purpose?
A No.
Q Has it acquired any other assets other
than that land?
A No.
Q And why did you feel it was necessary to
have that formed?
A Here again, it was tax advice and
accounting advice to create a separate <entity.
Separate legal entity.
Q And what was the benefit of that?
A Well, as best as I can understand there
were some benefits for the cost basis. And also
benefits in having an entity that would be in a
joint venture, if you will, with the development
company, Thomas Maile Real Estate Company.
Q So as far as developing the Linder Road
property were you going to do any ofthat
ofihat
personally? Or was it going to be througli these two
,.
;;
,;
entities? Developing,sa(eand
Developing'sa(eand owner§hiip?
ownerSltip? oj
oi;.
A What do yon iheiaH!l1y'1>ersorla~IY./then~L::
iheiaHil1y'1>ersorla~IY./then~:·::
c-rill16'tlsl1l Jerltilties.
erltilties.
Because lam ii1vofVethIVrfH-1be
ii1votveth"VrtH-1tie':.fM16't1s

M ~~ M COURT REPORTING SERVlCEf'mC.
SERVICEf'mC.

(208) 345-9611
, ili

C,:

.~,. \ / " ; :

':«.

':,,(.

i
001858
(208) 34s-S800'{fax)
34s-8800
{fax)
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20
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22
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24
25

-

Q You're involved as an owner of the
1
entities; right? Beyond that are you personally
2
involved?
3
A Yeah, I'm personally involved. Yes.
.4
.5
Q How is that?
A I materially participate in those
6
enterprises.
.7
Q As an owner?
8
A Yes.
9
Q And as an agent?
10
times.
11
A At t
imes.ll
Q Any other participation?
12
13
A What would that include? I don't
13
14
understand.
15
!
Q I don't know. I'm just asking if there
was any.
16
J7
A I don't think so.
17
.18
Q So my understanding of your testimony is
,18
landI9
that Berkshire Investments was going to own the land19
20
on Linder Road?
21
A It would be the titled owner ofthe land.
And titled owner of the improvements on the land. 22
Q And then the develop1er was going to be
23
24
Thomas Maile Real Estate Company?
AYes.
25

Southwest District Health applications. Ada County
Highway District applications. City of Eagle.
Q And what was the overall plan that was
being proposed with respect to development of that
property?
A To who?
Q Based on your plat?
A It was a seven unit -- or a seven-lot
development with a private road. And an irrigation
system in a common lot -- that came from a common
lot. There was at one point in time a plan to have
an equestrian trail. I hope that answers your
question.
Q And were any of these improvements placed
on the property?
A Sure. The survey is conducted. And then
you have the preliminary plat And from that
process you move toward final plat And those are
improvements. The plat is recorded. The road is
installed. The infrastructure for the electrical
and the gas is installed. So, yes.
Q Tell me about the road. What kind of road
is it?
A It is a paved road. Meets ACHD standards.
____
It's a private road.

Page 26

Page 28

1
Q And from a developer's standpoint what is
Q And what would developing consist of?
2 the advantage of a private road versus a public?
A Oh, my. Well, you have to undertake a
fair amount of effort and work: associated in dealing
3
A Well, in this particular parcel of real
with the various governmental agencies. Ada County 4 property there was such a concern. over the high
Developmental Services. Central District Health.
5 water table that the engineering staff, the water
groundwat~r specialists, and soil
Ada County Highway District. Various irrigation
6 consultant, groundwat~r
7 conservationists all seemed to provide the opinion
companies. City of Eagle in this case. U.S.
Department of Geology. Anny Corp of Engineers was 8 that it was high enough that there maybe problems
9 with ACHD acceptance as a public right-of-way. So I
even a possibility in this project. There is a lot
10
of different hoops to jump through in development.
10 think it was the engineer's choice or call that in
J 1 his opinion it would be better developed as a
So it was anticipated that it would be a major
:12 private road. So that is the advantage.
undertaking.
Q Was there a written pla.n of development
:13
Q Is the development complete today?
A No, I wouldn't say it is complete.
14
that was established?
Q What needs to be done?
A Yeah, I would say that you have the
15
::16
16
preliminary plat application process. You have the
A There needs to be the finalization of the
Ada County neighborhood contact process. There is a '17 pump in the common lot. The property has been ready
:18 to be marketed and there are building lots
lot of written documents relatilllg to the process.
Q Have you provided all of those documents
19 available. So in that sense it is done. But in a
in discovery?
20 construction sense there is more to be done.
A I sure think so.
21
Q Other than installing this final pump what
.... ...22.
-.22. _
i l ..T'm.sol"nLthedocumenl<;
__ __ .---22--else_needs_to_bedolleJrQOlJULinfr~struCtuI"e
_Q..
T'm.SOI"DLthedocnmenl<; thatvou ____
.---22--else_needs_to_bedollefrQo:uuLinf:r~strnctuI"e
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
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BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE
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MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
COUNTERDEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
DISMISS AND/OR MOTION IN LIMINE

Plaintiffs,
vs.
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, et al.
Defendants.

Counterc1aimants respectfully request that this Court deny the Counterdefendants'
The Counterclaimants
Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion in Limine which was filed on November 2, 20 IO.
I O. This motion
is nothing more than another request that this Court reconsider its numerous decisions dismissing
the initial Complaint and denying the requests for summary judgment on the counterclaims.
counterc:1aims.
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For clarity, the Counterc1aimants
Counterclaimants will be referred to collectively as "Taylors" and the
Counterdefendants will be referred to collectively as "Mailes."
I.

Motion to Dismiss
The basis the Mailes are relying on to support this motion is not clear. The fi.rst sentence

of the Motion indicates that it is being brought pursuant to "I.R.C.P. Rule 12(b)(c)."
l2(b)(c)." The final
sentence of the Motion states that it is made "Pursuant to I.R.c.P. Rules 12(b)(d)."
l2(b)(d)." The motion
never identifies a specific subparagraph of Rule 12.

The Memorandum filed in support of the

Motion focuses on I.R.C.P. 12(c),
l2(c), but also contains a single reference to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).
l2(b)(6).
The memorandum vacillates between (1)
(l) an assertion that Mailes are entitled to absolute
immunity under the litigation privilege; and (2) repetition of the failed arguments that res
judicata should not apply, quasi- and equitable estoppel should apply, and "Berkshire was
prevented its day in court." Because this Court has addressed the second group of arguments
repeatedly, I this responsive brief will focus on the litigation privilege.

a. The Motion to Dismiss is Moot if the Court Denies
the Motion to Amend Reply
l2(c), a motion to dismiss looks only at the pleadings to
Under both I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) and 12(c),
of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102,
determine whether a claim for relief has been stated. Young v. City ofKetchum,

104,44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2002), I.R.C.P. 12(c).

I Memorandum Decision and Order, 7/2/09; Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment,
7/20/09; second Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on the Defendants' Counterclaims,
6/23/10; October 29, 20 II0
0 ruling from the bench denying Motion to Reconsider the July 2, 2009 decision.
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The pleadings currently at issue do not contain any reference to the ligation privilege which
Mr. Maile now seeks to assert. The present motion is based solely on the Sixth affirmative
defense in the amended Repll which the Mailes are seeking leave of the Court to file. Needless
to say, if that amendment is not allowed, there is no basis in the pleadings for a dismissal under
either 1.R.C.P.
I.R.C.P. l2(b)(6) or 12(c).

b. This Motion should be Treated as a Motion for Summary Judgment
While Mailes have based the Motion to Dismiss on 1.R.C.P.
1.R.c.P. l2(b)(6) and 12(c),an
understanding of their relationship to the plaintiff known as Berkshire Investment Services LLC
is absolutely essential to a determination of whether the litigation privilege applies in this case.
That relationship is demonstrated through the records of the Idaho Secretary of State, which
show that for each year since its inception in 2003, the Annual Report for that entity shows
Thomas Maile IV as the manager and as the registered agent. 3 In addition, Mr. Maile testified
in deposition that Berkshire Investments is "wholely owned by my wife and 1.,,4
Where a motion is captioned as a motion to dismiss but the court looks to evidence
outside the pleadings, the motion is more properly treated as a motion for summary judgment
of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473,
under 1.R.C.P.
I.R.C.P. 56(c). See 1.R.c.P.
1.R.C.P. l2(b) and 12(c);
l2(c); Thomson v. City ofLewiston,
rave, In
Arave,
12X Idaho 306, 307, 912 P.2d 674, 675
476, 50 P.3d 4RR, 491 (2002); Merrifield v. A

2 The proposed Sixth Affirmative Defense read in toto "Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants assert the
affirmative defense oflitigation privilege relating to the claims set forth in the Counter-Claim."
3 Exhibit A to 11117/10
11/17/10 Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss and/or in Limine.
4 Exhibit B to 11117/10
11/17/10 Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss and/or in Limine.
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(Ct.App.1996). Summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56(c) is proper only when there is no genuine
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When
assessing a motion for summary judgment, all controverted facts are to be liberally construed in
favor of the nonmoving party. Furthermore, the trial court must draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the party resisting the motion. G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 517,
ROR P.2d R51, 854 (1991); Sanders v. Kuna Joint Sch. Dist., 125
J 25 Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154,

156 (Ct.App.199
For the reasons stated below, the Mailes are not entitled to a dismissal of the
counterclaims as a matter of law. On the contrary, it would be appropriate for this Court to rule
that the Mailes are not entitled to immunity under the litigation privilege and deny this motion as
well as the motion for leave to amend to assert the privilege.

c. Mailes are not entitled to immunity under the litigation privilege
There is no dispute as to the fact that Thomas Maile is an attorney, and that during the
almost eight years of litigation over the Johnson Trust real property, he has frequently acted pro
se in representing himself, his wife, and their solely-owned LLC. He was doing so from the date
he filed the Complaint in this matter (December 31, 2007) until his present attorney substituted
and associated on September 11,2008.
Mailes argue that the litigation privilege discussed in the Taylor v. McNichols 5 decision is
available "not only to the attorneys of record but to the parties themselves.,,6

5
6

This is a

IDSCCI 36130, 36131, September 3, 2010.
Page 3, Memorandum Briefin Support of Motion to Dismiss, etc.

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
MOTION TO DISMISS AND/OR
MOTION IN LIMINE

4

001863

misreading of the Supreme Court decision. There is absolutely nothing in the Taylor decision to
indicate that the litigation privilege set forth applies to parties in anything other than the wellrecognized immunity from defamation actions. The Taylor v. McNichols case dealt solely with
the question of whether and under what circumstances a litigant may bring an action against the
attorney who represented his opponent.

The ruling of the court was "the litigation privilege

shall be found to protect attorneys against civil actions which arise as a result of their conduct or
communications in the representation of a client, related to a judicial proceeding.,,7 To accept
Mailes' reading of Taylor v.McNichols as granting absolute immunity to the parties (as opposed
to their independent counsel) would completely do away with the tort of abuse of process.
Mailes do not directly argue, but certainly seem to imply, that because Thomas Maile is
an attorney, he is entitled to absolute immunity for his conduct as a party in the course of
litigation. That argument has absolutely no merit. In Taylor v. McNichols, the Court specifically
ruled that in Idaho, "the litigation privilege is an absolute privilege, which only applies when a
s.cope of his
specific condition precedent is met, namely, that an attorney is acting within the scope
employment, and not solely for his personal interests."

8

The cases discussed by the Supreme

Curt all dealt with claims against independent attorneys who were separate and distinct from
their clients; none of the cases involved an attorney who was a party, let alone one who was
representing himself. The Idaho Court's analysis rested largely on the very valid concern that if
attorneys are exposed to lawsuits for their actions in representing their clients, it would invite

7

8

IDSCCI 36130, 36131, September 3,2010, page 15.
IDSCCI 36130, 36131, September 3,2010, page 18.
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attorneys to divide their interest between advocating for their client and protecting themselves
from a retributive suit. The entire analysis is based on the presumption that an attorney who has
been employed to repres~:nt
repres~:nt a client is acting in the client's interest, not his own.
There can be no doubt that even when Mr. Maile has been acting pro se (on behalf of
himself and his wife, as well as on behalf of their solely-owned LLC, Berkshire Investments), he
has been acting solely for his own interests and is therefore not entitled to the immunity of the
litigation privilege.
The counterclaim in this case is against the Mailes as individuals and parties, not against
Thomas Maile in his capacity as an attorney. There is no distinction between the interests of
Thomas O.
G. Maile, IV, the attorney, and Thomas and Colleen Maile and their LLC, as parties.
There has been no evidence to indicate that Colleen Maile or Berkshire Investments "employed"
Thomas Maile to represent them.

If Taylor v. McNichols were read to apply in thllS situation,

there would be absolutely no limit to the havoc an attorney could wreak when he has chosen to
represent himself.
This situation would be analogous to Taylor v. McNichols only if the Taylors had filed a
suit against one of the six independent attorneys who have represented Mailes at various times
over the last eight years. In contrast, the Mailes' Complaint against Clark and Feeney and its
attorneys falls squarely within the absolute immunity of the litigation privilege, a fact which
supports the counterclaim for abuse of process in the filing and continued pursuit of this action.
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-Mailes also appear to argue that the Taylor v. McNichols decision precludes a lawsuit
against opposing counsel in the absence of a claim of fraud.

That is not accurate. After ruling

on the litigation privilege, the Court simply analyzed each of the claims filed and pointed out the
reasons why they were not valid.

This included an analysis of the fatal defects in the fraud

claim, which was cited as an additional reason for affirming the lower court's dismissal of the
suit against the attorneys..
attorneys" There is nothing in the decision to lead to the conclusion that a fraud
claim is mandatory.
As always, theMailes.briefing intentionally oversimplifies the counterclaims as being
based solely on the filing of lis pendens.

This has never been the case, no matter how many

times they say it is so. Their reliance on Weitz v. Green is misplaced, as that case related solely
to the question of whether assertions during litigation could support a claim of slander of title.
That argument has no relevance now because the Taylors promptly and voluntarily withdrew
their counterclaim for slander of title after the Court issued the Weitz decision, which overturned
long-standing precedence:.
II. Motion in

Limin~
Limin~

The motion in limine: asks the Court to bar the Taylors "from introducing testimony and/or
evidence at trial relating to the actions of the counter-defendants" relating to prior litigation.
This argument appears to be based solely on the litigation privilege, and should also be denied
for the reasons set forth above. If the litigation privilege does not apply, there can be no rational
argument that Maile's actions in prior litigation are not directly relevant to the claims of abuse of
process and tortious interference with contract.
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III. Conclusion

Under the facts of this case, the litigation privilege set forth in Taylor v. McNichols does not
apply. Therefore, the Counterdefendants' Motion to Dimiss and/or Motion in Limine should be
denied.
DATED this

jj~ day of November, 2010.
LAWFIRM,P

By
Conni W. Taylor, a member of
Attorneys for Johnson Trust, Jo
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

~

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~day of November, 2010 I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed
to the following:
Thomas G. Maile, IV
380 West State Street
Eagle, ID 83616

G
G
G

14
Mr. Christ Troupis
Attorney at Law
PO Box 2408
Eagle, ID 83616

G
G
G

II

Mark Prusynski
MOFFATT THOMAS
101
10 1 S Capitol Blvd., 10 th Floor
PO Box 829
Boise, 10 8370 1I
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Co-counsel for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO,

n~

AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, N. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,

v.

Case No. CV-OC-0723232
REPL Y MEMORANDUM BRIEF
REPLY
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
DISMISS PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P.
RULE 12 (b)(c) &IOR
&/OR MOTJON IN
LIMINE RE: LITIGATION
PRIVILEGE

TAYLOR,
CONNIE WRIGHT TA
YLOR, f/k/a
TAYLOR,
CONNIE TA
YLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR,
TA
YLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR,
TA
YLOR, an individual; CLARK and
JPAUL T. CLARK,
FEENEY, a partnership; lPAUL
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN
-JOliN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
The counter-defendants by and through their undersigned co-counsel of record, and
provide their Reply Memorandum Brief in support of their Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to
REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT
&/OR MOTION IN LIMINE RE: LITIGATION PRIVILEGE
TO I.R.C.P. RULE 12 (b)(c) &IOR
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LR.C.P. Rules 12 (b)(c) &/or Motion in Limine Re: Litigation Privilege, as follows:

LEGAL ARGUMENT
1

The proposed Amended Reply to Counter-claim properly asserts an additional
affirmative defens,e, is not untimely, and is not prejudicial.
As set forth in the in the Memorandum Brief in support of the Counter-defendants'

Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to I.R.C.P.
LR.C.P. Rules 12 (b)(c) &/or Motion in Limine Re: Litigation
Privilege and has addressed herein, the affinnative defense of litigation privilege sets for a valid
defense that has application to the present facts. In addition, the counter-defendants have fully
complied with the Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning filed December 30,2009. The
executed stipulation provides, " 90 days before trial is the last day to file a motion to amend the
claims between the parties to the lawsuit, including to add a claim for punitive damages".

In

addition, on page of the stipulation, the parties agreed, "All other non-dispositive pre-trial
motions (including, but not limited to motions in limine) must be filed and heard not less than
twenty-one (21) days before trial".
LR.C.P. 15(a) provides that leave to amend "shall be freely given when justice so
requires." Hoskinson v. Hoskinson, 139 Idaho 448,80 P.3d 1049 (Idaho 2003). Other factors
that our Idaho Appellate Courts have considered when reviewing a trial court's decision to grant a
motion to amend include: 1) if the amended pleading provides a valid claim; 2) if the opposing
party would be prejudiced by the delay in adding the new claim; and 3) if the opposing party has
an available defense such as the statute of limitations, see generally, Black Canyon Racquetball
Club, Inc.
Inc, v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 119 Id. 171, 175,804 P.2d 900,904 (1991). The purpose

REPL
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behind the rules are to allow claims to be determined on the merits rather than on technicalities,
and to make pleadings serve the limited role of providing notice of the nature of the claim and
the facts at issue, Clark v. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323, 326, 715 P.2d 993,996 (1986).
A complaint is subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) when an affirmative defense
appears on the face ofthe complaint itself. Stewart v. Arrington Const. Co., supra, 92 Idaho at
530,446 P.2d 895; 2 A Moore's Federal Practice 8.28, p. 1863 (1974); 5 Wright & Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil §§ 1277, 1357 (1969). If an affirmative defense is not
disclosed by the complaint itself, the defense may not be raised by motion to dismiss, except
where 'matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court,' in which case
'the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment.' I.R.C.P.
LR.C.P. 12(b), Gardner v. Hollifield,
96 Idaho 609,533 P.2d 730 (Idaho 1975), citing Cook v. Soltman, 96 Idaho 187,525 P.2d 969
(1974); 2A Moore's, supra:; 5 Wright & Miller, supra; Stewart v. Arrington Const. Co., supra, 92
Idaho at 531,446 P.2d 895. An affirmative defense may be raised for the first time on .aa motion
for summary judgment. Fuhriman v. State, Dept. ofTransp., 143 Idaho 800, 153 P.3d 480 (Idaho
2007), Bluestone v. Mathewson, 103 Idaho 453, 455, 649 P.2d 1209 1211 (1982). All the parties
have filed and referenced matters outside the pleadings relating to the current motion. Both

parties have requested that the court treat the current motion as a motion for summary judgment.
The defense of litigation privilege is properly before the court even if the court denies the motion
to amend the reply to the counterclaims as all parties have relied upon matters outside the
pleadings.
The motion to amend the Reply to Counter-claim was based on the recent decision

REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT
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rendered in the Idaho Supreme Court case captioned, Taylor v. McNichols, 36130, 36131
(IDSCCI), decided on September 3, 2010, which established law with respect to the application
(lDSCCI),
of the litigation privilege. The counter-claimants cannot argue that there is prejudice and/or they
are harmed by alleged undue delay as the proposed amendment filing was within the stipulated
times allowed between the parties and is supported by the recent Taylor case. The amendment to
the Reply should be allow<::d.
2

The Counter-claimants have failed to allege sufficient facts in their amendE~d
counter-claim to establish an exception to the litigation privilege.
A claim asserting nothing more than an improper motive in properly obtaining process

does not successfully plead an abuse of process. Dalley v. Dykema Gossett P.L.L.C, 289046
(MICA) (Michigan 2010), citing, Young v Motor City Apartments Ltd Dividend Housing Ass'n
No 1 & No 2, 133 Mich. App. 671,681; 350 N.W.2d 790 (1984). The recent case of Wynn v.
Earin, 163 Wn.2d 361, 181 P.3d 806 (Wash. 2008), examined the application of the litigation
privilege and held:
The California Supreme Court explained the purposes of the rule (which is
codified in that state):
The principal purpose of the litigation privilege is to afford litigants and witnesses

the utmost freedom of access to the courts without fear of being harassed
subsequently by derivative tort actions.
The rule promotes the effectiveness of
judicial proceedings by encouraging "open
ofjudicial
channels of communication and the presentation of evidence" in judicial
proceedings. A further purpose of the privilege "is to assure utmost freedom of
communication between citizens and public authorities whose responsibility is to
investigate and remedy wrongdoing." Such open communication is "a
fundamental right to the right of access to judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings."
Since the "external threat of liability is destructive of this fundamental right and
of justice," courts have applied the
inconsistent with the effective administration ofjustice,"
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privilege to eliminate the threat ofliability for communications made during all
kinds of truth-seeking proceedings.
proceedings .
. . . Witnesses should be free from the fear of protracted and costly lawsuits
which otherwise might cause them either to distort their testimony or refuse to
testify altogether.
... In immunizing participants for liability for torts arising from communications
made during judicial proceedings, the law places upon litigants the burden of
exposing during trial the bias of witnesses and the falsity of evidence, thereby
of judgments and avoiding an unending roundelay of
enhancing the finality ofjudgments
litigation, an evil far worse than an occasional unfair result.
Silberg v. Anderson, 50 Cal.3d 205, 213-14, 786 P.2d 365, 266 Cal. Rptr. 638
(1990) (citations omitted) (quoting McClatchy Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior
Court, 189 Cal. App.3d 961, 970,234 Cal. Rptr. 702 (1987); Imig v. Ferrar, 70
Cal. App.3d 48,55, 138 Cal. Rptr. 540 (1977); Pettit v. Levy, 28 Cal. App.3d 484,
490-91, 104 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1972».
The United States Supreme Court has similarly explained the importance of
the witness immunity rule. The dictates of public policy ... require that the paths
which lead to the ascertainment of truth should be left as free and unobstructed as
possible.' " Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 333, 103 S. Ct. 1108 (quoting Calkins v. Sumner,
13 Wis. 193, 197 (1860». [163 Wn.2d 378] The Court has also explained: "
'Controversies sufficiently intense to erupt in litigation are not easily capped by a
judicial decree. Th(~ loser in one forum will frequently seek another....
another.... Absolute
immunity is thus necessary to assure that judges, advocates, and witnesses can
perform their respective functions without harassment or intimidation.' " Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478,512,98 S. Ct. 2894, 57 L. Ed.2d 895 (1978), quoted in
Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 335, 103 S. Ct. 1108. Ultimately, the rule protects litigants.,
whose interests at stake in a case range across the entire spectrum ofproperty,
of property,
family, and individual circumstances, by encouraging the full, truthful, and

complete testimony of witnesses.
The immunity afforded to statements made during the course of a judicial proceeding
extends not only to the parties in a proceeding but to judges, witnesses, and counsel as well.
Fridovich; Cox v. Klein, 546 So.2d 120 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). What the above holdings establish
is that the courts allow the privilege to attorneys advocating on behalf of clients, the litigants
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themselves, and witnesses involved in pursuing court proceedings.
The case of Fernandez v. Haber & Ganguzza, LLP, 3D08-3195 (FLCA3) (2010)
provides:
In the case before us, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor
of Ganguzza regarding the tortious interference claim because the undisputed
evidence in the record shows the existence of litigation privilege. The actions that
Ganguzza's law finn took, which included preparing and filing the Notice of Lis
Pendens, were privileged because they occurred during the course of a judicial
proceeding.
In Echevarria, McCalla, Raymer, Barrett & Frappier v. Cole, 950 So.2d 380
(Fla. 2007), the Florida Supreme Court held that absolute immunity applies to any
act occurring during the course of a judicial proceeding, whether the underlying
claim constitutes a common law tort or a statutory violation, including tortious
interference with a business relationship, so long as the act has some relation to
the proceeding. See also Boca Investors Group, Inc. v. Potash, 835 So.2d 273 (Fla.
3d DCA 2002). In the case before us, it is undisputed that the lis pendens filed by
Ganguzza's firm was filed during the course of the judicial proceeding brought by
the Association against Fernandez. There was undisputed evidence in the record
that the law firm was directed by the Association to prevent the sale, thus the film
was privileged in placing the lis pendens in connection with the action for
injunctive relief Any proceeding based on statements made in connection with a
judicial proceeding are not actionable. See Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas,
Mayes & Mitchell, P.A. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 639 So.2d 606,607-08 (Fla. 1994).
See also Ross v. Blank, 958 So.2d 437,441 (Fla. 4 DCA 2007).
Accordingly, the filing ofthe lis pendens together with the action for
injunctive relief was privileged and cannot be the basis of Fernandez's action for
tortious interference. The trial court was correct in granting summary judgment in
favor of Ganguzza's finn. Although we think that the behavior of the Ganguzza
law finn may have been highly unethical, we must affirm.
Idaho Law is in accord. Th publication of the notice oflis
of lis pendens is not defamatory. It
merely informs the public that the property is involved in litigation. Vanderford Co., Inc. v.
Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 165 P.3d 261 (Idaho 2007).
The case of Dalley v. Dykema Gossett P.L.L.C, 289046 (MICA) (Michigan 2010)
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involved a second lawsuit alleging the plaintiff and the attorneys in the first suit improperly
pursued their litigation. The Dalley, court stated in dismissing the claims of abuse of process and
tortious interference with ella business a business relationship, "In order to succeed under a claim
of tortious interference with a business relationship, the plaintiffs must allege that the interferer
did something illegal, unethical or fraudulent. There is nothing illegal, unethical or fraudulent in
filing a lawsuit, whether groundless or not." Dalley v. Dykema Gossett P.L.L.C, 289046 (MICA)
(Michigan 2010), citing Early Detection Center, P.C., v. New York Life Ins. Co., 157 Mich. App.
618 at 631, 403 N.W.2d 830 (Mich. App. 1986).
The case of Taylor v. McNichols, provides the Idaho Supreme Court's approval of sister
state's interruption of the l:itigation privilege in light of the theories of the counter-claimants in
the present case and provides:
In Kahala Royal Corp. v. Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel.
Stifel, LLP, the Supreme
Court of Hawai'i took an extensive look at the litigation privilege, and how
different jurisdictions have applied the privilege as it pertains to claims of tortious
interference. 151 P.3d 732 (Haw. 2007). The Court noted that generally for a
claim of tortious interference to be brought against an attorney, where such claim
arises out of his performance as an attorney, it must be established that the
attorney acted in a manner demonstrating personal malice or a desire to harm, not
springing from his desire to protect his client. Id. at 750. (discussing Schott v.
Glover, 440 N.E.2d 376,380 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) ("A plaintiff can state a cause of
action for tortious interference with a contract against a third party who is
conditionally privih;~ged if the plaintiff can set forth factual allegations from which
actual malice may reasonably be said to exist." (Emphasis added). However, these
allegations "would necessarily include a desire to harm, which is independent of
and unrelated to the attorney's desire to protect his client.") (Emphases added)).
See also Fraidin v. Weitzman, 611 A.2d 1046, 1080 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992)
("To remove the qualified privilege, the attorney must possess a desire to harm
the desire to protect his client. This would constitute
ofthe
which is independent of
actual malice and therefore substantiate a tortious interference with contract
claim.") (emphases added) (holding that, where the Appellant failed to allege fads
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constituting actual malice on behalf of the attorney, a motion for summary
judgment was appropriately granted); Macke Laundry Servo Ltd. P'ship V. Jetz
Servo Co., 931 S.
W .2d 166, 182 (Mo. Ct.App. 1996) ("This court recognizes a
S.W.2d
privilege for attomeys, when acting within the scope of the attorney" client
relationship, to advise and act for a client even though that advice, if wrong, may
cause a client to t0l1iously interfere with another's business relationship or
expectancy, so long as the attorney does not employ wrongful means and acts with
proteet the interests of the client and not for the attorney's self
good faith to proted
interest."); Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing Lawyers § 57(3) (2000)
("A lawyer who advises or assists a client to make or break a contract, to enter or
dissolve a legal relationship, or to enter or not enter a contractual relation, is not
liable to a non
client for interference with contract or with prospective contractual
nonclient
relations or with a legal relationship, if the lawyer acts to advance the client's
objectives without using wrongful means.").
The case of State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. CO. V. Singh, 131 F.3d
F .3d 148 (9th Cir. 1997),
involved a case similar to the counter-claimants' allegations in the present matter. There State
Farm brought an action against an opposing law firm and three litigants involved in a plior
litigated proceeding. State Farm argued that the parties were active in promoting perjury during
the trial. In ruling that the dismissal of the action was appropriate, the State Farm Court, stated,
"That privilege is very broad and protects litigants from liability for their assertions or claims in
harassed. [2] See
lawsuits, so that access to the courts will be facilitated and litigants will not be harassed,
Doctors' Co. V.
v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. App.3d 1284, 1293,275 Cal. Rptr. 674, 679 (1991). The
privilege is: absolute, even if the result is inequitable. See id. at 1294,275 Cal. Rptr. at 679".
There has been no logical argument advanced by the counter-claimants which addresses
why pro se litigants should be treated differently in the application of the litigation privilege. In
fact, pro se litigants are held to the same standards and rules as attorneys and litigants represented
by attorneys. Everhart V.
v. W"ashington
W'ashington County Road and Bridge Dept., 130 Idaho 273,275,939
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P.2d 849, 851 (1997), Golay v. Loomis, 118 Idaho 387, 392, 797 P.2d 95, 100 (1990). The
counter-claimants have not pointed to any legal authority which limits the litigation privilege to
attorneys as opposed to litigant. Case law above cited does not make such a distinction. In fact
Taylor v. McNichols holds otherwise and provides:
In fact, "at common law, the litigation privilege blanketed all participants in the
court system; private attorneys were treated no differently than judges,
government lawyers, and witnesses
.... This privilege is predicated on the long
witnesses....This
established principle that the efficient pursuit ofjustice
of justice requires that attorneys and
litigants must be pf~rmitted
pf~rmitted to speak and write freely in the course oflitigation
without the fear of reprisal through a civil suit for defamation or libel.
The litigation privilege based upon the case law cited is presumed to exist. Taylor v.
McNichols, also holds that the litigation privilege is presumed. The counter-claimants have
failed to allege any acts which could be construed as malice, fraud, or criminal behavior which
may result in the limitation of the litigation privilege. The counterclaims must be dismissed in
light of the allegations alleged in the amended counter-claims and the law cited in support of the
motion.
CONCLUSION
The amended counter-claim filed by the Taylor counter-claimants fails to advance any
legitimate claim in light of the litigation privilege. The attorney counter-claimants have failed to
object to the motion to dismiss and failed to file any brief in opposition to the motion. The
counter-claims must be dismissed.
DATED

this~cf day of November, 2010.
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DEPU'I'V
DEPU1"V

MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED

101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
Post Office Box 829
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone (208) 345-2000
Facsimile (208) 385-5384
msp@moffatt.com
17136.0306
Attorneys for Defendants Connie Wright Taylor fka
Connie Taylor, Clark and Feeney, and Paul T. Clark
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV-OC-0723232
CV -OC-0723232

MOTION TO DISMISS
COUNTERCLAIM OF CLARK AND
FEENEY DEFENDANTS

VS.

NO ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
COl'n-nE WRIGHT TAYLOR, fka CONNIE
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR,
T
AYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN TAYLOR,
CLARK. and FEENEY, a
an individual; CLARK
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, an individual;
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUST, an Idaho revocable trust; JOHN
DOES I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL
PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR CLAIMING
ANY RIGHT TO POSSESSION,

Defl;:ndants.

MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTERCLAIM OF CLARK AND
FEENEY DEFENDANTS - 1

Client: 18530061
1853006, 1

001886

Come now the defendants, Clark and Feeney, Connie Taylor, and Paul Thomas
Clark (the "Clark and Feeney Defendants") by and through their counsel, Mark S. Prusynski, and
pursuant to I.R.c.P. 41(a)(2), and move for an order of voluntary dismissal of the Clark and
Feeney Defendants' count,erclaims in the above matter, with and without fees or costs.
This motion is made on the grounds and for the reasons that the Clark and Feeney
Defendants' claims are derivative of the claims of the other defendants, and the only damages
unique to the Clark and Feeney Defendants are their fees for defending the claims of the
plaintiff, which can be adequately addressed in a post-trial motion to the court pursuant to
I.R.C.P.54(d)(1).
Defendants do not intend to request oral argument or to file a brief.
DATED this 2nd day of December, 2010.
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED

~

By_
_~--~~~--~-=~c-------+-_--"'-'=~=-=---'-----=--V-c---By____
Mark . Prusynski - Of the lrm
Attorneys for Defendants Connie Wright
Taylor fka Connie Taylor, Clark and
Feeney, and Paul T. Clark

MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTERCLAIM OF CLARK AND
FEENEY DEFENDANTS - 2

Client:1853006.1
Client:
18530061
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2nd day of December, 2010, I caused a true
and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTERCLAIM OF CLARK
AND FEENEY DEFENHANTS to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to
the following:
Thomas G. Maile IV
LA W OFFICES OF THOMAS

G MAILE IV, P.A.

380 W. State St.
Eagle, ID 83616-4902
Facsimile (208) 939-1001
Christ T. Troupis

PA
TROUPIS LA W OFFICE, PA
P.O. Box 2408
Eagle, ID 83616
Facsimile (208) 938-5482

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(x) Facsimile

( ) US. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(x) Facsimile

John C. Mitchell
CLARK & FEENEY
1229 Main St., Suite 201
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston,ID 83501-0285
Facsimile (208) 746-9160

( ) US. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(x) Facsimile

COlmie W. Taylor

( ) US. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(x) Facsimile

HENDERSON LA W

900 Washington, Suite 1020
WA 98660
Vancouver, WA
Facsimile (360) 693-2911

Mark S Prusynski

MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTERCLAIM OF CLARK AND
FEENEY DEFENDANTS - 3

Client: 1853006.1
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REG£: 'lED
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JAN
Local Counsel:
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CONNIE W. TAYLOR
Henderson Law Firm, PLLC
900 Washington Street, Suite 1020
Vancouver, W
A 98660
WA
Telephone 360.699.1530
Fax 360.693.2911
ISBA No. 4837
Attorneys for Johnson Trust,
DaHan Taylor, and John Taylor
Applying counsel:
PAUL L. HENDERSON
Henderson Law Firm, PLLC
900 Washington Street, Suite 1020
W A 98660
Vancouver, WA
Telephone 360.699.1530
Fax 360.693.2911

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE

Case No. CV OC 0723232

husband and wife,

Plaintiffs,

MOTION FOR LIMITED ADMISSION

vs.
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, et al.
Defendants.

The undersigned local counsel petitions the court for admission of the undersigned
applying counsel, pursuanlt to Idaho Bar Commission Rule 222, for the purpose of the aboveMOTION FOR LIMITED ADMISSION
ADMISSlON

1
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captioned matter.

Applying counsel certifies that he is an active member, in good standing,

of the bar of Washington (certificate attached), that he maintains the regular practice of law at
the above-noted address, and that he is not a resident of the State of Idaho or licensed Ito practice
IBeR 222 previously.
in Idaho. Applying counsel certifies that he has not been admitted under meR

Both undersigned counsel certify that a copy of this motion has been served on all other

parties to this matter and that a copy of the motion, accompanied by a $200 fee, has been
provided to the Idaho State Bar.
Local counsel certifies that the above

is true to the best of her knowledge, after

reasonable investigation. Local counsel acknowledges that her attendance shall be required at all
court proceedings in which applying counsel appears, unless specifically excused by the trial
judge.

~r-r6

/;AT~D fhi£ day ofDecember, 2010-~,
20 I(L", ,

",

.~~
~
':;:::ro~
~"'~:~~'U
~
Connie W. Taylor

MOTION FOR LIMITED ADMISSION

Paul

2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day of December, 2010 I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed
to the following:
Thomas G. Maile, IV
380 West State Street
Eagle, 10 83616

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001

Mr. Christ Troupis
Attorney at Law
PO Box 2408
Eagle, 10 83616

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 938-5482

Mark Prusynski
MOFF
A TT THOMAS
MOFFATT
101 S Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
PO Box 829
Boise, 10 83701

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 385-5384

MOTION FOR LIMITED ADMISSION
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-'--

RECEIVED

JAN 0
3 2011
03
Ada Cu-.:.;-.. 'j C:oi'k
C:ork

'-

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
)

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION

)

NO, 872:9
BAR NO.

)

OF
PAUL LLOYD HENDERSON
TO PRACTICE IN THE COURTS OF THIS STATE

)
)

CERTIFICATE A.S TO

)

STANDING

)
)
)

I, Ronald R,
R. Carpenter, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, hereby certify

PAUL LLOYD HENDERSON
was regularly admitted to practice as an Attorney and Counselor at Law in the Supreme Court and all the
Washing~on on October 27, 1978, and after that date was continuous in good standing
Courts of the State of Washing~on

Rid 3.1, conviction of a fc;:lony,
until he was suspended on October 13, 1997 for interim suspension per RId
nd

nd
attempted assault in the 2 degree (2 counts), until reinstament on November 8, 2001. His status is

currently active,
active.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have
hereunto set my hand and affixed
nd
the seal of said Court this 22 day of
December, 2010.
2010,

Ronald R. CaI"pent
CaI'pent
Supreme Court Clerk
Washington State Supreme Court

001892

RECEIVED

0 3 2Ct1
Jt\N 03
Ada Cou:-:ty ctorl.;
CONNIE W. TAYLOR
Henderson Law Firm, PLLC
900 Washington Street, Suite 1020
Vancouver, WA 98660
Telephone 360.699.1530
Fax 360.693.2911
ISBA No. 4837
Attorneys for Johnson Trust,
DaHan Taylor, and John Taylor

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability, and THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, and
COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE husband and wife,

Case No. CV OC 0723232

Plaintiffs,
MOTION IN
AUTHORITY

vs.

LIMINE

WITH

SUPPORTING

CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, et al.
Defendants.

TO:

THE HONORABLE RICHARD GREENWOOD
The Counter-defendants' Certification of Witnesses makes it apparent that they plan to

try to roll the clock back to 2003 and have a trial of all the issues which they raised
unsuccessfully in the Taylor v. Maile suit.

That is improper, and flies in the face of this

Court's order dismissing the Amended Complaint. The witness disclosure also shows that the
Counter-defendants plan to call expert witnesses to testify that every court decision against

COUNTERCLAIMANTS'
MOTION IN LIMINE

1
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them was wrong, that all the decisions in their favor were right, and that the appellate court is
going to set the record straight.

This, also, is improper.

Pursuant to IRE 103(c), IRE 402 and IRE 403, The Theodore Johnson Trust, John
Taylor, and Dallan Taylor respectfully move that this Court enter an order prior to trial
specifically excluding the testimony set forth below. The matters set out would be inadmissible
for any purpose. They have no bearing on the counterclaims, which are the only issues being
tried, or otherwise should be excluded for reasons stated below.
If the Court reserves ruling on any issues, opposing counsel and all witnesses should
be instructed to refrain from making any mention,

interrogation, or argument, directly or

indirectly, concerning any of the matters set forth herein, without first approaching the Bench
and obtaining a ruling of the Court outside the presence and hearing of the jury.
1.

Expert

le~ testimony.

Under IRE 702, a person with specialized knowledge

may testify as an expert ![that testimony "will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine
detennine a fact in issue."
Many, if not most, of the opinions which will be expressed by expert witnesses

John Runft and Thomas G. Maile, IV do not relate to any fact in issue in this case, but
instead are bIatant
countermand decisions which were
bllatant attempts to contradict and countennand
made by the trial court and the Supreme Court in Taylor v. Maile, as well as decisions
which have been made by this Court in the present matter.

The objectionable

testimony which has been disclosed at this juncture includes:

COUNTERCLAIMANTS'
MOTION IN LIMINE

2
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a.

Testimony, argument or inference that this Court's rulings in this case
were in error, such as:
res judicata did not apply to the Plaintiffs' claims in this case,

1.
l.

exceptions to the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel

II.

"were present" in this case,
There was "no determination of the merits"

111.

III

the present

litigation
b.

Testimony, argument, or inference that this Court erred in denying
Mailes'

motions to dismiss and/or for

summary judgment on the

counterclaims
c.

Testimony, argument or inference that speculates as to what past courts
might have done differently or what future courts may do, including:
1.
l.

Maile's intention to testify that "there is a high probability that

the appellate courts will reverse the current court's ruling as res
judicata does not apply and/or there is an exception based upon
perjury and/or fraud upon the court."
II.

Runft's intention to testify that Judge Wilper "wouId not have
ordered the property restored to the trust" without the Taylor's active

COUNTERCLA1MANTS'
COUNTERCLAlMANTS'
MonON
MOTION 1N
IN UM1NE
LlMlNE

3
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misrepresentation, and if there had been a trial, claims of quasi
estoppel "would have been considered by the court. "
iii.

Runft's intention to testify "if the present case is correct that
Taylors were no longer beneficiaries" their claim resulted in
judgment being wrongfully obtained based on fraud and/or criminal
conduct

d.

Testimony relating to the Supreme Court decision in Taylor v.
McNichols, which is just an attempt to ask the jurors to reverse this Court's
denial of the Counter-defendants' Motion for Reconsideration of the order
dismissing the claims against Clark and Feeney and its attorneys:
1.
I.

Testimony, argument or inference as to whether the litigation
privilege established in Taylor v. McNichols should be applied in this
instance. The applicability of the litigation privilege is a question of
law which must be decided by the Court, not the jury. Springer v.
Richardson Law Firm, 239 P.3d 473 (Okla.Civ.App. Div. I, 2010);

Unarco Material Handling, Inc., v. Liberato, 217 S.W.3d 227
(Tenn.Ct.App., 2010); See also Lubcke v. Boise City/Ada County
Housing Authority, 124 Idaho 450, 860 P.2d 653 (1993) (as to
qualified immunity).
11.

Testimony about the existence of a lawsuit between Reed Taylor
and John and Connie Taylor, and the underlying facts and allegations

COUNTERCLAIMANTS'
MOTION IN LIMINE
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in Taylor v. McNichols, which have no relevance in this matter,
would be presented solely to try to get some mileage out of the rift in
the family, and would be substantially prejudicial and not probative
of any issue in this case.
iii.

Testimony

as to "when a claim for litigation misconduct

accrues" and "the appellate court standards in review of issues on
appeal which based upon custom and practice and the rules of the
court, appellate courts will not consider issues that are not ripe for
judicial determination including the fraud upon the court and the
allegations of perjury committed by the attorneys and counterclaimants. "
e.

Any argument, inference, or testimony by witnesses, including Mr.
Runft and Mr. Maile, that the Taylors did not have the legal right to seek the
return of the Linder Road property. This issue was decided in Taylor

t

and

II2, is the law of the case, and it is improper for witnesses or
again in Taylor //2,

counsel to attempt to convince the jurors that their judgment on that issue is
superior to that of the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho.

In essence,

attempting to argue that issue at this trial amounts to a request that the jurors
reverse the trial and Supreme Court decisions, and is a perfect example of

I

2

Taylor v. Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 127 P.3d 156 (2005)
201I P.3d 1282 (2009)
Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 20

COUNTERCLAIMANTS'
MOTION IN LIMINE

5

001897

why res judicata is such a fundamental and important principle of our legal
system.
f.

Testimony which directly misrepresents prior court decisions, such as:

i.

Maile's intent to testify that the Supreme Court's decision

III
10

Taylor II held that "the Taylors had in fact disclaimed their entire
interest in the trust" and that "The Taylor's [sic] are not beneficiaries
of the trust as judicially determined in the January 2009 decision."
Runft's intent to testify that the Taylors retained no beneficial

11.
n.

interest in the Trust, were trustees only, and committed "an unlawful
objective in having the property restored by misrepresenting their

status as beneficiaries. "
lll.
Ill.

Runft's intent to testify that the "Supreme Court refused to access
[sic] sanctions of the filing of the present suit although requested by
the counterclaimants to so [sic]." This is a total fabrication.

No

request for sanctions was made; on the contrary, the Taylors joined

in the request for permissive appeal. The Supreme Court rejected the
request, and has not ruled in any manner on the filing of the present

suit.
iv.

Counter-defendants' claims were not frivolous or
Inferring that the Counter-defendants'claims

had merit because this Court has denied a request for fees and/or

COUNTERCLAIMANTS'
MOTION IN LIMINE
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sanctions.

In actuality, the request for fees relating to the Complaint

was reserved, not denied. 3
g.

Testimony as to "the custom and practice of attorneys in the State of
Idaho" is irrelevant.

The conduct required of attorneys is set forth in the

Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct,
and that is the only appropriate standard by which to measure the Counterdefendants' actions.
h.

Testimony as to money Berkshire invested in the real property and the
expression of theories as to why Mailes "were denied the remedy of unjust
enrichment." The trial court in Taylor v. Maile stated its reasons for that
decision, which are a matter of record4 ,and
, and "expert testimony" on that issue
is not only improper, it is not helpful to any issue pending in this matter.

1.

Testimony that Berkshire had paid for the land, the Trust had waived its
right to rescind the transaction, and Beth Rogers 2003 letter stating the trust
was "standing by the contract" are all irrelevant in light of the fact that the

contract was deemed to be void,S and that finding was upheld by the
Supreme Court. 6

Memorandum Decision and Order, July 2, 2009, paragraph VI, page 14.
See Ada Co. Case CV OC 04004730, Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Counterclaimant's claim for
Damages Grounded on the Theory of Unjust Enrichment, November 29,2006
5 Ada Co. Case CV OC 04004730, Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on Beneficiaries'
Claim, May 15, 2006.
6 Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 201 P.3d 1282 (2009).
3

4

COUNTERCLAIMANTS'
MOTION IN LIMINE
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J.

Testimony as to the applicability of judicial estoppel, which was among
the claims which were dismissed7 and was not pled as an affirmative
defense. Failure to plead a defense in the amended answer acts as a waiver of
the defense and all objections based on it. Ernst v. Hemenway and Moser,
Co., Inc., 120 Idaho 941,821 P.2d 996 (Ct. App., 1991).

2.

Dismissed claims couched as affirmative defenses.

The Counter-Defendants'

Second and Third Affirmative Defenses are, in reality, merely an attempt to raise,
as affirmative defenses, the very claims that were dismissed.
a.

The Second Affirmative Defense sets out the Idaho Code provisions for
racketeering activity.

That was raised as Count Eleven in the Amended

Compllaint8 , was dismissed, and cannot now be raised as an affirmative
defense.
b.

Claims for equitable estoppel and quasi estoppel, the Third Affirmative
defense, were also raised in the Amended Complaint9 ,IO and were dismissed,
barring their being raised as affirmative defenses.

3.

Testimony relating to issues relevant only in Taylor v. Maile, including:
a.

Value of the Linder Road property:

March 25, 2008 Amended Complaint, page 46, Count Twelve, Judicial Estoppel.
March 25, 2008 Amended Complaint, Count Eleven, pages 30 - 45.
9 March 25, 2008 Amended Complaint, Count Nine, page 29.
10 March 25, 2008 Amended Complaint, Count Ten, pages 29-30.
7

8

COUNTERCLAIMANTS'
MOTION IN LIMINE
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i.

In 2002 (erroneously referred to as 2004) (Knipe appraisal,
witnesses Brooks Potter and/or Bradford Knipe). This is irrelevant
to the counterclaims, and ultimately was not even relevant in the first
case. The ruling that the Mailes' purchase was void was based on the
lack of court approval as required by I. C. 68-108(b), not on whether
the purchase price was reasonable. Therefore, what the property was
worth in 2002 at the time of the Knipe appraisal has no bearing on
any issues in this case.

11.

In 2004 (Williams appraisal). For the reasons stated above, this
appraisal is also irrelevant to the issues remaining to be tried in this
matter.

111.

In 2006 (Joe Corlett appraisal and trial testimony).

Mr. Corlett

testified at the trial of Mailes' unjust enrichment claim in October of
2006.

His testimony was limited to the value of the property after

improvements which Mailes had made and is totally

case.

irreh~vant
irreh~vant

in this

In addition, at the court trial Judge Wilper ruled that the

improvements by Maile did not increase the value of the property. II
Allowing testimony on that issue would do nothing more than invite
the jurors to second guess Judge Wilper and the Idaho Supreme
Court, which affirmed his decision.

COUNTERCLAIMANTS'
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b.

Testimony by Al Knudson about the construction loan MaiIes obtained
on the Linder Road property in 2004. This was relevant only to the Mailes'
counterclaim for tortious interference with contract, which was dismissed by
Judge Wilper. 12

c.

Testimony by Bart Harwood, who represented the Johnson Trust for a
short time in 2004, or the beneficiaries or Trustees of the Johnson Family
Trust, Scott Johnson, Beth Rogers, Andrew Rogers, Darren Rogers, Brent
Johnson, Hazel Fisher.

None of these persons has had any involvement

with the Johnson Trust nor involvement in the lawsuits since the execution
of the Disclaimer Agreement in July of 2004, and have no knowledge that
would be relevant to the issues remaining to be tried in the present case.
d.

Testimony by David Wishney, whose sole involvement was in August of
2002 when he reviewed the purchase documents which Mr. Maile drafted.

e.

Testimony by Phillip Collaer, who was the attorney hired by Mr.
Maile's realtor's E&O carrier from 3/23/04 to 8/25/05. Mr. Collaer has had

no involvement in these matters during any time relevant to the issues
pending at this point.
f.

Testimony by Jack S. Gjording, who was the attorney hired by Mr.
Maile's legal E&O carrier. Mr. Gjording's involvement ended in 2005; he

II
12

See Ada Co. Case CY OC 0400473D, Memorandum Decision, November 29,2006, page 6
Ada County Case CYOC 0400473D, February 13,2006 Order Regarding Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
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-has had no involvement in these matters during any time relevant to the
issues pending at this point.
g.

Testimony by Imajean Hetherington, who was Mr. Johnson's accountant
prior Ito his death in 2002.

Mrs. Heatherington's sole involvement was

writing a letter to Mr. Johnson in 2002, prior to the Mailes' purchase of the
Linder Road property for $400,000, indicating that she felt the land might be
worth close to $1,000,000. Because the value of the property at that point is
not relevant, her testimony has no conceivable relevance to any pending
issue.

4.

Attitude and/or opinion of beneficiaries toward initial lawsuit; )'elationship
Joelationship

with Theodore Johnson.

The Counter-defendants should be precluded from presenting any

evidence whatsoever relating to whether beneficiaries or successor co-trustees to the Theodore
Johnson Trust approved or disapproved of the filing of the initial lawsuit against
Mailes/Berkshire.

Because the purchase was deemed to be void, such testimony is irrelevant

and immaterial, and any potential probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of

unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.
In addition, Counter-defendants have in the past attempted to introduce evidence as to
how frequently beneficiaries (specifically Helen Taylor and her children) visited Ted Johnson.
Because Mr. Johnson's state of mind has no bearing in this (or even in the preceding) action,
that line of questioning is also irrelevant and should not be permitted.

Judgment, page 3-4; Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims, June 7, 2006, page 2, paragraph 4.A.
COVNTERCLAIMANTS'
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5.

Speculation as to Ted Johnson's attitude and/or opinion toward selling the

Linder Road property to Mailes.

The Counter-defendants should also be precluded from

presenting any argument or evidence which would speculate as to what Ted Johnson's attitude

might have been about selling the trust property to Mailes.

That is totally irrelevant to the

issues in this case, and indeed had no relevance to the prior lawsuit, which held the purchase to
be void because the successor trustees had a conflict of interest and had not obtained court
approval of the sale, as was required by I.C. 68-108(b).

6.

Any communications between trustees and beneficiaries of the Theodore

Johnson Trust and their attorneys.

Counter-defendants have disclosed as fact witnesses

four attorneys (Bart Harwood,
HarWOOd, Connie Taylor, Paul Thomas Clark, and David Wishney) who
have represented the Johnson Trust and/or its trustees or beneficiaries. The Counter-defendants

should be precluded from presenting any evidence relating to communications or documents
for two reasons:
a.

None of the facts known by Harwood or Wishney are relevant to the

issues pending in this trial;

b.

All of those communications are protected by the attorney-client or work

product privilege.
c.

Calling opposing counsel as a witness creates a conflict with I.R.P.C.

3.7, which precludes an attorney from acting as advocate at a trial where he or she is "a

necessary witness."

There is no testimony which could be obtained from Ms. Taylor that

COUNTERCLAIMANTS'
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could not be obtained from other witnesses as well, and the Counter-defendants should be
precluded from attempting to call her as a witness.

7.
Circumstances surrounding the resignation of Beth and Andy Rogers and
all communications prior to execution of the Disclaimer Agreement.
Because the Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that in the Disclaimer Agreement the
Taylors specifically retained the right to pursue the suit relating to the Linder Road property,
any questions or argument on the circumstances leading up to that agreement would be nothing
more than an attempt to get the jurors in this action to in effect overrule the Supreme Court
decision.
In addition, all communications preceding the execution of the Disclaimer Agreement
(including but not limited to the April 14, 2004 letter from Connie Taylor to Bart Harwood)
are inadmissible under the parol evidence rule, which precludes extrinsic evidence of prior or
contemporaneous negotiations or conversations to contradict, vary, alter, add to, or detract from
the terms of an unambiguous contract." Howard v. Perry, 141 Idaho 139, 106 P.3d 465, 467
(2005). See also Valley Bank v. Christensen, 119 Idaho 496, 498, 808 P.2d 415, 417 (1991).

Our Supreme Court ruled in Howard that the presence of a merger clause in a written
contract conclusively establishes that the agreement is integrated and therefore subject to the
parol evidence rule.

The Disclaimer, Release & Indemnity Agreement contains an express

provision that "all prior or contemporaneous agreements, understandings, representations,

COUNTERCLAIMANTS'
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~

superseded.,,133 "The merger clause is not merely a
warranties and statements, oral or written, are superseded."]
factor to consider in deciding whether the agreement is integrated; it proves the agreement is
integrated." Howard v. Perry, 141 Idaho 139, 142, 106 P.3d 465, 468 (2005).

8.

Whether Helen Taylor has a will and the provisions thereof.

Counter-

defendants have questioned witnesses as to whether Helen Taylor has a will, and if so, what it
provides.

There is no relevance to that issue, and all evidence relating to the issue should be

excluded.
9.

Testimony

l~elen
l~elen

call Helen Taylor as a witness.

Taylor.

Counter-defendants have indicated an intention to

That should not be allowed; Mrs. Taylor is nearly 95 years

old, blind, and extremely hard of hearing even with the use of hearing aids.
10.

Administration, including distributions, of the Johnson Trust has no

relevance to the issues in this suit.
11.

AdvocacJr.J!y Mr. Maile.
AdvocacJ'..J!y

I.R.P.C. 3.7 precludes a lawyer from acting as

advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness. Because Mr. Maile
has named himself as an expert witness on the ultimate issues in this matter, he must be

prohibited from questioning witnesses, addressing the jury, or addressing the Court,
Court.
12.

Cumulative Evidence.

The Counter-defendants should not be permitted to

submit cumulative evidence.

13 Disclaimer, Release & Indemnity Agreement, paragraph 10, page 3, Exhibit A to Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition
to Motion for Summary Judgment, filed in the present action and dated April 10,2009.
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IRE 403 deals with the exclusion of relevant evidence on various grounds.
Specifically, evidence may be excluded even if probative when considering undue delay, waste
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

Idaho courts have stated that

"cumulative evidence is additional or corroborative evidence that 'goes to prove what has
already been established by other evidence.' BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 380 (6 th ed.

1990)." Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 971 P.2d 1151 (1998). An accountant's testimony was
deemed repetitious and excluded as cumulative evidence under IRE 403 when on]y one other
witness had presented the same data. Reed v. Reed, 137 Idaho 53, 44 P.3d 1108 (2002).
Based on the assumption that their disclosures are genuine and not merely an attempt to
harass and obfuscate, it is clear that the trial of this matter will take much longer than the five
days currently scheduled unless cumulative testimony is prohibited.

Counterclaimants ask that

the Court require the Counter-defendants to select and identify the witnesses they actually plan
to call to testify, and that the Counter-defendant be limited in the number of persons who can
be called on any specific issue.

a.

The Counter-defendants' disclosure indicates that Thomas Maile is gomg to
testify "as to the same areas outlined above by Mr. Runft and will provide the
same opinions as set forth above."

This is, by definition, cumulative testimony

which should be precluded under I.R.E. 403.
b.

The disclosure also names "Beneficiaries or Trustees of the Johnson Family
Trust. "

COVNTERCLAIMANTS'
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27 beneficiaries; of those, only the Taylors have had any involvement in this
matter since the Disclaimer Agreement was entered into in 2004.
c.

Four witnesses (Bradford Knipe, R. Brooks Potter, Tim Williams, and Joe
Corlett) are designated to testify as to the value of the Linder property.

d.

Three witnesses (John Runft, Thomas Maile IV, Dennis Cindell) are designated
to testify to the effect of a Lis Pendens and/or this litigation on the subject
property.

13.

Issues relating to real property in Star, Idaho.

Counter-defendams should be

precluded from presenting any evidence relating to the fact that Reed and Dallan Taylor
purchased real property located in Star, Idaho from the Theodore Johnson Trust.

That

purchase has no relationship to the issues in this case.

14.

Any

sugg{~stion
sugg{~stion

that recovery by Counterclaimants would not be subject to

federal income tax or any other form of taxation.

Idaho courts have been clear that

testimony regarding the presence or lack of taxation pertaining to damage awards is
inappropriate. lnama v. Brewer, 132 Idaho 377, 973 P.2d 148 (1999).

15.

Requested damage amount.

No mention, comment, question, argument or

other reference whatsoever should be made to the effect that the Counterclaimants' attorneys
have asked for a greater amount of damages than the Counterclaimants expect to receive. IRE
408.

16.

Mention of the probable testimony of a witness who will not be or may not

be testifying at trial.
COUNTERCLAIMANTS'
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witness, shall not mention the probable testimony of a witness who will not be or may not be
testifying at trial.
17.

Any reference to the financial status of any party to this suit.

The financial

status of any party to this lawsuit is irrelevant and should not be discussed.
18.

Adverse effect on society. Defense counsel and witnesses should not produce

argument or testimony to the effect that any award for Counterclaimants would adversely affect
jurors or society at large, or that awards in other cases have been too high or

havt~

an adverse

impact on society or specific segments of society.
19.

Expert opinions not provided through discovery under CR 26(b)(4).

Counter-defendants' counsel was requested through interrogatories to provide full opinions of
their experts to enable Counterclaimants to prepare for trial as allowed in CR 26(b)(4). IRE
705 then describes the scope of expert testimony, and requires that the underlying facts or data
have been previously disclosed to Counterclaimants if requested. Counterclaimants did request
complete disclosure, including the underlying facts or data, and therefore Counter-defendants
now should be limited in any expert testimony to the specific information provided.

20.

Referenc€~

to motion to exclude evidence.

There should be no mention that

this motion has been presented to or ruled upon by the Court.

In this connection,

Counterclaimants move that defense counsel be instructed not to suggest to the jury, by
argument or otherwise, that Counterclaimants have sought to exclude from proof any matter
bearing upon the issues in this cause or the rights of the parties to this suit.

COUNTERCLAIMANTS'
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CONCLUSION
Counterclaimants seek a pretrial order and ruling of this court. As to every ruling the
court makes in limine pursuant to these motions, Counterclaimants request that aU parties and
their counsel be instructed to specifically advise all witnesses prior to their testimony of the
court's rulings.
DATED thi&.;J4ay of December, 2010.
...
., ....

.........
_._-.-........

\,
By
Conni W. Taylor, a member ofthec,firm.
ofthec'firm.
Attorneys for Counterclaimants.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I 0 I caused to be served a true and correct
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _:ztj
;Zt] day of December, 20 I0
copy of the foregoing documt:nt by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

Thomas G. Maile, IV
380 West State Street
Eagle, ID 83616

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001

Mr. Christ Troupis
Attorney at Law
PO Box 2408
Eagle, ID 83616

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 938-5482

~!.~-~
U.S. Mail

Mark Prusynski
MOFFA
TT THOMAS
MOFFATT
th
10lh
101 S Capitol Blvd., 10
Floor
PO Box 829
Boise, ID 83701

Hand Delivered
Overnis-.ht Mail
Overni8..ht
Telecopy-i(FAX) (208) 385-5384

'- -. _.......~/ t/·
"\

""-,

!

Connie W. Taylor
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130
PO Box 2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone:
208/938-5584
Facsimile: r 208/938-5482
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com

0 3 2011
JAN 03
j

i\lAVARRO, Clerk
DAVID i\JAVARRO,
By/;.3ARDEN
JEPL'TY
JEPUTY

Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,

Case No. CV-OC-0723232

MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT
C]LAIMS
& LAY TESTIMONY RE: ClLAIMS
COUNTERAGAINST COUNTER
DEFENDANTS

v.
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOlIN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
COMES NOW, the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, by and through their co-counsel of
record, Christ T. Troupis, and moves this Honorable Court for entry of its Order prohibiting the

MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT & LAY TESTIMONY RE: CLAIMS AGAINST
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS - Pg 1
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Defendants/Counter-Claimants and/or Counter-Claimants' attorney and/or witnesses from
referencing whether the conduct ofthe counter-claimants was or was not reasonable, including
but not limited to voir dire, opening arguments, advancing testimony and/or submitting ,my
evidentiary items surrounding the jury determination of the issue of reasonableness.
This Motion is on the grounds and for the reasons that such testimony and/or information
is irrelevant and immaterial to these proceedings and lacks probative value and is further made
pursuant to the Memorandum Brief in Support of Motion in Limine, filed concurrently herewith
and the record and file contained herein. This Motion further is made pursuant to 401, 402, 403,
701, 702, 703, & 704 of the: Idaho Rules of Evidence. Oral argument is requested.
DATED this 31st day of December, 2010.

TROUP~,
CHRIST T. TROUP~,
Co-counsel for Coun er-Defendants
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...
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 31st day of December, 2010, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing (1) MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT & LAY TESTIMONY RE:
CLAIMS AGAINST COUNTER-DEFENDANTS, (2) MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT & LAY TESTIMONY RE: CLAIMS AGAINST
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS, (3) AFFIDAVIT OF CHRIST TROUPIS IN SUPPORT OF
MOTIONS IN LIMINE, together with (3) NOTICE OF HEARING RE: MOTION TO
EXCLUDE EXPERT & LAY TESTIMONY RE: CLAIMS AGAINST COUNTER
COUNTERDEFENDANTS, to be delivered, addressed as follows:
Connie W. Taylor
Henderson Law Firm
900 Washington St.
S1. Suite 1020
Vancouver, Washington 98660
Facsimile: (360) 693-2911

~U.S.Mail
(
)
()
Facsimile Transmission
()
Hand Delivery
(
)
()
Overnight Delivery

Mark Stephen Prusynski
PO Box 829
Boise, ID 83701
Phone: (208)345-2000
Facsimile: (208) 385-5384

~ U.S.Mail

Thomas G. Maile, IV.
380 W. State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001

(
)
()
()
()

Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

()

u. S. Mail

()

Facsimile Transmission
~ Hand Delivery
()
Overnight Delivery

CHRIST T. TROd~'s,
TROd~'s,
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defend,mts
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I\jO'J4J!~
I\jO'J4J!~

Christ 1'.
T. Troupis, ISB # 4549
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130
POBox 2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone:
208/938-5584
Facsimile:
208/938-5482
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com
ctroupis@troupis1aw.com

A.M

FILEO

JAN 03 2011
J,
J.

DAVID NAVARRO, ClerK
By A.

Gi~RDEN
Gi~RDEN

'JEPLITY

Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,
P1aintiffs/Counter-Defendants,
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,
v.

CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/kla
flkla
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.

.~
'~

_ _P.M.
_P.M._,,_____ .,

Case No. CV-OC-0723232

PLAINTIFFS/COUNTERPLAINTIFFS/COUNTER
DEFENDANTS'MEMORANDUM
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
TO EXCLUDE EXPERT & LAY
TESTIMONY RE: CLAIMS
COUNTERAGAINST COUNTER
DEFENDANTS

Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
COMES NOW, the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, by and through their co-counsel of
record, Christ T. Troupis, provide this Memorandum Brief in support of their Motion In Limine
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re: limiting expert's opinions regarding Idaho Law and ultimate factual issues.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The counter-claimants have provided named Dr. Graig Lewis, as an expert witness to testify
at trial. The scope ofthe testimony is set forth in the Counter-claimants' Witness Disclosure, which
of the Motion in Limine which is filed
is an attachment to the Affidavit of Christ Troupis in Support ofthe
concurrently herewith.

LEGAL ARGUMENT
A.

The Trial Court should not allow the Counter-claimants to present expert opinions
regarding the law surrounding the cause of actions relating to the Plaintiffs' claims
and/or actions and/or any opinions about the reasonableness of the filing and/or the
pursuit of such claims.
The determination of use of expert opinions is governed by LR.C.P. Rule 702. Under the

rules, expert opinion testimony is only admissible when" the expert is a qualified expert in the field,
n!asonably
the evidence will be of assistance to the trier of fact, experts in the particular field would n~asonably
rely upon the same type of facts relied upon by the expert in forming his opinion, and the probative
the opinion testimony is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect." Coombs v.
ofthe
value of
Curnow, 148 Idaho 129,219 P.3d 453 (Idaho 2009) citing Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho 42, 47,844
P.2d 24, 29 (Ct. App.1992);, see also Idaho R. Evidence 702, 703, & 403. " [E]xpert opinion which
is speculative, conciusory,
conclusory, or unsubstantiated by facts in the record is of no assistance to the jury in
844 P.2dl at 28-29;
46-47,844
rendering its verdict, and therefore is inadmissible." Ryan, 123 Idaho at 46-47,
see also Idaho R. Evidence 702. Testimony is speculative when it " theorizes] about a matter as to
which evidence is not sufficient for certain knowledge." Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561, 565, 97
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P.3d 428,432 (2004).
LR.C.P. Rule 702 provides:
Testimony by experts. If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as ,m expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
In general, expert testimony which does nothing but vouch for the credibility of another
witness encroaches upon the jury's vital and exclusive function to make credibility determinations,
and therefore does not 'assist the trier of fact' as required by Rule 702." U.S. v. Charley, 189 F.3d
1251,1267 (lOth Cir.1999); see also Washington v. Schriver, 240 F.3d 101, 113 (2d Cir.2001);
Goodwin v. MTD Products Inc., 232 F.3d 600,609 (7th Cir.2000).
The areas oftestimony in which the witness has identified in the Certification of Witnesses,
provides that Mr. Lewis will testify in essence that the position of the plaintiffs in filing the present
matter was not reasonable. ill addition, the witness may attempt to testify that no other attorney in
ofldaho would have reasonably believed that res judicata and/or collateral estoppel would
the State ofIdaho
not have been applied under the facts as made known to the plaintiffs. Reasonableness is normally
a factual issue for the jury, the court may make that determination as a matter of law when the
evidence leads to only one reasonable conclusion. See Brand S Corp. v. King, 102 Idaho at 734,639
P.2d at 432 (1981) Young v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 127 Idaho 130,898 P.2d 61 (Idaho
App.1994).
Where a jury has be,en requested, the non-moving party must receive the benefit of every
reasonable inference that may be drawn from the facts presented. Earl v. Cryovac, A Division of
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W.R. Grace Co., 115 Idaho 1087, 772 P.2d 725 (Ct. App.1989) (review denied); see also Anderson
P .2d 923 (1982). Therefore, O'Neil had the burden to demonstrate
v. Ethington, 103 Idaho 658, 651 P.2d
to the judge that a triable issue arose from the facts. Earl, supra; 6 J. MOORE, W. TAGGART, &
J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 56.11 (2d ed.1988). "A 'triable issue' exists
whenever reasonable minds could disagree as to the material facts or the inferences to be drawn from
those facts." Earl, supra 115 Idaho at 1093-94, 772 P.2d
of reasonableness
P .2d at 731-32. This threshold ofreasonableness
is as far as the judge may look. The task of weighing the evidence and observing the demeanor of
preseIved for the jury. Id. at 1094, 772 P.2d at 732. O'Neil v. Vasseur, 118
witnesses is properly preselved
Idaho 257, 796 P.2d 134 (Idaho App. 1990)
Idaho courts have routinely held that "an expert's opinion, in a proper case, is admissible up
to the point where an expression ofopinion
of opinion would require the expert to pass upon the credibility of
of disputed evidence. To venture beyond that point, however, is to usurp the
witnesses or the weight ofdisputed
jury's function." State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 696, 760 P.2d 27, 35 (1988); see also State v.
Konechny, 134 Idaho 410, 419, 3 P.3d 535, 544 (Ct. App.2000). "It is the jury's function to assess
the demeanor of the witnesses and make a determination of credibility.....
credibility..... This COUlt
COUIt will not
second-guess the jury's de:tennination on credibility or the weight to be given to witnesses'

testimony." State v. Allen, 129 Idaho 556, 558, 929 P.2d 118, 120 (1996)
The case of Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc. v. lAG Intern. Acceptance Group, N.V., 14 F.
Supp.2d 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), involved a claim of abuse of process, among other claims. The
District Court was called upon to determine if the defense could call an expert witness, a Harvard
Law Professor to render an opinion that the actions ofthe defendant were reasonable in light ofthe
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law. The court held that such testimony from an expert was not appropriate. Commencing at page
392 ofF. Supp.2d the court held:
In aid of that defense, Kidder wishes to call as an expert witness at trial

Professor Arthur R. Mil1er,
Miller, the Bromley Professor of Law at Harvard Law School
and noted authority on Federal civil practice. Professor Miller's report has been
26( a)(2) and 26(b)(4),
26(b)(4), Fed.
furnished to IAG's counsel as initial discovery under Rule 26(a)(2)
R. Civ. P. On the basis ofthat report, IAG now moves in limine to preclude Professor
Miller's opinions
....
opinions....
The issue is whether" under the Federal Rules of Evidence and governing case law,
Professor Miller's opinions may in whole or in part be placed before the jury.
Rules 701-706" F.R. Evid., govern opinions and expert testimony, which are
also subject to the relevancy provisions of Rules 401-403. Rules 702, 703, and 704
70.4
address the admissibility of the testimony of an expert witness called by a party.
Rule 702 allows a qualified expert to testify "in the form of an opinion or
otherwise" ifthe witness's "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of the fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue
... " Rule 703 provides that "[t]he facts or data in a particular case upon which an
expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to
the expert at or before the hearing." Rule 704(
a) provides that, with an exception not
704(a)
pertinent to this case:, "testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise
admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decide:d
by the trier of fact."
The Advisory Committee Notes describe the purpose of Rule 704(a):
The basic approach to opinions, lay and expert, in these rules is to admit them whe:n
helpful to the trier of fact. In order to render this approach fully effective and to allay

any doubt on the subject, the so-called "ultimate issue" rule is specifically abolishe:d
by the instant rule.
However, the Notes go on to caution:
The abolition of the ultimate issue rule does not lower the bar so as to admit all
opinions. Under Rules 701 and 702, opinions must be helpful to the trier of fact, and
Rule 403 provides for exclusion of evidence which wastes time. These provisions
afford ample assurances against the admission of opinions which would merely tell
the. jury what result to reach, somewhat in the manner of oath-helpers of an earlier
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day.
The proper application of
the expert opinion rules has generated a great deal of
ofthe
litigation, in this circuit and elsewhere. Each case turns upon its own circumstances.
It may not be possible to reconcile all the reported decisions. The analysis that
follows looks in the first instance to Second Circuit authority.
However, as a preliminary matter, it is apparent without citation to authority
that, even if certain aspects of Professor Miller's opinions are admissible at trial i( a
question considered infra), much that appears in his written report could not take the
form of testimony by Professor Miller to the jury.
First, Professor Miller could not testify as to what Kidder or M & W people did,
or what they said to t::ach other. That evidence must come from the trial testimony of
the individuals concl~rned, where it will be subject to cross-examination.
Second, Professor Miller could not testify as to the mental processes of the
Kidder and M & W people: what they knew, believed, assumed, or understood, on
the basis of their own knowledge or communications from others. Again, that
evidence must come from the trial testimony of the individuals concerned.
Third, Professor Miller could not testify as to facts that have no support in the
evidence generated by witnesses with knowledge ofthe facts.
The main thrust of Professor Miller's opinion is that Kidder reasonably relied
upon M & W's advice in suing IAG and obtaining an order of attachment, both
Kidder and M & W having formed the reasonable beliefthat
belief that sufficient legal grounds
existed to pursue that course. While Professor Miller's report is cast in terms of-the
reasonableness of/adder's and M & W's conduct. it is the functional equivalent
of an opinion that Kidder did not act with malice. since one who in good faith
ofcounsel
relies upon the advice of
counsel has probable cause to initiate civilproceeding£

and so does not act maliciouslv. Pinsky v. Duncan. 79 F.3d at 312.
Professor Miller's opinions "embrace!] an ultimate issue to be
Accordingly PI'ofessor
decided by the trier offact, " afunction sanctioned by Rule 704(a), so long as those
opinions do not "merely tell the jury what result to reach, " an effect explicitly
condemned by the Advisory Committee Notes. Nor may Professor Miller's opinions
usurp the trial judgt::'s function of instructing the jury on the law. I now consider
whether Professor Miller's proffered opinions cross the line into these forbidden
territories.
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I focus first upon Seeond Circuit decisions.
In United States v. Duncan, 42 F.3d 97, 101 (2d Cir. 1994), the Second Circuit
summarized the general principles of admissibility of expert opinions:

Generally, the use of expert testimony is not permitted if it will usurp either the role
of the trial judge in instructing the jury as to the applicable law or the role ofthe
of the jury
ofthe
in applying that law to the facts before it. When an expert undertakes to tell the jury
what result to reach, this does not aid the jury in making a decision, but rather
attempts to substitute the expert's judgment for the jury. When this occurs, the expert
acts outside his limited role of providing the groundwork in the form of an opinion
to enable the jury to make its own informed determination. In evaluating the
admissibility of expert testimony, this Court requires the exclusion of testimony
which states a legal conclusion....
conclusion ....
The Scop court found the SEC investigator's testimony particularly objectionable
because his stated conclusions were based not on personal knowledge, but on his
of the testimony and credibility ofother
of other witnesses. Therein, we found that
assessment ofthe
the investigator encroached upon the exclusive province of the jury in weighing
witness veracity.
42 F.3d at 101. That analysis resonates in the case at bar, because Professor Miller
has no personal knowledge of the facts giving rise to Kidder's suit against IAG, and
the resolution of the issues underlying IAG's claim of malicious prosecution will
largely depend upon the jury's weighing of witness veracity.
The Second Circuit held in Hygh that the admission of such opinions constituted
error. After stating that "[t]his circuit is in accord with other circuits in requiring
exclusion of expert testimony that expresses a legal conclusion," 961 F.2d at 363
(citations omitted), and invoking "the advisory committee's illuminating distinction
between admissiblf: and excludable versions of an expert's opinion testimony"

following Rule 704(b), id., the court of appeals said:
Far more troubling, Cox testified that Jacobs' conduct was "not justified under the
circumstances," not "'warranted under the circumstances," and "totally improper. " \Ve
have held that an expert's testimony that a defendant was "negligent" should not have
been allowed. See Andrews, 882 F.2d at 709; see also Strong, 667 F.2d at 686
(question whether lack of warnings rendered product unreasonably dangerous for
jury, not expert). We see no significant distinction in Cox's conclusory
condemnations of Jacobs' actions here, which, in the language of the advisory
committee, "merely [told] the jury what result to reach." Fed. R. Evid. 704 advisory
committee's note.
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Id. at 364. The Hygh court concluded that "Cox's testimony regarding the ultimate
legal conclusion entrusted to the jury crossed the line and should have been
excluded. " Id. [7] In Duncan, the Second Circuit said of Hygh:
The ultimate issue b(~fore the jury was whether the defendant used excessive force.
In holding that the expert's testimony was impermissible, this Court found that the
witness went beyond simply making factual conclusions and instead asserted
"conclusory condemnations [whichl merely told the iury what result to reach. "
en

In the portion of the Hygh opinion quoted supra, the Second Circuit relied upon its

prior holding in Andrews v. Metro North Commuter Railroad Co., 882 F.2d 705 (2d
Cir. 1989), and an Eighth Circuit decision, Strong v. E.!. DuPont de Nemours Co.,
Inc .. ,667 F.2d
F .2d 682 (8th Cir. 1981). The plaintiff in Andrews alleged that he slippt:d
Inc..,667
off a railroad platfonn and was injured by a moving train after he had walked some
3,000 feet along the tracks. The trial judge permitted plaintiffs expert witness to
testify that it was "reasonable" for plaintiffto
plaintiff to have walked that distance on the tracks,
and that "the railroad was negligent" in failing to avoid him. 882 F.2d at 708-09. The
Second Circuit held that by admitting those opinions, the trial judge permitted the
Rule 702, which preclude
expert "to exceed consistently the legitimate boundaries" of
ofRule
expert opinion testimony with respect to "lay matters which a jury is capable of
understanding and deciding without the expert's help." Id. at 708.
Strong arose out of a building explosion which killed plaintiffs decedent.
Plaintiffs theory was that a "pull-out" of a plastic pipe from a coupling caused gas
to seep into the basement. Plaintiff called as an expert witness an engineer who had
investigated the explosion. He offered to testify that "the lack of adequate warnings
and instructions constituted defects which made the products unreasonabIy
dangerous." 667 F.2d at 685. The trial judge excluded that testimony under Rule
704. reasoning that this answer to the underlying question-IrIs this an adequate
warning?"-impermissibly invaded the province ofthe jury. 1d.
Id. at 686. The Eighth
warning?"-impermissibly
Circuit affinned on that basis and added:

In United States v. Russo, 74 F.3d 1383 (2d Cir. 1996), a prosecution for stock

manipulation, the Second Circuit affirmed the trial court's admission ofa
of a government
expert's testimony b(~cause "it focused solely on factual considerations and did not
involve any legal characterizations. [The expert] gave no opinion as to whether the
appellants had violated the securities laws and did not make any statements about
their intent; he simply described certain stock transactions and his opinion of their
F .3d at 1395. Russo cited United States v. Bilzerian, 926
effect on the market." 74 F.3d
F.2d 1285 (2d Cir. 1991), another securities fraud case where the government offert:d
and the trial judge admitted comparably limited expert testimony. The Second Circuit
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affinned, noting that "[plarticularlv in complex cases involving the securities
industry, expert testimony may help a jury understand unfamiliar terms and
carefullJ!.
concepts," but cautioned that the use of such testimony "must be careful{r
circumscribed to assure that the expert does not usurp either the role of
the trial
o[the
Judge in instructing the jury as to the applicable law or the role of the jury In
applying the law to the facts before it." 926 F.2d at 1294. The Bilzerian court
continued:
Although testimony concerning the ordinary practices in the securities industry may
be received to enable: the jury to evaluate a defendant's conduct against the standards
of accepted practice,
practice" Marx, 550 F.2d at 509, testimony encompassing an ultimate
legal conclusion based on the facts of the case is not admissible, and may not be
made so simply because it is presented in tenns of industry practice.
United States v. Bronston, 658 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1981), was the prosecution of
a partner of a law firm for mail fraud arising out of the partner's"duty
partner's" duty of loyalty to
his finn's clients" and "his concealment from the clients of his promotion to their
hann" of the interests of a rival company. Id. at 922. The accused partner, Bronston,
did not testify at the trial. The defense called another partner, one Freund, and sought
to elicit from him e:xpert testimony "regarding the ultimate question of whether
Bronston's conduct amounted to a breach of fiduciary," id. at 930. The trial judge
excluded that testimony. The Second Circuit affinned, characterizing Freund's
opinion as "clearly inadmissible" because, inter alia, "his testimony would In
substance have conveyed nothing more to the jury than his 'general beliefas to
how the case should be decided. ' " ld.
Id. (citing and quoting Marx & Co. v. Diners'
Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 505,510 (2d Cir.)).

"[t]he admission of such testimony would give the appearance that the court was
shifting to witnesses the responsibility to decide the case. It is for the jury to
evaluate the facts in the light of the applicable rules of law. and it is therefore
erroneous for a witness
witlless to state his opinion on the law of
o(the
the (orum.
forum. " Id. at 5J 0

(citation omitted). In Marx the Second Circuit cautions trialjudges "not to allow
trials before juries to become battles ofpaid advocates posing as experts on the
respective sides concerning matters ofdomestic law. " Id. at 511.
That cautionary nok resonates in the case at bar, because any opinion Professor
Miller is allowed to give for Kidder will inevitably be countered by a contrary
opinion by lAG's expert witness, be that witness Judge Adams or someone else.
Klaphake and West stand for the propositions that while a client such as
Kidder, asserting a reasonable reliance defense, may testify as to the disclosures it
made to advisers, the advice it received and its reliance upon it, and the advisers may
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describe the advice they gave, questions of whether the client made full disclosure,
and acted throughout in good faith or with malice, are for the jury to decide; and the
jury is not assisted by expert opinion testimony about the reasonableness of the
advice or the client's reaction to it.
In contending that Professor Miller's opinions are not only admissible but
Ginor v.
essential to it, Kidder cites legal malpractice cases such as Estate of GinoI'
Landsberg.
Landsberg, 960 F.Supp. 661 (S.D.N.Y.1996).
rS.D.N.y.1996). But the instant case is not one for
legal malpractice. and the analogy is false. A malpracticeplainti(Jmustprove
malpracticeplaintifJmustprove that
fai/ell to act in conformity
con(ormity with accepted professional standards
the defendant fai/e(l
prevailing at the place and time the services were rendered. Under New York la)~
a medical malpractice plainti[fcannot
fl/
plainti(Jcannot get his case to the jury in the absence f!f
expert opinion testimony that the defendant violated those professional standard£.
736, 739-41 (2d
ad Cir. 1987) (issuespresented b,X
see Sitts v. United States. 811 F.2d 736.
medical malpractice action would "quite obviously not [bel ... within the realm Q/
Q.[
competence ofa lay jury") (construing New York law); McDermott v. Manhattan
Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 15 N.Y.2d 20,255 N.Y.S.2d 65, 68, 203 N.E.2d 469 (Ct.
App.1960). I reached the same conclusion in a legal malpractice case, Barry v.
Liddle, O'Connor, Finkelstein & Robinson, 1997 W.L. 7363725, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18820 (S.D.N.Y.).

However.
for legal
However, in the case at bar. lAG is not suing either Kidder or M & W (or
malpractice. lAG is not suing M & Wat alL lAG is suing Kidder (or
for malicious
of Kidder's conduct and
prosecution: the case will turn upon the reasonableness ofKidder's
its then-existing state o(mind: and these are the sort ofquestions
of questions that lay jurors
have been answerinJ~ without expert assistance from time immemorial.
I conclude that Second Circuit authority requires me to preclude Professor'
Miller's opinion testimony, as set forth in his written report.
To the extent that Professor Miller would seek to opine before the jury that
Kidder had probable: cause to believe lAG breached its contract with Kidder, he
would inevitably have to discuss his construction of the contract and the parties'
obligations thereundl~r--as
thereundl~r--as he does at length in the sub-paragraphs to his written
report. But that testimony would usurp the role ofthe jury, and is precluded by the
Marx and Krear decisions. [11]

To the extent that Professor Miller would seek to opine biifore
before the jury about
the elements of
New York contract andattachmentlaw--as he does at length in the
ofNew
sub-varagraphs to his written report-his testimony would usurp the role ofthe.
trial judge in instructing the jury on the law.
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To the extent that Professor Miller would seek to opine before the jury that
Kidder acted reasonably and in good faith--as he argues at length in his written
report--the overwhelming weight of Second Circuit authority precludes expert
testimony about thesle issues. Whether a party acted with objective reasonableness
is a quintessential common law jury question. By the same token. juries
traditionally decide whether an individual acted knowinf:lv.
knowinr:lv. or willfullv. or
ofmind. Thu.~
maliciously.
maliciouslY. or with specific intent. or with any other relevant state ofmind.
this case will present to the jury no new or more demandinf:
demandinr: task than what juries
have always done.
Believing that to be so, and given the Second Circuit cases cited supra, I grant
lAG's motion to preclude Professor Miller's opinion testimony.
Notwithstanding Kidder's protests, this result works no unfairness upon it. The
Kidder'1md M & W witnesses will testify fully concerning the relevant facts, as
contrac,~
indeed they should. The Court will instruct the jury on the laws of contrac,~
attachment. and malicious prosecution. as indeed it should. The jurors will then
apply that law to the facts as they find them. as indeed they should. in fulfillment
lef:al traditions.
ofthe Nation's ler:al
The counter-claimants use of expert testimony on areas of law which will and should be
provided to the jurors in jury instructions, should be prohibited. The opinions ofunreasonableness
of unreasonableness
ofthe
of
the plaintiffs' action is improper. The opinions concerning the reasonableness ofthe
of the filing ofthe
of the
Berkshire suit and/or the actions taken in Judge Wilper's proceedings or the present matter, invade
the province of the jury's functions and should be limited and restricted.
DATED this 31st day of December, 2010.

t!hd2..-;/-
CHRISTT. TR&?ns:
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
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1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130
PO Box 2408
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Telephone:
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Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STA
TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,

Case No. CV-OC-0723232
MOTION IN LIMINE RE:
TESTIMONY CONCERNING
HELEN TAYLOR

v.
CONNIE WRIGHT TA
YLOR, flkla
TAYLOR,
f/kla
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR,
TA
YLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR,
TA
YLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
COMES NOW, the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, by and through their co-counsel of
record, Christ T. Troupis, and moves this Honorable Court for entry of its Order prohibiting the
Defendants/Counter-Claimants from referencing during oral argument, voir dire or eliciting
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,'.
testimony concerning the desires and/or opinions of Helen Taylor, mother of the individual
named Taylor Defendants on the grounds of relevancy. This Court has previously stricken the
Affidavit of Helen Taylor indicating that the Affidavit of Helen Taylor has no relevance: to the
issues involved in this matter.
This Motion is on the grounds and for the reasons that such information is irrelevant and
immaterial to these proceedings and lacks probative value. This motion is made on the record
and file contained herein, including this Court's prior ruling on the counter-claimants' opposition
to an earlier summary judgment proceeding wherein the Court ordered stricken the Affidavit of
Helen Taylor as not relevant, and further made pursuant to 401, 402, and 403 of the Idaho Rules
of Evidence. This Motion is further made on the grounds and for the reasons that such testimony
and/or information is irrelevant and immaterial to these proceedings and lacks probative value
and is supported further with the Memorandum Brief in Support of Motion in Limine, filed
concurrently herewith and the record and file contained herein. Oral argument is requested.
DATED this 31st day of December, 2010.

tJL32c

CHRIST T. TROl;iS'I"""'S=,= - - - - - - - - - 
Co-counsel for Counter-Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 31 st day of December, 2010, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing (1) MOTION IN LIMINE RE: TESTIMONY CONCERNING
HELEN TAYLOR, (2) MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE RE:
TESTIMONY CONCERNING HELEN TAYLOR, together with (3) NOTICE OF HEARING
RE: MOTION IN LIMINE RE: TESTIMONY CONCERNING HELEN TAYLOR,
TA YLOR, to be
delivered, addressed as follows:
Connie W. Taylor
Henderson Law Firm
900 Washington St.
st. Suite 1020
Vancouver, Washington 98660
Facsimile: (360) 693-2911
Mark Stephen Prusynski
PO Box 829
Boise, ID 83701
Phone: (208) 345-2000
Facsimile: (208) 385-5384
Thomas G. Maile, IV.
380 W. State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001

~
( )
( )
( )

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

~ u. S. Mail
( ) Facsimile Transmission
( ) Hand Delivery
( ) Overnight Delivery
( )

~
( )

U. S. Mail

Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

tJf9~
~~

CHRIST T. TR£PIS,
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130
PO Box 2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone:
208/938-5584
Facsimile:
208/938-5482
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com
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Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,

Case No. CV-OC-0723232

MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION IN
LIMINE RE: TESTIMONY
CONCERNING HELEN TAYLOR

v.
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, flkla
f/k/a
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable

trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
COMES NOW, the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, by and through their co-counsel of
record, Christ T. Troupis, provide this Memorandum Brief in support of their Motion In Limine
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•
re: Testimony of Helen Taylor.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The counter-claimants in earlier proceedings attempted to have this Court consider the
Affidavit ofHelen
of Helen Taylor which was filed on April 8,2009. The counter-claimants filed their Reply
Memorandum Brief in Support of Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment Relating to the

Defendants' Counter-claim.& in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on April
14,2009. The counter-defendants objected to the affidavit as not having any relevance. The Court
made its determination and ruled that the Affidavit of Helen Taylor had no relevance.

LEGAL ARGUMENT
A.

There Is No Relevancy Nor Any Probative Value for the Jury relating to What Helen
Taylor's Opinions or Understandings are as to the Trust And/or Any Disclaimer
Agreements and the Counter-claimants Should Be Restricted from Referencing the
Same at Any Stage of These Proceedings.
Helen Taylor is the mother of the individual Taylor counter-claimants. What her opinions

are or were has no bearing as to the individual Taylors' actions in the underlying litigation. Connie
Taylor prepared pleadings and R. John Taylor executed as verified pleadings, the relevant pleadings
litigation . R. John Taylor provided sworn testimony before the Probate Court.
in the underlying litigation.
Those verified pleadings and his sworn testimony have no bearing on his mother's opinions then
of relevant evidence is set forth in the following Idaho Rules ofEvidence
of Evidence
or now. The determination ofrelevant
which provide:
Rule 401. Definition of relevant evidence
"Relevant Evidence'" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence.
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Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence inadmissible
All relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by these rules or by
other rules applicable in the courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is not
admissible.
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste
oftime
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion ofthe issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
Any attempted reference to opinions from Helen Taylor and/or actions which might have
been undertaken by the Taylors clearly has no relevance to the issues to be resolved by the jury
in this matter. The plaintiffs' amended verified complaint before Judge Wilper, was predicated
upon the perjured testimony ofR. John Taylor. Helen Taylor had no bearing upon alh~gations
which gave rise to the plaintiffs' amended complaint in these proceedings.
CONCLUSION
The counter-claimants should not present facts or opinions regarding Helen Taylor's state
of mind then or now. The counter-claimants should be restricted in any attempt to allude to the
intentions or desires of Helen Taylor and/or actions which the Taylors undertook for their
mother.
DATED this 31st day of December, 2010.

CHRIST T. TRO PIS,
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defend,mts
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE
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Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone:
208/938-5584
Facsimile:
208/938-5482
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com

~~1D20=F'L~M._===
~~1D2??l=F'L~M._===
JAN 03 2011
;I,

DAVID NAvARRO, Clerk

-

By A. GARDEN
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Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, N. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,

Case No. CV-OC-0723232

PLAINTIFFS/COUNTERPLAINTIFFS/COUNTER
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
EXCLUDE TESTIMONY OIi' BOB
DEBOLT

v.
flkla
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/kla
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.

Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
COMES NOW, the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, by and through their co-counsel of
record, Christ T. Troupis, and moves this Honorable Court for entry of its Order prohibiting the
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Defendants/Counter-Claimants from referencing during oral argument, voir dire, or eliciting
testimony and/or advancing any evidentiary items concerning the opinions of Bob DeBolt on the
grounds that such expected testimony lacks foundation, that such testimony and/or the
information is immaterial to these proceedings and lacks probative value and is not relevant.
This Motion is madl~ pursuant to Idaho Rules of Evidence Rules 401,402,403,702, &
703. This motion is further supported by Counter-defendants' Memorandum in Support of
Motion In Limine to Exclude Testimony of Bob DeBolt, filed concurrently herewith which is
incorporated by reference herein, together with Rule 26(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure,
the executed Stipulation for Scheduling & Planning, the counter-claimants failure to submit
timely supplemental discov,ery responses, together with their violation of the Order for
Scheduling entered on July 2,2009, and the pleadings and record on file in this matter.
Oral argument is requested.
DATED this 31st day of December, 2010.

(!M~0~~

_

TRO IS, Co-counsel for
CHRIST T. TROl1PIS,
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 31 st day of December, 2010, I caused a true and
correct copy ofthe foregoing (1) PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
EXCLUDE TESTIMONY OF SAM LANGSTON, (2) MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT
OF PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY OF
LIMThfE RE:
SAM LANGSTON together with (3) NOTICE OF HEARING RE: MOTION IN LIMThrE
MOTION TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY OF SAM LANGSTON to be delivered, addressed as
follows:
Connie W. Taylor
Henderson Law Firm
900 Washington St. Suite 1020
Vancouver, Washington 98660
Facsimile: (360) 693-2911
Mark Stephen Prusynski
PO Box 829
Boise, ID 83701
Phone: (208) 345-2000
Facsimile: (208) 385-5384
Thomas G. Maile, IV.
380 W. State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001

~U.S.Mail
~U.S.Mail

()
()
()

Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

~U.S.Mail
~U.S.Mail
" ()
()
()

Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

( )
( )

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

{t

CHRIST T. TRO IS,
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
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_P.M._
A.M~-P.M._-

Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130
PO Box 2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone:
208/938-5584
Facsimile:
208/938-5482
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com

JAN 03 20H
DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
J.
J,

By A. GARDEN
DEPUTY

Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,
v.

CV -OC-0723232
Case No. CV-OC-0723232

PLAINTIFFS/COUNTERPLAINTIFFS/COUNTER
DEFENDANTS'MEMORANDUM
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY OF
BOB DEBOLT

CONNIE WRIGHT l'
AYLOR, f/k/a
TAYLOR,
flk/a
CONNIE TAYLOR,
TA YLOR, an individual; DALLAN
l'
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
l'
T AYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOI-IN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
COMES NOW, the: Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, by and through their co-counsel of
record, Christ T. Troupis, provide this Memorandum Brief in Support of Motion to Exclude
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Testimony of Bob DeBolt.
I.

INTRODUCTION
Counter-defendants' Motion in Limine is based upon Counter-claimants' improper
identification oftheir expert witnesses in violation of Rule 26(b)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure, the counter-claimants failure to abide by the executed Stipulation for Scheduling &
Planning, their failure to submit timely supplemental discovery responses, together with their
violation ofthe Order for Scheduling entered on July 2,2009. On December 30,2009, the
parties filed their joint Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning. The executed stipulation
provides, " 90 days before trial, advancing party shall disclose each person advancing paliy
intends to call as an expert witness at trial and state the subject matter on which the witness is
expected to testify" and "90 days before trial, advancing party shall disclose all information
required by Rule 26(b)(4) ofthe Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure regarding expert witnesses".
This Court entered its Civil Case Order for Scheduling Conference and Order re: Motion
Practice on July 2,2009. Contained within that Order was the requirement that disclosure of
expert witness be identified and the subject matter and substance of any opinions be provided no

later than 120 days before trial or as stipulated between the parties. Full compliance pursuant to
the Order, the stipulation, and discovery rules, was required on or before October 29 th,
\ 2010.
The counter-claimants initial Witness Disclosure was served on October 27, 2010. A true
and correct copy of the same is annexed as Exhibit "A" to the Affidavit of Christ Troupis filed in
support of the motion in limine. The counter-claimants were served and responded to specific
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'-'
interrogatories and request for production regarding potential expert witnesses. A true and
correct copy of the relevant pages ofthe counter-claimants' Answers to the Plaintiffs' First Set of
Discovery (pp. 1,
I, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10) are annexed as Exhibit "B" to the Affidavit of Christ Troupis
filed in support ofthe motion in limine. The counter-claimants Supplemental Witness
Disclosure was served on December 9, 2010. A true and correct copy ofthe same is annexed as
Exhibit "C" to the Affidavit of Christ Troupis filed in support ofthe motions in limine. The
counter-claimants failed to supplement their answers to the plaintiffs' first set of discovt:ry as
2010.
required by the executed Stipulation for Scheduling & Planning on or before October 30, 20
I o.

II.

APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS
A motion in limine enables a judge to rule on evidentiary questions without having to
consider the matter at trial for the first time. Davidson v Beco Corp., 112 Idaho 560, 563, 733
P.2d 781, 784 (1986) (modified on other grounds). In effect a motion in limine allows ajudge to
have the benefit of time to research and review issues in a calculated manner instead of having to
address issues "on the fly". A motion in limine allows counsel on both sides to make strategic
decisions before the trial concerning the context and order of evidence to be presented. Davidson,

112 Idaho at 563, 733 P.2d at 784.

held that a failure to meet the requirements of Rule 26 of the Idaho
Idaho courts have hdd
Rules of Civil Procedure typically results in the exclusion of the proffered evidence. Radmer v

Ford Motor Co., 120 Idaho 86, 89,813 P.2d 897, 900 (1991). Allowing testimony to be
presented where Rule 26 has not been complied with is reversible error. Id.; Clark v, Klein. 137
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Idaho 154, 157,45 P.3d 810, 813 (2002).

III.
ARGUMENT
A.

Counter-claimants' Expert Witnesses Must Be Excluded Because Counter
Counterclaimants Failed to Disclose the Information Required by Rule 26(b)~.
26(b)~.

The parties executed their stipulation for the scheduling governing the proceedings in this
case. The executed stipulation provides, " 90 days before trial, advancing party shall disclose
each person advancing party intends to call as an expert witness at trial and state the subject
matter on which the witness is expected to testify" and "90 days before trial, advancing party
shall disclose all information required by Rule 26(b)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure
regarding expert witnesses". Rule 26(b)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure states in
pertinent part:
A complete statement of all opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons
therefore; the data or other information considered by the witness in forming the
opinions; any exhibits to be used as a summary of or support for the opinions;
any qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications authored by
the witness within the preceding ten years; the compensation to be paid for the
testimony; and a listing of any other cases in which the witness has testified as an
expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four years.
Id.

The counter-claimants' initial witness disclosure dated October 27,2010, failed to list
Bob Debolt as a potential expert witness. The counter-defendants provided the following
specific discovery requests to the counter-claimants:

INTERROGATORY NO.7.: Please identify each and every expert you
intend to call at the trial of this case and with respect to each witness you listed,
describe:
(a)
The subject matter on which each expert may testify;
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
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(b)
The substance of the facts to which each expert may testify;
(c)
The substance of the opinions to which each expert may testify;
(d)
The expert witnesses' credentials which you allege qualify the
witness as an expert.
(e)
The description of any and all reports prepared or used by persons
(e)
who mayor will tes.tify as expert witnesses at any hearings or trial of this action
(f)
The description of all documents in which the expert has reviewed
in arriving at his opinion
(g)
The description of all the data or other information considered by
the witness in forming the opinions
(h)
The description of the qualifications of the witness, including a
description of all publications authored by the witness within the preceding ten
years
(I)
The detailed description of any and all cases in which the witness.
has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four years.
(j)
Is the expert to be compensated for his work and efforts in
connection with this action? If so, please state how much he is to be paid.
INTERROGATORY NO.8.: Please identify each expert you intend to
call as an expert witness in this matter. With regard to each such witness, pleas(:
pleas(!
state:
(a)
The substance of the facts and opinion to which each such expert
will testify; and
(b)
The identity of any document or documents upon which each such
expert will rely in giving testimony.
The counter-claimants indicated in their discovery responses of August 27,2009, that
such information would be forthcoming in compliance with the agreed too stipulated deadlines
(October 30, 2010). Nothing was received.
Nor was there any indication regarding the witnesses past history of providing testimony
d(~position within the preceding four years, hourly rates, curriculum
as an expert at trial or by d(!position

vitae, however, the disclosure said it would be forth coming. Nor was there any list of all
publications authored by the witness within the preceding ten years; nor was there any indication
as to what the witness had been paid to provide opinions. To date there has been no such
supplement nor has there been any supplement to discovery responses. The counter-claimants'
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answers to discovery provided that such information would be provided by October 30, 2010.
The disclosure of Bob DeBolt was executed and served on December 9, 2010,
approximately 39 days after the Stipulation for Scheduling & Planning, and Order for Scheduling
Conference and Order re: Motion Practice filed on July 2,2009, and the counter-claimants'
agreement to supplement thl~ir answers by October 30, 2010. In addition the Supplemental
Witness Disclosure (Exhibit "C" to Affidavit of Christ Troupis) provided by the counter··
claimants was served approximately 9 days after the counter-defendants timely provided their
expert witness disclosures on November 30, 2010.
Such timely disclosures and the information contained therein are critical for compliance
with Rule 26(b)(4). Real estate valuations require considerable time and considerable
documentation to demonstrate the underlying facts and data utilized in forming any opin:ions, all
of which were missing in counter-claimants' initial disclosure, and responses to specific
interrogatories and requests for production. The disclosure ofthe witness Bob Debolt never was
made in the counter-claimants' initial Witness Disclosure. The counter-claimants indicated in
their discovery responses of August 27,2009, that such information would be forthcoming in
compliance with agreed too stipulated deadlines. Nothing was received. The Counter-claimants'

obviously had, since August 27, 2009, time to develop any opinions which they expected. from
Bob DeBolt. However, the Counter-claimants' chose to wait until past the compliance deadlines
to provide the information relative to any opinion which may be advanced from Bob DeBolt.
Typically, failure to meet the requirements of Rule 26 results in exclusion ofthe proffered
evidence. Hopkins v. Duo-Fast Corp., 123 Idaho 205,846 P.2d 207 (Idaho 1993)
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Here, counter-claimants have failed to timely identify Mr. Debolt and the substance of the
expert testimony to be given at trial as required by the stipulation of the parties, the previous
court order, and further fail,ed to timely supplement their answers to discovery. Counterclaimants utterly failed to f()llow the required procedures established for disclosure of Bob
DeBolt.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 provides additional insight into the requirements of
Idaho Rule 26, in that the Idaho Rules were patterned after the Federal Rules. "In the absence of a
ruling from the Idaho Supreme Court to the contrary, we deem it appropriate to follow tederal
precedent in order to maintain, to the extent possible, consistency between the federal and Idaho
rules." State v. Woodbury, 127 Idaho 757, 760, 905 P.2d 1066, 1069(Ct, App. 1995). Th(;: purpose
of Federal Rule 26 "is the elimination of unfair surprise" to the opposing party. Arnseon v,

Michigan Tissue Bank, 2007 WL 468986 at *5 (D. Mont. 2007). "The test of a report is whether
it was sufficiently complek, detailed and in compliance with the Rules so that surprise is
eliminated. . .. Id. "An expert report should be sufficiently complete as to include the substance
of what the expert is expected to give in direct testimony, and the reasons for such testimony.
The report should offer the 'how and why' of the results, not mere conclusions." ld.

The failure to timely disclose Mr. Debolt, and the substance of the expected testimony
has prejudiced the counter-defendants in their trial preparation. The counter-defendants had
provided their disclosures and certifications to the court before their required due date of
November 30, 2010. During the Holiday season, co-counsel for the counter-defendants. left his
office on December 7,2010 and did not return until December 22,2010. Counter-defendants'
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co-counsel was unable to review the disclosure until his return and was not able to address the
issues in a timely manner. All of which have created extreme difficulty in attempting to rebut
such late disclosed opinions of Bob DeBolt.
In Radmer, the Idaho Supreme Court discussed at length why expert testimony should be

timely and completely disclosed so the opposing party has an opportunity to fully evaluate and
rebut it. Radmer, 120 Idaho at 89, 813 R2d at 900. The Court emphasized that cross-examination
cannot be effectively conducted without timely and fill disclosures as required by Rule 26. Id.
Rul,e 26
The Radmer Court noted, quite bluntly, that "the failure to meet the requirements of Rulle
results in exclusion of the proffered evidence." Id.
In addition, the late disclosure of Mr. Debolt, provides a complete lack of any opinion

regarding the issue on price or market value of the subject property for the relevant periods of
time. The proposed testimony of activity in the real estate market from January 2005 through
December 2008 will not assist the trier of fact in determining market value in 2009. Expert
opinion which is speculative, conclusory, or unsubstantiated by facts in the record is of no
assistance to the jury in rendering its verdict, and therefore is inadmissible." Ryan, 123 Idaho at
46-47, 844 P.2d at 28-29; see also Idaho R. Evidence 702.

The opinions which will be attempted to be offered through the testimony of Bob DeBolt
will have no relevance and should be precluded.

III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, counter-defendants respectfully request that the Court grant the
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Motion in Limine and exclude the late disclosed opinion testimony of Counter-claimants' expert
witness, Bob DeBolt, identified in the Counter-claimants' Supplemental Witness Disclosure of
December 9,2010.
DATED this 31st day of December, 2010.

Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
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208/938-5482
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com
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Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STA
TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,

Case No. CV-OC-0723232
MOTION IN LIMINE RE: IDAHO
STATE BAR COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs/Counter··Defendants,

v.
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, flkla
f/k/a
TAYLOR,
CONNIE TA
YLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
Defendants/Count,er-Claimants.
Defendants/Countler-Claimants.
COMES NOW, the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, by and through their co-counsel of
record, Christ T. Troupis, and moves this Honorable Court for entry of its Order prohibiting
prohibi1ting the
Defendants/Counter-Claimants and/or Counter-Claimants' attorney and/or witnesses from
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referring at any point in the above captioned proceedings including but not limited to voir dire,
opening arguments, and further prohibiting any references and/or any testimony and/or any
evidentiary issues surrounding to any allegations related to the Idaho State Bar complaint.
This Motion is on the grounds and for the reasons that such information is irrelevant and
immaterial to these proceedings and lacks probative value. This motion is made on the rlecord
r,ecord
and file contained herein, including this Court's prior ruling on the counter-claimants motion to
amend their counterclaim during the hearing of May 13, 2010. This Motion is further made
pursuant to 401, 402, and 403 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. Oral argument is requested.
DATED this 31st day of December, 2010.

C~=IS=---'
c~

-----

Co-counsel for Counter-Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 31st day of December, 2010, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing (l) MOTION IN LIMINE RE: IDAHO STATE BAR
COMPLAINT, (2) MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION U"J LIMINE RE:
IDAHO STATE BAR COMPLAINT, together with (3) NOTICE OF HEARING RE: MOTION
IN LIMINE RE: IDAHO STATE BAR COMPLAINT, to be delivered, addressed as follows:

Connie W. Taylor
Henderson Law Finn
st. Suite 1020
900 Washington St.
Vancouver, Washington 98660
Facsimile: (360) 693-2911
Mark Stephen Prusynski
PO Box 829
Boise, ID 83701
Phone: (208) 345-2000
Facsimile: (208) 385-5384
Thomas G. Maile, IV.
380 W. State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001

~U.S.Mail
()
()
()

Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

~U.S.Mail
()
()
()

Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

()
()

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

Y

()

~--;~

TRO~iS,

CHRIST T. TROQ;JS:
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
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Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,

Case No. CV-OC-0723232

MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION IN
LIMINE RE: IDAHO STATE BAR
COMPLAINT

v.
T AYLOR, f/k/a
fIkIa
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR,
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
COMES NOW, the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, by and through their co-couns,el
co-counslel of
record, Christ T. Troupis, provide this Memorandum Brief in support of their Motion In Limine
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re: Idaho State Bar.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
of an Idaho State Bar
The counter-claimants have previously provided this Court with a copy ofan
Complaint during the hearing regarding the counter-claimants' motion for summary judgment. In
addition the counter-claimants proposed an amended counter-claim in April 29, 2010, referencing
certain allegations pertaining to the Idaho State Bar proceeding against counter-defendant Thomas
Maile, in his capacity as an attorney. This Court allowed the amended counter-claim to be filed
however, required the counter-claim to strike any and all references to any Idaho State Bar
proceedings.

LEGAL ARGUMENT
A.

There Is No Relevancy Nor Any Probative Value for the Jury in Eluding to Any Idaho
State Bar Proceedings and the Counter-claimants Should Be Restricted in Any Manner
to Eluding to the Same at Any Stage of these Proceedings.
of relevant evidence is set forth in the following Idaho Rules of Evidence
The determination ofrelevant

which provide:
Rule 401. Definition of relevant evidence
"Relevant Evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination ofthe action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence.
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence inadmissible
All relevant evidencc~ is admissible except as otherwise provided by these rules or by
of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is not
other rules applicabl,e in the courts ofthis
admissible.
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion, or
waste of time
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Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
unfair prejudice, confusion ofthe
of the issues, or misleading
outweighed by the danger of
ofunfair
the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste oftime, or needless presentation
ofundue
of cumulative evidence.
Any attempted refenmce to allegations surrounding any pending Idaho State Bar proceeding
clearly has no relevance to the issues to be resolved by the jury in this matter. There are allegations
pending, however, there has been no hearing to date on any issues surround such proceedings.
In addition there are lUles promulgated by the Idaho State Bar which further limit any attempt

to reference such proceedings and/or the allegations surrounding the proceedings. The Idaho Rules
of Professional Conduct, general provisions, as amended through July 1, 2010, provide in the
section labeled Scope:
Violation of
give rise to a cause ofaction
of action against a lawyer nor
ofaa Rule should not itself
itselfgive
should it create any presumption in such a case that a legal duty has been breached.
In addition, violation of
ofaa Rule does not necessarily warrant any other nondisciplinary
remedy, such as disqualification of a lawyer in pending litigation. The Rules are
designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating
conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for civil
liability. Furthermore, the purpose of the Rules can be subverted when they are
invoked by opposing parties as procedural weapons. The fact that a Rule is a just
basis for a lawyer's self-assessment, or for sanctioning a lawyer under the
administration of a disciplinary authority, does not imply that an antagonist in a
collateral proceeding or transaction has standing to seek enforcement of the Rule.

Nevertheless, since the Rules do establish standards ofconduct
of conduct by lawyers, a lawyer's
of the applicable standard of conduct.
violation of a Rule may be evidence ofbreach ofthe
V., provides:
The Idaho Bar Commission Rules, Section v.,
SECTION V. Rules For Review Of Professional Conduct Rule 520. Immunity
(a) Grievants - Witnesses. Grievances, complaints, testimony and other presentation
or arguments submitted to the Professional Conduct Board, a Hearing Committee,
ofthe
the Professional Conduct Board or ofany
of any Hearing Committee, or Bar
any member of
Counsel, all proceedings and conduct maintained or engaged in under these Rules,
ly
and all testimony and showings with respect to any such matters shall be absolutel
absolutel1y
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privileged, and no civil litigation predicated thereon may be instituted or maintained.

The jury pursuant to the above authority has no benefit in the counter-claimants advancing
any references to such proceedings. There is no probative value for the jury benefits. The matters
undertaken before the Idaho State Bar Commission are privileged and confidential.
CONCLUSION
The counter-claimants have admitted in recent arguments before this court that their claims
are against the counter-defendants as individuals not for anything done by Mr. Maile in a role as an

attorney. The counter-claimants should be restricted in any attempt to elude to any allegations of
violations of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct.
DATED this 31st day of December, 2010.

CHRIST T. TROU S,
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
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Plaintiffs/Counter··Defendants,
v.
CONNIE WRIGHT l'
T AYLOR, flkla
f/k/a
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TA
YLOR, an individual; CLARK and
TAYLOR,
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHJ~ DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
COMES NOW, the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, by and through their co-counsel of
record, Christ T. Troupis, and moves this Honorable Court for entry of its Order prohibiting the
Defendants/Counter-Claimants and/or Counter-Claimants' attorney and/or witnesses from
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referencing the fair market value ofthe real property prior to February 2009, and/or referencing
loss of profits prior to February 2009, and/or referencing the fair market value ofthe real
property after August 2009, and/or referencing loss of profits after August 2009 in the above
captioned proceedings including but not limited to voir dire, opening arguments, advancing
testimony and/or submitting any documents surrounding loss profits and/or market value prior to
February 2009 and/or after August 2009.
This Motion is made pursuant to Title 45, Chapter 5 ofthe Idaho Code, I.C. § 45-1302,

I.e. § 5-505 and 401,402, and 403 ofthe Idaho Rules of Evidence. This Motion is further made
on the grounds and for the reasons that such testimony and/or information is irrelevant and
immaterial to these proceedings and lacks probative value and is supported further with the
Memorandum Brief in Support of Motion in Limine, filed concurrently herewith and the;: record
and file contained herein. Oral argument is requested.
DATED this 31st day of December, 2010.

CHRIST T. TROUP , Co-counsell for
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
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''CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 31 st day of December, 2010, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing (1) MOTION IN LIMn~E RE: DAMAGES, (2) MEMORANDUM
BRIEF n~ SUPPORT OF MOTION m LIMINE RE: DAMAGES, together with (3) NOTICE
OF HEARING to be delivered, addressed as follows:
Connie W. Taylor
Henderson Law Firm
900 Washington St. Suite 1020
Vancouver, Washington 98660
Facsimile: (360) 693-2911

~U.S.Mail

Mark Stephen Prusynski
PO Box 829
Boise, ID 83701
Phone: (208) 345-2000
Facsimile: (208) 385-5384

U. S. Mail
{f Facsimile
Transmission

Thomas G. Maile, IV.
380 W. State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001

()
()
()

Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

( )
( )

Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

( )
( )

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

{f

Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130
PO Box 2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone:
208/938-5584
Facsimile:
208/938-5482
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com

JAN 03 2011
Cieril<.
J. DAVID NAVARRO,. Cierii<.
By';. GARDEN
DEPUTY

Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
----~

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
. Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
BIRCHMAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH
; MAILE, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Count~:r- Defendants,
Plaintiffs/Count~:r-

__

-,-------~~-~_.

.

- - - - - - - - _.... _ _ - - - - - 
..

Case No. CV-OC-0723232

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'
MOTION IN LIMINE RE:
DAMAGES

!

v.
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
T AYLOR, an individual:; R. JOHN
TAYLOR,
TAYLOR, an individual:; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
•. ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
I POSSESSION.
I

Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
The counter-defendants by and through their undersigned co-counsel of record, and
provides this Memorandum Brief in support of their Motion in Limine re: Damages, as follows:

LEGAL ARGUMENT
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1. The Court should limit the evidence presented on Taylors' alleged damages to the
time period from February, 2009 to August, 2009.
A. Taylors presented a claim for damages in the first lawsuit, together with a

claim for rescission.
This Court's July 2,2009 Memorandum Decision and Order stated:
"On January 23, 2004, three of the beneficiaries, Reed Taylor, Dallan Taylor and R. John
Taylor (collectively the Taylors), filed the first lawsuit, alleging three causes of action
seeking damages or rescission of the sale."
Taylors elected the remedy of rescission in the first lawsuit. Judgment was entered in
favor of Taylors by Judge Wilper for rescission. That judgment was affirmed on appeal and the
case remanded in February, 2009 on that suit. Any damage claims that Taylors assert based on
the fact that title to the property had not reverted to the Trust prior to that date are barred.
Attached to the Affidavit of Christ Troupis as Exhibit E is an excerpt from the deposition
of R. John Taylor taken on December 14, 2004 in which he acknowledged that in their first
lawsuit, Taylors sought to recover money damages from MaileslBerkshire and in the alternative,
an order for rescission of the sale.
B. Taylors only pleaded damage claims limited to that time period.
In their Amended Counterclaim, Taylors have alleged that their damages arise
from Mailes/Berkshire:
, 2h. "Failing to release the lis pendens in Taylor v. Maile for six months after the
Supreme Court decision affirming the district court order quieting title in the
Linder Road property to the Johnson trust."
Taylors' alleged claims for abuse of process and interference with prospective economic
advantage in this action are that the failure to remove the Lis Pendens adversely affected their

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMIE RE:
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ability to sell the property after the date that the rescission judgment was affirmed, February
2009, through the date that it was released, August, 2009.
C. The legitimacy of the Lis Pendens prior to remand of the prior lawsuit in February,
2009 has been decided in the prior lawsuit, and cannot form the basis of a claim in this action.
Judge Wilper ruled upon the counter-claimants' motion to strike the Lis Pendens which
was filed pending the appeal. The Taylors in the litigation before Judge Wilper in 2007,
requested that the court strike the Lis Pendens filed in May 2006 and/or requested that a bond be
posted during the appeal. Judge Wilper entered his Order on March 1, 2007 denying the motion
and pursuant to that order the lis pendens was authorized to remain of record, (attachments to
Affidavit in Support of Motion for Certification filed July 13,2009). The appeal was remanded
back to the district court in February 2009. The parties in the present action further stipulated
that the above captioned matter would be stayed pending the decision in Taylor v. Maile.
As a matter of law there was a legitimate right as to the priority of maintaining the lis
Penden in the current case up through the time the court ruled that res judicata applied to the
plaintiffs' claims (July 2009). In fact as Judge Wilper indicated a litigant has a right to maintain
a lis pendens even through the appeal process.
Taylors assertions in their Amended Counterclaim relate only to the retention of a Lis
Pendens after the rescission order became final upon remand in February, 2009.
2. On the Taylors' claim for Intentional Interference with Expectancy, the
wrongfulness of the conduct with respect to "intentional interference with
expectancy"is a question for the court, not the jury. The Court should delineate
what wrongful conduct is alleged, and limit the evidence presented to whether that
conduct occurred and whether there are any defenses to liability for it.
Carter,. 143 Idaho 373, 146 P.3d 639, 647 (2006), the Court noted:
In Carter v. Carter,
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"THE MAGISTRATE COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING TRc\T
TRC\T
THE ELEMENT OF WRONGFULNESS IN THE TORT OF
INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH EXPECTANCY IS AN ISSUE
OF LAW AND NOT AN ISSUE OF FACT
The magistrate court concluded that the element of wrongfulness in the tort
of intentional interference with expectancy is an issue of law and not an issue: of
fact. The district court affirmed. This Court adopts the analysis of the district
court in reviewing this matter on appeal.
[I]t is an issue of law for the court to determine whether the nature of the act
complained of could be considered wrongful or not. In other words, the definition
of what could be considered wrongful is a question of law. Once the act is so
defined by the judge, it then becomes a jury question to determine whether the act
was or was not committed as defined."

The Court should therefore issue an order delineating what constitutes wrongful conduct
for purposes of this cause of action, and issue an order limiting all evidence presented to (1)
whether that conduct occwTed and (2) whether our defenses mitigate it or justify it.
The jury should not be presented with evidence of other conduct that occurred during the
prior lawsuit for the purpose of Taylors arguing that Mailes engaged in a course of wrongful
conduct commencing in the prior action.
3. In delineatingwh:ilt constitutes 'wrongful conduct,' the Court should exclude the
riling or maintenance of a Lis Pendens.

It is not a tort where one acts to protect her own economic interests, even if there is

interference with the contract expectancy of another, so long as the acts of the intervenor are not
independently wrongful. The issue of whether or not the actions complained of are or are not
"wrongful" in this context is for the court to determine in defining the issues. The cas(: of Carter
v. Carter, 143 Idaho 373, 146 P.3d 639 (2006) provides at p. 648 of 146 P.3d.:
The magistrate court concluded that the element of wrongfulness in the tort of
intentional interfefl~nce with expectancy is an issue of law and not an issue of fact.
The district court affirmed. This Court adopts the analysis of the district court in
reviewing this matter on appeal.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMIE RE:
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'-'
In this case, it is obvious that Neta had her own expectancy, and her own interests
to advance and protect in the matter. It is not a tort where one acts to protect hler
own economic interests, even if there is interference with the contract
expectancy of
anot,her, so long as the acts ofthe
of the intervenor are not
ofanot,her,
independently wrongful. The issue of whether or not the actions complained of
are or are not "wrongful" in this context is for the court to determine in defining
the issues, and would normally have been included in the instructions. The issm:
for the jury to determine is whether or not the alleged tortfeasor acted in the
manner alleged.
The Carter, case injects the language "independently wrongful". Such language as an
element of the tort seems to be traced to a California case involving claims of slander of title and
tortious interference with contract. The case of Park 100 Investment Group II, LLC v. Ryan,_
Cal. Rptr.3d_, 180 Cal. App.4th
AppAth 795 (2009) which held:
Since the filing of the lis pendens on the Oviatt property in Case No.
BC349120 alleged a real property claim and was privileged, and because Oviatt
has made no argument that the lis pendens lacked merit for other reasons,
recordation of the lis pendens cannot be the basis for intentional interference with
prospective economic advantage or slander of title causes of action, even if Heron
acted with malice. (Sylmar Air Conditioning v. Pueblo Contracting Services, Inc.,
supra, 122 Cal. App.4th
AppAth at pp. 1058-1 059 [where act is privileged, plaintiff cannot
show a probability of prevailing]; Navarro v. IHOP Properties, Inc. (2005) 134
Cal. App.4th
AppAth 834, 843-844 [36 Cal. Rptr.3d 385] [same]; Albertson v. Raboff,
supra, 46 Cal.2d at pp. 378-382; Woodcourt, supra, 119 Cal.App.3d at pp. 249
249251; Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.(l995) 11 Ca1.4th 376,393

[45 Cal.Rptr.2d 436,902 P.2d 740] [to plead intentional interference with
prospective economic advantage, defendant had to engage in some act that was
wrongful by some measure other than the fact of interference itself]; Palmer v.
Zaklama, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th
Cal.AppAth at pp. 1378-1379; National Medical
Transportation Network v. Deloitte & Touche (1998) 62 Cal.AppAth
Cal.App.4th 412,440
[72 Cal.Rptr.2d 720] [independently wrongful act is required to prove negligent
interference with prospective economic advantage]; Brody v. Montalbano (1978)
87 Cal. App.3d 725, 738 [151 Cal. Rptr. 206].)
The California court in analyzing a potential claim for a filing of lis pendens requires
act for both a slander of title and tort of interfrence with prospective
"independent wrongful" ac:t
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN
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economic advantage. The same principles should apply in Idaho. "An act is independently
wrongful if it is unlawful, that is, if it is proscribed by some constitutional, statutory, regulatory,
common law, or other determinable legal standard. (Korea Supply, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1159.)
Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 44 Cal.4th 937,945-46,81 Cal. Rptr.3d 282, 189 P.
P . 3d 285
(2008). The filing of a lawsuit is a pre-requisite to a filing of a lis pendens. The publication of
the notice of lis pendens is not defamatory. It merely informs the public that the property is
involved in litigation. Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 165 P.3d 261 (Idaho
2007). The filing of a lis pendens cannot give rise to any actionable claim against the plaintiffs.
The Relevant portion of Idaho Code section 5-505, provides:

of possession
5-505. LIS PENDENS. In an action affecting the title or the right ofpossession
of real property, the plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint,...
complaint, ... may file for
record with the recorder of the county in which the property or some part thereof
is situated, a notice of the pendency of the action, containing the names of the
parties, the object of the action or defense, and a description of the property in
that county affected thereby. From the time ofiiling such notice for record
only shall a purchaser or incumbrancer of the property affected thereby be
deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the action, and only of its
pendency against parties designated by their real names. (emphasis added).
The matter before the court requires this court to construe the plain meaning and intention
of I. C. § 5-505. The interpretation of a statute is an issue of law over which this Court exercises
free

The Idaho statute relating to the right to file a Lis Pendens is straightforward.
The case of Joseph C.L.U. Ins. Assoc., Inc. v. Vaught, 117 Id. 555, 557, 789 P.2d 1146,

(Cl. App.
App.1990),
1148 (Ct.
1990), provides:
A lis pendens is a notice to the world of the existence of a claim affecting certain
real property. See I.e. § 5-505; Suitts v. First Security Bank ofIdaho, N.A., 100
Idaho 555, 559,602 P.2d 53, 57 (1979). The lis pendens does not purport, by
itself, to establish or to change anyone's legal rights. Of course, the filing of alis
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMIE
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pendens may highlight a possible legal problem affecting the property, thereby
inducing an extra measure of caution by potential purchasers or lenders until the
litigation is concluded. But this does not mean that any underlying legal rights
have been altered.
The Joseph, supra, case authority, establishes that the filing of a lis pendens does not
"change the legal rights" of the litigants. It is simply a recorded document giving notice to the
world that litigation has bt~en instituted which may affect the underlying property. Under these
facts, did the filing of the Lis Pendens and the ultimate release of the Lis Pendens by the
plaintiffs give rise to any actionable torts?
The purchase price has not been returned and the plaintiffs had established rights
pursuant to vendee's lien statute which affect the title of property as any foreclosure action does.
The plaintiffs have the right to pursue a foreclosure of their vendee's lien. The foreclosure of
vendee's lien as with any lien foreclosure is addressed in I.C. § 45-1302, which provides:
Determination of All Rights upon Foreclosure Proceedings.
property ...
In any suit brought to foreclose a mortgage or lien upon real property...
the plaintiff..., plaintiff in intervention may make as party defendant in the same
cause of action, any person, including parties mentioned in section 5-325, having,
claiming or appearing to have or to claim any title, estate, or interest in or to any
part of the real or personal property involved therein, and the court shall, in
addition to granting relief in the foreclosure action, determine the title, estate or

interest of all partic~s thereto in the same manner and to the same extent and effect
as in the action to quiet title.
The plaintiffs since the entry of the Order by Judge Wilper on March 1,2007 (allowing
the continued recording of the lis pendens), have had a lawful right to foreclose a vendee's lien.
A vendee's lien is afforded the same right as any other type oflien foreclosure referenced in I.C.
tht: same effect as a quiet title action. The specific language of the statute
§ 45-1302 and is given tht~
provides, "determine the title, estate, or interest of all parties thereto in the same manner and to
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN
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the same extent and effect as in the action to quiet title". A detennination of a vendee's lien is
according to the statute equivalent to a quiet title action. Clearly, there is no dispute of fact that
the plaintiffs lawfully were: entitled to record a lis pendens on their claim for a return of the
purchase price, as provided in I.C. § 45-1302. The defendants have admitted that they have not
returned the purchase price, and would not return the purchase price unless the plaintiffs agreed
to dismiss their potential right to an appeal (Affidavit of Connie Taylor dated December 18, 2009
filed 12/21109;
12/21/09; Exhibit "A" to Affidavit of Thomas G. Maile, IV., In Support of Plaintiffs'
Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Defendants' Counterclaim).
A plain reading of I.C. § 45-1302 supports the plaintiffs' position that a lis pendens was
proper until the vendee's lien is foreclosed upon. The plaintiffs have consistently asserted that
the right to pursue the vendee's lien and the foreclosure of the same, was part and parcd of the
Lis Pendens which were previously filed of record. The plaintiffs have released their lis
pendens. On July 13,2009 after receipt of the Court's Memorandum, the plaintiffs rekased the
lis pendens relating to the current matter. Although, technically, the plaintiffs could have
maintained the lis pendens through an appeal in the current case (as allowed by Judge Wilper
during the appeal in Taylor v. Maile), the plaintiffs voluntarily removed the same. Until the
purchase price was returned, pursuant to I.C. § 45-1302, the plaintiffs were entitled to maintain
their lis pendens.
The case of Weitz v. Green, 148 Id. 851,230 P.3d 743 (2010) held:
The district court"s finding as to the publication element was erroneous as a
matter oflaw. As this Court noted in Richeson v. Kessler, "[w]ith certain
exceptions, unimportant here, defamatory matter published in the due course of a
judicial proceeding, having some reasonable relation to the cause, is absolutely
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COU1\lTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMIE RE:
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privileged and will not support a civil action for defamation although made
maliciously and with knowledge of its falsity." 73 Idaho 548, 551-52,255 P.2d
707,709 (1953). If the defamatory statement was made in the course ofa
proceeding and had a reasonable relation to the cause of action of that proceeding,
that statement may not be used as the basis for a civil action for defamation.
Carpenter v. Grimes Pass Placer Mining Co., 19 Idaho 384, 393-94, 114 P. 42, 45
(1911).
As the Weitz case held such statements whether set forth in a lis pendens filed of record
or contained in allegations of a complaint are judicially immune from liability if they "had a
reasonable relation to the cause of action of that proceeding". The actions of the counterdefendants relating to the judicial proceeding in this matter and Judge Wilper's matter whether
protected under a vendee's lien or a claim for a constructive trust, the pleadings and the Lis
Pendens were reasonably related to the claims for relief in properly pursued litigation in both
cases.
Counter4. The Court should exclude evidence of any claimed damages after the Counter
defendants fIled their release of the Lis Pendens.
The plaintiffs filed their release of the Lis Pendens in this litigation on July 13,2009
after this court ruled that res judicata barred the plaintiffs' claims. The plaintiffs filed their
vendee's lien of record on August 3, 2009, and Judge Wilper has ruled that this vendee's lien is

valid and may be retained lmtil it is satisfied by repayment of the purchase price. The counterclaimants have not been hindered by a Lis Pendens in their ability to sell, transfer, or borrow
against the property since it was released and therefore cannot assert or recover any damages
associated with any time subsequent to the release oflis pendens. Compensatory damages for
lost profits and future earnings must be shown with a reasonable certainty. Hummer v. Evans,
129 Idaho 274, 280, 923 P.2d 981,987 (1996). Damage awards based upon speculation and
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION
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conjecture will not be allowed. Rindlisbaker v. Wilson, 95 Idaho 752, 519 P.2d 421 (1974).
Inland Group of Companies, Inc. v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 133 Idaho 249, 985 P.2d
674 (Idaho 1999). The counter-claimants cannot assert any claims for damages beyond July
2009.
5. The Court should exclude any claim for damages arising from the filing
riling and
maintenance of th.~ vendee's lien, or Plaintiff's motion to enforce their vendee's lien
by foreclosure.

Judge Wilper ruled that the filing of the vendee's lien and the foreclosure

ofth~~

same

were not a misuse ofthe
of the judicial system that warranted sanctions. As stated in the case of Carter,
supra, "It is an issue of law for the court to determine whether the nature of the act complained of
could be considered wrongful or not. In other words, the definition of what could be considered
wrongful is a question of law. Once the act is so defined by the judge, it then becomes a jury
question to determine whether the act was or was not committed as defined." The Honorable
Judge Wilper ruled that Plaintiffs were entitled to maintain a vendee's lien, and although Taylors
asked Judge Wilper to sanction Plaintiffs for attempting to enforce the vendee's lien by
foreclosure, Judge Wilper declined to assess sanctions. The Taylors' claim in their amended
complaint that this action was actionable is inconsistent with Judge Wi1per's
Wilper's ruling that the
MaileslBerkshire have a legal right to the remedy of a vendee's lien, which of necessity" includes
the right to enforce that remedy.

5.

The Court should e,xclude
e~xclude evidence and argument that Taylors are entitled lto
recover their attonleys fees and costs as additional damages.
The counter-claimants should be precluded from having the jury consider any attorneys

fees and costs incurred in the defense of the plaintiffs' claims which were dismissed by this
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court. The case of Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Id. 670, 183 P.3d 758 (Idaho 2008), provides
authority for this court to restrict the counter-claimants from advancing any theories before the
jury that they are entitled to damages based upon attorneys fees and costs incurred in the defense
of the plaintiffs' claims. This court at the conclusion of the counter-claim will be in a position
JPosition to
detennine ifthere is a basis for any award of costs and attorneys fees. The Losser, decision
provides:
A party may not pursue an independent action to recover attorney fees and costs
incurred in an earlier lawsuit involving the same parties.
parties .
.... If a pleading is signed in violation of Rule 11 , then the court upon motion or
upon its own initiative, shall impose "upon the person who signed it, a
represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include ... a
reasonable attorney's fee." Bradstreet's verification of the application for infomLal
probate of a will that she forged clearly is not conduct "well grounded" in fact nor
is it "warranted by I~xisting law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification or reversal of existing law."
.... Generally, however, a litigant must pursue attorney fees and costs in the same
proceeding as the underlying litigation. "Where an action based on the same
wrongful act has been prosecuted by plaintiff against defendant to a successful
issue, he or she cannot in a subsequent action recover his or her costs and
expenses in the former action as damages." 25 C.J.S. Damages § 79 (2007) . "As
a general rule, litigation costs and attorney's fees incurred in prior litigation
against the same defendant are not recoverable in a subsequent action." 22 AM.
JUR. 2D Damages § 435 (2007) .

We do not suggest that a party may never bring an action to recover an
award of attorney fees and costs incurred in earlier litigation. Indeed, we have
recognized that, in certain circumstances, attorney fees may properly be awarded
as an element of damages. See e.g., Abbie Uriguen Oldsmobile Buick, Inc. v. U.S.
Fire Ins. Co., 95 Idaho 501,509,511 P.2d 783, 791 (1973) (attorney fees incurred
in defense ofthird party's claim after insurance company breached contractual
obligation to defend held to be proper element of damage arising out of breach).
Rather, our holding is simply that a party may not bring a second lawsuit to
recover attorney fees and costs incurred in an earlier lawsuit from a party to that
earlier lawsuit.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMJ[E
LIM1[E RE:
DAMAGES- Pg 11

001964

In the present mattl~r, the plaintiffs' initial lawsuit has been dismissed. This court will
have the opportunity to determine if the initial filing was a frivolous claim against the eounter
eounterclaimants. The holding in Losser, supra, prohibits the counter-claimants from presenting any
testimony or evidence of their attorney fees and costs incurred as the counter-claimants were
parties to the first lawsuit.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court should enter appropriate orders limiting
presentation of evidence and argument to the jury as noted herein.
DATED this 31st day of December, 2010.

Ct~~co-counsel
c~~co-counsel

for

Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMIE RE:
DAMAGES- Pg 12

001965

...

NO. ~-.t'f)m

FILED

A.M_L~-P.M. __- - -

Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130
PO Box 2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone:
208/938-5584
Facsimile:
208/938-5482
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com

JAN 03 ZOH
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
8yA. GARDEN
ByA.
DEPUTY

Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
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MOTION IN LIMINE RE:
RELEVANCE OF PRIOR
ALLEGATIONS

v.
CONNIE WRIGHT T
AYLOR, fIkIa
TAYLOR,
flk/a
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TA
YLOR, an individual; CLARK and
TAYLOR,
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
COMES NOW, the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, by and through their co-counsel of
record, Christ T. Troupis, and moves this Honorable Court for entry of its Order prohibiting the
Defendants/Counter-Claimants from referencing during oral argument, voir dire or eliciting
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,
'"
testimony and/or advancing any evidentiary items concerning the allegations which were
involved in the prior underlying litigation Taylor v. Maile on the grounds that any and all
allegations are barred by Rles Judicata and/or Collateral Estoppel. The Idaho Supreme Court
affirmed Judge Wilper deh::rmination
detl:::rmination that the real estate closing was void, for lack of notice to
the beneficiaries pursuant to

I.e. § 68-108.

This Motion is made pursuant to Idaho Rules of Evidence Rules 401,402, and 403. This
Motion is further made on the grounds and for the reasons that such testimony and/or information
is irrelevant and immaterial to these proceedings and lacks probative value and is supported
further with the Memorandum Brief in Support of Motion in Limine, filed concurrently herewith
and the record and file contained herein. Oral argument is requested.
O.
DATED this 31 st day of December, 20 IIO.

CH~o-counSeL
CH~o-counSeL

for

Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
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.....

'

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 31 st day of December, 2010, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing (1) MOTION IN LIMINE RE: RELEVANCE OF PRIOR
ALLEGATIONS, (2) MEMORANDUM BRIEF U'l"
U'J" SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMn~E RE:
RELEVANCE OF PRIOR ALLEGATIONS, together with (3) NOTICE OF HEARING RE:
MOTION IN LIMINE RE: RELEVANCE OF PRIOR ALLEGATIONS to be delivered"
addressed as follows:
Connie W. Taylor
Henderson Law Firm
900 Washington st.
S1. Suite 1020
Vancouver, Washington 98660
Facsimile: (360) 693-2911

~U.S.Mail
~U.S.Mail

Mark Stephen Prusynski
PO Box 829
Boise, ID 83701
Phone: (208) 345-2000
Facsimile: (208) 385-5384

~U.S.Mail
~U.S.Mail
()
Facsimile Transmission
()
Hand Delivery
()
Overnight Delivery

Thomas G. Maile, IV.
380 W. State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001

()
()
()

Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

()
()

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
~ Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
()

~~~

CHRIST T. TROU~~S,=-----Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549
TROUPIS LA
W OFFICE
LAW
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130
PO Box 2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone:
208/938-5584
Facsimile:
208/938-5482
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com

~==
~~--,-~~~[~ ~=JAN n 3 7rl1i
,. U l
I

DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk

,,

'3y A GARDEN
By
DEPUTY

Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counter··Defendants,

Case No. CV-OC-0723232

MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION IN
LIMINE RE: RELEVANCE OF
PRIOR ALLEGATIONS

v.
£IkIa
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, £!kIa
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
CONNIE TAYLOR,
TA YLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR,
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
COMES NOW, the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, by and through their co-counsel of
record, Christ T. Troupis, provide this Memorandum Brief in support of their Motion In Limine

MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE RE: RELEVANCE
OF PRIOR ALLEGATIONS - Pg 1
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re: Relevance of Prior Allegations.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties were involved in the previous underlying litigation, Taylor v. Maile. The current
claims in the previous underlying litigation. Ultimately the
counter-claimants advanced a number of
ofclaims
Idaho Supreme Court in Taylor v. Maile (1) determined that it appeared that a conflict of interest
might have existed with Beth Rogers, the nominated successor trustee pursuant to I.C. § 68-108.
The Supreme Court in Taylor v. Maile (1) knew that the grantor ofthe trust, Theodore L. Johnson
had died two days before the closing and transaction was closed by Beth Rogers, as a successor
nominated trustee.

It was this Decision that prompted Connie Taylor to draft the Amended

Complaint in the underlying litigation to include the allegations that Reed Taylor, Dallan Taylor, and

R. John Taylor were residual beneficiaries ofthe trust. Based upon the verified Amended Complaint
the district court entered the "Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims", reasoning that as residual
beneficiaries the Taylor could set aside the real estate transaction. The underlying prior litigation
never made any determination as to any other claims but determined, on one sole issue, that the
property be restored to the nust
oust because of the lack of notice to the Taylor beneficiaries.
LEGAL ARGUMENT

A.

All facts, allegations, contention advanced by the Taylors apart from the lack of notice
to the beneficiaries which resulted in the Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim cannot be
raised as the same ~nre
~llre not relevant.
The determination of
relevant evidence is set forth in the following Idaho Rules ofEvidence
of Evidence
ofrelevant

which provide:
Rule 401. Definition ofrelevant evidence

MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE RE: RELEVANCE
OF PRIOR ALLEGATIONS - Pg 2
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··"Relevant
"Relevant Evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the detennination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence.
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence inadmissible
All relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by these rules or by
this state. Evidence which is not relevant is not
other rules applicable in the courts of
ofthis
admissible.
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion, or
waste of time
Although relevant, e:vidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
outweighed by the danger of
ofunfair
undue delay, waste oftime, or needless presentation
the jury, or by considerations of
ofundue
of cumulative evidence.
The jury should not consider any of the allegations, claims, etc., that were part of the
Judgment in the prior underlying proceedings. Those issues have no relevance to the current
proceedings or the prior Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims.
Any attempted reference to allegations surrounding the initial pleadings in Maile v. Taylor
that do not relate to I.e. § 68-108, are of no relevance to the current proceedings and would unduly
ofthe
the counter-claim, to wit: were allegations contained in the
confuse the jury in the principle issue of
plaintiffs' amended complaint and demand for jury trial, groundless and constitute an intentional
interference with a prospective business advantage and abuse of process. Any attempt by the
counter-claimants to retry or raise similar issues that there were raised in Taylor v. Maile, are not
relevant. Such evidence wh{:ther through testimony or any attempt to introduce evidence on such
of unfair
issues, should be excluded as its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger ofunfair
prejudice, would confuse the issues, or mislead the jury, and would amount to undue delays, and a

MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE RE: RELEVANCE
OF PRIOR ALLEGATIONS - Pg 3
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waste of time.
CONCLUSION
The counter-claimants should be limited in voir dire, argument, presenting testimony and/or
attempting to introduce evidence on issues that were covered in Taylor v. Maile. Such issues or

theories should be barred under the above cited Rules of Evidence.
DATED this 31st day of December, 2010.

8tv1)~

CHRIST T.
T. TROGl1-S,--=------
TROG¥r'S,
CHRIST
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
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NO'-IK:"TIJ,
NO,tKJl7'

FILED

..."", i\,M-I't:Jb'l:dP.M _ _ __
..."
A.M-I4:3b'l:J- _P.M---

JAN 03 2011
.1, DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk

Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130
PO Box 2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone:
208/938-5584
Facsimile:
208/938-5482
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com

ByP.. GARDEN
DEPUTY

Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO,

n~

AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

1--;~RKS~II~i IN~E~T~EN'~~~~C, an--
an--1--;~RKS~I1~iIN~E~T~EN'~~~~C,
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
BIRCHi MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH
., MAILE, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,
!

Case No. CV-OC-0723232
CV -OC-0723232

AFFIDAVIT OF CHRIST TROUPIS
IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS IN
LIMINE

v.

CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
: TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
I FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
I an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, ~m Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
I
!

I

I

Defendants/Counter-Claimants.

STA TE OF IDAHO )
STATE
) ss:
County of Ada)
CHRIST T. TROUPIS, being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:

001973

1.

Your Affiant is the co-counsel of record for Berkshire Investments, LLC, Thomas G.
Maile, IV., and Colleen Birch-Maile in the above captioned matter. That the information
and facts set forth herein are based upon your affiant's personal knowledge and/or
observations and can testify as to the truth ofthe matters asserted herein if called upon as
a witness at the trial ofthis matter. That your affiant provides this affidavit in support of
the motions in limine filed herein.

2.

That attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of the Counter-claimants'
Witness Disclosure received on October 27,2010, regarding witness designation and
Rule 26 compliance, and the same is incorporated by reference herein as if set forth in
full herein.

3.

That attached hereto as Exhibit "B" are true and correct copies ofthe relevant pages of
the counter-claimants' Answers to the Plaintiffs' First Set of Discovery (pp. 1,6, 7, 8, 9,
10), dated August 27, 2009, and the same are incorporated by reference herein as if set
forth in full herein. That your affiant has not received nor has the counter-claimants
provided any supplemental responses to said discovery responses.

4.

That attached hereto as Exhibit "c" is a true and correct copy of the Counter-claimants'
Supplemental Witness Disclosure received on December 10, 2010, regarding witness
designation and the same is incorporated by reference herein as if set forth in filII
full herein.

5.

the Scheduling Order in
That attached hereto as Exhibit "D" is a true and correct copy of
ofthe
this matter.

6.

Your affiant left his office on December 7,2010, and was not able to review and consider
the late disclosures by the counter-claimants until December 22, 2010.
20 10. That the

AFFIDAVIT OF CHRIST TROUPIS IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS IN LIMINE - Pg 2

001974

disclosures referenced in the above exhibits were delivered approximately 45 days after
stipulated discovery deadlines and after the required time referenced in the Court Order.
That your affiant has not been able to obtain any experts in opposition to the late
disclosed experts by the counter-claimants.
7.

That annexed Hereto as Exhibit "E" Is a True and Correct Copy of Page 81 from the
Deposition ofR. John Taylor taken on December 14, 2004in the case captioned, Taylor
vs Maile Ada County Case No. CV OC 04-00473D.
DATED this 31st day of December, 2010.

TROUP I ,
CHRIST T. TROUPI
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants

31

st

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, this
day of December, 2010.

.
Notary Pu i~ for Idaho
C~
Residing at
C~
My Commission Expires ---J.Ul?ZI'-")e>...:\L
~i)\l1)lLf
....-l""'"~ __- - 

J1DA
ADA
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EXHIBIT "A"
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10/27/2010
10/27/201D

13:52

3E.DE,994989

HLlRDISTEI~j
HLlRDISTEI~j

LAl'·)
LAl'J

CONNIE W. TAYLOR
Henderson Law Office:
900 Washington Street, Suite 1020

Vancouver,
A 98660
VanCGuver, W
WA
Telephone 360.699.1530
ISBA No. 4837
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THlC
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE INvESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho Iirdted liability.
liability, and THOMAS G,
G.

Case No. CV OC 0723232

MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE
husband and wife,

Plaintiffs,

COUNTERCLAIMANTS'
VS.
""S.

'WITNESS DISCLOSURE

CO'N'NIE
C01'l'NIE WRIGID' TAYLOR. et al.
Defendants.

The Counterclaim
ants may call any of the following witnesses to testify at the trial in the
Counterclaimants
above matter scheduled to begin on January 31, 2011:
Expert Witnesses:
1.

D. Craig Lewis, Professor Emeritus of Law
450 Sunv.est Drive, #73,
Cas8 Grande. 1"\Z 85 t 22 .,

Profe&sor Lewis will explain to the jurors the legal doctrines of res judicata (claim precksion)
precl\;:sion)
and c(Jllarerai
c(Jllarera! estoppel (issue preclusion), and that the purpose behind those doctrines is to

Counten:laimants' Witness Disclosure
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",",'
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,Hl,/27!281Ct
I H1,/27/281Ct

13: 52

360£',934'389
360£'.934'389

HOP-EtETE HJ LAW

PAGE
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preclude the multiple litigation of claims. He will testifY tbat these legal doctrines have long
been a part of the standard Jaw school curriculum, tnat
toat they have been recognized for many
decades, that the doctrLnes are well estab.lished law in the State of
ofIdaho,
Idaho, and that any attorney
licensed to practice law in Idaho would be familiar with them.
Professor Lewis will compare the issues raised in the prior lawsuit (Taylor v.
v, Maile) to the
Amended Complaint filed in this proceeding. and will demonstrate that the current procel~ding
procet~ding

was a clear attempt by Mr, MaiJe
Maile to relitigate his claim that the Taylors did not have standing to
pursue an action against him for the retum of the Linder Road property.

Based on the Kdaho

Supreme Court's rulings that the Taylors did have standing, Professor Lewis will explain why
the suit against the Johnson Trust and its trustees is barred by claim preclusion (res judicata).
which al50 prohibits the suit against the Trusl's attorneys, who were in privity with the Trust.
He will further testify that the suit against the Tnlst and beneficiaries' attorneys is also barred by
issue preclusion (collateral estoppels). because the standing of the beneficiaries to bring suit is an

issue which Mr. Maik raised unsuccessfully in the prior lawsuit.

Profe~sor
Profe~sor

Lewis will testify

that no attorney could reasonably believe that there is a legitimate legal basis for Maile's la'\vsuit,

and that flUng and pursuing that action is not reasonably justifiable.
Professor lewis's opinions are based on his education, training and knowledge. as well

as on his review of documents filed in Taylor

li.
Ii.

presenr action; including but
Maile and in the present

not limited to rhe
the foilowing (which may be used as exhibits in support of his opinions):
From the Taylor v, Af'aile case:
a, Maile's Answer and Counterclaim dared 917i05
b. Order c,n Plaintiff s MSJ dated 2i13/06
211 3106

Counterclaimants' WHness Disclosure
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c. Order Granting MSJ on beneficiaries' c.laims dated 5115106
5/15/06

d. Judgment 011 Beneficiaries' Claims dated 6i7106
6i7/06
dellying Maile's claim for unjust enrichment (11/29/06)
(11129/06)
e. Memorandum Decision denying
f.

Appellant's/Cross-Respondents' Reply Brief (Maile)

g. Respondent's/Cross-Appellants' Reply Brief (Taylor)
h. Taylor v. Maile I Supreme Court Opinion
i.

Taylor v. Maile II Supreme Court Opinion

From Maile v. Taylor case:
j.

Maile's Amended Complaint (3/25/08). The initial complaint was never served.

k. Memorandum Decision (7/02/09) dismissing Maile's claims based on res judicata

grounds
Lewis '5 qualifications and publications are listed on his Curriculum Vitae,
Professor Lewis's
which is attached as Exhibit A.

His fee i1' $150 per hour for consulting,
consulting. $250 per hour for

testimony, He has not testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within
deposition or trial testimony.
the preceding four years.

2. Sam Langston. MAl
Langston & Associates, Inc.
Sue!:t
2219 State Suel:t

Boise, m 83702
Mr. Langston will testify as to hi::; opinion of the market value of the Fairfield
Estates Subdivision in accordance with Uniform Standard of Professional Appraisal

Practice (VSPAP), with an August 3, 2009 retrospective date of value,

His opinion will

be based on comparable real property transactions, and he \vill prepare a Summary

Counterd.timants' Witness Disclosure
Counterd.limants·
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360699498'3
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data, reasoning and analysis used in the appraisal
Appraisal Report which discusses the data.

process to devdop the opinion of value.

The Summary Appraisal Report will be

provided in a supplementa!
supplemental response upon receipt.

Mr. Larlgston's qualifications are set forth in the curriculum vitae whic:h is
attached as Exhibit B.

His fee tor the Summary Appraisal Report is $4,500,

hourly rate for testimony (at deposition or trial) is $350 per hour.

and his

Mr. Langston's

testimony ill the: past four years has been requested and will be provided when received..
3. Connie Shannahan
Co!dwell Banker Tomlinson
TomJinson Group
Coldwell

408 South Eagk~ Roa.d
Eagle ID 83616
~s.

as

to

Shannahan is a real esmte
esrate agent in Eagle, Idaho, who may be called to

t(~stify
t(~stify

the information which she gathered in the Real Estate Services Proposal dated

dated April 22, 20 I0,
January 12, 2010.
2010, a copy of whi ch was attached to her a.ffidavit dared
I0,

which has been. previously provided. Specifically, she may be asked to testify
testity as to the
sale of lots in lEagle which are comparable to those in the Fairfield Estates subdivision
between January of 2005 and December of 2008, and that the sale prices on five acre lots
during the 2005-2006 time frame ranged from a lot of 5325,000 to a high of $699,000.
Ms. Shannahan's curriculum vitae, hourly rates, and prior testimony have been
requested and will be provided when received.
2. Lay/fact witnesses who may be called to testify:
John Taylor
TayLor
Po Box 538
lewist.on fd 83501

Councerdaimams' Witness Disclosure
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DaHan J Taylor

410 Clear Creek Drive
Meridian Id 83462

Chuck Leis
2118 N Canter PI.

Eagle, Idaho 83616
(208) 863-0687
Dan and Cindy LeBeau
615 W. Rush ct.
Ct.
Eagle, 1D 83616
(208) 939 2556
Stephen McPhcters
PO Box 44137
Boise. ID 83711
(208) 377·4261
(208) 377-9321
Anna Gepford
10601 Horseshoe Bend Rd., Space 20

ID 83714
Boise. TO
(208) 938-4745
luile Anderson
lube
101 Daggett Creel( Rd.

Boise, ID 83716
(208) 342-4018
Steven Counter

11789 WAlcott St.
Boise, ID 83709
378·0959
(208) 378-0959

Richard Zam7.:0W
Zamzow':; Feed and Seed
6313 fairview Ave
Boise. Idaho
(208) 375·4231
Counterclaimants' \Vitness Disclosure
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Mr. Doug Crandall
Attorney at Law

1015 W. Hays
Boise, ID 83702
(208) 343-1211
Mr. John Wood (in person or through reading swom testimony in unjust enrichment trial)
3390 Flint Drive
Eagle, ill 83616
(208) 412-5969
COllnterclaimants reserve the right to supplement and amend this disckJ,sure
The Counterclaimants

to include rebuttal witnesses andfor testimony after receiving the Counterdefendants'
witness disclosures.
this.?/ day of October, 2010.
DATED thiJ]

L.>\ W OFHCE
HENDERSON L..'\
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CERTIFICA TE OF SERVICE
CERTIFICATE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

;;Jf
(lfOctober, 2010 I caused to be served a
;;;Jf day "fOctober,

true and correct copy of the foregoing dDcument by the method indicated below, and addressed
to the following:

Thomas G.Maile

Attorney at Law
380 W. State St.
Eagle, ID 83616

Mr. Christ Troupis
Attorney at Law
PO Box 2408
Eagle, 10
lD 83616

G

U.S. Mail

G

Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail

k-= -

L~ Tek',copy (FAX) (108) 939-1001
G

US.
us. Mail

Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail

938-5482
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 938·5482

Counterclaimaiits' Witness Disclosure
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EXHIBIT "B"
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1

2
3
4

5

CONNIE W. TAYLOR
CLARK and FEENEY
P.O. Drawer 285
Lewiston, Idaho 8350
83501I
Telephone (208) 743-9516
ISBA No. 4837
Attorneys for Defendants John Taylor
DaIlan
DaHan Taylor and the Johnson Trust

6

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STA
TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE

7
8

9

10

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability, and THOMAS G. MAILE, IV,
and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE husband and
wife,

Case No. CV OC 0723232

11

Plaintiffs,

ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFFS FIRST SET
OF DISCOVERY DIRECTED TO
DEFENDANTS DALLAN TAYLOR, AN
INDIVIDUAL; R. JOHN TAYLOR, AN
INDIVIDUAL; THEODORE L.
JOHNSON REVOCABLE TRUST~,
TRUST~, AN
IDAHO REVOCABLE TRUST

12
13
14

vs.
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, et al.

15

Defendants.

16

17

Defendants John Taylor, DaHan Taylor, and the Theodore Johnson Trust, by and through
18
19

their attorney of record, submit the following responses to the Plaintiffs First Set of Discovery

20

Directed to Defendants DaHan Taylor, an Individual; R. John Taylor, an Individual; Theodore L.

21

Johnson Revocable Trust, an Idaho Revocable Trust:

22
23
24

25
26

ANSWERS TO THE PLAINTIFFS
FIRST SET OF DISCOVERY

-1-1

B Y: .. ~ __________
BY:
~
-.. - ----LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK AND FEENEY
LEWISTON, IDAHO B3S01
LEWISTON.
001985

INTERROGATORY NO.4: Please identify in full and complete detail each and every
document, writing, or other physical evidence which you intend to offer as an exhibit in the trial of
1

2

this matter.

3

ANSWER Exhibits could include but not be limited to those submitted in the trial of the

4

},4aile, Case No. CV OC 04 00473D. Attached as Exhibit "A" are copies
companion case Taylor v. }'4aile,

5

of
the Plaintiff and Defend,mt Exhibit lists. In addition, counterclaimants will introduce each ofthe
ofthe

6

court decisions (district and appellate) which have established the fact that neither the\1ailes nor
7

8

Berkshire Investments has any legitimate claim to ownership of the Linder Road propel1y.

9

INTERROGATORY NO.5: Please identifY each and every lawsuit in which you have been

10

a party by providing the caption of said case, the case number and the court in which said action has

11

or was filed, including, but not limited to, actions brought against you by any governmental agency

12

or body.
13
14

ANSWER:

Other than the Taylor v. Maile litigation relating to the Linder Road property,

15

any lawsuits are irrelevant, immaterial, and not calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible

16

evidence.

17

INTERROGATORY NO.7;
NO.7: Please identify each and every expert you intend to call at the

18
trial of this case and with respect to each witness you listed, describe:
19

(a)

The subject matter on which each expert may testify;

21

(b)

The substance of the facts to which each expert may testifY;

22

(c)

The substance of the opinions to which each expert may testify;

23

(d)

The expert witnesses' credentials which you allege qualifY the witness as an expert

20

24
25
26

ANSWERS TO THE PLAINTIFFS
FIRST SET OF DISCOVERY
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LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK AND FEENEY
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501
LEWISTON.
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(e)

The description of any and all reports prepared or used by persons who mayor will
testify as expert witnesses at any hearings or trial ofthis action.

1

2
3
4

5

ANSWER:

This information will be provided within the time frames set forth in the

Court's scheduling order.

INTERROGATORY NO.8: Please identify each expert you intend to call as an expert
witness in this matter. With regard to each such witness, please state:

6

(a)

The substance of the facts and opinion to which each such expert will testify; and

(b)

The identify of any document or documents upon which each such expert will rely

7

8
9

10
11

in giving testimony.

ANSWER: See Answer to Interrogatory 7.
INTERROGATORY NO.9: Relative to any ofthe documents described in your responses

12

to the Requests for Production accompanying these Interrogatories please identify in full and
13
14

complete detail each and every document, writing, or other physical evidence which has either been

15

lost, misplaced or in otherwise not available at this time. Relative thereto please explain your

16

inability to produce the same.

17
18

ANSWER:

Not applicable.

INTERROGATORY NO. 10: Please identify in full and complete detail each and every

19
20

21

document, writing or other physical evidence which you relied upon in answering any of the
interrogatories contained herein.

22

ANSWER:

23

INTERROGA TORY NO. 11: As to each item ofgeneral
of general and/or special damages for which
INTERROGATORY

24

25
26

No documents were relied upon in answering these interrogatories.

you seek recovery in this lawsuit, please state:
ANSWERS TO THE PLAINTIFFS
FIRST SET OF DISCOVERY
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(a)

The date and amount of the item;

(b)

A brief description of the item; and

(c)

If the item was a charge or bill, the name and address of the originator thereof, i.e.,

1
2

the person or entity by whom or in whose behalf the charge was made.

3
4

5

ANSWER: The conduct ofthe counterdefendants has made it impossible to sell the Linder
Road property. The amount of damage will be the difference between the value of the property at

6
prop<~rty but for
the time of trial as compared to the amount which could have been obtained for the propl~rty

7
8
9

the litigation. This will be, at a minimum, the $1.8 million offer as testified to by John Wood in the
trial of the unjust enrichment claim in Taylor v. Maile.

Other damages include but will not

10

necessarily be limited to costs and attorneys fees, which currently exceed $60,000 for these

11

defendants.

12

INTERROGATORY NO. 12: With regard to the claims asserted to damages, please itemize
13

14
15
16

of money
each element of damages for which you are suing, and state in dollars and cents the amount ofmoney
you are suing for each.
ANSWER:

17

18

See previous answer, which will be supplemented prior to the trial.
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.1: Please produce the ORIGINAL and/or copies

19

of all letters, memoranda, records, receipts, invoices, agreements, contracts and other documents and
ofall
20

21
22

23
24

25
26

exhibits which Defendants, or Defendants' attorney, intend to use or offer in evidence at the trial of
this case.
RESPONSE: Exhibits could include but not be limited to those submitted in the trial of the
companion case Taylor v. Maile, Case No. CV OC 04 00473D. Attached as Exhibit "A" are copies
ANSWERS TO THE PLAINTIFFS
FIRST SET OF DISCOVERY
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of the Plaintiff and Defendant Exhibit lists.
1

The counterdefendant is in possession of copies of

these exhibits, as well as the decisions of the trial courts and the appellate courts.

2

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.2: Please produce the ORIGINAL and/or copies

3

of any and all reports prepared or used by persons who mayor will testify as expert witnesses on

4

behalf of the Defendants at the trial of this action, together with all documents in which the expert

5

has reviewed in arriving at his opinion, all documents which relate to all opinions to be expressed

6

and the documents which relate to the basis and reasons therefore, together with all documents
7

8

demonstrating the data or other information considered by the witness in forming the opilnions; any

9

exhibits to be used as a summary of or support for the opinions; any documents including but not

10

limited to resumes demonstrating the qualifications of the witness, including all publications

11

authored by the witness within the preceding ten years; any and all documents indicating the

12

compensation to be paid or which has been paid for the testimony; any and all documents which list
13
14
15
16
17

18

of any other cases in which the witness has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the
preceding four years.

RESPONSE: This information will be provided within the time frame for disclosing expert
witness information set forth in any scheduling order issued by the trial court.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.3: Please produce the ORIGINAL and/or copies

19
20

of any and all documents which in any way tend to support your claim that counter-claimants have

21

suffered special and/or other general damages, and estimated future damages as alleged in your

22

counter-claim.

23

RESPONSE:

See responses to preceding requests for production.

24

25
26

ANSWERS TO THE PLAINTIFFS
FIRST SET OF DISCOVERY
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'REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.4: Please produce any and all tax documents, files,
1

L. Johnson Revocable Trust, for the years 2004,2005,2006.,
records, etc., relating to the Theodore 1.

2

1099s, K-1
K-1 s,
2007, 2008, both Federal and State, including but not limited to all tax returns, 1041 s, 1099s,

3

etc.

4

5

RESPONSE: See Johnson Trust tax returns for 2004 - 2007, which are attached as Exhibit
"B" to these responses

6

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.5: All exhibits which counter-claimants anticipate
7

8
9

10
11

utilizing at the trial of this matter

RESPONSE: See Answer to Interrogatory No.4. The counterdefendant already has copies
of all exhibits which have been identified at this point in time.

REQ UEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.6: All documents which in any way tend to support

12

counter-claimants claim for damages, past and present, as alleged in your counter-claim.
13

14

RESPONSE: See response to preceding request for production.
,"/' {1ftl

15

DA
TED this j, f j day of August, 2009.
DATED

16

CLARK and FEENEY

17

(

18

By__"~_-_'-_"_~'
"~ -.- ~. __________~_______')
By
'~)~__________

19

Connie W. Taylor, a memfer of the firm: /
Attorneys for Defendants.\
/

,

20

I

21
22
23
24

25
26

ANSWERS TO THE PLAINTIFfS
FIRST SET OF DISCOVERY
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CONNIE W. TAYLOR
Henderson Law Office
900 Washington Street, Suite 1020
Vancouver, WA
WA 98660
Telephone 360.699.1530
ISBA No. 4837
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE
husband and wife,

Case No. CV OC 0723232

Plaintiffs,
vs.
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, et al.

COUNTERCLAIMANTS'
SUPPLEMENT
AL
SUPPLEMENTAL
WITNESS DISCLOSURE

Defendants.

The Counterclaimants hereby supplement their previous witness disclosure with the
following information:

2. Sam Langston, MAl
Langston & Associates, Inc.
2229 State Street
Boise, ID 83702
Mr. Langston wiD testify as to his opmlOn of the value of the Fairfield Estates
Subdivision in accordance with Unifonn Standard of Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP).
Counterclaimants' Supplemental
Witness Disclosure

001992

He will testify that as of August 3,2009 retrospective date of value, the parcels had a total value
of $650,000.00; and will explain the method by which he reached that value, all of which is
detailed in the Summary Appraisal which has been provided, by email, to opposing counsel on
December 7, 2010. A hard copy of the Summary Appraisal is attached hereto.
Mr. Langston win also testify to the Residential Demand Analysis, contained at pages 30
- 33 of the Summary Appraisal, and the fact that the Ada County residential market is in a period
of market correction from the high levels of demand experienced during the 2005 and early 2006
markets. The facts on which his opinions are based are set forth in detail in the Summary
Appraisal Report which discusses the data, reasoning and analysis used in the appraisal process
to develop the opinion of value.

3.

Bob Debolt
Coldwell Banker Tomlinson Group
408 South Eagle Road
EagieID 83616
Mr. Debolt is a real estate broker in Eagle, Idaho, who may be called to testify as to the

information on historical sales of real property in Eagle, Idaho which is contained in the Real
Estate Services Proposal dated January 12, 2010 (a copy of which was attached to the Affidavit
of Connie Shannahan

datt~d

April 22, 2010, which has been previously provided). Specifically,

Mr. Debolt may be asked to testify as to the sale of lots in Eagle which are similar to those in the
Fairfield Estates subdivision between January of 2005 and December of 2008, and that the sale
prices on five acre lots during the 2005-2006 time frame ranged from a low of $325,000 to a
high of $699,000, which means that a reasonable aggregate value for the lots in the Fairfield
Subdivision during those years would have ranged from a low of $2,275,000 to a high of
Counterclaimants' Supplemental
Witness Disclosure

001993

$4,893,000. He may also be asked to testify to the decline in both the number of sales and in the
sale price for such parcels which occurred between 2006 and 2009.
Mr. Debolt's curriculum vitae, hourly rates, and prior testimony have been requested and
will be provided when received.

The Counterclaimants reserve the right to further supplement and amend this disclosure
to include rebuttal witnesses and/or testimony.

alft

DATED this ~I-- day of December, 2010.

Counterclaimants' Supplemental
Witness Disclosure
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-"
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

~
-3-

day of December, 2010 I caused to be served a

true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed
to the following:

Thomas G. Maile
Attorney at Law
380 W. State St.
Eagle, ID 83616

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001

Mr. Christ Troupis
Attorney at Law
PO Box 2408
Eagle, ID 83616

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
el copy (FAX) (208) 938-5482
~"
"
_--....-.~
---...:~

onnie W. Taylor
Attorney for Defendants

/

Counterclaimants' Supplemental
Witness Disclosure
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT~OF
J. DAVID
r,IA\!i\QP('
NAVAQj:..>(',
.VJ;,
q
_
.
THE STATE OF IDAHO , IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF AfJAEf\)I'J:~::Rl\cNI~i[lv
AiJAEf\)I'J:~::R
l\c!\)/lJi6~"''''
Dt:2!JTY
Dt:PUTY
II

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS LLC,
THOMAS G MAILE IV,
COLLEEN BIRCH MAILE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR,
DALLAN TA YLOR,
CLARK AND FEENEY,
PAUL T CLARK,
THEODORE L JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUST,
R. JOHN TAYLOR,

d

I
I"I

\'.
\''-' ,

rq',,1

1 ,•• __ ~ .•/

Case No. CV-OC-2007-23232

CIVIL CASE
ORDER FOR SCHEDULING
CONFERENCE AND ORDER RE:
MOTION PRACTICE

Defendant.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-captioned case is scheduled for a scheduling
conference to commence on AUGUST 3, 2009 at 2:30 p.m. by telephone conference; plaintiffs
counsel shall initiate the conference call.
The purpose of the conference will be to enter a scheduling order regarding the deadlines
contained in the attached schedule. All parties must appear at this time in person or by
counsel.

Counsel must be the handling attorney, or be fully familiar with the case and have

LR. c.P. 16(a)
16(a) and ;l6(b).
authority to bind his/her client and law firm on all matters set forth in I.R.
In lieu of this scheduling conference, all parties may stipulate to deadlines and other
information required in the enclosed Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning. This stipulation
must be completed and signed by all parties, and filed with the court at least three (3) working
days before the scheduling conference. The hearing will not be vacated until: I) the attached
stipulation is received by the court; and 2) counsel has contacted the court's clerk at the number
set forth below to confirm that the hearing is vacated. The foregoing notwithstan. d;ifl.·.gd~~fl~S
d;ifl.·,gd~~fl~S
: c:l::l
L..:'::l \~ li; JJ, I!J 8111
8 Ii!
. J)
,I
\

\

---.-/!
~!

ORDER FOR SCHEDULING CONFERENCE AND ORDER RE: MOTION PRACTICE
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PACE - 1

W
-

By:.
__
BY: . __________________
001997

STIPULA TION MAY NOT ALTER THE TIME REQUIREMENTS SPECIFIED IN THIS
STIPULATION
ORDER, EXCEPT AS TO THE TIME OF DISCRETIONARY DEADLINES.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the following shall apply to motions filed in this case.

1.

SCHEDUI.ING AND HEARINGS. The Court holds its regular civil law and

motion calendar on Mondays, Wednesdays and Thursday afternoons commencing at 3:00 P.M.
Scheduling conferences and miscellaneous matters shall be heard starting at 4:00 P.M. Motions
shall be generally heard commencing at 3:00 P.M. Absent an order shortening time, all motion
practice other than motions for summary judgment will be governed by I.R.C.P. 7. Counsel is
expected to contact the Court's Deputy Clerk, Jennifer Kennedy (phone 208-287-7531) to
schedule hearings and to confirm the availability of opposing counsel for proposed hearing dates.
ANY MATTER REQUIRING TESTIMONY TOTALING MORE THAN 30 MINUTES
SHALL NOT BE SCHEDULED ON THE COURT'S REGULAR MOTION CALENDAR. As
an accommodation to out-of-town counsel and parties,.
parties" hearings on any pretrial motion (except
motions for summary judgment, motions in limine or hearings at which testimony is to be
offered) may be conducted by telephone conference call pursuant to I.R.C.P. 7(b) (4). Unless
ordered by the court, telephone conferences will be held ONLY if all counsel so stipulate and the
court approves that stipUlation.
stipulation. Counsel requesting a hearing by conference call will be
responsible for arranging for placement of the call and the cost thereof.

The telephone

conference must be pre-arranged with the clerk before the date of the hearing.
2.

MOTIONS GENERALLY (applies to every motion).
a. One additional copy marked or stamped "Judge's
"JUdge's Copy" of any motion and
opposing papers (including affidavits, and briefs) must be submitted to the
judge's chambers when such documents are filed or lodged with the clerk of
the court.
b. Pursuant to the local rules each side will be allotted 15 minutes for oral
argument on a motion will be set by the court, except for summary judgments.

ORDER FOR SCHEDULING CONFERENCE AND ORDER RE: MOTION PRACTICE
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,

.
Each side will be allowed 30 miinutes on motions for summary judgment,
including rebuttal argument.
c. If a notice of hearing is not filed within fourteen (14) days after the motion is
filed, the motion will be deemed withdrawn.

3.

WITNESS DISCLOSURESIEXPERT
DISCLOSURES/EXPERT WITNESSES:

Unless the parties

stipulate otherwise or the court orders otherwise at the request of a party, the
following governs disclosure of witnesses before the pre-trial conference. With
l6(e)(6)(J), each party shall
the exception of impeachment witnesses I.R.C.P 16(e)(6)(J),
disclose the existence and identity of intended or potential expert or lay witnesses
to the extent required by interrogatories or other discovery requests propounded
by another party. There is no independent duty to disclose expert or lay witnesses
except as required to adequately respond to discovery requests or supplement
prior responses. If discovery requests seeking disclosure of expert witnesses are
propounded, the plaintiff upon whom such requests are served shall, in good faith,
disclose the existence and identity of potential or intended expert witnesses and
the subject matter and the substance of any opinions of such experts at the earliest
opportunity, and in no event later than one hundred-twenty (120) days before trial.
A defendant upon whom such requests are served shall, in good faith, identify any
potential or intended expert witnesses and the subject matter and substance of any
opinions of such experts at the earliest opportunity, and in no event later than
eighty-five (85) days before trial.

THIS PROVISION MEANS THAT WHEN

AN EXPERT IS IDENTIFIED, HE OR SHE MUST HAVE
HA VE PERFORMED
SUCH INVESTIGATION AS MAY BE NECESSARY, REVIEWED SUCH
DOCUMENTS AS MAYBE NECESSARY, AND REACHED CONCLUSIONS
OR OPINIONS AS MAY BE REQUIRED SO THAT DISCLOSURE OF THAT
INFORMATION,
INFORMA
TION,

OR SUCH OTHER INFORMATION AS

MAY BE

REQUESTED BY DISCOVERY OR BY I.R.E. 703 AND 705 WILL BE
DISCLOSED NO LATER THAN 120 DAYS OR 85 DAYS PRIOR TO TRIAL.
THE EXPECTATION THAT AN EXPERT MAY BE DEPOSED IS NOT A
GROUND FOR FAILURE TO MAKE DISCLOSURES CALLED FOR BY

ORDER FOR SCHEDULING CONFERENCE AND ORDER RE: MOTION PRACTICE
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DISCOVERY, BY RULE OF EVIDENCE, OR BY RULE 26(b)(4) IRCP.
EXPERTS MAYBE PROHIBITED FROM TESTIFYING TO ANY OPINIONS
OR

FOU~rDA TION
FOU~rDA

FOR SUCH OPINIONS THAT HAVE NOT BEEN THE

SUBJECT OF TIMELY AND PROPER DISCLOSURE. IF AN OPTI'JION OR
FOUNDATION FOR AN OPINION OF AN EXPERT CHANGES IN ANY
FASHION AFTER PREVIOUS DISCLOSURES HAVE BEEN MADE THERE
IS A DUTY TO IMMEDIATELY _SUPPLEMENT SUCH INFORMATION
PURSUANT TO RULE 26(e) IRCP.
Any party upon whom discovery is served who intends or reserves the right to call
any expert witness in rebuttal or sur··rebuttal shall, in good faith, identify such
experts at the earliest opportunity, and in no event later than forty-two (42) days
before trial. A DEFENSE EXPERT INTENDED TO BE CALLED DURING
DEFENSE CASE IN CHIEF IS NOT A "REBUTTAL" WITNESS WITHIN
THE TER1\.1S OF THIS ORDER. Any party upon whom discovery requests are
served seeking disclosure of lay witnesses shall, in good faith, disclose the
identity of all such witnesses at the earliest opportunity, and in no event later than
forty-two (42) days before trial. Absent a showing of good cause and a lack of
unfair prejudice to any other party, any witness who has not been timely disclosed
will not be permitted to testify at trial.

4.

MOTIONS TO COMPEL DISCOVERY.
a. A motion to compel discovery Bmst contain a certification as required by
IRCP 37(a) (2) (that efforts were made to resolve the dispute before the
motion was filed).
b. The motion to compel must SPECIFICALLY ADDRESS THAT PORTION
OF THE DISCOVERY AT ISSUE and CONTAIN A STATEMENT OF
REQUESTED RELIEF.
c. Reasonable expenses incurred when successfully prosecuting or opposing a
motion to compel discovery will be awarded as provided in Rule 37(a)(4)
37( a)( 4) of
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

5.

MOTIONS FOR FULL OR PARTllAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

ORDER FOR SCHEDULING CONFERENCE AND ORDER RE: MOTION PRACTICE
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a. The party movmg for summary judgment shall prepare as separate
documents: (a) a motion; and (b) a legal memorandum containing a written
statement of reasons and legal authority in support of the motion. A concise
statement of the claimed undisputed material facts alleged by movant shall be
included at the beginning of the memorandum following a concise statement
of the nature of the case. Each statement of facts shall include a reference to
the particular place in the record which supports the claimed fact. The legal
memorandum shall ALSO include a statement, supported by authority, of the
elements of any claim or defense relevant to the motion.
b. The party opposing a motion for summary judgment shall prepare a legal
memorandum containing a written statement of reasons in opposition to the
motion, which shall include a concise statement of claimed genuine issues of
material fact and/or which are material facts omitted from the moving party's
statement of facts. Each statement of a fact shall include a reference to the
particular place in the record which supports the factual dispute. The legal
memorandum shall include a statement, supported by authority, of the
elements of any claim or defense relevant to the motion.
c. The schedule for serving briefs and affidavits shall be as set forth in Idaho
56( c). COUNSEL ARE EXPECTED TO STRICTLY
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c).
COMPLY WITH TIME REQUIREMENT.
d. The hearing on a motion for summary judgment will be set AFTER the
moving party has submitted the motion, legal memorandum and statement of
facts. The hearing date can then be obtained from the judge's court clerk.
DATED this

--l----2-

~1tg

day f

2tJ~ .
,2~1.
,

Richard D. Greenwood
District Judge

ORDER FOR SCHEDULING CONFERENCE AND ORDER RE: MOTION PRACTICE

PAGE·
PAGE -::

002001

EXHIBIT "E"

002002

Uti,.

n

lUUY

]U:j~AM
lU:j~AM

-.

&FEENEY

CLARK

Frc
01
Fr'_,20893910
_, 2089391001

-,,--,~----,~---

-0'_._.
-----_.,_._.

Arry
P
Page:
age: 2/5

NO, 328 3
Data: 12122120092:[

--,

~'.
~',

2

-.-.-..
---.~....
---.------~.
_.

PM

DlSTRJCT COtrRl'
XN mE DISTRiCT
COt.rRT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
TH.E STATE Oli' IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

13atsh
iy~ In
\/. et
13atshiY~
In\}'.
e.-t aJ

caseNo.0V DC

Plaintiff,

Dl-~3~3a..
Dl-~3~3a..

CMLCASE

VB.

S'TJPULAnON FOR SO:£EDULING &
S1JPULAnON

PLANNING

abOVe parties hereby stipulate to the {olJowing
The above
folJowing scheduling deadlines:

A.

EXPERT WlTNESSES

nJJ
..
~
D.d"~~
~
(phliJtti
t,..W.VlLna
o.aVllnCA
.o.n .
erts)
uuVlLnG\
n~. ~
o.aVl11\CA na r.~..v~
plaitltUl: shalJ..tii
shalJ...tli clas·
clas ch person plairrHff
plairrEiff int~ds to call
calJ
1.
0 dnys before trial, plai=tia:

~

J
J'
'

fl

as an expert witnes:s at trial and

1;ltate

(){1
f'lt1

the subject matter on which the witness IS expected to

testify.

l1D

trial,_~.u~~
trial,_~.u~~

intbnnatioD. required by Rule
2.
days before
all intbrrnatioD.
of Civil Procedure t'ogarding
26(b)(4) ofthe Idaho Rules ofCivil
rogarding expert witnesses.

3D day~ before lriaJ,~
lriaJ,~~ ~ £~tb
Po~tb any deposltiollB Oftll~~~~g
Oftl1~~~~g par~

3.
~nitial ClXp:rt wiltlesse,g,
wi!t2esse.9.

.,
.

=~~tR.CI1s)
~1"II'Wl i~ Dtu4u
I'i ~(O{)f1d,.ina. D1Y-fJ
D1Y.fJ
=~~tR.CI1s)
~1"II'tYlIl
Yf..(O{)nd,ina.
--=..Lo..lL- days before trial~~!Ji-di~ose
trial~~!Ji'di~ose each person~
person~t iDkehds' u.:J
4. --=.Lo..lL-

J

to call as an expert witness at trial and state tbe subject matter on which th= witness IS expectod
to testify.

~~

tria{_@,~~se
ttia{~~~Jli~P@,~~se

alI infonnation
in.fonnation required by Rule
5.
days before
all
26(b)(4) ofrhe
of the Idaho Rule:s ofCiviJ Procedure regarding expert w.itnesses.
6.
~feneant'5
~feneant'5

~D

days before
expert witnesses.

triall{.\~~~Ji~A\IP'U'"~te
triall{,\~~Ji~A\IP'U'"~te

any depositions of t'he

respondJn~ p~
respondJn~

sCmmIJLINC 1'.1'/0 PLANNrNG
STIPULATION FOR scmmULINC

This fax was reoeived by GFI FAX

PAGI1,·1
PAGI1,·!

k
http.!."""....f.
rna sr fax server For more information ,• visit'. http.!."""....f'
. I ....... g I.com

002003

DEC, 29,2009
29.2009 10: 35AM

CLARK

&FEENEY
FEENEY

Fr~
2D89391 001
Fr~....2D89391

Page: 3/5

a~!:l~n.1~rts)
a~~~n.1~rts)

-.-._---_
------------..
-.-..---_
... ...,.. ,,,......------
~2""
P ~

ATTY

NO.)
,)

Date: 1212212009 ~:c.

aciVanc1nd

"'

,J

OJ

__ PM

,
.
ad.v'tU1CAnC~
ad.v'tU1CAnC~

7. ~_ days before trial,~sE!lI
person~inten{js to
trial,~sE!lI disclose each person~inten{js
call as an expert witn,e~s at trial to rebut new information or issues disclosed or raised by the
..defeli6Bl'l.t.
def£ffi68l?t.. reSfX'nf;i.f
reSfX'n~.f

ns

tW.vttntl'n4

3D _

8.
days before trialrflle:intifJ shalP disclose all infQnnation required by Rule
26(b)(4) of the Idaho R.ules of Civil Procedure regarding the rebuttal expert witnesses,

15

9.
dayS before trial,
pXi'7tlff'p rebuttal expert
expert witnesses.
witnesses.
aI1J~'1~l~~uttal

a

r~mi~~Jl
r~mi~~l1 complete any depositions of the

IJa.nLAn~

B.

LAYWITNESSES

(j
aAva.nc.ina
(J h.
MVM1c.ina
adva..nc-in/il
tril!l, ~damflff shall disclose each pe:rson-fllQi~g
1. ~_
1
days before trill!,
person-plaiJi'rif£ intends to
call as a lay witness at trial (excluding
(exclud.ing impeachment witnesses).

D _

LD
~D

r~d..im
r~d..im

r~d.lna
r~e:U'na

_
trial,BBt,
2. _I/t;,
days before trial,
Elef.en6aet- sltaH disclose each petso~t
petso~t int:tJds
to oall as a lay wttness at trial (",,"eluding
(l'X.cluding impeachment witnesses).
Q."
QQ
~

advttntina_
adVMtina_

. days before trial,
"fIrustifi sWill diBCloso
diBClos(I each lay witn.ess (exotu1cHng
(exolu,o;ng
trial,1"!nm.tifi
~peachmcht
~peachmcht ~tnesses)
~tnesses) Ftiff\,intendB
~~ to call at ~rial to rebut new information or issues
dIsclosed or rrused
ad VdJ1t.4nOt
rmsed by the ~t:---eefeft~t.
Vl1.J1t.4nOt
tl~
..J
4. ~~Q
'days befor&""'trlal~
befor&""'trlal~ all parties shall complete at,>, depositions of lay
witnesses.
3,.

resr;oncU
resr;ontU

C.

DEADLINES FOR INlTIA
TING DISCOVERY
INlTIATING

q

1,
D days before trial is the last" day for serving interrogatories,
intmogatories, requests for
1.
production, requests to pcnnit
pennit entry upon land or other property, M,d requests for admission.

~,
examination.
D.,

n ~ WI,ys
W1,ys before tdal 'is the last day for .filing motions for a physical or mental

DEADLINE FOR SUPPLEMENTAl..
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES TO DISCOVERY

3D

1.I.
days before trial, all parties must serve any supplomental
discovery required by Rule 26(e) of
ofthe
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
Procedure,
E.

respons(~ to
responsl~

PRETR[AL
PRETRrAL MOTlONS

1. Summary judgment and other dispositive motions must be filed and heard, no litter
llHer
lhan 60 day:; before trial.
STIPULAt'lON FOR SCU~D\JUNG
SCU~D\JLlNG A~D PLANNING

This fax was received by GFI FAX

rAGE-l2
rAGE-

k f
ma er ax server, For more information. visit: http://WWN.gfi.com

002004

DEC, 29, 2009 10: 35AM
35A~
_~_,

,

CLARK

&FEENEY

Fre,,__ ,2089391001
_ Fre..__

ATTY
Page: 4/5

12122/2009 2:~ PM
Date: 12/22/2009

'

l.~ct...:.-:::..o_

1. ..-..0:--0...:..-:::-°_

clays before trial is the last day to file motions to add additional parti~3

to the lawsuit

Cl0
Cl 0

2.
days before trial is the last day to .file I'lI'! motion to H111end
amend the claims
damages,
between existing parties to the lawsuit, including to add a claim {or punitive damages.
DOll-dispositive pre-trial motions (including, but not limited to motionll in
3. All other Don-dispositive
{wenty~one (21) da)'S before trial.
(imine) mltst be filed ruld heard not less than {wenty~one
F.

TRIAL SETTING

MaYChtrial to b
Max

1. This case can 'be sctfor a trial to commence on or after
I ZD Ib Nl)te,
j:ompelling Circumstanccs,
Circumstances, 110
110 (lase wiD be set (or
that :ilbsent extrernely l:ompelling
ror triaJ more than Eilll
days from the date ofming the eomp]aiDt,
eomp]ajDt.
2. It is estimated that the trial will take

--L
--±-

days.

3. This case is 10 be tried as a:
_~_ court trial
_~_
-=::;:::jUt)' trial
{PJease confer and complete.
atu!£,!!
4. Patties preferenoe for trial dates: {Please
complete.. Do Dot atu!£!!
!unsyaiJable
dates~. _The parties may inquire ofthr: clerk available mal
ttial dates.
:':unsyaiJable dates~,
MOlIDAt'~ \DECEMBER 13 2010.
- /'Cl)'AEU: OF MO:NDAt'~
.'
(b.-)Wt~ek
20 /I .
(b)Wt~ek a/Monday,s
of Monday, Uf!~
ofMonday,l]
201T.
( ) (C)Wcek ofMonday,_
~ .3l
3l =,200.
(J ((L;W~~e.k
., 'w
((L;W~~e.k of Monday,
~ 20_11.
20_11,

(J)

=,

f1,
.

K

.,

5. The parties will submit a pretrial conference memorandum pursuant to I.R.C.P. J6(d),
whic:h sha.1l bo filed with the Clerk no Jat=r thtm ~evr;n (7) days before tbe pro-trial conferem:e.
Th~ Memorandum may be filed as a joint sUbmission or separately.
G.

MEDIATION
agrcll3ll3 to mediation:
I. The parties agrc

Yes_

NO$...

2. If yes:
.l.
a.

The parties agre:e to submit 10 mediation with a mediator mutually ngreed
upon.

b, Mediaticm shall b~gin
b.
bl;gin _ _ _ _ days {'rior to trial.
f'OR SCHElJllL:Il'lG
SCHElJllLH'IG AND I'LANNlIIICl
STIPULATION POR

PACE·3

This fax was received by GFI FAXmak f
.'
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i;)ctween the parties,
c. Unless otherw:ise agreed in writing 1;)ctween
partics the cost of mediation
p.mies.
sha1l be equally divided between the parties.
j

The parties ref:enre the right to amend this stipolation by agreement of aU parties,

subject to Cou rt approval; eaell party reserves tbe right to seek: amendment hereof by
tObferences f&r .9uch
Court order, and to request lurther status tobferences

purpo~e,
purpo~e,

in

ac:cord~"ce
ac:cord~"ce

UtC.P. 16(a) and 16(b).
with UtC,P.

Dato:

~_---.::~.-:::::.:.:a~::"'::::.......!~~~L______~~~~~~~-+--~L-________----------D~o:

Coul:Iscl for Other P
Coullscl

__

~

__

~

____________

Sl"PliLA rro/ll FOR SCHEDVLJNO AND Pl.ANNlNG
nANNING
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~

_ _ _ _ Date:
Date! _ _ __
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ma ker fax server f!r:

..
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-'
DEPOSITION EXCERPT OF R. JOHN TAYLOR TAKEN 12-14-2004
PAGE 81
Q. Exhibit 26 of Beth Rogers' deposition, that's the Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial.
That's signed by your brother and your wife; is that correct.
A. Yes.
19
20
Q. And did you have a chance to review that document?
A. I did.
22
23
Q. Before it was actually filed?
A. I did.
24
25
Q. Did you concur in the language of the Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial?
2
A. Yes.
3
Q. And what is it that the plaintiffs want out of this litigation; what is it they seek?
5
A. We want the difference in -- well, the difference in the value of the property and the
amount that it was sold for. And we believe that is $6 to $800,000.
8
Q. Okay. You've also sued for damages. Is that the damage claim that you're wanting?
10
A. Yes, essentially.
11
Q. Is that you want out ofthis lawsuit?
A. 6- to 800,000. Yes.
12
13
Q. Anything else you want out of this litigation?
A. We would -- we would like to see that, uh --, punitive damages are added to that.
14
Q. Okay.
16
17
A. And we would like to see, uh, you eventually disbarred.
19
Q. Okay. Anything else?
20
A. No. That's enough.
21
Q. Now, there is an allegation that you want a recision of the contract?
23
A. As an alternative. Yes.
24
Q. But you want the money first?
25
A. It would be easier. It goes to my mom.
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10 2011
JAN 10

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk

county Clerk
Ada County

By LARA AMES
DEPUTY
DePUTY

CONNIE W. TAYLOR
Henderson Law Firm, PLLC
900 Washington Street, Suite 1020
Vancouver, WA 98660
Telephone 360.699.1530
Fax 360.693.2911
ISBA No. 4837
Attorneys for Johnson Trust,
DaHan Taylor, and John Taylor

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE
husband and wife,

Case No. CV OC 0723232

Plaintiffs,

TO
AFFIDAVIT
IN
OPPOSITION
MOTIONS TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY
OF SAM LANGSTON, BOB DEBOLT

vs.
AYLOR, et al.
CONNIE WRIGHT l'
TAYLOR,
Defendants.
STATE OF WASHINGTON
County of Clark

)
: ss.
)

Connie Taylor, being duly sworn, states as follows:
1.

I am the attorney for the defendants John Taylor, DaHan
Dallan Taylor, and the Theodore

Johnson Trust, and make this affidavit from my personal knowledge.

AFFIDAVIT
AFFIDA VrT IN OPPOSITION TO
MOTIONS TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY
OF LANGSTON, DEBOLT

1

002009

2.

Our expert witness disclosures were due by October 31,2010.
31, 20lO. On October 27,

2010, I disclosed that Sam Langston was performing an appraisal as to the value of the Linder
Road property as of August 3,2009, that he would be preparing a summary report, and that it
would be provided as soon as it was received. In addition, when I transmitted that disclosure to
opposing counsel, I stated "I will supplement as soon as additional information is received, and
stipulate to extend time for your expert disclosure ifnecessary."
if necessary." I am attaching true and correct

copies of the Fax Transmittal confirmations to Mr. Troupis and Mr. Maile as Exhibit A.
3.

Mr. Langston has submitted an affidavit which indicates that because of the

severe downturn in the real estate market, it was exceedingly difficult for him to locate property
sales which could be used as comparables in the preparation of the Summary Report.

Because

of this situation, the preparation of this report took longer to complete than is typical.
typica1.
4.

I received the report from Langston and Associates on December 6, and promptly

forwarded it to opposing counsel on December 7.
5.

The Counter-Defendants' certification of witnesses disclosed Maurice Clifton as

an expert witness who will give extremely detailed testimony as to the market conditions and
comparable properties, a history of five-acre parcels in the Eagle area which were marketed as
far back as 2005, as well as his opinion as to the market value of the lots at various time frames.
6.

I did not receive a request from opposing counsel for an extension of time to

disclose their experts. By letter dated January 4, 2011, I have indicated that we will still honor
that offer, but have received no response. A copy of that letter is enclosed as Exhibit B.
8.
7.

With regard to witness Bob DeBolt, I believe there has simply been a

misunderstanding. After our October 27,2010 disclosure, Connie Shannahan infomled me that
she could not be available to testify during the anticipated trial dates. Bob DeBolt, who is the

2

002010

broker in the same real estate office, will be testifying to exactly the same information Ms.
Shannahan would have. The substance of his testimony is contained in a report which opposing
counsel has had since April 28, 2010.

I have confirmed that fact by letter to Mr. Troupis dated

as__Exhi&it-.~.
Exhi&it-.~.
January 5, 2011, a copy of which is attached as__

Connie W. Taylor
Subscribed and sworn to before me on

~~~
rO- ~
-Z D\\
' iffieefJ~,

Not~~ P~bhc

for Washington.State

L
,..J,.

Resldmg m Ij:;W-C ~~ \~' 00/1
Commission expires:'T\
(

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

~

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of January, 2011 I caused to be served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
G. Maile, IV
Thomas G,
380 West State Street
Eagle, ID 83616

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001

Mr. Christ Troupis
Attorney at Law
PO Box 2408
Eagle, ID 83616

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 938-5482

Mark Prusynski
MOFFATT THOMAS
101 S Capitol Blvd., 10
10lhth Floor
PO Box 829
Boise, ID 83701

-$;
+

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 385-5384
Te1ecopy
e~~jl."
... . ,.
~

k~~~l
3
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"-,

.....,
....,

-----------------------,
---------------,

TRANSMISSION VERIFICATION REPORT
TIME
NAME
FAX
TEL
SER."

DATE,TIME
FAX NO. /NAME
DURATION
PAGE(S)
RESULT
MODE

10/27/2010 13:57
HOREN:;TE I N LAW
3606994989
3505994989
3606991530
3505991530
BROJ5J347770

10/27 13: 55
12089385482
00:02:18

11
ClK

STANDARD
ECM

HENOERSON
HENDERSON LAW O.FFICE
Attorneys at Law
900 Washington, Suite 1020
Vancouver, WA 98660
(360) 699-.1530
699·.1 530 Fax: (360) 693-1911
693-29U

FAX MEMORANDUM
TO:

Thomas Maile IV (208) 939
..1001
939..1001
Christ Troupis (208) 938-5482

DATE:

October 27,2010

RE~

Berkshire v. Taylor

FROM:

Connie Taylor

NO. PAGES:

--..J.ooI-11_
---J.-I-11_

pgJOriginal will not be sent
Gentlemen.:
Gentlemen: I am enclosing a letter to the Clerk of the Court, Notice of Servi.ce, and
Couoterclaimant's Witness Disclosure. 1 will supplement as soon
soon. as additional
002012
infonnation is received, and stipulate to extend time for your expert disclosure if
necessary.

~, - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - , . . . . 
~'----------------------~~

TRANSMISSION VERIFICATION REPORT
TIME
NAME
FAX
TEL
SER.#

DATE,TIME
FAX NO. /NAME
DURATION
PAGE(S)
RESULT
MODE

10/27 13:52
12089391001
00:02:18

11

OK
STANDARD
ECM

.. j

10/27/2010 13:54
LAW
3505994989
3506991530
BROJ5J347770
HOREN~)TE I N
HOREN~)TE

.

V,l,

Vl/).·V'-'
r vt
I)··V'-'

I

HENDERSON II..AW
..AW OFFICE
Attorneys at .Law
900 Washington, Suite 1.020
1020

Vancouver, WA 98660
(360)

699~1530FBJ;:

(360) 693-2911

FAX MEMORANDUM
TO:

Thomas Maile IV (208) 939-1001
Christ Troupis (208) 938-5482

DATE:

October 27,2010

RE:

Berkshire v. Taylor

FROM:

Connie Taylor

NO. PAGES:

__/-I-L
__
/-I-L__

~Original
~Original will not be sent
Gentlemen: I am enclosing a letter to the Clerk ofthe
of the Court, Notice of Service,
Service. and
Counterclaimant's
Counterc1aimant's Wjtness
Witness Disclosure. I will supplement as soon as additional
infonnation is received, and stipulate to extend time for your expert disclosure if
necessary.
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HENDERSON LAW FIRM, PLLC
900 Washington Street, Suite 1020
Vancouver, WA 98660
(360) 699-1530 Fax: (360) 693-2911
Attorneys
Paul L. Henderson
Connie W. Taylor *
* (admitted in Washington and Idaho)

Paralegals
Linda Wolfe
Tami Henderson

January 4,2011

Facsimile: (208) 938-5482
Mr. Christ Troupis
PO Box 2408
Eagle, ID 83616
Re: Maile v. Taylor
Dear Christ:
I have just received your packet of motions. In regard to Mr. Langston, I would like to remind you that my Fax
Memorandum to you dated October 27, 2010 indicated I would supplement as soon as additional information was
received, and stipulate to extend time for your expert disclosure if necessary. His report was sent to me on
ih.
December 6 th , and I forwarded it to both you and Mr. Maile by email on December 7'h.
You did not request additional time for your expert disclosure, but I would still honor the offer I made to you
nearly a month ago. You also have not indicated a desire to depose Mr. Langston, who assures me he can be
available for such a deposition.

Sincerely,

cc:

Client (by email)
Mark Prusynski email
Thomas Maile (FAX) (208) 939-1001

002014

HENDERSON LAW FIRM, PLLC
900 Washington Street, Suite 1020
Vancouver, WA 98660
(360) 699-1530 Fax: (360) 693-2911
Attorneys
Paul L. Henderson
Connie W. Taylor *
*(adrnitted in Washington and Idaho)

Paralegals
Linda Wolfe
Tami Henderson

January 5, 2011
Facsimile: (208) 938-5482

Mr. Christ Troupis
PO Box 2408
Eagle, ID 83616
Re: Maile v. Taylor
Dear Christ:
I believe there may be a misunderstanding as to our witnesses Connie Shannahan and Robert DeBolt.
Ms. Shannahan cannot be available to testify during the trial dates, so Mr. DeBolt at her office has
agreed to testify as to the information contained in the Real Estate Services Proposal dated January 12,
2010, a copy of which was sent to you by Federal Express on April 28, 2010. Mr. DeBolt is not an
additional witness; he will be testifying to precisely the same information that Ms. Shannahan would
have.
Also, I would like to confirm that you are arranging the conference call for the pretrial conference on
Monday at 3:30 p.m., as required by the January 4,2010 scheduling order. Please let me know if there
is a number I should call in to, or if an operator will be placing the calls.
Sincerely,

cc:

Client (by email)
Mark Prusynski email
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ReCEIVED
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10 2011
JAN 10
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH Clerk

CONNIE W. TAYLOR
Henderson Law Firm, PLLC
900 Washington Street, Suite 1020
Vancouver, W
A 98660
WA
Telephone 360.699.1530
Fax 360.693.2911
ISBA No. 4837
Attorneys for Johnson Trust,
DaHan Taylor, and John Taylor

By ELYSHIA HOLMES'
DI:f>UTY
DI:PUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE
husband and wife,

Case No. CV OC 0723232
COUNTERCLAIMANTS'
REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS

Plaintiffs,
vs.

CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, et al.
Defendants.

Attached

are

Counterclaimants'
Counterc1aimants'

requested jury instructions

1 through

3L.

Counterclaimants also request that the court give the following IDJI2d pattern instructions:
Counterc1aimants
1.00, 1.01, 1.03, 1.05, 1.09, 1.13, 1.15.2, 1.17, 1.20.1, 1.22, 1.24.2, 1.28, 1.43.1.
It will quite likely be necessary to modify these instructions after the Court rules on the

parties' motions in limine. Because at this point it is impossible to predict all of the testimony,
Counterc1aimants' Requested
Counterclaimants'
Jury Instructions

002016

",-,,"

the Counterclaimants reserve the right to submit additional or supplemental jury instructions
prior to or at trial of this matter.
DATED this _ _ day of January, 2011.

Counterclaimants' Requested
Jury Instructions

002017

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _ _ day of January, 2011 I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed
to the following:
Thomas G. Maile, IV
380 West State Street
Eagle, ID 83616

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001

Mr. Christ Troupis
Attorney at Law
PO Box 2408
Eagle, ID 83616

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 938-5482

Mark Prusynski
MOFFATT THOMAS
101 S Capitol Blvd., 10 th Floor
PO Box 829
Boise, ID 83701

G
G
G
G

~

u.s. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
T
y (FAX) (208) 385-5384
-1'\,

Counterclaimants' Requested
Jury Instructions

002018

Counterclaimants' Requested
INSTRUCTION NO.1

In this case the Counterclaimants claim that these are the facts:
That the Counter-defendants committed an abuse of the legal process by wrongfully and
for an improper purpose asserting baseless claims to real property and pursuing and needlessly
prolonging litigation over that property.

The Counterclaimants also claim that the Counter-

defendants wrongfully interfered with an offer to purchase the property, causing the
Counterclaimants to lose the opportunity to sell their real property and incur other expenses to
maintain the property.
Thus the Counterclaimants seek to recover from the Counter-defendants losses as well as
conseqmmtial losses for the abuse of process and interference with prospective
its incidental or conseqmmtiallosses
economic advantage.

Given- - - - - - Refused- - - - - Modified- - - - - Covered- - - - - Other- - - - - - JUDGE

002019

COUNTERCLAIMANT'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO.2
On the issue of abuse of process, the Counterclaimants have the burden
of proof on each of the following propositions:
(1) The Counter-defendants committed a willful act in the use of

legal process not proper in the regular course of the
proce(~ding
proce(~ding

(2) The ad was committed for an ulterior, improper purpose

You will be asked

th(~

following question on the jury verdict form:

Did the Counter-defendants commit an abuse of process?
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence in the case that

each of the propositions contained in this instruction has been proved, you
should answer the jury question "yes."

If you find that any of these

propositions has not been proved, you should answer the question "no."

Bade// v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 104, 765 P.2d 126, 129 (1998)

Given- - - - - - _ .
Refused- - - - - - Modified- - - - - Covered- - - - - - Other- - - - - - - -

JUDGE

002020

COUNTERCLAIMANTS' REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO.3
On the Counterclaimants' claim of intentional interference with a
prospective economic advantage against the Counter-Counter-defendant
Counterclaim ants have the burden of proof on each of the
Thomas Maile, the Counterclaimants
following propositions:
1) The existence of a valid economic expectancy;
2) knowledge of thl~
thc~ expectancy on the part of the interferer;
3) intentional interference inducing termination of the expectancy;
4) the

interferenct~
interferenc«~

was wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the

interference itsdf (Le. that the Counter-Counter-defendant interfered for an
improper purpose or improper means) and
Counterclaim ants whose expectancy has been disrupted.
5) resulting damage to the Counterclaimants
You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form:
Did the Counter-Defendants intentionally interfere with a prospedive
economic advantage?
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these

propositions has

be{~n

proved, then you should answer this question "yes." If

you find from youJr consideration of all of the evidence that any of these
propositions has not been proved. then you should answer this question
Question "no."

IDJl1.41.2,
IDJI 1.41.2, WESCO v. Ernest, IDSCCI #35732, November 24,2010
Given- - - - - - Refused- - - - - Modified- - - - - Covered- - - - - - - ,
Other- - - - - - - ,

JUDGE

002021

COUNTERCLAIMANTS' REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO.4
If the jury decides the Counterclaimants are entitled to recover from the

Counter-defendants, the jury must determine the amount of money that will
reasonable and fairly compensate the Counterclaimants for any of the following
Counterelements of damages proved by the evidence to have resulted from the Counter
defendant's conduct:
1. Direct, incidental and consequential damages resulting from the loss of

prospective economic advantage
2. Damages incurred in defending against the abuse of process
Whether any of these elements of damage has been proved is for you to
determine.

IDJI 9.03 (modified)
72 C.J.S. Process § 164, citing Marlin Oil Corp. y. Barby Energy Corp., 2002 OK CIV APP 92, 55 P.3d 446 (Diy. 3
2002), Zachair, Ltd. Y. Driggs, 135 Md. App. 403, 762 A.2d 991 (2000).

Given- - - - - - Refused- - - - - Modified- - - - - Covered- - - - - Other- - - - - - -

JUDGE

002022

COUNTERCLAIMANTS' REQUESTED

JURY INSTRUCTION NO.5
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability, and THOMAS G. MAILE, IV,
and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE husband and

Case No. CV OC 0723232

wife,
Plaintiffs / Counter-Defendants,
vs.
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, fjkja
f/k/a CONNIE
TAYLOR an individual; DALLAN TAYLOR,
an individual; R. JOHN TAYLOR an
individual; CLARK AND FEENEY, a
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK an individual;
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUST, an Idaho revocable trust; JOHN
DOES I - JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSONA
IN POSSESSION OR CLAIMING ANY RIGHT
TO POSSESSION.

VERDICT

Defendants / Counterclaimants.

We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows:
Question No.1: Did the Counter-Defendants commit an abuse of process?
[_]
Answer to Question No.1: Yes [-l

[_]
No [-l

002023

Question No.2: Did the Counter-Defendants intentionally interfere with a prospective
economic advantage?
Answer to Question No.2: Yes [_]

No [_]

If you answered "Yes" to either or both of questions 1 and 2, answer Question No.3.

Question No.3: What is the total amount of damage sustained by the Counterclaimants as
a result of the conduct of the Counter-Defendants?
Answer to Question No.3: We assess Counterclaimants' damages as follows:

------ $_
-Dated February

_
---.J
_----J

2010.

Foreperson

002024

-

002025

COUNTERCLAIMAI\JTS'REQUESTED

INSTRUCTION NO.6

Intent may be established by inference as well as by direct proof.

Highland Enters., Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 340,986 P.2d 996,1006 (2009

Given- - - - - - Refused- - - - - Modified- - - - - Covered- - - - - Other- - - - - - -

JUDGE

002026

COUNTERCLAIMANTS' REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO.7

One who uses a legal process against another primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it
is not designed, is subject to liability to the other for harm caused by the abuse of process.

Restatement (Second) of Torts A§ 682 (1977).

Given- - - - - - Refused- - - - - Modified- - - - - Covered- - - - - Other- - - - - - -

JUDGE

002027

COUNTERCLAIMAINTS'REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO.8

Intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage may be demonstrated if it
is shown that the actor desires to bring about the interference, or knows that the interference is
certain or substantially certain to occur as a result of his action.

Intent can be shown even if the interference is incidental to the actor's intended purpose
and desire but known to him to be a necessary consequence of his action.

Enters .. Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 340,986 P.2d 996, 1006
lO06 (2009)(quoting
Highland Enters..
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 cmt. D,j (1977))

Given- - - - - - Refused. _ - - - - - 
Modified- - - - - Covered- - - - - Other- - - - - - -

JUDGE

002028

COUNTERCLAIMANTS' REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO.9

Wrongfulness of intentional interference with a prospective economic expectancy may be
shown by proof that either:
(1) the Counter··defendant had an improper objective or purpose to harm the

Counterc1aimants;
Counterclaimants; or
(2) the Counter-defendant used a wrongful means to cause injury to the prospective
business relationship.
However, an enforceable contract need not be shown to exist, just a valid economic
expectancy.

Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 286, 824 P.2d 841, 861
(1991); Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M & Lynn Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 20S, 217, 177
P.3d 955, 964 (2008).

Given- - - - - - Refused- - - - - Modified- - - - - Covered- - - - - Other- - - - - - _ .

JUDGE

002029

_
....

-"'

Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130
PO Box 2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone:
208/938-5584
Facsimile:
208/938-5482
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com

:

_

If4tfa~t.
¥L

I

JAN 1 0 2011
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
LATIMORE
By eARLY l.ATIMORE
DEPUTY

Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, N. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,

Case No. CV-OC-0723232

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'
REQUESTED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS AND PROPOSED
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM

v.
TA YLOR, flk/a
fIkIa
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR,
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
TAYLOR,
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOlIN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
COMES NOW, the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, by and through their co-counsel of
record, Christ T. Troupis, and respectfully submits their requested Jury Instructions, numbered

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND PROPOSED
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM - Pg 1

002030

-'"
-"'"
page one through pagel)? , together with their requested Special Verdict and request the
following stock Jury Instmctions, as IDJI Stock instmctions as follows: 1.00; 1.01; 1.02; 1.03;
1.03.1;1.05; 1.09; 1.11; 1.13; 1.13.1; 1.20.1; 1.24.1; 1.24.2; 1.40; 1.404;
9.0; 9.01; 9.07; 9.12; 9.14.
DATED this 9th day of January, 2011.

CHRIST T. TROU S, Co-counsel for
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND PROFIOSED
PROF10SED
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM - Pg 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 9th day of January, 2011, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing (1) COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS,
together with the proposed Special Verdict fonn to be delivered, addressed as follows:
Connie W. Taylor
Henderson Law Finn
900 Washington St. Suite 1020
Vancouver, Washington 98660
Facsimile: (360) 693-2911

(X)
()
()
()

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

Mark Stephen Prusynski
PO Box 829
Boise, ID 83701
Phone: (208) 345-2000
Facsimile: (208) 385-5384

(X)
()
()
()

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

Thomas G. Maile, IV.
380 W. State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Facsimile: (208) 939-100 I

()
()
(X)
()

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

WORD FILE transmitted to dclykema@adaweb.net

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND PROPOSED
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM - Pg 3
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..........
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. I
These instructions explain your duties as jurors and define the law that applies to this case.
It is your duty to detennine the facts, to apply the law set forth in these instructions to those facts,
and in this way to decide the case. Your decision should be based upon a rational and objective
assessment of the evidenc{:.
evidenct:. It should not be based on sympathy or prejudice.
It is my duty to instruct you on the points of law necessary to decide the case, and it is your
duty to follow the law as I instruct. You must consider these instructions as a whole, not picking out
one and disregarding others. The order in which these instructions are given or the manner in which
they are numbered has no significance as to the importance of any ofthem.
of them. Ifyou
If you do not understand
an instruction, you may send a note to me through the bailiff, and I will try to clarify or {!xplain
t:xplain the
point further.
In detennining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this trial. This

evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits admitted into evidence, and any
stipulated or admitted facts. While the arguments and remarks of the attorneys may help you
understand the evidence and apply the instructions, what they say is not evidence. If an attorney's
argument or remark has no basis in the evidence, you should disregard it.
The production of evidence in court is governed by rule oflaw. At times during the trial, I
sustained an objection to a question without pennitting the witness to answer it, or to an offered
exhibit without receiving it into evidence. My rulings are legal matters, and are solely my
GIVEN:
___
REFUSED: _
MODIFIED:- - COVERED: _ __
OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 1

002033

COUl'ITER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO.
responsibility. You must not speculate as to the reason for any objection, which was made, or my
ruling thereon, and in reaching your decision you may not consider such a question or exhibit or
speculate as to what the answer or exhibit would have shown. Remember, a question is not evidence
and should be considered only as it gives meaning to the answer.
There were occasions where an objection was made after an answer was given or the remark
was made, and in my ruling on the objection I instructed that the answer or remark be stricken, or
directed that you disregard the answer or remark and dismiss it from your minds.

In your

deliberations, you must not consider such answer or remark, but must treat it as though you had
never heard it.
The law does not require you to believe all of
the evidence admitted in the course ofthe
of the trial.
ofthe
As the sole judges of the facts, you must determine what evidence you believe and what weight you
attach to it. In so doing, you bring with you to this courtroom all ofthe
of the experience and background
of your lives. There is no magical formula for evaluating testimony. In your everyday affairs, you
determine for yourselves whom you believe, what you believe and how much weight you attach to
what you are told. The considerations you use in making the more important decisions in your
everyday dealings are the same considerations you should apply in your deliberations in this case.

LD.J.L 1.00 - Introductory instruction to jury
GIVEN:
REFUSED: _ __
MODIFIED: _ __
COVERED: _ __
OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 2
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COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~
During your deliberations, you will be entitled to have with you my instructions concerning
the law that applies to this case, the exhibits that have been admitted into evidence and any notes
taken by you in the course of the trial proceedings.
If you take notes during the trial, be careful that your attention is not thereby diverted from
the witness or his testimony; and you must keep your notes to yourself and not show tht~m to other
persons or jurors until the jury deliberations at the end of the trial.

I.DJ.I. 1.01 - Deliberation procedures
GIVEN:
REFUSED: _ __
MODIFIED:- - COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 3

002035

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~
There are certain things you must not do during this trial:
1.

You must not associate in any way with the parties, any of the attorneys or their

employees, or any of the witnesses.
2

You must not discuss the case with anyone, or permit anyone to discuss the case with

you. If anyone attempts to discuss the case with you, or to influence your decision in the case, you
must report it to me promptly.

3.

You must not discuss the case with other jurors until you retire to the jury room to

deliberate at the close of the entire case.
4.

of the testimony and have
You must not make up your mind until you have heard all ofthe

received my instructions as to the law that applies to the case.
5.

You must not contact anyone in an attempt to discuss or gain a greater understanding

of the case.
6.

You must not go to the place where any alleged event occurred.

IDJI 1.03 - Admonition to jury
GIVEN:
REFUSED:
MODIFIED: _ __
COVERED: _ __
OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 4

002036

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO.-----=±
NO.-----=±Members ofthe jury, I remind you that you are not to discuss this case among yourselves or
with anyone else, nor to form any opinion as to the merits of the case, until after I finally submit the
case to you.

IDJI 1.03.1 - Admonition to jury - short form
GNEN:
REFUSED:
_
MODIFIED:- - _
COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 5

002037

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~
Any statement by me identifying a claim of a party is not evidence in this case. I have
advised you of the claims of the parties merely to acquaint you with the issues to be decided.

IDJI 1.05 - Statement of claims not evidence
GIVEN:
REFUSED: _ __
MODIFIED: _ __
COVERED: _ __
OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 6

002038

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~

---.L2.

Members ofthe jury, I remind you that you are not to discuss this case among yourselves or
with anyone else, nor to form any opinion as to the merits ofthe case, until after I finally submit the
case to you.

IDJI 1.03.1 -
GIVEN:
REFUSED: _ __
MODIFIED: _ __
COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 7

002039

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION N o . l
The following facts are not: in dispute:
1. The Supreme Court in 2009 stated "While the first appeal to this Court was pending, the
of the Trust executed the Disclaimer, Release, and Indemnity Agreement (Disclaimer)
beneficiaries ofthe

in June 2004. In the Disclaimer, the beneficiaries, other than the Taylors, disclaimed any interest in
the lawsuit against the Mailes. In addition, the Taylors disclaimed their interest in all other Trust

property in favor of their mother, the beneficiaries agreed to an immediate distribution to
beneficiaries, the Rogers resigned as trustees, the named successor trustee declined to serve as
trustee, and the beneficiaries nominated and appointed the Taylors as trustees".

2. The Taylors who were represented by the law firm Clark and Feeney, filed their verified petition
in the probate court on November 12,2004, requesting the probate court appoint them as successor
trustees ofthe
of the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust. The petition was executed by R. John Taylor
as a verification ofthe facts contained in the petition. Page 2 of the verified petition stated under
oath, "the petitioner's 88-year-old mother, Helen Taylor, is the sole remaining beneficiary ofthis
ofthis
of the terms ofa
of a Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity Agreement."
trust by virtue ofthe
3.

In December 2005, the Idaho Supreme Court rendered its decision that the Taylors as

beneficiaries had standing to pursue claims against the Plaintiffs. "The Taylors allege they were
aggrieved of these actions by virtue of their status as residual beneficiaries of the Trust".

4. On March 9, 2006, a Verified Amended Complaint was filed by the Taylors, who were
GIVEN:
REFUSED:
MODIFIED: _ __
COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 8
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COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO.
of the Verified Amended CompIaint stated
represented by the law firm of Clark and Feeney. Page 1 ofthe
under oath, "Reed and R. John Taylor are residents of Nez Perce County, Idaho; Dallan Taylor is a

the plaintiffs are residual beneficiaries ofthe
of the Theodore L.
resident of Ada County Idaho. All of
ofthe
Johnson Trust."
4. Judge Wilper held: Once a party treats a contract as valid after the appearance of facts giving rise
to a right of
rescission, the right of
rescission is waived. The district court entered its Memorandum
ofrescission,
ofrescission
th(;: successor
Decision and Order on July 28, 2005 allowing the trust to amend its complaint after tht;:
trustees received the required appointment by the probate court. The district court did grant
Berkshire Investments' and Mailes' motion in part ruling that the Taylors and the trust had waived
rights to rescind the contract as "once a party treats a contract as valid after the appearance of facts
ofrescission,
ofrescission
giving rise to a right of
rescission, the right of
rescission is waived." The District Court fmther
fUlther found
that the "Plaintiffs (Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust and the Taylors), now with s.tanding as
trustees, did not act promptly to pursue rescission once the grounds for it arose.
5. Judge Wilper had ruled that Berkshire Investment could pursue its claims for quasi and equitable
estoppel and its claim oftortuous interference with contract claim against the trust and the Taylors
which was entered prior to the ruling on the Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims (Judg1e Wilper's
Order Regarding Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on February 13, 2006).
6. The Taylors filed a motion for sanctions against the plaintiffs before the Idaho Supreme Court
GIVEN:
REFUSED:
MODIFIED: _ __
COVERED:__ _
OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 9

002041

........
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO.
which was related to the filing of the initial complaint in this present action. The Idaho Supreme
Court denied any imposition ofsanctions
of sanctions against the plaintiffs-counter-defendants ( Supreme Court
Order dated February 11, 2008) relating to the filing of the first complaint in 2007 in this action.
7. Judge Ronald Wilper entered an Order denying the plaintiffs' verified motion to

fon~close

their

vendee's lien during the pendency of this action and denied the counter-claimants' motion for
sanctions on March 11, 2010.
8. The current legal proceedings are not being pursued by the counter-claimants against Thomas

Maile as an attorney. The claims are against Thomas Maile and Colleen Maile, husband and wife
and Berkshire Investments LLC.

IDJI 1.07. Facts not in dispute
GIVEN:
REFUSED: _ __
MODIFIED: _ __
COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 10
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COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~
In deciding this case, you may not delegate any of your decisions to another or decide any
question by chance, such as by the flip of a coin or drawing of straws. If money damages are to be
awarded or percentages of fault are to be assigned, you may not agree in advance to average the sum
of each individual juror's estimate as the method of determining the amount of the damage award
or percentage of negligence.

IDJI 1.09 - Quotient verdicts
GIVEN:
REFUSED:
MODIFIED: _ __
COVERED: _ __
OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 11
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COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~
If it becomes necessary during your deliberations to communicate with me, you may send a
you to the bailiff. You should not try to communicate with me by any
note signed by one or more of
ofyou
means other than such a note.
of the
During your deliberations, you are not to reveal to anyone how the jury stands on any ofthe
questions before you, numerically or otherwise, unless requested to do so by me.

IDJI 1.11 - Communications with court
GIVEN:
___
REFUSED: _
MODIFIED:- - COVERED:___
OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 12
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COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
ID
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ID
of the Jury: In order to return a verdict, it is necessary that at least three-fourths of
Members ofthe
the jury agree. Your verdict must represent the considered judgment of each juror agre:eing to it.
It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to reaching

an agreement, if you can do so without violence to individual judgment. Each of you must decide
of the evidence with your fellow
the case for yourself, but do so only after an impartial consideration ofthe
of your deliberations, do not hesitate to reexamine your own views ,md change
jurors. In the course ofyour
your opinion if convinced it is erroneous. But do not surrender your honest conviction as to the
weight or effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of your fellow jurors, or for the mere
purpose of returning a verdict.
of the facts. Your sole interest is to ascertain
You are not partisans. You are judges - judges ofthe
the truth from the evidence in the case.

IDJI 1.13.1 Alternate form - concluding remarks

GNEN:
REFUSED: _ __
MODIFIED:- - 
COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 13
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COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~
When I say that a patiy has the burden of
proof on a proposition, or use the expression "ifyou
"if you
ofproofon
find" or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded that the proposition is more probably true
than not true.

IDJI 1.20.1 - Burden of proof - preponderance of evidence
GIVEN:
REFUSED: _ __
MODIFIED:- - COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 14

002046

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~
of proof on a proposition by clear and convincing evidence,
When I say a party has the burden ofproofon
I mean you must be persuaded that it is highly probable that such proposition is true. This is a higher
burden than the general burden that the proposition is more probably true than not true.

IDJI 1.20.2 - Burden of proof - preponderance of evidence
GNEN:
REFUSED:
MODIFIED: _ __
COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS -15
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COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. The law makes no distinction between direct
and circumstantial evidence. Each is accepted as a reasonable method ofproof
of proof and each is respected
for such convincing force as it may carry.

IDJI 1.24.1 - Circumstantial evidence without definition

GIVEN:
REFUSED: - - MODIFIED: _ __
COVERED: _ __
OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 16
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COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. Direct evidence is evidence that directly
proves a fact. Circumstantial evidence is evidence that indirectly proves the fact, by proving one or
more facts from which the fact at issue may be inferred.
The law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence as to the degree of
proof required; each is accepted as a reasonable method of proof and each is respected for such
convincing force as it may carry.

IDJI 1.24.2 - Circumstantial evidence with definition

GIVEN:
REFUSED: - - _
MODIFIED:- - COVERED:___
OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS --17
17
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COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. \~
Once a party treats a contract as valid after the appearance of facts giving rise to a right of
rescission, the right of rescission is waived.

White v. Mock, 140 Idaho 882, 104 P.3d 356 (Idaho 2004)
GIVEN:
REFUSED: - - _
MODIFIED:- - COVERED: _ __
OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 18
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COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION N o . 1
A "chose in action" is defined to include personal property that one person owns but
another person possesses, the owner being able to regain possession through a lawsuit.

Black's Law Dictionary 258 (8th ed. 2004) defines
GNEN:
REFUSED: _ __
MODIFIED:- - COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS -19

002051

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

n

To be a judicial admission a statement must be a deliberate, clear, and unequivocal
statement of a party about a concrete fact within that party's knowledge.

Strouse, 129 Idaho at 619,930 P.2d at 1364 (Ct. App. 1997). Get more
GIVEN:
REFUSED: _ __
MODIFIED:- - COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 20

002052

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REjsSTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO.
PERJURY DEFINED. Every person who, having taken an oath that he will testify,
declare, depose, or certifY truly, before any competent tribunal, legislative committee, officer, or
person in any of the cases in which such an oath may by law be administered, wilfully and
contrary to such oath, states as true any material matter which he knows to be false, is guilty of
perjury.

Idaho Code Section 18-5401
GIVEN:
REFUSED: _ __
MODIFIED:- - _
COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 21

002053

COU1\J"TER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~
The tenn "oath" as used in the last section 18-5402, includes an affinnation, and every
other mode authorized by law of attesting the truth of that which is stated.

§ 18-5402. OATH DEFINED
GIVEN:
REFUSED: - - MODIFIED:- - COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 22

002054

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. JlL
SUBORNATION OF PERJURY. Every person who wilfully procures another person to
commit perjury is guilty of subornation of perjury, and is punishable in the same manner as he
would be if personally guilty of the perjury so procured.

Idaho Code section 18-5410 states:
GIVEN:
REFUSED: ___
MODIFIED:- - COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 23

002055

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~
It is no defense to a prosecution for peIjury that the accused did not know the materiality
ofthe false statement made by him; or that it did not, in fact, affect the proceeding in or for which
it was made. It is sufficient that it was material, and might have been used to affect such
proceeding.

§ 18-5406. IGNORANCE OF MATERIALITY NO DEFENSE
GNEN:
_
REFUSED: - - MODIFIED:___
COVERED:___
OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 24

002056

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'
REQUESTED
)FJ.-.
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. JFJ.-.
The test for materiality is whether the testimony probably would or could influence a
tribunal or jury on the issue before it. The false statement relied upon need not bear direetly upon
the ultimate issue of fact. A statement is material if it is material to any proper point of inquiry,
and if it is calculated and intended to bolster the witness' testimony on some material point or to
support or attack his credibility. The degree of materiality is not important.. .. It is no de£ense to a
prosecution for perjury that the accused did not know the materiality of the false statement made
by him; or that it did not, in fact, affect the proceeding in or for which it was made. It is sufficient
that it was material, and might have been used to affect such proceeding.

State v. Wolfrum; 175 P.3d 206 (Idaho C.A. 2007)
GIVEN:
REFUSED: - - MODIFIED: _ __
COVERED: _ __
OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 25

002057

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~
The plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following propositions by clear and
convincing evidence:
1. That the defendant stated a fact to the plaintiff;
2. The statement was false;
3. The statement was material;
4. The defendant either knew the statement was false or was unaware of whether the statement
was true at the time the statement was made.
5. The plaintiff did not know that the statement was false;
6. The defendant intended for the plaintiffto rely upon the statement and act upon it in a manner
reasonably contemplated;
7. The plaintiff did rely upon the truth ofthe statement;
8. The plaintiffs reliance was reasonable under all the circumstances;
9. The plaintiff suffered damages proximately caused by reliance on the false statement.
10. The nature and extent of the damages to the plaintiff, and the amount thereof.

IDJI 4.60. Fraud - issues
GIVEN:
REFUSED: _ __
MODIFIED: _ __
COVERED: _ __
OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 26

002058

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~
Persons procuring, aiding, abetting, advising, consenting, or ratifying abusive acts.
Liability for the abuse of process tort generally extends to all who knowingly procure, participate
in, aid, or abet the abuse, and those who advise or consent to the abusive acts, or who
subsequently adopt or ratify them, are liable as joint tortfeasors.

1 Am. Jur. 2d Abuse of Process § 19

GNEN:
REFUSED:
MODIFIED:- - COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 27

002059

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~CO
The elements essential to sustain the action are: (1) that the defendant made an illegal,
improper, perverted use of the process, a use neither warranted nor authorized by the process, and
(2) that the defendant had an ulterior motive or purpose in exercising such illegal, perve11ed, or
improper use of process, and (3) that damage resulted to the plaintiff from the irregularity.

1 Am. Jur 2d Abuse of Process §4.

GNEN:
REFUSED: - - MODIFIED:- - COVERED: _ __
OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 28

002060

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~
A non-client may bring a cause of action against an attorney for abuse of process.
The absolute privilege that protects attorneys from liability for defamation occurring in the course
of a judicial proceeding does not provide an attorney with an absolute defense to liability for
abuse of process. Thus, an attorney may be liable for damages for abuse of process where the acts
011 by the
complained of are personal acts, or are the acts of others wholly instigated and carried on

attorney.

1 Am. Jur. 2d Abuse of Process § 21 Attorneys
GIVEN:
REFUSED: - - MODIFIED:- - COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 29

002061

n

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO.
It was the duty of the Taylors and their attorneys, before and at the time of the alleged

negligent action, to use ordinary care for the well being of Berkshire Investment.

IDJI 2.00.1. Duty of care (modified)
GIVEN:
_
REFUSED: - - MODIFIED:___
___
COVERED:OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 30

002062

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
n~STRUCTIONNO.11lL
JURY n'l"STRUCTION
NO.J1lL
When I use the word "negligence" in these instructions, I mean the failure to use ordinary
care in the management of one's property or person. The words "ordinary care" mean the care a
reasonably careful person would use under circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence.
Negligence may thus consist ofthe failure to do something which a reasonably careful person
would do, or the doing of something a reasonably careful person would not do, under
circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence. The law does not say how a reasonably
careful person would act under those circumstances. That is for you to decide.

IDJI 2.20 Negligence.
GNEN:
REFUSED: - - _
MODIFIED:- - _
COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 31

002063

.....'
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~
There was a certain statute in force in the state of Idaho at the time of the of the occurrence
in question which provided that:
PERJURY DEFINED. Every person who, having taken an oath that he will testify,
declare, depose, or certify tmly, before any competent tribunal, legislative committee, officer, or
person in any of the cases in which such an oath may by law be administered, wilfully and
contrary to such oath, states as true any material matter which he knows to be false, is guilty of
pelJury.
A violation of the statute is negligence, unless compliance with the statute was impossible
or something over which the party had no control placed the individual in a position of violation
of the statute or an emergency, not of the party's own making, caused the individual to fail to
obey the statute or an excuse specifically provided for within the statute existed.

IDJI 2.22. Violation of statute or ordinance - negligence per se
GIVEN:
REFUSED: ___
___
MODIFIED:_
COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 32

002064

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~
There was a certain statute in force in the state of Idaho at the time of the of the occurrence
in question which provided that:
SUBORNATION OF PERJURY. Every person who wilfully procures another pl~rson
p,;!rson to
commit perjury is guilty of subornation of peIjury, and is punishable in the same manner as he
would be if personally guilty of the peIjury so procured.
A violation of the statute is negligence, unless compliance with the statute was impossible
or something over which the party had no control placed the individual in a position of violation
of the statute or an emergency, not of the party's own making, caused the individual to fail to
obey the statute or an excuse specifically provided for within the statute existed.

IDJI 2.22. Violation of statute or ordinance - negligence per se
GIVEN:
REFUSED: - - _
MODIFIED:- - COVERED: _ __
OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 33

002065

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~
The effect of establishing negligence per se through violation of a statute is to
conclusively establish the first two elements of a cause of action in negligence. Negligence per se
lessens the plaintiffs burden only on the issue of the 'actor's departure from the standard of
conduct required of a reasonable man. Thus, the elements of duty and breach are establi
estab1i shed as a
matter of law and do not need to be determined by a jury.

Nation v. State, Dept. ofColTection, 144 Idaho 177, 158 P.3d 953 (Idaho 2007)
GIVEN:
REFUSED: - - _
MODIFIED: _ __
___
COVERED:OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 34

002066

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~
Constructive fraud is a breach of legal or equitable duty which, irrespective of the moral
guilt of the fraud feasor, the law declares fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive others, to
violate public or private confidence, or to injure public interests. Neither actual dishonesty of
purpose nor intent to deceive is an essential element of constructive fraud. In its generic sense
constructive fraud comprises all acts, omissions and concealments involving a breach of legal or
equitable duty, trust or confidence and resulting in damage to another. Constructive fraud does not
require a Plaintiff to plead the nine elements of common law fraud.

McGhee v McGhee 82 Idaho 367 (1960); Hudson v. Cobbs, 118 Idaho 474,797 P.2d 1322 (Idaho
1990)
GIVEN:
REFUSED: _ __
MODIFIED: _ __
COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 35

002067

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. H?J
Upon a trial for having with intent to cheat or defraud another designedly, by any false
pretense, obtained the signature of any person to a written instrument, or having obtained from
any person, any money, personal property, or valuable thing, the defendant cannot be convicted if
the false pretense was expressed in language, unaccompanied by a false token or writing, unless
the pretense or some note or memorandum thereofbe in writing, subscribed by or in the hand
writing ofthe defendant, or unless the pretense be proven by the testimony oftwo (2) witnesses,
or that of one (1) witness and corroborating circumstances; but this section shall not apply to a
prosecution for falsely representing or personating another, and, in such assumed character,
marrying, or receiving any money or property.

§ 19-2116. FALSE PRETENSE - SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
GIVEN:
___
REFUSED: MODIFIED: _ __
COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 36

002068

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. .~L\An "enterprise" is defined as "any sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, business,

labor union, association or other legal entity or any group of individuals associated in fad
although not a legal entity, and includes illicit as well as licit entities." I.C. § 18-7803(c).
18-7803(c). A
"pattern of racketeering" is defined as: engaging in at least two (2) incidents of racketeering
conduct that have the same or similar intents, results, accomplices, victims or methods of
commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated
incidents, provided at least one (1) of such incidents occurred after the effective date of this act
and that the last of such incidents occurred within five (5) years after a prior incident of
racketeering conduct.
A single scheme may be sufficient to establish a pattern of racketeering if the plaintiff
establishes "that the predicate acts themselves amount to, or constitute a threat of, continuing
racketeering activity."

Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763,775,890 P.2d 714, 726 (1995). Mannos v. Moss, 143 Idaho
927,931, 155 P.3d 1166, 1170 (2007)
GIVEN:
REFUSED: _ __
MODIFIED: _ __
COVERED: _ __
OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 37

002069

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~l:J
It is unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise to conduct or
enga~~ng in a
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of the affairs of such enterprise by enga~~ng

pattern of racketeering activity. Whoever violates the provisions of this subsection is guilty of a
felony.

Idaho Code § 18-7803(a)(1)-(21). Idaho Code § 18-7804(c)
GIVEN:
REFUSED: - - MODIFIED:- - COVERED: _ __
OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 38

002070

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 3lo
"Racketeering" means any act which is chargeable or indictable under the following
sections of the Idaho Code or which are equivalent acts chargeable or indictable as equivalent
crimes under the laws of any other jurisdiction:
(10) Fraudulent practices, false pretenses, insurance fraud, financial transaction card crimes
and fraud generally (sections 18-2403, 18-2706, 18-3002, 18-3101, 18-3124, 18-3125, 18-3126,
18-6713,41-293,41-294 and 41-1306, Idaho Code);
(17) Perjury (sections 18-5401 and 18-5410, Idaho Code);
It is unlawful for any person who has received any proceeds derived directly or indirectly from

a pattern of racketeering activity in which the person has participated, to use or invest, directly or
indirectly, any part of the proceeds or the proceeds derived from the investment or use thereof in
the acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise or rleal
rl~al
property.
It is unlawful for any person to engage in a pattern of racketeering activity in order to acquire

or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise or real prop,erty

18-7803 Definitions; 18-7804 Prohibited Activities -- Penalties.
GIVEN:
REFUSED: - - MODIFIED:- - _
COVERED:__
_
OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 39

002071

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. '61
A judgment obtained by fraud may, however, be void under some circumstances, and
subject to collateral attack, as where such fraud appears on the face of the record or goes to the
method of acquiring jurisdiction. Likewise, the judgment may be attacked collaterally where fraud
has been practiced in the very act of obtaining the judgment, or on the party against whom the
judgment was rendered, so as to prevent him from having a fair opportunity to present his case.
Judgments obtained by extrinsic, rather than intrinsic, fraud may be attacked collaterally. The
extrinsic fraud which is required as a basis for collateral attacks on judgments is defined as fraud
which is collateral to the issues tried in the case where the judgment is rendered.

Res Judicata. 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 532
GIVEN:
_
REFUSED: - - MODIFIED: _ __
COVERED: _ __
OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 40

002072

........
.......
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. i6
Extrinsic fraud is "where
I1where a party is prevented by trick, artifice, or other fraudulent conduct
from fairly presenting his claims or defenses or introducing relevant and material evidence. It is
I1tampering with administration ofjustice"
more than mere interparty misconduct. Id. It is a "tampering
of justice" which
suggests "a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the public.

Campbell v. Kildew, 141 Idaho 640, 115 P.3d 731 (Idaho 2005) (quoting 7 Moore's Federal
Practice, P 60.37(1) 612-13).

GIVEN:
REFUSED:
___
MODIFIED:COVERED:- - OTHER:
INSTRUCTIONS·- 41
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS

002073

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~
The subornation of perjury by an attorney and/or the intentional concealment of documents
by an attorney are actions which constitute extrinsic fraud.

Chewning v. Ford Motor Co., 354 S.C. 72, 579 S.E.2d 605 (2003).

GIVEN:
REFUSED: - - MODIFIED: _ __
COVERED: _ __
OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 42

002074

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. tfO
/f0
Fraud is extrinsic when it actually prevents an adversarial trial but is intrinsic when it is
employed during the course of the hearing which provides the forum for the truth to appear, albeit,
the truth was distorted by the complained of fraud.

Jones v. Rosenberg, 178 Mel. App. 54,940 A.2d 1109 (Md. App. 2008) Manigan, 160 Md. App.
at 121, 862 A.2d 1037 (quoting Billingsley, 43 Md. App. at 719, 406 A.2d 946).
GIVEN:
REFUSED: - - MODIFIED:- - COVERED: _ __
OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 43

002075

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~
Extrinsic fraud is " fraud that induces a person not to present a case or deprives a person of
the opportunity to be heard."

Hilton Head Ctr. of S.C. v. Public Servo Commn., 294 S.c. 9, 11, 362 S.E.2d 176, 177 (1987).
GIVEN:
REFUSED: _ __
MODIFIED:- - COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 44

002076

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. L\~
Relief is granted for extrinsic fraud on the theory that because the fraud prevented a party
from fully exhibiting and trying his case, there has never been a real contest before the court on
the subject matter ofthe action. On the other hand, intrinsic fraud is fraud which was presented
and considered at trial.

Hagy v. Pruitt, 339 S.C. 425, 431-32, 529 S.E.2d 714, 718 (2000) (citing Evans v. Gunter, 294
Hagyv.
App.1988)).
S.C. 525, 529, 366 S.E.2d 44, 46 (Ct. App.l988)).

GIVEN:
REFUSED: - - _
MODIFIED:- - COVERED:- - 
OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 45

002077

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. L\-"J
L\-'/J
Extrinsic fraud is a fraud which misleads and induces the court to find in favor of the party
perpetrating the fraud.

Hilton Head Ctr., 294 S.C. at 11, 362 S.E.2d at 177.
GIVEN:
REFUSED: - - MODIFIED:- - COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 46

002078

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

Lt4

"Extrinsic fraud is 'fraud that induces a person not to present a case or deprives a person of
the opportunity to be heard.' "

Id. at 81,579 S.E.2d 605,579 S.E.2d at 610 Raby Const., L.L.P. v. Orr, 358 S.c. 10,594 S.E.2d
478 (S.C. 2004)
GNEN:
REFUSED: __
_
MODIFIED:- - _
COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 47

002079

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
4C:J
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. L\C:J
Extrinsic fraud is "fraud that induces a person not to present a case or deprives a person of
the opportunity to be heard. Relief is granted for extrinsic fraud on the theory that because the
fraud prevented a party from fully exhibiting and trying his case, there has never been a real
contest before the court on the subject matter of the action."

Hilton Head Ctr. of South Carolina v. Public Servo Comm'n, 294 S.C. 9, 11,362 S.E.2d ] 76, 177
(1987). Chewning V. Ford Motor Co., 354 S.C. 72, 579 S.E.2d 605 (S.C. 2003)
GIVEN:
REFUSED: - - MODIFIED: _ __
COVERED: _ __
OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 48

002080

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~
The subornation of perjury by an attorney and/or the intentional concealment of documents
by an attorney are actions which constitute extrinsic fraud. Contrary to perjury by a witness or a
party's failure to disclose requested materials, conduct which constitutes intrinsic fraud, where an
attorney--an officer of the court--suborns perjury or intentionally conceals documents, he or she
effectively precludes the opposing party from having his day in court. These actions by an
attorney constitute extrinsic fraud. Moreover, while the analysis does not turn on the
categorization of fraud as intrinsic or extrinsic, the law hold an attorney's subornation of perjury
and/or the intentional concealment of documents constitutes fraud upon the court.

See Kupferman v. Consol. Research & Mfg. Corp., 459 F.2d 1072 (2d Cir. 1972)

GIVEN:
REFUSED: _ __
MODIFIED:- - COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 49

002081

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~
Involvement of an attorney, as an officer of the court, in a scheme to suborn perjury would
be considered fraud on the court.

Cleveland Demolition Co. v. Azcon Scrap Corp., 827 F.2d 984,986 (4th Cir. 1987)
GIVEN:
REFUSED: _ __
MODIFIED:- - COVERED: _ __
OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 50

002082

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
t-\l(;
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. L\;1O
A verdict may be set aside for fraud on the court if an attorney and a witness have
conspired to present peIjured testimony.

Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1978)
GIVEN:
REFUSED: _ __
MODIFIED: _ __
COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 51

002083

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
L\C\
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. lJ/\
Since attorneys are officers of the court, their conduct, if dishonest, would constitute fraud
on the court.

Dixon v. Comm'n ofInternal Revenue, 2003 WL 1216290 (9th Cir. 2003)
GIVEN:
REFUSED: _ __
MODIFIED: _ __
COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 52

002084

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY n~STRUCTION
n~STRUCTION NO. ~
Attorney subornation of petjury and false statements to trial court constitute fraud upon the
court.

Porcelli v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 78 F.R.D. 499 (E.D.Wis.l978) (noting distinction
between petjury involving officers of the court and witness or party); see 12 James Wm. Moore et
aI., Moore's Federal Practice,-r 60-21[4] [b] (3d ed.2002).Chewning v. Ford Motor Co., 354 S.C.
72, 579 S.E.2d 605 (S.C. 2003)
GIVEN:
_
REFUSED: - - MODIFIED: _ __
COVERED: _ __
OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 53

002085

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

2L

In order for a party to obtain relief under such a rule, the party seeking relief must prove
the most egregious conduct involving corruption ofthe judicial process itself by establishing to
the satisfaction of the trial judge that there was perjured testimony which influenced the judgment
of the court. ... In any event, some courts hold that a judgment may be vacated for perjury under
certain conditions, as where a party obtains a judgment by that party's own willful perjury, or by
the use of false testimony, which the party knows at the time to be false.

49 C.J.S. Judgments § 310
GWEN:
REFUSED: - - 
MODIFIED:- - COVERED: _ __
OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 54

002086

COU1\TTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
COU1\TTER-DEFENDANTS'
Sf}..
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. Sf}.,
Idaho Court Rules provide:
Rule 60(b). Mistakes, inadvertence, excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, fraud, grounds
for relief from judgment on order.

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his It:gal
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due
diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3)
fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied,
released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6)
any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than six (6) months after the
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) does not
affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. Such motion does not require leave from
the Supreme Court, or the district court, as the case may be, as though the judgment has been
affirmed or settled upon appeal to that court. This rule does not limit the power of a court to: (I)
entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding, or (ii) to
GIVEN:
REFUSED: - - MODIFIED: _ __
COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 55

002087

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO.
set aside, as provided by law, within one (I) year after judgment was entered, a judgment obtained
against a party who was not personally served with summons and complaint either in the state of
Idaho or in any other jurisdiction, and who has failed to appear in said action, or (iii) to set aside a
judgment for fraud upon the court.

LR.C.P. Rule 60(b)
GIVEN:
REFUSED: - - MODIFIED: _ __
COVERED: _ __
OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 56

002088

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
s?)
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. S?)
Claims brought under 1.R.c.P.
LR.C.P. 60(b) are not barred by res judicata because they are one of
the recognized "avenues ... for attacking a judgment."

Wallerv. State, Dept. of Health and Welfare, 146 Idaho 234,192 P.3d 1058 (Idaho 2008), Davis
v. Parrish, 131 Idaho 595,599,961 P.2d 1198, 1202 (1998)

GIVEN:
REFUSED: _ __
MODIFIED:- - COVERED: _ __
OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 57

002089

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. £ii.
~
When an issue of standing is raised, the focus is not on the merits of the issues raised, but
upon the party who is seeking the relief.

Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 641, 778 P.2d 757, 763 (1989). Scona Inc. v. Green
Willow Trust, 133 Idaho 283, 286,985 P.2d 1145, 1148 (1999).

GIVEN:
REFUSED: - - MODIFIED: _ __
COVERED: _ __
OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 58

002090

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~
Questions of standing must be decided by this Court before reaching the merits of the
case.

Citibank v. Carroll, 35053 (IDSCCI)
GIVEN:
REFUSED: _ __
MODIFIED:- - COVERED:- - 
OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 59

002091

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~
A real party in interest 'is the person who will be entitled to the benefits ofthe action if
successful, one who is actually and substantially interested in the subject matter.

Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866,870,993 P.2d 1197, 1201 (1999)
GIVEN:
REFUSED: _ __
MODIFIED: _ __
COVERED: _ __
OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 60

002092

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

Sl

Under Idaho Code, section 68-1 06(
c)(1), the successor trustees are specifically and
06(c)(1),
unequivocally empowered under the statute to sell a trust asset which was placed in trust by the
trustor, without court approval.

GIVEN:
REFUSED: _ __
MODIFIED:- - COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 61

002093

.......
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
~
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. f:11l
There can be no Res Judicata (claim preclusion) ifthere is not ripe for judicial
determination a valid cause of action.

Idaho First Natl. Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 283-84, 824 P.2d 841, 858-59
(1991)
GIVEN:
REFUSED: _ __
MODIFIED:- - _
COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 62

002094

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. SC\
The time when a cause of action accrues may be a question of law or a question of fact,
depending upon whether any disputed issues of material fact exist. Where there is no dispute over
any issue of material fact regarding when the cause of action accrues, the question is

on(~

of law

for determination by the court.

Reis v. Cox, 104 Idaho 434,. 660 P.2d 46 (1982)
GIVEN:
REFUSED: _ __
MODIFIED:- - COVERED:- - 
OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 63

002095

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

JiL

The policy considerations underlying the doctrine of res judicata are aimed at discouraging
the splintering of actions, at precluding repetitive actions based on the same transaction. It is a
different question than the question of when a cause of action accrues.

Kawai Farms, Inc. v. Longstreet, 121 Idaho 610, 613, 826 P.2d 1322, 1325 (1992).
GIVEN:
REFUSED: _ __
MODIFIED: _ __
COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 64

002096

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~
The time of taking occurs, and hence the cause of action accrues, as of the time that the
full extent of a party's loss of use and enjoyment of the property becomes apparent.

McCuskey v. Canyon County Commissioners 128 Id. 213, 128 Idaho 213 (1996).
GIVEN:
REFUSED: _ __
MODIFIED:- - COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 65

002097

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. J.Q.L

J.u.L

After the court entered its order in July 2009 dismissing the plaintiffs' claims tht: Idaho
Supreme Court ruled, a cause of action against one party's opponent's attorney in litigation, based
on conduct the attorney committed in the course of
that litigation, may not be properly instituted
ofthat
prior to the resolution ofthat litigation, even where the allegedly aggrieved party believ(~s that the
attorney in question has been acting outside the legitimate scope of representation and solely for
his own benefit. In addition, allegations of aiding and abetting in the commission of tortious acts,
must await resolution ofthe underlying case, before a complaint can be commenced.

(lDSCCI)
Taylor v. McNichols, 36130, 36131 (IDSCCI)

GNEN:
REFUSED: __ _
MODIFIED:- - _
COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 66

002098

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~
Only when a case has been concluded may one truly identify whether or not a prosecution
has been malicious, whether an attorney has committed malpractice, or, whether an attorney has
acted fraudulently or solely for his own benefit.

Taylor v. McNichols, 36130, 36131 (IDSCCI)
GIVEN:
REFUSED: _ __
MODIFIED: _ __
COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 67

002099

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

Ji::L

A constructive trust can be imposed where property was obtained either fraudulently or
through violation of a fiduciary duty.

Hettinga v. Sybrandy, 126 Idaho 467, 469,886 P.2d 772, 774 (1994), Witt v. Jones, 111 Idaho
165, 722 P.2d 474 (1986).
GIVEN:
REFUSED: _ __
MODIFIED: _ __
COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 68

002100

-,.
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~
Constructive trusts are raised by equity for the purpose of working out right and justice, where
there was no intention of the party to create such a relation, and often directly contrary to the
.... If one party obtains the legal title to proP{:rty, not
title....
intention of the one holding the legal title
only by fraud or by violation of confidence or of fiduciary relations, but in any other
unconscientious manner, so that he cannot equitably retain the property which really belongs to
another, equity carries out its theory of a double ownership, equitable and legal, by impressing a
constructive trust upon the property in favor of the one who is in good conscience entitled to it,
and who is considered in equity as the beneficial owner.

501 (Ct. App.1984).
Bengoechea v. Bengoechea, 106 Idaho 188, 677 P.2d SOl
GIVEN:
REFUSED: - - MODIFIED:- - COVERED: _ __
OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 69

002101

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~
Any action "affecting the title to real property" allows the filing of a lis pendens by an
interested party in order to protect their interest in the property subject to the litigation. Such
actions include actions attempting to set aside a fraudulent conveyance of real property; actions to
establish a constructive trust over real estate which may have been obtained by fraud.

App.l984).
Bengoechea v. Bengoechea, 106 Idaho 188, 677 P.2d 501 (Ct. App.1984).
GIVEN:
REFUSED:
MODIFIED:- - COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 70

002102

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
1.O1
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~
The publication of the notice oflis pendens is not defamatory. It merely informs the public
that the property is involved in litigation.

Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 165 P.3d 261 (Idaho 2007).
GIVEN:
REFUSED: - - _
MODIFIED:- - _
COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 71

002103

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

a

In order to succeed under a claim of tortious interference with a business relationship, the

claimant must allege that the interferer did something illegal, unethical or fraudulent. There is
nothing illegal, unethical or fraudulent in filing a lawsuit, whether groundless or not.

Dalley v. Dykema Gossett P.L.L.C, 289046 (MICA) (Michigan 2010), citing Early Detection
Center, P.e., v. New York Life Ins. Co., 157 Mich. App. 618 at 631,403 N.W.2d 830 (Mich.
App.1986).
GIVEN:
REFUSED: _ __
MODIFIED:- - COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 72

002104

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. loq
Res Judicata involves five factors which are required to bar re-litigation of an issue
detennined in a prior proceeding: (I)
(1) the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had
a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the present action; (2) the issue decided
in the prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in the present action; (3) the issue sought
to be precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation; (4) there was a final judgment on the
merits in the prior litigation; and (5) the party against whom the issue is asserted was a party or in
privity with a party to the litigation.

TicorTitlev. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 123, 157 P.3d 613, 617(2007).
GIVEN:
REFUSED: _ __
MODIFIED:- - COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 73

002105

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 1D
One of the oldest and most universally accepted juridical principles is that embmced in the
doctrine of res judicata. In the absence offraud or collusion a judgment is conclusive as between
the parties and their privies on all issues which were (or should have been) litigated in the
action.... Generally speaking, the fraud which will invalidate a judgment must be extrinsic or
collateral to the issues tried, by which the aggrieved party has been prejudiced, or prevented from
having a fair trial.

P.2d
.2d 1031, 1034 (1949)
Robinson v. Robinson, 70 Idaho 122, 128, 212 P
GIVEN:
__ _
REFUSED: MODIFIED:- - _
COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 74

002106

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. '1 \
Rule 60(b) I.R.C.P.,
LR.C.P., provides that the court may relieve a party from a judgment: (1) under
60(b)(3) for 'fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic)',
extrinsic)" and (2) under a portion
of the last sentence of 60(b), empowering the court 'to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the
court.'
The Law defines extlinsic fraud as being fraud by which the aggrieved party has been
prejudiced, or prevented from having a fair trial.

Willis v. Willis, 93 Idaho 261, 460 P.2d 396 (1969)
GIVEN:
REFUSED: ___
___
MODIFIED:COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 75

002107

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~
Determination of All Rights upon Foreclosure Proceedings.
property...
In any suit brought to foreclose a mortgage or lien upon real property...
the plaintiff..., plaintiff in intervention may make as party defendant in the same cause of action,
any person, including parties mentioned in section 5-325, having, claiming or appearing to have or
to claim any title, estate, or interest in or to any part of the real or personal property involved
therein, and the court shall, in addition to granting relief in the foreclosure action, detemtine the
title, estate or interest of all parties thereto in the same manner and to the same extent and effect as
in the action to quiet title.

I.e. § 45-1302
GIVEN:
_
REFUSED: - - MODIFIED:___
COVERED:___
OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 76

002108

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 1 ')
In an action affecting the title or the right of possession of real property, the plaintiff at the
time of filing the complaint, and the defendant at the time of filing his answer, when affirmative
relief is claimed in such answer, or at any time afterward, may file for record with the recorder of
the county in which the property or some part thereof is situated, a notice of the pendency of the
action, containing the names of the parties, the object of the action or defense, and a description of
the property in that county affected thereby. From the time of filing such notice for record only
shall a purchaser or incumbrancer of the property affected thereby be deemed to have constructive
notice of the pendency of the action, and only of its pendency against parties designated by their
real names.

Idaho Code § 5-505. LIS PENDENS
GIVEN:
REFUSED: - - MODIFIED:- - COVERED: _ __
OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 77

002109

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQU:ESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. '1 t.\t.\An action may be brought by any person against another who claims an estate or interest in
real or personal property adverse to him, for the purpose of determining such adverse claim.

Idaho Code § 6-401. ACTIONS TO QUIET TITLE
GIVEN:
REFUSED: - - MODIFIED: _ __
COVERED: _ __
OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 78

002110

-

-,

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

-1S
'1S

Because the doctrine oflaches is founded in equity, in determining whether the doctrine
applies, consideration must be given to all surrounding circumstances and acts of the parties. The
lapse of time alone is not controlling on whether laches applies.

Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho 352, 48 P.3d 1241 (Idaho 2002)
GIVEN:
REFUSED: - - MODIFIED:- - COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 79

002111

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~
The basis for the doctrine oflaches is that "courts of equity do not favor antiquated or stale
demands, and will refuse to interfere where there has been gross laches in commencing the proper
action, or long acquiescence in the assertion of adverse rights."

Abrams v. Porter, 128 Idaho 869, 920 P.2d 386 (Idaho 1996)
GIVEN:
_
REFUSED: - - MODIFIED: _ __
COVERED: _ __
OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 80

002112

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 'l1
A foreclosure is an equitable proceeding.

Fann Credit Bank of Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270,869 P.2d 1365 (Idaho 1994)

GNEN:
REFUSED: _ __
MODIFIED: _ __
COVERED: _ __
OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 81

002113

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ·1~
The relationship between an attorney and client is one of agency wherein the attorney acts
as agent for the principal.

Vreeken v Lockwood Engineering P.V. 148 Idaho 89 (2009)
GIVEN:
REFUSED: _ __
MODIFIED:- - COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 82
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COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. -1°\
There is no dispute in this case that Connie Wright Taylor, fIkIa
flk/a Connie Taylor, Clark and
Feeney, a partnership and Paul T. Clark were the agent of the principals DaHan Taylor, R. John
Taylor, and the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, at the time of the transaction described by
the evidence. Therefore, DaHan Taylor, R. John Taylor, and the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable
Trust, the principals, were responsible for any act of Connie Wright Taylor, f/k/a Connie Taylor,
Clark and Feeney, and Paul T. Clark, the agents, within the scope of the agent's authority.

IDJI 6.41.1. Agent's act binds principal - agency admitted (modified)
GWEN:
REFUSED: _ __
MODIFIED: _ __
COVERED:- - 
OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 83
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COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INBTRUCTION NO. ~
£'kIa Connie
One ofthe issues to be decided by you is whether Connie Wright Taylor, £!kIa
Taylor, Clark and Feeney, a partnership and Paul T. Clark and Dallan Taylor, R. John Taylor, and
the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust were engaged in a joint enterprise. A joint enterprise
exists if all of the following elements are present:
(1) an agreement, express or implied, between two or more persons to carry out a common
purpose as a group;
(2) a community of pecuniary interest in the common purpose shared among each member of the
group; and
(3) an equal voice in the control of the enterprise held by each member of the group.
The phrase "community of pecuniary interest" means that the common purpose of the enterprise
must be the accomplishment of a commercial or business objective, carried out for the mutual
profit ofthe group. It is not present where the purposes ofthe individual members of the group are
separable or entirely personal to the individuals or their families, even if the separate purposes or
personal purposes are pecuniary gain.

of joint enterprise
IDJI 6.48. Definition ofjoint
GIVEN:
REFUSED: - - MODIFIED:- - COVERED: _ __
OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 84

002116

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. iLL

It is not a tort where one acts to protect her own economic interests, even if there is
interference with the contract expectancy of another, so long as the acts of the intervenor are not
independently wrongful.

Carter v. Carter, 143 Idaho 373, 146 P.3d 639 (Idaho 2006)

GIVEN:
REFUSED: - - MODIFIED: _ __
COVERED: _ __
OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 85

002117

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 0~
Tortious interference with a prospective economic advantage has five elements: "(1) The
existence of a valid economic expectancy; (2) knowledge of the expectancy on the part of the
interferer; (3) intentional interference inducing termination of the expectancy; (4) the interference
was wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the interference itself (i.e. that the defendant
interfered for an improper purpose or improper means) and (5) resulting damage to the pllaintiff
whose expectancy has been disrupted."
This tort requires a showing that the interference was wrongful beyond the fact of
interference itself.

Highland Enters., Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 338, 986 P.2d 996, 1004 (1999), Lexington
Heights Dev., LLC v. Crandlemire, 140 Idaho 276, 286,92 P.3d 526,536 (2004), Commercial
Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M. & Lynn Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208, 177 P.3d 955 (Idaho 2008)
GIVEN:
REFUSED: _ __
MODIFIED: _ __
COVERED:- - 
OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 86

002118

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 0'j
To establish that the intentional interference resulting in injury was wrongful, a party may
offer proof that either: "(1) the defendant had an improper objective or purpose to harm the
plaintiff; or (2) the defendant used a wrongful means to cause injury to the prospective business
relationship. "
relationship."

.3d
P.3d
Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M. & Lynn Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208, 217, 177 P
(IDSCCI), Idaho First Nat'l Bank
955,964 (2008). Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, 35732 (lDSCCI),
v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266,286,824 P.2d 841,861 (1991)
GIVEN:
REFUSED: - - MODIFIED: _ __
COVERED: _ __
OTHER:
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002119

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be
signed by at least one (l)
(1) licensed attorney of record of the state ofIdaho, in the attorney's
individual name, whose address shall be stated before the same may be filed. A party who is not
represented by an attorney shall sign the pleading, motion or other paper and state the party's
address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be
verified or accompanied by affidavit. The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate
that the attorney or party has read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of the
signer's knowledge, information, and belief after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and
is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal
of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion or
other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is
called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion or other paper is signed in
violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the
person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an
order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because
of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Rule 11(a)(1).
I I (a)(l). Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers; sanctions defined
GIVEN:
REFUSED:
MODIFIED: _ __
COVERED: _ __
OTHER:
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002120

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY U'l"STRUCTION NO.
"Conduct" means filing a civil action, asserting a claim, defense, or other position in connection
with a civil action, or taking any other action in connection with a civil action.
"Frivolous conduct" means conduct of a party to a civil action or of his counsel of record that
satisfies either of the following:
(I) It obviously serves merely to harass or maliciously injure another party to the civil action;

(ii) It is not supported in fact or warranted under existing law and cannot be supported by a good
faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.

Idaho Code § 12-123. Sanctions for Frivolous Conduct in a Civil Case
GIVEN:
REFUSED: - - MODIFIED:- - COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 89

002121

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. t)S
The counter-defendants have asserted the affinnative defense of equitable estoppd. This is
a legal tenn which means the counter-claimants may be prevented from pursuing their claims by
reason of the counter-claimants' own conduct.
To establish the defense of equitable estoppel, the counter-defendant has the burdlen of
proof on each of the following propositions:
1. The counter-claimants falsely represented or concealed a material fact to the counter-defendants
and/or the court;
2. The counter-claimants knew or should have known the true facts;
3. The court and/or the counter-defendants did not know and could not discover the true facts;
4. The court and/or counter-defendants relied on the misrepresentation or concealment to the
counter-defendants' prejudice.

IDJI 6.22.1. Equitable estoppel
GIVEN:
REFUSED: - - MODIFIED: _ __
COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 90

002122

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~
The doctrine of quasi-estoppel applies when: (1) the offending party took a different
position than his or her original position, and (2) either (a) the offending party gained an
advantage or caused a disadvantage to the other party; (b) the other party was induced to change
positions; or (c) it would be unconscionable to permit the offending party to maintain an
inconsistent position from one he or she has already derived a benefit or acquiesced in.

Terrazas v. Blaine County ex reI. Bd. ofCom'rs, 147 Idaho 193,207 P.3d 169 (Idaho 20(9); Allen
v. Reynolds, 145 Idaho 807, 812,186 P.3d 663, 668 (2008)
GIVEN:
REFUSED: _ __
MODIFIED: _ __
COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 91

002123

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
1O"1
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 10-1
Judicial estoppel is intended to prevent abuse of the judicial process by deliberate shifting
of positions to suit the exigencies of a particular action. For guidance purposes and to avoid
misapplication of
judicial estoppel, it should be made clear that the concept should only be
ofjudicial
applied when the party maintaining the inconsistent position either did have, or was chargeable
with, full knowledge of the attendant facts prior to adopting the initial position. Stated another
judicial estoppel takes into account not only what a party states under oath in
way, the concept of
ofjudicial
open court, but also what that party knew, or should have known, at the time the original position
was adopted. Thus, the knowledge that the party possesses, or should have possessed, at the time
the statement is made is determinative as to whether that person is "playing fast and loose" with
the court.
Representations of fact, purporting to be on the basis of the lawyer's personal knowledge,
may well be used against that lawyer in subsequent proceedings. Certainly, statements in an
affidavit of an attorney purporting to be based upon personal knowledge could be governed by the
ofjudicial
doctrine of
judicial estoppel.

Heinze v. Bauer, 145 Idaho 232, 235, 178 P.3d 597, 600 (2008)
GIVEN:
_
REFUSED: - - MODIFIED: _ __
___
COVERED:OTHER:
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002124

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~
Admission constitutes a binding judicial admission -- "a fonnal ...statement
... statement made by ...
an attorney, in the course of
judicial proceedings, for the purpose, or with the effect, of dispensing
ofjudicial
with the need for proof by the opposing party of some fact. "Judicial admissions may be
considered for the purposes which they were made without admission into evidence, and a party
making an admission may not controvert the statement on appeal.

Strouse v. K-Tek, Inc., 129 Idaho 616, 618, 930 P.2d 1361, 1363 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing McLean
v. City of Spirit Lake, 91 Idaho 779, 783,430 P.2d 670,674 (1967»
GIVEN:
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MODIFIED: _ __
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COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY IN"STRUCTION NO. Ql'\
A judicial admission is a statement made by a party or attorney, in the course ofjudicial
of judicial
proceedings, for the purpose, or with the effect, of dispensing with the need for proof by the
opposing party of some fact.

Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 761, 765, 86 P.3d 475, 479
(2004).
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MODIFIED:- - _
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COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~O
A judicial admission is a deliberate, clear, unequivocal statement of a party about a
oflaw .... [and] not opinion.
concrete fact within the party's peculiar knowledge, not a matter oflaw....

In re Universe Life Ins. Co., 144 Idaho 751,171 P.3d 242 (Idaho 2007)
GIVEN:
REFUSED: _ __
MODIFIED: _ __
COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 95
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COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. C\ \
Fraud which will invalidate a judgment must be extrinsic or collateral to the issm:s tried,
by which the aggrieved party has been prejudiced, or prevented from having a fair trial.

Frank v. Bunker Hill Co., 117 Idaho 790, 792 P.2d 815 (Idaho 1988)
GIVEN:
REFUSED: - - MODIFIED:- - _
COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 96
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-,
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

3L

A judgment obtained by fraud may, however, be void under some circumstances, and
subject to collateral attack, as where such fraud appears on the face of the record or goes to the
method of acquiring jurisdiction. Likewise, the judgment may be attacked collaterally where fraud
has been practiced in the very act of obtaining the judgment, or on the party against whom the
judgment was rendered, so as to prevent him from having a fair opportunity to present his case.

50 C.J.S. Judgments § 532. Fraud, collusion, or perjury
GWEN:
REFUSED:
MODIFIED:- - COVERED: _ __
OTHER:
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002129

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. q'~
Statutory protection is a defense to any alleged wrongful recording of a notice of claim.

Hewson v. Asker's Thrift Shop, 120 Idaho 164, 167,814 P.2d 424,427 (1991).
GIVEN:
REFUSED: - - MODIFIED:- - COVERED: _ __
OTHER:
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......
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
qL\JURY INSTRUCTION NO. qL\
Generally a right which stems from statutory protection is a defense to certain actions.

Rincover v. State, 128 Idaho 653, 656, 917 P.2d 1293, 1296 (1996).

GNEN:
REFUSED: - - MODIFIED:- - COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 99

002131

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. e10
A claimant can state a cause of action for abuse of process or tortious intentional
interference with a business advantage against a third party who is conditionally privileged if the
claimant can set forth factual allegations from which actual malice may reasonably be said to
exist.

Taylor v. McNichols, 36130, 36131 (IDSCCI) (2010) (modified)
GIVEN:
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MODIFIED:- - COVERED: _ __
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COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. C\lp
Only when a case has been concluded may one truly identify whether or not a prosecution
has been malicious, whether an attorney has committed malpractice, or, whether an attomey has
acted fraudulently or solely for his own benefit.

Taylor v. McNichols, 36130, 36131 (IDSCCI)
GIVEN:
REFUSED: _ __
MODIFIED:- - COVERED:. -OTHER:
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......
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

on

Attorneys must not knowingly counselor assist a client in committing a crime or fraud.

(IDSCCI)
Taylorv. McNichols, 36130, 36131 (lDSCCI)
GIVEN:
REFUSED: _ __
___
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COVERED:- - OTHER:
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COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. {\CO
By giving you instructions on the subject of damages, I do not express any opinion as to
whether the counter-claimants are entitled to damages.

IDJI 9.00. Cautionary instruction on damages
GIVEN:
REFUSED: _ __
_
MODIFIED:- - COVERED: _ __
OTHER:
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COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. C\(~
If the jury decides the counter-claimant is entitled to recover from the counter
counterdefendant(
s), the jury must determine the amount of money that will reasonably and faid y
defendant(s),
compensate the counter-claimant for any damages proved to be proximately caused by the
counter-defendant( s)' conduct.
counter-defendant(s)'
The elements of damage the jury may consider are:
1. The difference between the fair market value of the property immediately before the
occurrence, and its fair market value after the occurrence.
Whether the plaintiff has proved any of these elements is for the jury to decide.

IDJI 9.01. Damage instruction for injuries to plaintiff - general case
GIVEN:
REFUSED: - - MODIFIED:- - COVERED:- - OTHER:
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COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. \ CO
If the jury decides that the counter-claimant is entitled to recover from the counterdefendants, the jury must determine the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly
compensate the counter-claimant for any damages proved to be proximately caused by the
counter-defendant(
s)' conduct.
counter-defendant(s)'
The elements of damage to counter-claimant's property are:
The difference between the fair market value of the property immediately before the occurrence,
and its fair market value after the occurrence.

IDJI 9.07. Property damage instruction

GNEN:
REFUSED: _ __
___
MODIFIED:COVERED:- - OTHER:
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COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. JQL
When I use the tenn "value" or the phrase "fair market value" or "actual cash value" in
these instructions as to any item of property, I mean the amount of money that a willing buyer
would pay and a willing seller would accept for the item in question in an open marketplace, in
the item's condition as it existed immediately prior to the occurrence in question.

IDJI 9.12. Value or fair market defined
GIVEN:
REFUSED: _ __
MODIFIED:- - COVERED:- - OTHER:
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002138

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. \ D'A
A person who has been damaged must exercise ordinary care to minimize the damage and
prevent further damage. Any loss that results from a failure to exercise such care cannot be
recovered.

IDJI 9.14 - Mitigation of damages
GIVEN:
REFUSED: _ __
MODIFIED:- - COVERED:- - OTHER:
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COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO.J.(22
NO.J.D2
I have given you the rules of law that apply to this case. I have instructed you regarding
matters that you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the facts. In a few minutes
counsel will present their closing arguments to you and then you will retire to the jury room for
your deliberations.
Each of you has an equally important voice in the jury deliberations. Therefore, the
attitude and conduct of
jurors at the beginning of the deliberations are important. At the outset of
ofjurors
deliberations, it is rarely productive for a juror to make an emphatic expression of opinion on the
case or to state how he or she intends to vote. When one does that at the beginning, one's sense
of pride may be aroused and there may be reluctance to change that position, even if shown that it
is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates, but you are judges. For you, as for
me, there can be no triumph except in the ascertainment and declaration of the truth.
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views. Deliberate with the objective of
reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual judgment. Each of
you must decide this case for yourself; but you should do so only after a discussion and
consideration of the case with your fellow jurors.

IDJI 1.13 - Concluding remarks
GIVEN:
_
REFUSED: - - MODIFIED:___
COVERED:- - 
OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 108

002140

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 'bl.\
'bL\
On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a foreman, who will preside
over your deliberations.
Appropriate forms of verdict will be submitted to you with any instructions. Use only the
ones conforming to your conclusions and return the others unused.
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. If your verdict
is unanimous, your foreman alone will sign it; but if nine or more, but less than the entire jury,
agree, then those so agreeing will sign the verdict.
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdict, you will notify the bailiff: who
will then return you into open court.

IDJI
1.15.1 Completion of verdict form - general verdict
IDJll.15.1

GIVEN:
REFUSED: _ __
MODIFIED:- - COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS -109
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COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. \OS
On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a foreman, who will preside
over your deliberations. An appropriate form of verdict will be submitted to you with any
instructions. Follow the directions on the verdict form, and answer all of the questions required
of you by the instructions on the verdict form. A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your
number, or nine of you. As soon as nine or more of you shall have agreed upon each of the
required questions in the verdict, you should fill it out as instructed, and have it signed. It is not
necessary that the same nine agree on each question. If your verdict is unanimous, your foreman
alone will sign it; but if nine or more, but less than the entire jury, agree, then those so agreeing
will sign the verdict. As soon as you have completed and signed the verdicts, you will notify the
baili ff, who will then return you into open court.

IDJI 1.15.2 - Completion of verdict form on special interrogatories
GIVEN:
REFUSED: - - MODIFIED:- - COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS -110
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COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. \oto
I have given you the rules of law that apply to this case. I have instructed you regarding
matters that you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the facts. In a few minutes
counsel will present their closing arguments to you and then you will retire to the jury room for
your deliberations.
Each of you has an equally important voice in the jury deliberations. Therefore, the
of jurors at the beginning of the deliberations are important. At the;: outset of
attitude and conduct ofjurors
deliberations, it is rarely productive for a juror to make an emphatic expression of opinion on the
case or to state how he or she intends to vote. When one does that at the beginning, one's sense
of pride may be aroused and there may be reluctance to change that position, even if shown that it
is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates, but you are judges. For you, as for
me, there can be no triumph except in the ascertainment and declaration of the truth.
obj(~ctive of
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views. Deliberate with the obj(~ctive

reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual judgment. Each of
you must decide this case for yourself; but you should do so only after a discussion and
consideration of the case with your fellow jurors.

IDJI 1.13 - Concluding remarks
GIVEN:
REFUSED:
MODIFIED: _ __
COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 111
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COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. \01
On counter-claimants' claim of abuse of process against the counter-defendants, the
counter-claimants have the burden of proof on each of the following propositions by clear and
convincing evidence:
(1) Counter-defendants affirmatively used a legal process against the counter-claimants;

(2) primarily to accomplish an improper purpose outside of simply gaining an advantage in the
underlying litigation for which the process was not designed;
(3) harm has been caused to the counter-claimants by misuse of the process external to the
litigation that cannot be compensated in the underlying proceeding.
On counter-claimants' claim of tortious interference with prospective business advantage
against the counter-defendants, the counter-claimants have the burden of proof on each of the
following propositions:
1. The existence of a valid economic expectancy;
2. knowledge of the expectancy on the part of the interferer;
3. intentional interference inducing termination of the expectancy;
4. the interference was wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the interference itself;
5. resulting damage to the counter-claimant whose expectancy has been disrupted.
6. It is not a tort where one acts to protect her own economic interests, even if there is
interference with the contract expectancy of another, so long as the acts of the intervenor are not
GIVEN:
REFUSED:
__ _
MODIFIED:___
COVERED:OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 112
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COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO.
independently wrongful.
In this case, the counter-defendants have asserted affirmative defenses. On these
affirmative defense, the counter-defendants have the burden of proof on each of the following
propositions for any oftheir affirmative defenses:
1. The doctrine of quasi-estoppel applies when: (1) the offending party took a different position
than his or her original position, and (2) either (a) the offending party gained an advantage or
caused a disadvantage to the other party; (b) the other party was induced to change positions; or
(c) it would be unconscionable to permit the offending party to maintain an inconsistent position
from one he or she has already derived a benefit or acquiesced in.

2. Equitable Estoppel. The doctrine of equitable-estoppel applies when:
1. The counter-claimants falsely represented or concealed a material fact to the counterdefendants and/or the court;

2. The counter-claimants knew or should have known the true facts;
3. The court and/or the counter-defendants did not know and could not discover the true facts;
4. The court and/or counter-defendants relied on the misrepresentation or concealment to the
counter-defendants' prejudice.

3. Judicial Estoppel. The doctrine of
judicial-estoppel applies when:
ofjudicial-estoppel
Judicial estoppel is intended to prevent abuse of the judicial process by deliberate shifting of
GIVEN:
REFUSED: _ __
MODIFIED:- - COVERED:- - 
OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS --113
113
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COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO.
positions to suit the exigencies of a particular action. For guidance purposes and to avoid
misapplication of
judicial estoppel, it should be made clear that the concept should only be
ofjudicial
applied when the party maintaining the inconsistent position either did have, or was chargeable
with, full knowledge of the attendant facts prior to adopting the initial position. Stated another
way, the concept of
judicial estoppel takes into account not only what a party states under oath in
ofjudicial
open court, but also what that party knew, or should have known, at the time the original position
was adopted. Thus, the knowledge that the party possesses, or should have possessed, at the time
the statement is made is determinative as to whether that person is "playing fast and loose" with
the court.
Representations of fact, purporting to be on the basis of the lawyer's personal knowledge,
may well be used against that lawyer in subsequent proceedings. Certainly, statements in an
affidavit of an attorney purporting to be based upon personal knowledge could be governed by
ofjudicial
the doctrine of
judicial estoppel.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the counter-claimants have
proved each of the propositions required of the counter-claimants for either of their claims on
the case in chief, and further find that the counter-defendants have failed to prove each of the
propositions required for anyone of their affirmative defense, your verdict should be for the
counter-claimants.
GIVEN:
REFUSED:
MODIFIED:- - _
COVERED:- - OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS -114
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COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO.
If you find that the counter-claimants have failed to prove each of the propositions
required of the counter-claimants for any of their claims on the case in chief, or find that the
counter-defendants have proved each of the propositions required for the any of their aHirmative
afjirmative
defense, your verdict should be for the counter-defendants.
You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form:
This form consists of a series of questions that you are to answer. I will read the verdict
form to you now.
QUESTION NO. 1. Did the Counter-Defendants commit an abuse of process?
ANSWER: Yes

No

QUESTION NO.2. Did the Counter-Defendants commit a tortious interference with a
prospective economic advantage?
ANSWER: Yes

No

If you answered the first two questions "No," you are done. Sign the verdict as instructed and
advise the Bailiff. If you answered either question "Yes," continue to the next questions.,
QUESTION NO.3. Was there proof establishing a claim of "Equitable Estoppel" against
the counter-claimants?
ANSWER: Yes

No

QUESTION NO.4. Was there proof establishing a claim of "Quasi-Estoppel" against the
GIVEN:
REFUSED: - - MODIFIED: _ __
COVERED: _ __
OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 115
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COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO.
counter-claimants?
ANSWER: Yes

No

QUESTION NO.5. Was there proof establishing a claim of "Judicial Estoppel" against
the counter-claimants?
ANSWER: Yes

No

If you answered any of the above question numbers 3 through 5, "Yes" then please, sign
the verdict as instructed and advise the Bailiff. If you answered all the above question numbers 1
through 6, "No", continue to the next questions.
The verdict form continues:
QUESTION No.6: What is your determination of the total amount of damages sustained
by the counter-claimants:
Answer: "",$=======
Finally, you should sign the verdict as explained in another instruction."

IDJI 1.43.1. Instruction on special verdict form
GIVEN:
REFUSED: _ __
MODIFIED: _ __
COVERED:- - 
OTHER:
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS -116
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,

Case No. CV-OC-0723232

SPECIAL VERDICT

Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,
v.
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, flkla
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
"We, the jury, answer the questions submitted to us in the special verdict as follows:
QUESTION NO. 1. Did the Counter-Defendants commit an abuse of process?
ANSWER: Yes

No

QUESTION NO.2. Did the Counter-Defendants commit a tortious interference with a
prospective economic advantage?
ANSWER: Yes

No

QUESTION NO.3. Was there proof establishing a claim of "Equitable Estoppel" against
the counter-claimants?

SPECIAL VERDICT - Pg 1
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ANSWER: Yes

No

QUESTION NO.4. Was there proof establishing a claim of "Quasi-Estoppel" against the
counter-claimants?
ANSWER: Yes

No

QUESTION NO.5. Was there proof establishing a claim of "Judicial Estoppel" against
the counter-claimants?
ANSWER: Yes

No

QUESTION No.6: What is your determination of the total amount of damages sustained
by the counter-claimants:

Answer: .,.,,$=======
-"',$=======

JUROR

JUROR

JUROR

JUROR

JUROR

JUROR

JUROR

JUROR

JUROR

JUROR

SPECIAL VERDICT - Pg 2
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JUROR

JUROR

SPECIAL VERDICT - Pg 3
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TROUPIS LAW OFFICE
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130
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Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STA
TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUJ'l"TY
COUl'l"TY OF ADA
STATE
- - -----------c-----

· BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
I MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCHBIRCH
MAILE, husband and wife,
I,

Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,

------------,

----------~-l

CV -OC-0723232
Case No. CV-OC-0723232

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
COUNTER-CLAIMANTS' MOTION IN
LIMINE AND SUPPLEMENTAl.
MOTION IN LIMINE

· v.
CONNIE WRIGHT l'
TAYLOR,
AYLOR, f/k/a
, CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
AYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
· l'
TAYLOR,
l'
AYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
TAYLOR,
• FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
· an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
I

· REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable

trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
iI ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
· POSSESSION.
Ii

!

Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
The Counter-Defendants by and through their undersigned co-counsel of record provide
this Memorandum Brief in Opposition to Counter-Claimants Motion in Limine and
Supplemental Motion in Limine, as follows:
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LEGAL ARGUMENT
A. Subjects of Counterclaimants' limine motion.
Counterclaimants request limine orders for exclusion of evidence and/or argument in
approximately 41 categories. They are summarized briefly as follows:
1. Opinion testimony that the Court's ruling in this case on the issue of res judicata was in
error.
2. Opinion testimony that the court's ruling denying BerkshirelMailes' motions to
dismiss and/or for summary judgment were in error.
3. Mr. Maile's opinion that the appellate court will reverse the ruling on res judicata
and/or find an exception based on perjury or fraud on the court.
4. Mr. Runft opinion that Judge Wilper would not have ordered property restored to the
trust without Taylor's misrepresentation of their status as beneficiaries of the trust.
5. Mr. Runft's opinion that if Taylors were no longer beneficiaries, the judgment ordering
the property restored to the trust was wrongfully obtained by their fraud and/or crimina.l
misconduct.
6. That the litigation privilege should apply as a defense in this case.
7. Testimony about the Taylor v. McNichols lawsuit between Reed Taylor and John and
Connie Taylor.
8. Testimony as to when a claim for litigation misconduct accrues, and limitations of
appellate review to areas ripe for judicial determination.
9. Testimony that Taylors did not have the legal right to seek return of the Linder
property to the trust.
10. Mr. Maile's testimony that he interpreted the Supreme Court's decision in Taylor II
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO COUNTERCLAIMANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE AND
SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION IN LIMINE - PG 2
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as holding that "Taylors had in fact disclaimed their entire interest in the trust" and were not
beneficiaries of the trust.
11. Mr. Runft's testimony that Taylors didn't retain any beneficial interest in the trust,
and "committed an unlawful objective in having the property restored by misrepresenting their
status as beneficiaries."
12. Testimony that the refusal of the Court to award sanctions on Taylors' request
justifies an inference that Counterdefendants' claims were not frivolous.
13. Testimony as to the "custom and practice of attorneys in the State ofIdaho."
14. Testimony as to the money invested by Berkshire in the property, and theories as to
why Berkshire and Mailes were denied the remedy of unjust enrichment.
15. Testimony that Berkshire paid for the land and the Trust waived its right to rescind
the transacdtion, and Beth Rogers represented to Mailes and Berkshire that the Trust would stand
by the contract.
of judicial estoppel.
16. Testimony as to applicability ofjudicial
17. Testimony as to Counterdefendants' Second and Third Affirmative Defenses.
18. Testimony about the value of the Linder property in 2002, 2004, and 2006.
19. Testimony by Al Knudson about the construction loan obtained by Mailes in 2004.
20. Testimony by Bart Harwood about the disclaimer agreement.
21. Testimony by David Wishney about the 2002 purchase of the Linder prope:rty.
22. Testimony by Phillip Collaer about the erroneous admission in appellate briefing that
Maile had a conflict of interest in purchasing the Linder property.
23. Testimony by Jack Gjording about the erroneous admission in appellate briefing that
Maile had a conflict of interest in purchasing the Linder property.
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO COUNTERCLAIMANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE AND
SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION IN LIMINE - Pg 3
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24. Testimony by Imajean Hetherington about the value of the property in 2002.
25. Testimony about the agreement or disagreement of other beneficiaries with the filing
of the initial lawsuit against Berkshire and Mailes.
26. Testimony about Ted Johnson's state of mind about sale of the property to :\1ailes.
27. Testimony about communications between the trustees and beneficiaries of the trust
and their attorneys.
28. Testimony about communications prior to execution of the Disclaimer Agreement
and surrounding the resignation of Beth and Andy Rogers.
29. Testimony as to Helen Taylor's will.
30. Testimony by Helen Taylor.
31. Testimony about administration and distributions of the Trust.
32. Advocacy by Mr. Maile during the trial.
33. Any Cumulative evidence.
DaHan Taylors purchase of real property from the trust.
34. Testimony about Reed and Dallan

35. Testimony that Counterclaimants recover would not subject to taxation.
36. Amount of damages requested in pleadings.
37. Comment on testimony of witnesses who will not or may not testify.
38. Comment on financial status of a party to the suit.
39. Comment on adverse effects on society of an award.
40. Expert opinions not disclosed pursuant to the scheduling order.
41. Comments on motions to exclude evidence.

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO COUNTERCLAIMANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE AND
SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION IN LIMINE - PG 4
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--B.Argument
Counterclaimants contend that Counterdefendants committed abuse of process "by their
conduct in Taylor v. Maile and in the present lawsuit." They allege that Counterdefendants
purpose ... " The Amended
"engaged in willful acts ... primarily to accomplish an improper purpose...
Counterclaim lists a number of specific acts, all of which occurred in the litigation. In their
witness disclosure, Counterclaimants assert their intention to introduce evidence regarding
events that occurred during the present and prior litigation, and to introduce valuations of the real
property going back to 2004 as part of their damage claims.
It appears from Counterclaimants' Motion in Limine that they view abuse of process and

interference with economic advantage to be strict liability torts. That is, they argue that since this
Court dismissed the Berkshire/Maile Complaint, ruling that it was barred by res judicata, that this
fact, together with the fact that Berkshire/Maile filed a Notice of Lis Pendens and various other
filings, are not only sufficient, but conclusive evidence proving their claims, and therefore, all
that remains for them is to submit those facts and then prove up their damages.
Neither of these tort claims are strict liability offenses. To prove their claim for abuse of
process, Counterclaimants must show:
1. Counterdefendants affirmatively used a legal process against counterclaimants;
2. Primarily to accomplish an improper purpose outside of simply gaining an advantage
in the underlying litigation, for which the process was not designed; and
3. Harm has been caused to the Counterclaimants by misuse of the process external to
the litigation that cannot be compensated in the underlying proceeding.
The tort of intentional interference with prospective economic advantage requires proof
that:
COUNTERCLAlMANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE AND
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO COUNTERCLAIMANTS'
SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION IN LIMINE - Pg 5
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.........

1. The defendant had an improper objective or purpose to harm the plaintiff; or
2. The defendant used a wrongful means to cause injury to the prospective business
relationship; and
3. The defendant's actions caused damage to the plaintiffs prospective business
relationship.
In their motion in limine, Counterclaimants argue for application of a double standard --that the Court should allow Counterclaimants to present evidence about all of the
Counterdefendants' actions in the prior litigation, claiming that each of these actions constituted
an abuse of process and resulted in an interference with their prospective economic advantage,
but at the same time preclude Counterdefendants from presenting any evidence in response to
explain why they took the actions, their justification for the actions and state of mind as to the
propriety and legality of those actions at the time that they took them, and present expE:rt
testimony with respect to the legal basis of their reasoning at the time. Granting the
Counterclaimants' motion on most of the requested areas of testimony would effectively convert
the torts of abuse of process and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage to
strict liability claims. If the actions are relevant to the claims, then the reasons underlying those
actions are just as relevant to establish defenses to the claims.
In their defense to these claims of abuse of process and intentional interference,
Counterdefendants are entitled to present evidence on all factual issues and respecting all of the
events that Counterclaimants introduce in their case in chief. Counterdefendants are entitled to
present evidence on each of these factual issues to establish that they did not willfully act "to
accomplish an improper purpose." As proof of these defenses, the following will be rdevant and
defendants at the time that they undertook
material: (1) the subjective state of mind of Counter
Counterdefendants
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO COUNTERCLAIMANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE AND
SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION IN LIMINE - PG 6
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each of the acts that Counterclaimants complain of; (2) the reasons that Counterdefendants did
each ofthe specific alleged acts, and (3) whether they reasonably believed these acts were
justified under the circumstances, and (4) given the state of Idaho law at the time that t:ach act
occurred, and the procedural posture of the litigation, whether Counterdefendants could
reasonably entertain such beliefs, and (5) the absence of any ulterior or wrongful motive by
Counterdefendants at the time that they undertook each of the complained of acts.
If Counterclaimants do not present evidence regarding a particular act,
Counterdefendants will have no need to introduce evidence to defend that act. However, it is
impossible for us to predict what subjects the Court will allow Counterclaimants' case to cover.
In response to Counterdefendants' motion in limine regarding the litigation privilege,
Counterclaimants made the following argument: "If the litigation privilege does not apply, there
can be no rational argument that Maile's actions in prior litigation are not directly relevant to the
claims of abuse of process and tortious interference with contract."
While the motion in limine addresses 41 categories, the foregoing covers most of
Counterclaimants' argument in support of their motion, including issues # 1,2,3,4,5,6,9, 10,
11,13, 14, 15, 16, 17,20,22, and 23.

Issues 1- 5.
Counterclaimants seek to exclude expert testimony about the application of res judicata in
this case. Counterclaimants claim that because the Court ruled that res judicata barred the
complaint,
Counterdefendants' com
plaint, that the filing was an abuse of process. Counterdefendants'
experts will testify that at the time that the Counterdefendants' Complaint was filed in this case,
that the application of the doctrine of res judicata to these facts was not clearly established, and
that it was not umeasonable for Counterdefendants to conclude that res judicata did not preclude
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO COUNTERCLAIMANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE AND
SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION IN LIMINE - Pg 7
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their claims. That testimony is not contrary to this Court's ruling on res judicata or dismissal of
the claims, and is relevant to the defenses asserted in this case because it bears on the willfulness,
motives, and state of mind of the Counterdefendants in filing their complaint.
Counterclaimants want the court to preclude Thomas Maile from testifying that he
believes that the appellate court will reverse the Court's ruling on res judicata and/or the
perjury/fraud exception to it. His subjective belief in the merits of his claims, to the extent that
those beliefs motivated the actions that Counterclaimants contend were an abuse of process, is
relevant.
Counterclaimants want the court to preclude John Runft from testifying that Judge Wilper
"would not have ordered the property restored to the trust" without Taylors active
misrepresentation. This is a gross oversimplification of his expert testimony. Mr. Runft will
testify that given the legal posture ofthe case at the time that the hearing on unjust enrichment
was held, that the Taylors' misrepresentation of their status as beneficiaries and the Court's
acceptance of that status caused the Court to reverse its prior ruling that Berkshire could pursue
its claims for quasi-estoppel, allowing Taylors to rescind the transaction and limiting Berkshire's
remedy to unjust enrichment. A hearing on the quasi estoppel claim was never allowed against
the trust since the property had been restored to the trust independent of the action of the mailes
and/or the trust.
BerkshirelMailes were prevented from defending their right to retain title to the property
as against the trust on the basis of quasi estoppel, which was previously authorized by Judge
Wilper. That claim was supported by facts establishing their equitable claims -- they had paid the
full purchase price, taken possession, and made improvements amounting to a detriment to
MaileslBerkshire. These facts are relevant to establish extrinsic fraud by Taylors. The Mailes
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO COUNTERCLAIMANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE AND
SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION IN LIMINE - PG 8
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were deprived of an opportunity to defend the claims affecting title by the trust as the Taylors
judgment on Beneficiaries claims instead of a
perjury as to their status led to the entry of
ofjudgment
judgment on the Trust's claims. The cases were consolidated and Taylors' asserting th(~mselves
th(!mselves
as beneficiaries deprived the defense to the trust's claims to title. This has nothing to do with
unjust enrichment claims.
Counterdefendants' expert witness disclosure stated that Mr. Runft would testify as
follows:
The witness will testify that without the Taylors active misrepresentation, Judge Wilper
would not have ordered the property restored to the trust. Judge Wilper's Memorandum
Decision and Order, on July 28, 2005 (attached to the Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part 2-Exhibit
K), establishes that the trust could not rescind the transaction since the action of the trustee, Beth
Rogers demonstrated the trust had waived its right to rescind the sales transaction. Judge Wilper
had previously ruled that Berkshire Investment could pursue its claims for quasi and equitable
estoppel and its claim of tortious interference with contract claim (Judge Wilper's Order
Regarding Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, on February 13,2006). The trust could
not have had the property restored as it waived that right to restore the real property to the trust
and/or the claims of quasi estoppel would have been considered by the court. An unlawful
objective was committed by the defendants in having the property restored by misrepresenting
their status as beneficiaries before the court in January 2006. The plaintiffs were prevented from
advancing to trial to show that the trust was estopped from claiming title and this constitutes a
valid claim of extrinsic fraud. Fraud is extrinsic when it prevents a party from having his day in
court. The plaintiffs were prevented from presenting their claim based on quasi estoppel to
maintain title to the property. The plaintiffs were limited to their claim for money damages
(unjust enrichment) for enhancement of value to the property only.

Issue #6 That the litigation privilege should apply as a defense in this case.
The litigation privilege applies to parties as well as their attorneys. Depending on the
specific conduct that the Counterclaimants assert constituted an abuse of process, testimony that
the Counterdefendants believed that conduct was privileged is relevant.

Issue #7. Testimony about the Taylor v. McNichols lawsuit between Reed Taylor and John and
Connie Taylor.
Counterdefendants contend that they filed the lawsuit against Taylors for a proper
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO COUNTERCLAIMANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE AND
SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION IN LIMINE - Pg 9
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purpose and that their actions were reasonable. The Supreme Court's ruling in Taylor v.

McNichols supports that claim.

Issue #8.Testimony as to when a claim for litigation misconduct accrues, and limitations of
appellate review to areas ripe for judicial determination.
Counterdefendants contend that they reasonably believed that they had a right to file the
lawsuit against Taylors, and that the prior Supreme Court decision did not bar the suit. Their
state of mind is relevant in that regard as well as the existing law and/or goodfaith argument for
the extension of law.

Issue #9. Testimony that Taylors did not have the legal right to seek return of the Linder
property to the trust.
This evidence is relevant to the Counterdefendants subjective beliefs at the time that they
filed their lawsuit against Taylors. The manner in which the Taylors obtained their judgment
was based upon perjury and extrinsic fraud. The case of Taylor v. McNichols recognizes that
attorneys and parties acting fraudulently or committing a crime gives rise to a new cause of
action at the conclusion ofthe underlying case.

Issue #10. Mr. Maile's testimony that he interpreted the Supreme Court's decision in Taylor II as
holding that "Taylors had in fact disclaimed their entire interest in the trust" and were not
beneficiaries of the trust.
Mr. Maile's subjective belief and state of mind at the time that the suit was fikd against
Taylors for abuse of process is relevant.

Issue #11. Mr. Runft's testimony that Taylors didn't retain any beneficial interest in the trust,
and "committed an unlawful objective in having the property restored by misrepresenting their
status as beneficiaries."
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO COUNTERCLAIMANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE AND
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Mr. Runft's expert opinion that a reasonable argument can be made in support of
Maile/Berkshire's position and decision in filing the lawsuit against Taylors supports the defense
that it was filed with a proper purpose.
Issue #12. Testimony that the refusal ofthe Court to award sanctions on Taylors' request
justifies an inference that Counterdefendants' claims were not frivolous.
The fact that Judge Wilper and the Supreme Court both refused to award sanctions
against BerkshirelMaile although asked to do so by Taylors for specific conduct during the
litigation is material evidence on the issue whether their actions were legally authorized, or
frivolous and supports the opinions that the filing of the claims against the counter-claimants was
based upon meritorious claims and/or issues.
Issue #13. Testimony as to the "custom and practice of attorneys in the State ofIdaho."
To the extent that Taylors have admitted that they are not suing Tom Maile as 1m
attorney, and this Court has so indicated in its prior rulings, testimony in this area may not be
introduced. However, Counterdefendants should be permitted to respond to any testimony
allowed by the Court from Taylors as to a reasonableness or lack of reasonableness of filing and
pursuing the claims dismissed by this court standard of care for attorneys.
Issue #14. Testimony as to the money invested by Berkshire in the property, and theories as to
why Berkshire and Mailes were denied the remedy of unjust enrichment.
BerkshirelMailes have not contended that they were denied the remedy of unjust
emichment. They were denied the remedy of quasi-estoppel as against the Trust which was
th{! value of
making a claim to the title, recovery for which is not dependent upon an increase in th{:
the property from the investment. Quasi estoppel as allowed by Judge Wilper would have
allowed an evaluation of the competing equities to the title. The Mailes were prevented from
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defending the claims of title by the trust based upon quasi estoppel. Equitable considerations
authorizing the remedy of quasi estoppel included the fact that Mailes paid the entire purchase
price, took possession of the property and made improvements costing $250,000. All ofthese
facts amounted to a detriment to Mailes and these facts are relevant to establish the basis for
BerkshirelMailes' claims for extrinsic fraud. The Mailes were deprived of an opportunity to
defend the claims affecting title by the trust as the Taylors perjury as to their status led to
judgment on beneficiaries claims as opposed to a judgment on trust's claims. The cases were
Berkshire~..1ailes
consolidated. Taylors asserted themselves as beneficiaries, which deprived Berkshire~..1ailes

defense to the trust's claims to title. This has nothing to do with unjust enrichment claims This
testimony supports the Counterdefendants' claim that they brought suit for damages against
Taylors and their attorneys for a proper purpose based upon their belief that Taylors had engaged
in extrinsic fraud which prevented BerkshirelMailes from having a trial on their quasi-estoppel
claim. Counterdefendants also believed that they had the right under IRCP Rule 60(b), not barred
by res judicata, to file a separate action against Taylors to seek equitable relief and damages
based on that extrinsic fraud. The issue is not whether BerkshirelMailes were correct in those
beliefs, but whether they entertained them at the time that the complaint was filed. Those beliefs
negate the element of 'improper purpose' required in proof of an abuse of process or interference
with economic advantage claim.
Issue #15. Testimony that Berkshire paid for the land and the Trust waived its right to rescind

the transaction, and Beth Rogers represented to Mailes and Berkshire that the Trust would stand
by the contract.
This testimony supports the Counterdefendants' claim that they brought suit for damages
against Taylors for a proper purpose. See Response to #14.
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Issue #16. Testimony as to applicability of
judicial estoppel.
ofjudicial
This testimony supports the Counterdefendants' claim that they brought suit for damages
against Taylors for a proper purpose. See Response to #14.
Issue #17. Testimony as to Counterdefendants' Second and Third Affirmative Defensl~s.
Counterdefendants are entitled to introduce evidence on the facts supporting the claims
that they filed against Taylors and their belief as to the viability oftheir claims, to the extent that
Taylors assert the claims that Berkshire/Mailes did not file the claims with a proper purpose. See
Response to #14.
Issue #18. Testimony about the value of the Linder property in 2002, 2004, and 2006.
We have moved in limine to preclude Taylors from introducing any evidence as to the
value of the property, except for the period oftime from the issuance ofthe remittitur in Taylor
II, which was April 15,2009, and the date that the lis pendens was removed, July 13,2:009. To
the extent that this limitation is applied, valuations on other dates would not be relevant.
Issue #19. Testimony by Al Knudson about the construction loan obtained by Mailes in 2004.
This testimony forms the basis for Counterdefendants' quasi-estoppel claims which were
not brought to a trial for the reasons set out in # 14 above. Mr. Knudson will testify that the
eVI~n in light
construction loan required the Mailes to incur expenses to complete the subdivision eVt~n

of the Taylors' filing the 1st lawsuit and lis pendens. Mailes were forced to continue the
development, and did so in reliance upon representations made by Beth Rogers (nominated
successor's trustee) in 2003 that the Trust was standing by the real estate contract. Mailes had to
invest an additional $250,000 in the property in addition to the purchase price.
Issue #20. Testimony by Bart Harwood about the disclaimer agreement.
gers. The basis of Counterdefendants' claims against
Rogers.
Bart Harwood represented Beth Ro
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Taylors arose from their execution of the disclaimer agreement. Counterdefendants believed that
Taylors perpetrated perjury and a fraud on the court that resulted in BerkshirelMailes' loss of the
Linder Road property. That was the basis for their lawsuit against Taylors for equitable relief and
their claim for damages. The facts regarding the disclaimer supported the Counterdefendants'
beliefs that caused them to file the lawsuit, and support their claim that it was filed for a proper
purpose. Bart harwood will provide testimony surrounding the purpose of the disclaimer
agrement and whether the judicial admissions by the counter-claimants that Helen Taylor was
the sole beneficiary of trust was consistent with the disclaimer agreement as negotigat~:d by and
between the Taylor beneficiaries and his client Beth Rogers.
Issue #21. Testimony by David Wishney about the 2002 purchase ofthe Linder property.
propelty.
We cannot predict what testimony Counterclaimants will be allowed to introduce on their
claims. To the extent that they attempt to attack Thomas Maile by asserting that the transaction
with Ted Johnson was not fair, testimony by third parties as to that transaction would be relevant.
Issue #22. Testimony by Phillip Collaer.
Mr. Collaer was one of the handling attorneys in Taylor v. Maile. To the extent that
Taylors are allowed to argue and present evidence to support the claim that actions taken in that
lawsuit by Counterdefendants constituted an abuse of process, Mr. Collaer has knowledge ofthe
facts relative to those actions and their proper purpose. Additionally, his testimony would be
foundational as to how that case ended with a determination that IC §68-106 was violated.
Issue #23. Testimony by Jack Gjording.
Mr. Gjording will not be called as a witness.
Issue #24. Testimony by Imajean Hetherington about the value of the property in 2002.
Ms. Hetherington will not be called as a witness.
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Issue #25. Testimony about the agreement or disagreement of other beneficiaries with the filing

of the initial lawsuit against Berkshire and Mailes.
Counterdefendants may call Beth Rogers to testify about the acts leading up to the
execution of the disclaimer agreement and her contacts with Connie Taylor and the other Taylors
with regard to their efforts to gain control ofthe Trust starting in 2003. It is Counterdefendants'
contention that Connie Taylor worked to gain control ofthe trust and place John Taylor as
trustee in place of Beth Rogers so that they could pursue the lawsuit against Berkshire/Mailes.
Her testimony will also establish that the Taylors knew of the importance to gain beth rogers as
trustee to join in the litigation as evidenced by the fact that the Taylors first lawsuit as
beneficiaries was dismissed for lack of standing since the court ruled that the trustee was
required to bring suit. Beth Rogers testimony is also important to establish the facts reIative to
quasi-estoppel
Counterdefendants' quasi
-estoppel claim.
Issue #26. Testimony about Ted Johnson's state of mind about sale of the property to MaBes.
Mailes.
if the Court were to allow Taylors to introduce
This testimony would be relevant only ifthe

evidence or make the claim that Tom Maile took advantage of Ted Johnson with respect to the
sale of the real property from the Trust.
Issue #27. Testimony about communications between the trustees and beneficiaries of the trust

and their attorneys.
Bart Harwood will testify about the negotiations and execution of the disclaimt:r
agreement, and its effect. He represented Beth Rogers. Taylors do not have standing to assert a
privilege claim on her behalf. In addition there has been a request to preclude Connie Taylor as a
witness. There is now new counsel who has filed his motion for limited admission to at::t
al::t as
counsel for counter-claimants. The jury should consider some essential facts relating to Connie
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---Taylor that would require only limited testimony. Connie Taylor drafted the documents which
her husband executed which amounted to perjury. These acts ultimately lead to the judgment on
the beneficiaries' claims. She attended depositions were her clients made admissions under oath
concerning the fact that Helen Taylor was to get any money or property from the underlying
litigation. Connie Taylor dealt with the beneficiaries ofthe trust to obtain her husband's control
over the trust. This enabled her husband to file a lawsuit on behalf of the trust while the Taylors'
first lawsuit was dismissed by Judge Wilper. Her conduct and her testimony is relevant for the
jury to consider relating to the basis of the good faith clams advanced by the Counterdefendants
demonstrating there was no abuse of process. Also see response to #20

Issue #28. Testimony about communications prior to execution ofthe Disclaimer Agreement and
surrounding the resignation of Beth and Andy Rogers.
Beth Rogers may testify about the circumstances surrounding her resignation and her
understanding of the effect of the disclaimer agreement on the interests of the Taylors as
beneficiaries of the Trust. See Responses to #27 & 20.

Issue #29. Testimony as to Helen Taylor's will.
So long as Taylors are precluded from testifying that they acted on behalf of their mother
and with her consent in pursuing the lawsuits, this testimony would not be relevant. However, to
the extent that they do introduce such evidence, Helen Taylor's testimony and contents of her
will would be relevant.

Issue #30 Testimony by Helen Taylor.
See above. See Response to #29

Issue #31 Testimony about administration and distributions of the Trust.
Distribution ofthe trust assets was made in violation of the express terms of tht;: trust.
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Those facts show that Taylors disclaimed their interests as beneficiaries. The terms of the trust
provided that Ted Johnson's siblings only received income of the trust during their lives with no
right to invade the corpus of the trust. The Taylor brothers were beneficiaries of the corpus of the
trust, but relinquished their entire beneficial interest in the trust and authorized disbursement of
the trust corpus to their mother in exchange for the right to pursue the lawsuit as trustt:::es, and
retaining only a liability to the trust, which was their agreement to indemnify the trust in the
event that they lost the lawsuit against Berkshire/Mailes. See Response to #28, 27, 25, & 20.

Issue #32

Advocacy by Mr. Maile during the trial.

Mr. Maile is a witness and party in the case. He is represented by counsel who will
handle all aspects of the trial.

Issue #33

Any Cumulative evidence.

The court does not have the ability to determine at this point in time what evidence is
cumulative. Ruling on this motion should be reserved until evidence has been presented at trial.

Issue #34

Testimony about Reed and Dallan Taylors purchase of real property from the

trust.
Counterdefendants cannot anticipate what evidence Taylors may introduce on their
claims. If they assert that the price paid to the Trust by BerkshirelMailes was not fair, the
subsequent sale of property to Reed and Dallan Taylor by the trust without any appraisal would
be relevant to that claim.

Issue #35

Testimony that Counterclaimants recover would not subject to taxation.

Issue #36

Amount of damages requested in pleadings.

Issue #37

Comment on testimony of witnesses who will not or may not testify.

Issue #38

Comment on financial status of a party to the suit.
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Issue #39

Comment on adverse effects on society of an award.

Issue #40

Expert opinions not disclosed pursuant to the scheduling order.

Counterdefendants agree that expert witnesses should only be allowed to testif:y to the
extent that either side has properly disclosed such expert in a timely manner and fully as required
by the scheduling order. Counterdefendants have fully complied with the scheduling order by
timely disclosing their expert witnesses and providing a complete description of their ,mticipated
testimony. However, Counterclaimants have not done so with the exception ofD. Craig Lewis.
The testimony of all other experts offered by Counterclaimants should therefore be excluded. D.
Craig Lewis' testimony should be excluded for other reasons as set out in our motion in limine.
Issue #41. Comments on motions to exclude evidence.

RESPONSE TO SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION IN LIMINE

Counterclaimants ask for exclusion of evidence about the Petition for Appointment of
Trustees dated November 15, 2004, contending that it was superseded by the amended petition of
April 18, 2005. The relevance of this pleading in this case does not depend on whether the
document continues to function as a pleading. Instead, its relevance is based on whether
Counterdefendants believed that this filing evidenced an attempt to commit perjury and extrinsic
fraud. In this case, the evidence is admissible to show that Counterdefendants' purpose in
pursuing their complaint was proper in that they believed they had legal rights that were
enforceable at the time that the complaint was filed.
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Counterclaimants also ask for exclusion of evidence about the probate court hearings. The same
principles apply to that evidence as to the Petition noted above.
DATED this 10th day of January, 2011.

PIS, Co-counsel for
CHRIST T. TR
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
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I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 10th day of January, 2010, I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Memorandum in Opposition to CounterClaimants' Motion in Limine and
Supplemental Motion in Limine to be delivered, addressed as follows:
--,

Connie W. Taylor
Henderson Law Firm
900 Washington St. Suite 1020
Vancouver, Washington 98660
., Facsimile: (360) 693-2911
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Thomas G. Maile, IV.
380 W. State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001
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Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
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CONNIE W. TAYLOR
Henderson Law Firm, PLLC
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Vancouver, W
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Attorneys for Johnson Trust,
DaHan Taylor, and John Taylor

JAN 11 2011
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IRICH. Clerk
By BETH MAS1iERS
OEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability, and THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, and
COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE husband and wife,
Plainti
ffs,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV OC 0723232

MEMORANDUM
OPPOSING
COUNTER
COUNTERDEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE

YS.
vs.

CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, et al.
Defendants.

The Counterclaimants (Johnson Trust, Dallan Taylor, and John Taylor) submit the
following memorandum in opposition to the motions in limine filed by the Counter-Defendants.
1. Witness Sam Langston: The Counter-Defendant's Motion to exclude the testimony of
Sam Langston states that "such testimony and/or the information is immaterial to these
proceedings and lacks probative value and is not relevant."

The memorandum, however,

focuses solely on the timeliness of the disclosure of his appraisal; that is the argument this
memorandum will address.
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Mr. Langston's identify, qualifications, and the nature of his testimony were provided
on October 27, and his report was provided on December 7. The Counter-defendant
incorrectly state that they have not received supplemental discovery responses.

In actuality, a

supplemental response which specifically incorporated the witness disclosures was faxed to
them on December 29, two days before the date on the Motion.

A list of the law firms for

which Mr. Langston has acted as a witness has also been provided by informal means.
This court's scheduling order and I.R.C.P. 26(e)(l) require a party to "seasonably"
supplement disclosures as to expert witnesses.

Under subparagraph 4, the court may exclude

the testimony of witnesses not disclosed by a required supplementation of the responses.

The

decision as to whether to exclude undisclosed expert testimony is committed to the sound
discretion of the trial court. Schmechel v. Dille, 148 Idaho 176, 219 P.3d 1192 (2009).
The cases in which expert testimony has been excluded all look to whether the other
party was unfairly surprised, and whether the delay in disclosure prevented the other party
from having time to prepare to cross examine the witness. Neither of those elements is present

in this instance, and this is not a case which justifies the exclusion of this witness.

The

affidavit from Sam Langston shows that there was good cause for the delay in completing his
appraisal, and indicates that it was provided on December 6.

The Counter-Defendants

acknowledge they received a copy of the appraisal on December 7, so there can be no
argument that the disclosure was not "seasonably supplemented."
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This case certainly is not analogous to the Radmer case upon which the CounterDefendants rely; in that case, the defendant did not learn until the first day of trial that one of
the plaintiff's experts would be testifying to opinions that had not been disclosed. Nor is it like
the Clark case, where the disclosure was not supplemented until several days into the trial.

In

the other case cited in support of this motion, Hopkins v. Duo-Fast, the trial court allowed a
defense witness to express undisclosed opinions even though the plaintiffs were not advised of
changes in the expert's anticipated testimony until the morning he was going to testify.
Similarly, in Wiseman v. Schaffer, I the Court of Appeals affirmed a decision aJilowing
alilowing two
expert witnesses to testify who were disclosed for the first time in a supplemental discovery
response only three days before trial.
Most importantly, there is no factual support for counsel's statement that "your affiant
has not been able to obtain any experts in opposition to the late disclosed experts.,,2 Mr.
Langston's appraisal does not raise any issues which were not addressed in great detail by the
Counter-Defendants' witness Maurice Clifton,3 including an in-depth analysis of the market for
five-acre parcels in Eagle, how it has changed over the years, what comparable lots have sold

for, and his opinion as to the present market value of the lots in question. Mr.Clifton's opinion
is actually very close to Mr. Langston's valuation; Mr. Clifton will opine that these seven lots

115 Idaho 537, 768 P.2d 900 (CI. App. 1989),
Affidavit of Christ Troupis in support of motions in limine, paragraph 7, page 3.
3 Certification to Opposing Counsel of Expert & Lay Witnesses, pages 8-15.
I

2
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"have a present market value of between $90,000 and $125,000 each lot for a quick sale," and
Mr.Langston placed a value on the entire parcel of $650,000.
2. Witness Bob DeBolt.

The October 27 disclosure indicated that Connie Shannahan of

Coldwell Banker's realty would be testifying as to the information contained in the Coldwell
Banker Real Estate Services Proposal dated January 12, 2010, a copy of which had been filed
to opposing counsel as an attachment to her affidavit dated April 22, 2010.

Because Ms.

Shannahan is unable to be present at the trial, the broker in her office, Bob DeBolt, was
substituted to testify to the exact same information. This change in witnesses was "seasonably
supplemented" on December 9, 2010.
Because Mr. DeBolt's testimony will be the same as that of Ms. Shannahan, there is no
basis for excluding his testimony.

See Vannoy v. Uniroyal Tire CO.,4 in which the Idaho

Supreme Court stated:
We also find no error in the trial court's allowance of Dr. Surbaugh to testify in place of
plaintiff's treating physician who was unavailable at trial. Dr. Surbaugh was an associate
of plaintiff's treating physician, and his testimony was offered as being substantially the
same as the treating physician's testimony would be, and further testifying from the same
medical records which the treating physician would have testified from.

The Counter-Defendants certainly cannot argue that they are prejudiced by this change in
witness, or that there has been an unfair surprise.
3.

Witness Connie Shannahan. The first complaint about the disclosure for Ms.

Shannahan is that it merely provided her name and "a short, vague, potential conclusory
statement regarding the expected experts' opinions contained in her affidavit previously provided
4111
4 III Idaho 536, 544, 726 P.2d 648 (1985)
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to this court on April 22, 2010." This is not accurate; the disclosure stated she would testify as
to the infonnation contained in the Real Estate Services Proposal which was attached to her
affidavit. That proposal is a 37 page document which contains much of the same infonnation as
is contained in the disclosure for the Counter-Defendants' expert witness, Maurice Clifton.
The second complaint is that there was no opinion provided relating to the market value
of the real property "for the relevant periods of time," just the reference to a "range of listing
prices." The report covers the sale of comparable lots from January 2005 through January 12,
I 0, which is essential to show the damage to the Taylors from their inability to (1) accept the
20 I0,
$1.8 million offer they received in September 2005 and/or (2) actively market the property. The
Counter-defendants may have a different theory as to what time period is "relevant," but that is
an argument which goes to the weight, not the admissibility, of this testimony. It is a rather odd
argument, though, because the detailed infonnation contained in this report is very similar to the
testimony which they propose to elicit from Mr. Clifton, who makes repeated references to the
range of prices for similar lots in the Eagle area and a variety of different opinions as to potential
listing and possible sale prices for the Linder Road lots.
The third complaint is that we have not provided infonnation on qualifications, fees, prior
testimony or publications.
pUblications.

We have requested that infonnation from Mr. DeBolt and it will be

provided immediately when received; however, it is frequently difficult to obtain such
infonnation from witnesses who are not in the business as testifying as experts. They cite no
cases in which a late disclosure of background infonnation has resulted in the exclusion of a
witness.
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4. "Expert and Lay testimony Re: claims against Counter-Defendants." This motion
seeks to exclude any opinions as to the reasonableness of Mr. Maile's filing of the Berkshire suit
and/or the actions taken in Judge Wilper's proceedings, arguing that it invades the province of
the jury's functions.

This motion is quite peculiar in light of the fact that the Counter-

Defendants have indicated that both John Runft 5 and Thomas Maile6 will provide extensive
testimony and opinions that Mr. Maile's conduct was "allowed," was "acceptable," was
"reasonable," was "authorized," was "within the acceptable standard," was "appropriate," was
"required," and was "reasonably supported."
The memorandum in support of this motion consists of a six page quotation from a 1998
federal district court case, Kidder, Peabody v. lAG,
JAG, 7 which included an abuse of process claim.
In its defense, Kidder, Peabody claimed that it had acted on the advice of counsel, and disclosed
as an expert witness a law professor who intended to testify that Kidder, Peabody was reasonable
in relying on that advice. The court excluded the testimony because it felt that the real question
was whether the client had acted in good faith or with malice, and the jury would not be assisted
by expert opinion testimony.
This case is distinguishable from Kidder because the "client" is also an attorney, with
unique duties and obligations which are beyond the knowledge of lay persons. The trial will
involve an analysis of conduct in two different cases, with two appeals, one trial, numerous
motions, and many decisions.

Expert testimony is absolutely necessary to help the jury

understand terms and concepts which are well outside the knowledge of a lay person. Because of

Certification to Opposing Counsel of Expert & Lay Witnesses, pages 2 - 8
Certification to Opposing Counsel of Expert & Lay Witnesses, pages 15 - 16
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Mr. Maile's status as an attorney, the reasonableness of his conduct must be analyzed by persons
with qualifications in the legal field.
Counsel has been unable to locate any abuse of process cases other than Kidder in which
a legal expert was not allowed to testify under a 702-704 analysis. For example, in the very
recent 2009 Washington case Hough v. Stockbridge,8 two attorneys were allowed to testify as
expert witnesses about proper procedures, proper basis for motions, and express an opinion about
whether Mr. Hough had complied with civil discovery rules.

See also Yater v. Coy,9, in which

the defendant was an attorney accused of abuse of process for filing a claim that had no factual
basis. The attorney filed a motion for summary judgment which was support by the: affidavit of
an attorney, who express the expert opinion that the lawyer's conduct was reasonablle as well as
procedurally and substantively proper.

The trial court's order granting summary judgment was

failed to counter
affirmed by the Indiana Court of Appeals, which noted that the plaintiffs had jailed
the defense expert by presenting evidence that no competent and reasonable attomey familiar
with the law of the forum would have considered the claim worthy of litigation, or that the
attorney was acting with ulterior motive when filing the suit.
The issues in this case are analogous to legal malpractice cases,

III

which expert

testimony is almost always mandatory. See, for example, the Idaho Court of Appeals decision
th
in Jarman v. Hale, 10 in which the Court cited Annot. 14 A.L.R.4
A.L.R.4th
170 (1982) for the proposition

that "A lay witness does not have the experience, knowledge and wisdom to opinionate on the

S.D.N.Y. 1998)
152 Wash.App. 328, 216 P
.2d 1077 (2009)
P.2d
9681 N.E.2d 232, 234 (Indiana, 1997)
10 112
J 12 Idaho 270, 273, 731
73 J P.2d 813, 816 (et. App. 1986)
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complexities of trial practice ... "

The expert testimony must, however, relate to a disputed

factual issue, rather than merely being legal argument. Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 21 P.3d
908 (2001).
I.R.E. 704 allows expert testimony, by opinion or inference, which embraces an ultimate
issue to be decided by the trier of fact. The Counter-Defendants' own disclosure recognizes that
the question of whether Mr. Maile's conduct was reasonable or appropriate is relevant in this
case.

That goes directly to the issue of whether his use of the legal process was proper in the

regular course of proceedings.

They certainly can't be seriously arguing that Professor Lewis

may not testify to the very matters they plan to argue so vociferously.

The jury will be left with

the role of deciding which of the conflicting testimony to believe, and the ultimate question of
whether Mr. Maile's conduct was done for an improper purpose or by improper means.
5. Idaho State Bar Complaint. Taylors have the burden of showing that Mr. Maile's
Conduct was wrongful (i.e. had an ulterior, improper objective or was done by improper
means).ll

Because the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that "what motivates a person to

proof,"l2 Idaho has specifically recognized that interference
act seldom is susceptible of direct proof,,,l2
can be "wrongful" by reason of a statute or other regulation, or a recognized rule of common
law, or an established standard of trade or profession. 13

Idaho First Nat'! Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 286, R24 P.2d R41, 861 (1991); Commercial
Ventures,
VentI/res, Inc. v. Rex M. & Lynn Lea Family Trust, 145 Iduho 20R, 217,177 !'.3d 955,964 (2008) Badell v. Beeks.
115 Idaho 101, 104, 765 P.2d 126, 129 (1998)
12 Highland Enterprises v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330 at 340.
13 Idaho First Nat. Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc, 121 Idaho 266, 285, 824. P.2d 841,860 ((1991).
II
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Taylors' position is that Mr. Maile's conduct has been motivated, in part, by the ulterior
motive or improper purpose of forestalling a disciplinary action by the Idaho State Bar. He is
unlikely to admit that, so it will have to be established through inference. They will present
evidence of wrongfulness through testimony by Professor Craig Lewis and rebuttal testimony of
Leland Ripley that Mr. Maile's conduct has failed to comply with the standard for attorneys,
including the court rules and the rules of professional conduct. This is directly allowed by the

Idaho First Nat. Bank v. Bliss decision, and does not amount to attempting to bring a civil suit
for violation of a rule. John Taylor will testify that he filed a grievance with the Idaho State Bar
in 2005, and that the Bar did not file its complaint until 2009, after the Idaho Supreme Court had
issued its second decision and this Court dismissed Mr. Maile's complaint. Mr. Ripley will also
testify as to the IBCR which allows the Bar to suspend a disciplinary proceeding when litigation
is ongoing, and that many attorneys who are facing disciplinary proceedings raise the fact that
litigation is still pending to forestall the Bar.
The Idaho State Bar Complaint is, therefore, extremely relevant and probative on the
issue of whether Mr. Maile's conduct was undertaken for an improper purpose or by improper
means.

The fact that the Bar is recommending a suspension gives him substantial incentive to

keep the litigation churning. How else can you explain why an attorney would appeal a decision
which was based on facts to which there was no dispute (which in fact simply complied with the
directive of the Supreme Court in Taylor 1), pursue claims which had no legitimate basis, file
duplicative and uniformly unsuccessful motions and repeated requests to reconsider every ruling
against him, and basically do everything within his power to drag this litigation out for over
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seven years (so far), including filing a second lawsuit which was barred by the most elemental
legal principles?
Where evidence has substantial probative value on the issue on which is it introduced and
that issue is genuinely in dispute, it should be allowed.

14

As to the argument that the Complaint

is prejudicial, unfortunately the truth frequently does not put us in a favorable light.

The

question is whether it is unduly prejudicial, which in this case it is not. Any potential prejudice

can be handled by advising the jury that the evidence is being admitted for a limited purpose, that
Mr. Maile has denied the Complaint, and that a final determination has not yet bt:::en reached.
The Complaint could be used for illustrative purposes only as the witnesses testify, and not
transmitted to the jury room.
6. Damages.
a.

Claims in Taylor v. Maile. The Counter-Defendants have filed a motion in

limine arguing that there is no relevance to the facts, allegations and contentions from Taylor v.

Maile prior to the Amended Complaint.

On the issues of damages, however, they take the

opposite position and argue that the remedies sought in the initial pleadings shoul.d
should somehow
limit the damages sought in this case. They cite no legal authority for this position.
There is no relevance to deposition testimony taken over six years ago, nor to the
damages sought in the initial Complaint in the first lawsuit. It is incorrect to state that Judgment
was entered in favor of Taylors by Judge Wilper for rescission; the truth is that the Judgment was

entered because the purchase agreement was found to be void ab initio because of the lack of

14

Int'/ TrallSp. Corp., 121 Idaho 643,827 P.2d 656 (1992).
Watson v. Navistar Int'!
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court approval. There is no authority cited for the position that damages claimed prior to the date
of remand are barred; the prior suit did not address the current counterclaims.
b. Time period. Counter-Defendants' request that the Court limit the damage
evidence to the time period from February to August of 2009. This request is based on their oftrepeated position that the abuse of process claim is based solely on the filing of lis pendens.
That is not, and never has been, accurate.

They point to a single paragraph from the Amended

Counterclaim, and ignore the fact that the remaining nine paragraphs state broad allegations as to
15

conduct undertaken for an improper purpose in both the current lawsuit 15 and in Taylor v.
Maile. 16
c. Lis pendens. This is a red herring. The Taylors' claims are based on Mailes'
conduct in continuing to assert an ownership interest in the Linder Road propeliy after the
December 23, 2005 opinion in Taylor I. They have never been based solely on the existence of
Maile's lis pendens.

Their insistence in focusing solely on the lis pendens is like dancing

maniacally around a single tree and ignoring the rest of the forest.

Nevertheless, the fact that

the lis pendens in the prior action was allowed to remain in place during the

appl~al
app~~al

does not

answer the question of whether, given the Supreme Court's opinion in Taylor I, Mr. Maile's
continued efforts to claim ownership of the property were not proper in the regular course of the
proceeding and were pursued for an improper purpose, which is the issue in this case.
It is, however, incorrect to state that the vendee's lien creates an ownership interest in the

property. That statement is, in fact, directly contrary to Idaho law. The Idaho Supreme Court

Paragraphs 2(a), (b), and 0) Amended Counterclaim dated May 28, 2010.
Paragraphs 2(c) though 0), Amended Counterclaim.
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has ruled that a lien creates a personal property right, not an interest in real property.

Under

Idaho law, a lien is a charge upon property to secure payment of a debt and transfers no title to
the property subject to the lien. I.C. § 45-109; I.C. § 45-101. Chavez v. Barrus, 146 Idaho 212,
221, 192 P.3d 1036, 1045 (2008), citing Middlekauff v. Lake Cascade, Inc., 103 Idaho 832, 834,
654 P.2d 1385, 1387 (1982); 51 Am.Jur.2d Liens § 2 (stating that a lien confers no ownership
interest).

The Counter-Defendants incorrectly argue that they "have the right to pursue a

foreclosure of their vendee's lien." Judge Wilper specifically ruled that they do NOT have that
right as long as they continue to seek to have his judgment set aside in a collateral proceeding,
and called their efforts "disingenuous." 17
While the simple act of recording a lis pendens does not support a slander of title claim,
maintaining a "wrongful" lis pendens when there is no legitimate claim to ownership of the
property has been found to support claims for abuse of process and intentional interference.

Hewitt v. Rice, 154 P.3d 408 (Colo. 2007).
d. Wrongfulness of conduct on intentional interference claim. This argument is,
In

essence,

a third motion for summary judgment on the counterclaim for intentional

interference with economic expectancy. Counter-Defendants request that this Court make a
determination of "what constitutes wrongful conduct," then limit the evidence to th{l
th{! question of
whether the conduct occurred and whether there are defenses which mitigate it or justify it.
The problem with this position is that it completely removes the element which looks to
the objective or purpose of the conduct.

Idaho courts have ruled that the wrongfulness of

17 A copy of the March 25, 2010 order and the bankers' statements upon which it was based were attached as
Exhibit A to the April 28, 2009 Affidavit of Counsel.
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intentional interference with a prospective economic expectancy may be shown by proof that

either (1) the Counter-defendant had an improper objective or purpose to harm the
Counterclaimants; or (2) the Counter-defendant used a wrongful means to cause injury to the
prospective business relationship. Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho
266,286,824 P.2d 841, 861 (1991); Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M & Lynn Lea Family

Trust, 145 Idaho 208, 217, 177 P.3d 955, 964 (2008). The wrongfulness can corne from the
actor's intention, not soley from the conduct.

Idaho cases have long recognized that intent is a

IS
question of fact for the jury.
jury.18

The Carter case upon which the Counter-Defendants pin their argument is an anomaly.
It was a probate case in which the judge submitted questions to an advisory jury; one of the

questions submitted was whether Mrs. Carter's intentional interference was wrongful. No jury
instructions were requested, nor were any given on the definition of what could or could not be
considered as a wrongful act. From the opinion, it does not appear that there was an allegation or
any proof that Mrs. Carter had an improper objective or purpose to harm the opposing party, and
her conduct was limited to seeking a determination of the validity of the trust. The judge, in
electing not to follow the advisory jury, noted that "the definition of what could be considered
law.,,19 In affirming the ruling, the Supreme Court speciJically noted
wrongful is a question of law.,,)9
"The issue of whether or not the actions complained of are or are not 'wrongful' in this context is
for the court to determine in defining the issues, and would normally have been included in the

18 Urry v. Walker and Fox Masonry Contractors, 115 Idaho 750, 769 P.2d 1122 (1989); Sohn v. Foley, 125 Idaho
168, 868 P.2d 496, (et. App. 1994)
19 Carter v. Carter, 143 Idaho 373, 146 P.3d 639, 647, 648 (2006)
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'
MOTIONS IN LIMINE
13

002184

instructions." Id.
This case is very different from Carter.

Here, there are allegations that the interference

was wrongful because it done for an improper objective or purpose to harm, and jury instructions
on the legal definition of "wrongfulness" have been requested.

Whether interference was for

an improper purpose is uniformly recognized to be a question of fact. See, for example, Gillmor
v. Family Link, LLC, 224 P.3d 741, 2010 WL 114814, 647 Utah Adv. Rep. 3,2010; Young v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 119 Hawai'i 403, 198 P.3d 666 (2008); Awakuni v. Awana, 115 Hawai'i 126,

165 P.3d 1027 (2007); Cascade Ambulance Service, Inc. v. City of Bellingham, 113 Wash.App.
1054, (Wash.App. Div. 1,
I, 2002). Idaho law does not require a showing of conduct which is
"independently wrongful," and it is improper to suggest that this court adopt that as an element
of intentional interference claims simply because the Counter-Defendants think "the same
principles should apply in Idaho."

This is particularly true in light of the fact that the California

case cited deals with negligent, not intentional, interference.
The other big difference between the instant matter and the facts in Carter is the question
of the legitimacy of the underlying claim. The Court in Carter noted, "In this case, it is obvious

that Neta had her own expectancy, and her own interests to advance and protect in the matter. It
is not a tort where one acts to protect her own economic interests, even if there is interference
with the contract expectancy of another. ...."" !d.
Id. In the present case, the wrongful interference
occurred after the Supreme Court issued its decision in Taylor I on December 23, 2005.

That

decision noted that Maile's brief on appeal had pointed out the conflicting interests among the
classes of beneficiaries, and stated unequivocally that:
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Where a trustee has an individual interest in the trust that poses a conflict in the exercise
of a trust power, such as the power to close a sale of real property, "the power may be
exercised only by court authorization ...
..."" Idaho Code § 68-108(b). There is no indication
in the record that the Rogers obtained court approval for the sale and one could
reasonably infer that they did not, since the sale occurred just one week after Mr.
.... Here, the Mailes are alleged to have known all of the facts because of
Johnson's death
death....
Mr. Maile's position as attorney and realtor for both parties and purchaser of the property.
Under the allegations, he and his associates could not be considered bona fide purchasers
for value. The remedy provided for under the foregoing authorities is imposition of a
constructive trust. .. 20
From the date of this opinion forward, Mr. Maile had no legitimate factual or legal basis
to claim an ownership interest in the real property. He himself had pointed out that the trustee
had a conflict of interest, which he was in a unique position to know as the attorney who had
drafted the trust agreement. There was no dispute that court approval was not obtained, and
there is no dispute that Mr. Maile was aware of those facts.

He had no legitimate claim to

ownership of the property, which would support a jury finding that his asserting such a claim
was wrongful.
e. Damages after release of lis pendens. There is no dispute as to this issue; Sam
Langston will testify as to the value of the Linder Road property as of the date the lis pendens
were finally released, and no claim will be made for reduction in the value of the property after
that date.
f.

Damages arising from vendee's lien. The Taylors do not expect to claim any

specific damages solely stemming from the vendee's lien, but will argue that the efforts to

Taylor v. Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 259-60, 127 P.3d 156, 162-63 (2005)
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foreclose that lien while concurrently seeking to set aside the judgment upon which it was based
is part of the wrongful conduct of the Counter-Defendants.

This is an entirely different issue

from a court's decision of whether to assess sanctions for a Rule 11 violation on a single motion.
g. Attorneys fees as damages. We agree that it is not proper to file an independent
action seeking to recover fees and costs incurred in an earlier lawsuit, as stated in Lasser
Losser v.
Bradstreet. 21 That principal would prohibit Taylors from seeking an award of fees incurred in
Taylor v. Maile, and they are not making such a claim. It does not, however, prevent them from
seeking the fees incurred in defending themselves in the present litigation as an element of
damages for abuse of process and intentional interference with economic advantage.

Those

costs and attorneys fees were incurred in the present matter, not in an earlier lawsuit.
7.

Prior allegations. Taylors agree that their March 9, 2006 Amended Complaint in

Taylor v. Maile superseded the allegations in their prior Complaint; however, many of those
same allegations were litigated as part of the affirmative defense of unclean hands im the unjust
enrichment trial. Taylors do agree, however, that the value of the Linder Road property at the
time of Mailes' purchase became moot, given the basis for voiding the contract, and do not
intend to offer evidence on that issue.

21

145 Idaho 670,183 P.3d 758 (2008).
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Under the same analysis, the filing of the Taylors' Amended Petition on Apri118, 2005 in
the Johnson Trust probate superseded the petition dated November 14, 2004, and no testimony
should be allowed on the earlier petition. 22
It should be noted that the Counter-Defendants' memorandum on this issue once again

misstates the holding in Taylor II as ordering "that the property be restored to the trust because
of the lack of notice to the Taylor beneficiaries." There was absolutely no discussion of any kind
as to notice to the benneficiaries" The Mailes' purchase contract was voided because they
acquired the property with actual knowledge of the fact that the transaction had not been
approved by the court as required under Idaho Code 68-108.

8. Desires and/or opinions of Helen Taylor.
The Supreme Court has already ruled in Taylor II that Helen Taylor's children reserved
their interest in the Linder Road property and that athey had the right to pursue the action
seeking to recover title to the property.

That ruling is the law of the case, and this Court has

already ruled that the Counter-Defendants are estopped from attempting to raise that issue again.
There is no ambiguity as to the agreement, and therefore no need to interpret it or look to the
intent or understanding of the parties. For these reasons, the Counterclaimants agree that there is
no relevance to Helen Taylor's opinions and understandings as to the Trust and/or the Disclaimer
Agreement.

However, if the Counter-Defendants are allowed to in any way argue or infer that

Helen Taylor's children do not have an ongoing interest in that real property, it will be necessary

22 Once an amended pleading is filed, it supersedes the original and causes it to cease to function as a
pleading. Ernst v. Hemenway, 120 Idaho 941,947,821 P.2d 996, 1002, citing People v. Hunt, 1
Idaho 433, 436 (1872).
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to set the record straight. This issue is discussed in more detail in the Taylors' motion in limine,
paragraph lee) on page 5, and paragraph l(t) on page 6.
DATED this 10th day of January, 2011.
HENDERSON LAW FIRM, PLLC

'\
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By

Connie W. Taylor, a member of the
Attorneys for Counterclaimants.
Counterc1aimants. ,
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Thomas G. Maile, IV
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130
PO Box 2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone:
208/938-5584
Facsimile:
208/938-5482
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
B~' ABBY GARDEN
DEPUTY

Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IsERKSHlRE
~ERKSHlRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCHBIRCH
: MAILE, husband and wife,
II

CV -OC-0723232
Case No. CV-OC-0723232

!

Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,

AFFIDAVIT OF CHRIST TROUPIS
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN
LIMINE

Iv.
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
" REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
I POSSESSION.

i

I

!

Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
---------------~~~~~~~~~-------~------------------------------~-------------------------------

STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss:
County of Ada)
CHRIST T. TROUPIS, being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
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1.

Your Affiant is the co-counsel of record for Berkshire Investments, LLC, Thomas G.
Maile, IV., and Colleen Birch-Maile in the above captioned matter. That the information
and facts set forth herein are based upon your affiant's personal knowledge and/or
observations and can testify as to the truth of the matters asserted herein if called upon as
a witness at the trial of this matter. That your affiant provides this affidavit in support of
the motion in limine filed herein.

2.

That attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of the contract executed by
Connie Taylor, on behalf of the Counter-claimants, with the appraiser Sam Langston
dated October 20, 2010.

3.

Your Affiant never consented, authorized or led opposing counsel to believe that any
discovery deadlines would be extended, enlarged or modified. Your Affiant never
received a proposed stipulation to modify the stipulated scheduling orders and your
affiant never authorized an extension of any discovery responses relating to the: disclosure
of experts or facts and opinions relating to the same. Also, your affiant never requested
opposing counsel to extend Counter-Defendants' stipulated deadlines.

4.

Your Affiant has reviewed, ordered and generally been involved with clients and

participated in the ordering of commercial real estate appraisals. That based upon such
professional history of more than 30 years in the practice of law, your affiant believes
that it was extremely unrealistic to expect an appraisal to be completed within nine or ten
days.
DATED this 11 th day of January, 2011.
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FILED
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1 2 2011
JAN 12
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By ABBY GARDEN
DEPUTY

Co-counsel for Plaintiffs
IJ'l"
IJ\j THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, m AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

i
I

BERKSHIRE mVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCHBIRCH
MAILE, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,

Case No. CV-OC-0723232

REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF
COUNT}~R
IN SUPPORT OF COUNT}~R
DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN
LIMINE

v.
v.

,. CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership;,
partnership;. PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS m POSSESSION OR
CLAIMmG ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.

!

Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
'--_ _ _D_e_fe_n_dan_ts_/_C_oun
__te_r_-C_l_ai_m_a_n_ts_._ _J - - - - - - - - - -_ _ _ _ _ _ _

'----------------"-----------------

Jj.

The counter-defendants by and through their undersigned co-counsel of record, and
provide their Reply Memorandum Brief in Support of Counter-defendants' Motions in Limine,
as follows:
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LEGAL ARGUMENT
1.

Exclusion of Sam Langston.

The Counter-Claimants do not deny they failed to meet the deadlines for the required
disclosure. They did not timely provide expert opinions and the facts that supported those
opinions in accordance with the scheduling order.
They argue that they seasonably supplemented disclosures as to experts. Under I.R.C.P.
Rule 26(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure a party has a duty to seasonably supplement
discovery responses. But the argument that the late disclosure of the opinions and the underlying
facts is nothing more than a seasonable supplement flies in the face of the parties stipulation, the
Court's Order, and the counter-claimants promise to supplement specific discovery requests by
the agreed discovery deadlines. A true and correct copy of the relevant pages of the counterclaimants' Answers to the Plaintiffs' First Set of Discovery (pp. 1,6, 7, 8, 9, 10) are mmexed as
Exhibit "B" to the Affidavit of Christ Troupis filed on December 30, 2010 in support of the
motion in limine.
Counterclaimants assert that the opinions and underlying facts of the appraisal was
delivered to Counterdefendants on December 7,2010. Mr. Troupis was out of his office on that
date because he was on a pre-planned vacation to Hawaii. He was not able to review and
consider the late disclosures by the counter-claimants until his return on December 23,2010.
The disclosure was delivered approximately 40 days after stipulated discovery deadlines and
after the required time refl;:renced in the Court Order. Co-counsel was not been able to obtain
any experts in opposition to the late disclosed experts by the counter-claimants. In addition no

REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'
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attempt was made by the counter-claimants to submit an appropriate stipulation for the extension
of deadlines. Nor was any motion filed by the counter-claimants to seek a court order modifying
the Scheduling Order and/or the Stipulation for Scheduling & Planning filed approximately 12
months earlier. Nor did the counter-defendants agree to extend any deadlines.
In their affidavits, Counterclaimants submit that because of the downturn in the real
estate market, preparation of an appraisal took longer than anticipated. The fact is that the
Counterclaimants did not even retain their appraiser until October 20,2010, ten days prior to
their disclosure deadline. (See Affidavit of Christ Troupis filed concurrently herewith). The
scheduling order was stipulated to in December, 2009. Counterclaimants knew that the issues in
their case required the retention of real estate experts. They have no excuse for waiting until 10
days before the discovery cut-off date to hire an expert. Counterclaimants excuse for their failure
to comply with the discovery deadlines is unreasonable, and prejudicial to Counterdefendants.
The expert should be excluded from testifying.
2.

Exclusion of Bob DeBolt.
The Affidavit of Christ Troupis Exhibit "C" filed December 31, 2010, contains a true and

correct copy of the Counter-claimants' Supplemental Witness Disclosure which was delivered on
December 10, 2010. This was the first time Bob DeBolt was identified as an expert. There is no
reference in the supplemental disclosure that he was substituting for Connie Shannahan. Even if
he is a substitute for her, no timely disclosures were made as to his proposed testimony or his
qualifications. Once again the counter-claimants failed to meet the established discovery dates
and the expert witness should be excluded.

REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'
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3.

Exclusion of Connie Shannahan.

The fundamental problem with the disclosure of Ms. Shannahan is that she willl not offer
an opinion about a selling price of the subject property, but simply a "range oflisting prices", as
set out in her report. In Farr West Investments v. Topaz Marketing L.P., 148 Id. 272, 220 P.3d
1091 (Idaho 2009), the Court specifically held that listing opinions have no relevance to market
value, and are not material evidence of market value. The opinion testimony from the witness
for the year 2010 also has no bearing on any relevant point in time in this case. This witness
and/or substituted witness, Bob DeBolt, should be excluded.

4.

Exclusion of Craig Lewis.

To allow the potential testimony of Mr. Craig Lewis would be tantamount of putting him
in the jury box, since he proposes to testify as to what was reasonable and what was
unreasonable in filing a lawsuit and the pleadings associated with litigation. The disclosure filed
October 27, 2010 by the counter-claimants stated that Mr. Lewis would testify regarding the
unreasonableness of the filing of the amended complaint by the counter-defendants (p. 2 of
Counterclaimants' Witness Disclosure). It is for the trier of fact to detennine whether the actions
of the Counterdefendants were reasonable or unreasonable, not the province of experts.. In
addition, testimony by Mr. Lewis regarding the court's determination made on res judicata is
cumulative and would not aid to the jury. The Court's Memorandum Decision is an undisputed
fact that res judicata was mled to apply to the case.

BerkshirelMailes intend to present

testimony that at the time that their lawsuit was filed, that they believed that their claims could
properly be brought. That evidence directly relates to disproving the elements of abuse of

REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'
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process and/or the tort of intentional interference with a business advantage. It does not
contradict the Court's subsequent ruling that these claims were barred by the application of res
judicata. Berkshire/Mailes intend to show that they did not file and prosecute their complaint for
"an illegal, improper, perverted use of the process, a use neither warranted nor authorized by the
process" 1 Am. Jur 2d Abuse of Process §4.
Counter-Claimants cite the Washington case Hough v. Stockbridge, 216 P.3d :ll077
(Wash. App. Div. 2,2009) as support for their proposition that Mr. Lewis should be allowed to
testify as to reasonableness of the Counter-defendants actions in filing the amended complaint.
However, the Washington case dealt with an entirely different set of issues compared to the
expected area of Greg Lewis' testimony. There, the two attorneys testified as to whether the
attorney complied with civil discovery rules, the proper basis for a motion for reconsideration,
and pleadings associated with an involuntary dismissal. The Washington court allowed such
opinion testimony, on whether the attorney complied with civil discovery rules and on the proper
basis for a motion for reconsideration. The testimony was based upon the witnesses technical or
specialized knowledge of the law. The Washington attorneys did not testify as to the
reasonableness of the filing of motions and/or the reasonableness of discovery.
The complete opposite is involved with the potential expected testimony of Mr. Lewis.
The testimony of Mr. Lewis as set forth in the Counterclaimants' Witness Disclosure is not
relevant and not proper for opinions from an expert and should be excluded.

5.

Exclusion of Idaho State Bar Complaints.
The counterclaim,mts allege that Maile used the current proceedings to avoid

REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'
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disciplinary action by the Idaho State Bar. The argument has no merit. There is no one listed to
testify from the counterclaimants' witness disclosure or discovery responses that could provide a
basis in fact that the current proceedings are an attempt to derail the Bar proceedings. There is
no witness from the State Bar listed that provide the jury with any foundation as why
proceedings are commenced and/or the timetable for such proceedings. The evidence of the
allegations before the State Bar are mere allegations that are not substantive evidence of abuse of
process or tortious interference with business advantage. The filing of a Bar proceeding has no
bearing on a jury determination that Berkshire/Mailes acted with "an illegal, improper, perverted
use of the process, a use neither warranted nor authorized by the process".
Furthermore, the counterclaimants have admitted during the motion for summary
judgment/motion to dismiss that the litigation privilege applies to Mr. Maile as an attorney. The
'countercIaimants have admitted that the current action is not against Mr. Maile for any action
committed as an attorney since such action is protected by the litigation privilege. There are no
allegations that Mr. Maile committed fraud or criminal activity that would be an exception to the
litigation privilege.
The Counterclaimants' obscure connection to the State Bar proceedings is based on pure
speculation. They assert "How else can you explain why an attorney would appeal a decision
which was based on facts to which there was no dispute (which in fact simply complied with the
ofthe
the Supreme Court in Taylor I)" (Memorandum in Opposition to Counterdirective of
Defendants' Motion in Limine p. 9).

Clearly, there were good faith arguments advanced before

the Supreme Court, as the Court denied the counterclaimants' motion for costs and attorneys fees

REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'
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on appeal.

There was no finding of frivolous litigation either by the district court or the

appellate court. There have never been any sanctions assessed either by the district court or the
appellate court against BerkshirelMailes, although the counterclaimants have repeatedly
requested sanctions. The State Bar proceedings have no relevance to the current proceedings and
under the specific the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct State Bar cited any reference to such
proceedings must be excluded at trial.

6.

Damages.
The counterclaimants argue that the actions of BerkshirelMailes during Taylor v. Maile 2

including the appeal amount to actionable abuse of process and a tort of interference with a
prospective business advantage. The Idaho Supreme Court considered the arguments advanced
in Taylor v. Maile 2 and affirmed the district court, but did not find any frivolous conduct on the
part of the Appellants Ber'kshirelMailes. On March 17,2009 the appellate court entered its
Order Awarding Costs - Supreme Court Docket No. 33781 in approximately $700.00. On April
15,2009 the Remittitur was entered by the Supreme Court. The scope of any of
counterclaimants' damages cannot reach back to a point in time where the counterdefendants
were lawfully pursuing their appellate rights in Taylor v. Maile 2. Permitting Counterdaimants
to claim that the filing of the appeal constituted an actionable tort would subject any
unsuccessful appellant to such specious claims. That is not the law in Idaho.
The vendees' lien remains as a valid lien against the real property. The vendel~s' lien will
remain until $400,000.00 is paid to Berkshire Investments. The counterclaimants can claim no
damages as a result ofthe vendees' lien as the counterclamants themselves have the power to

REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'
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pay the amount outstanding which will result in the lien being satisfied. If the Lis Pendens was
wrongfully maintained, a point the counter-defendants refute, then what is the period of time for
which the counter-claimants can assert damages? As a matter oflaw, there can be no wrongful
conduct by BerkshirelMailes for any period of time in which the recording of the Lis Pendens
was authorized specifically by Judge Wilper.
The Counter-Claimants mis-apply the law on the issue of damages representing the
recovery of costs and attorneys fees. Had there been a slander of title action that was viable
perhaps one could so argue. However, the Counter-Claimants voluntarily withdrew their slander
of title claim and consequently there is no basis for the jury to consider costs and attorneys fees
incurred in defense of the multi count amended complaint filed by the Counter-defendlant's in
this case. Any argument that the Counter-Claimants may have regarding an award of their
attorneys fees incurred as a result of the filing of the Complaint should properly be submitted to
the Court at the conclusion of this case, not to a jury.
In addition, the Counterclaimants have failed to properly supplement their disc:overy
responses with respect to their claims for costs and attorneys fees. Specific exhibits Wl~re
wl~re
requested in discovery. The Counterclaimants did not provide any exhibit relating to costs and
attorneys fees associated with any defense involving the initial complaint filed by the Counter
defendants herein. Counterclaimants should not be allowed to present the jury with damage
claims for attorneys fees and costs, when they have failed to respond to discovery requests that
specifically requested such information. Evidence of these claims should be excluded at trial.

6.

Helen Taylor.

REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'
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In ruling on a prior motion for summary judgment, the court has stated that Helen
Taylor's opinions and desires have no relevancy in this matter. As testified by John Taylor
during his deposition taken December 14, 2004,
" there is an allegation that you want a recision of the contract? A. As an
alternative. Yes. Q. But you want the money first? A. It would be easier. [t
goes to my mom".
This deposition testimony was taken only 32 days after the Taylors filed their verified
petition in the probate court on November 12,2004, requesting the probate court to appoint them
as trustees of the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust. The petition was executed by R. John
Taylor as a verification of the facts contained in the petition. Page 2 of the verified petition
states under oath, "the petitioner's 88-year-old mother, Helen Taylor, is the sole remaining

of this trust by virtue ofthe
of the terms ofa
of a Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity
beneficiary ofthis
Agreement." What Helen Taylor desired or how the Taylors acted on her behalf has been
clearly documented under oath. There is no relevance as to the desires of Helen Taylor or the
intentions of her sons relative to the course of proceedings in the underlying litigation..
DATED this 11 th day of January, 2011.

(Jt,

V E-...::,

"c

_

CHRIST T. TR
TRO{JPIS,
PIS,
Plaintiffs/CounterCo-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter
Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 11 th day of January, 2011, I caused a true and correct
COUNTERcopy of the foregoing REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER
DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE, to be delivered, addressed as follows:
,,'
I
I Mark Stephen Prusynski
i ()
U. S. Mail
I
• PO Box 829
I (X)
Facsimile Transmission
Boise, ID 83701
()
Hand Delivery
()
Overnight Delivery
Phone: (208) 345-2000
: Facsimile: (208) 385-5384
I
,,

Connie W. Taylor
Henderson Law Firm
Finn
. 900 Washington St.
S1. Suite 1020
I Vancouver, Wa. 98660
Facsimile: (360) 693-2911
!

!

Thomas G. Maile, IV.
I 380 W. State Street
, Eagle, Idaho 83616
939-100 I
I Facsimile: (208) 939-1001

I,

(

)

(X)
'( )
'( )
I

I

(

)

(X)

( )
( )

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

I

(}4 7)

I:J-

_

CHRIST T. TR'(j{Jj>j"S, co-counsel for
Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants
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DefendantsiCounterclaimants Connie Wright Taylor fka
Attorneys for Defendants/Counterclaimants
Connie Taylor, Clark and Feeney, and Paul T. Clark

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,

CV-OC-0723232
Case No. CV
-OC-0723232

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN
LIMINE TO PRECLUDE CONNIE
TAYLOR'S TESTIMONY

vs.
CONNIE WRIGHT T
AYLOR, fka CONNIE
TAYLOR,
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN TAYLOR,
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, an individual;
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUST, an Idaho revocable trust; JOHN
DOES I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL
PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR CLAIMING
ANY RIGHT TO POSSESSION,
Defendants/Counterclaimants.
Defendants/Counterc1aimants.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE
CONNIE TAYLOR'S TESTIMONY-1
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Counterdefendants ("Berkshire") have indicated a desire to call Connie Taylor as
a trial witness. Counterclaimants filed a motion in limine and addressed this issue in Section 6
on pages 11 and 12 of their brief in support of their motion in limine. Counterclaimants
responded on January 10 with a brief in opposition to the motion in limine, referring to the issue
of Connie Taylor's testimony as issue No. 27 and addressing it as follows on pages 15 and 16 of
their brief:
In addition there has been a request to preclude Connie Taylor as a
witness. There is now new counsel who has filed his motion for
limited admission to act as counsel for counter-claimants. The jury
should consider some essential facts relating to Connie Taylor that
would require only limited testimony. Connie Taylor drafted the
documents which her husband executed which amounted to
perjury. These acts ultimately lead to the judgment
jUdgment on the
beneficiaries' claims. She attended depositions were her clients
made admissions under oath concerning the fact that Helen Taylor
was to get any money or property from the underlying litigation.
Connie Taylor dealt with the beneficiaries of the trust to obtain her
husband's control over the trust. This enabled her husband to file a
lawsuit on behalf ofthe trust while the Taylors' first lawsuit was
dismissed by Judge Wilper. Her conduct and her testimony is
relevant for the jury to consider relating to the basis of the good
faith clams advanced by the Counterdefendants demonstrating
there was no abuse of process. Also see response to #20

II.

CONNIE TAYLOR'S TESTIMONY IS NOT RELEVANT TO THE CLAIMS OR
DEFENSE AT TRIAL
Berkshire's brief simply describes the role of any lawyer involved in litigation-

drafting documents, attending depositions, dealing with the clients, and filing a lawsuit - and
then concludes "Her conduct and her testimony is relevant for the jury to consider relating to the
basis of the good faith claims advanced by the Berkshire demonstrating there was no abuse of
process." Some explanation should be required to cover the leap to the conclusion that her

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE
CONNIE TAYLOR'S TESTIMONY - 2
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testimony is relevant. Berkshire failed to explain how the undisputed facts that Connie Taylor
drafted documents and attended depositions that led to the judgment against Berkshire had "any
tendency to make the existence of' Berkshire's good faith or lack thereof more or less probable,
and therefore Berkshire failed to pass the basic relevancy test under Rule 401 of the Idaho Rules
of Evidence.
Furthermore, Berkshire's proposed testimony relates solely to claims that have
been dismissed from this case. Berkshire's claims of fraud upon the court, the Taylors' lack of
standing, and the alleged perjury concerning Helen Taylor being the only beneficiary has been
addressed numerous times and dismissed on the motion for summary judgment from this case
and reaffirmed in the decision on the motion to reconsider. That testimony is not relevant to any
issues in the case, because all of those issues have been dismissed from the case.
III.

CONNIE TAYLOR'S TESTIMONY IS PRIVILEGED.

Berkshire apparently intends to have Connie Taylor testify about her work on the
lawsuits involving the property. The pleadings or other documents that she prepared or signed,
and the depositions she attended speak for themselves. Any testimony beyond those documents
would necessarily involve her mental impressions or communications with her clients, which
would invade the work product and attorney-client privileges.
IV.

BERKSHIRE DOES NOT PASS THE THRESHOLD TEST FOR CALLING
OPPOSING COUNSEL

The undersigned counsel was unable to find any Idaho reported cases dealing with
calling opposing counsel as a witness at trial. Perhaps the lack of reported decisions was the
result of civility among attorneys in Idaho. The Idaho Supreme Court, however, in Foster v.
Traul, 145 Idaho 24, 175 P.3d 186 (2007), dealt with the somewhat analogous attempt to
Traut,

BRIEF IN SUPPORT Ol~ MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE
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disqualify opposing counsel. The court began its analysis by noting that the preamble to the
Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct stated, "The purpose of the Rules can be subverted when
they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural weapons." 145 Idaho at 32. The court then
stated that when the motion to disqualify comes from an opposing party, the motion should be
viewed with caution, and approved of a four part test adopted by the Idaho Court of Appeals in

Weaver v. Millard, 120 Idaho 692, 696, 819 P.2d 110, 114 (Ct. App. 1991). The four parts ofthe
test are:
(1) Whether the motion is being made for the purposes of
harassing the defendant,
(2) Whether the party bringing the motion will be damaged in
some way if the motion is not granted,
(3) Whether there are any alternative solutions, or is the proposed
solution the least damaging possible under the circumstances, and
(4) Whether the possibility of public suspicion will outweigh any
benefits that might accrue to continued representation.

Foster v. Traul, 145 Idaho at 32-33 (quoting Weaver v. Millard, 120 Idaho at 698,819 P.2d at
116).
Rule 3.7 of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct deals with a lawyer as a
witness, stating:
(a) Lawyers shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer
is likely to be a necessary witness unless:
(1) The testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2) The testimony relates to the nature and value of
services rendered in the case; or
(3) Disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial
hardship on the client.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE
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Rule 37, however, does not seem to contemplate situations in which the lawyer is called as a
jurisdictions have dealt with the
witness by the opposing party. Some of the surrounding
sUIToundingjurisdictions
application of a similar rule to disqualification of counsel by an opposing party. In Chappell v.
Cosgrove, 121 N.M. 636, 916 P.2d 836 (1996), the New Mexico Supreme Court followed other

jurisdictions focusing on the "necessary witness" language of the Rule. The court held that an
attomey was not a necessary witness and therefore could not be disqualified because there were
four other potential witnesses who could testify about a relevant meeting that was the issue of the
lawsuit. Id., 916 P.2d at 839-40.
The Colorado Supreme Court treats the subpoena of opposing counsel as the
functional equivalent of a motion to disqualify. Williams v. District Court, 700 P.2d 549, 555
(Colo. 1985). The Court in Williams decided that the party serving the subpoena had the burden
of establishing that the opposing counsel's testimony would actually be adverse to his or her
client, that the evidence sought to be elicited would likely be admissible, and there was a
555compelling need for such evidence that could not be satisfied by some other source. !d. at 555
56.
The seminal case regarding whether opposing counsel can be deposed is Shelton
v. American Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1986). In Shelton, the court discussed the
potential disruption of the adversarial system by the use ofthe tactic to depose opposing counsel
and adopted a test similar to the test adopted by the Colorado Supreme Court in Williams, supra.
Since motions to disqualify or attempts to depose opposing counsel are to be
viewed with caution, calling opposing counsel at trial should certainly be justified only under
extreme circumstances. In exercising this court's discretion, the tests adopted by other courts in
similar circumstances are instructive. Berkshire should have the burden of proving that Connie
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Taylor's testimony is relevant to the issues in the case, is essential to the defense of the claims
against Berkshire, and carllot
carillot be presented by any other means. Berkshire cannot prove this. It
cannot show that Connie Taylor's testimony is essential to the defense of any issues in this suit.
The same testimony can be established because it is not contested by the claimants, can be
shown by other witnesses, or proved by the use of the depositions that Connie Taylor attended.
This written evidence would seemingly be the best evidence in any event. Because Berkshire
cannot establish the elements of these tests, Berkshire's attempt to call Connie Taylor as a
witness appears to be a "procedural weapon" subverting the Idaho Rules of Professional
Conduct, which should not be condoned.
DATED this

.1]
.L]J:iday of January, 2011.
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED

/]/f/
~]~
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/(
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By
____-7~~~__~~~---------
B
y-------,~~'-"'-----'----""-=---J'_/_----Mark S Prusynski - Of the irm
Attorneys for Defendants/Counterclaimants
Connie Wright Taylor fka Connie Taylor,
Clark and Feeney, and Paul T. Clark
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this / J.-t!i
J.-tU day of January, 2011, I caused a true
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE TO
PRECLUDE CONNIE TAYLOR'S TESTIMONY to be served by the method indicated
below, and addressed to the following:
Thomas G. Maile IV
LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS

G MAILE IV, P.A.

380 W. State St.
Eagle, ID 83616-4902
Facsimile (208) 939-1001
Christ T. Troupis
TROUPIS LA w OFFICE,

P
A
PA

P.O. Box 2408
Eagle,ID
Eagle,
ID 83616
Facsimile (208) 938-5482

(v(U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(0U.S.
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(r(F acsimi Ie

Jolm C. Mitchell
CLARK & FEENEY
1229 Main St., Suite 201
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, ID 83501-0285
Facsimile (208) 746-9160

( v{U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Connie W. Taylor

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(oJ1
(~ Facsimile

HEN DERSON LA W

900 Washington, Suite 1020
Vancouver, WA 98660
Facsimile (360) 693-2911

Mark

rJ. Prusynski
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Christ Troupis
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130
PO Box 2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone:
208/938-5584
Facsimile:
208/938-5482
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com
Co-counse1
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COl."TNTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited Liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCHBIRCH
MAILE, husband and wife,

CV -OC-0723232
Case No. CV-OC-0723232

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF
SUP]PORT
CHRIST TROUPIS IN SUP:lPORT
OF MOTION IN LIMINE RE:
STATE BAR

P
laintiffs/Count,er-Defendants,
Plaintiffs/Count'er-Defendants,

v.
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, £'kIa
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR,
TA
YLOR, an individua1; R. JOHN
TAYLOR, an individuaJ; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable

trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
'--

Defendants/Counter-Claimants.

--lL..

_

~------------------------------~-----------------------------

STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss.:
County of Ada)
CHRIST T. TROUPIS, being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
AFFIDAVlT
TROUPlS Th' SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE
AFFIDA
VlT OF CHRIST TROUPIS
1
RE: STATE BAR COMPLAINT AND DAMAGES
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Your Affiant is the co-counsel of record for Berkshire Investments, LLC, Thomas G.
Maile, IV., and O)Ueen Birch-Maile in the above captioned matter. That the information
and facts set forth herein are based upon your affiant's personal knowledge and/or

observations and Gan testify as to the truth of the matters asserted herein if calkd upon as
in:mpport
a witness at the trial of this matter. That your affiant provides this affidavit in
.:mpport of

the motion in limine filed herein.

2.

th.~
The two attachments to this affidavit establish conclusively that, contrary to thl~

Counterclaimants' contention, Thomas Maile did not appeal the adverse ruling on
Beneficiaries Claims for the purpose of delaying a hearing on the grievance filed by R.
John Taylor. The grievance letter from Mr. Taylor was not sent until after the date that
the Mailes requested certification of the Court's decision for the purpose of filing an
lssues rc;:lating to Mailes' right to regain title to the property.
appeal on issues
3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of the Motion for Cel1ification
Pursuant to IRCP 54(b) Re: Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims which was filed June 28,
2006 in case number CV OC 04-004730.

4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy of the July] 0, 20061etter from

R. John Taylor to the Idaho State Bar, complaint fonn cover sheet and Index ddailing
dc~tailing the
documents provided to the State Bar.
DATED this 20th day of January, 2011.

tJL/})~
~~

TROUPIS,~

CHRIST T.
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
AFFlDA VIT OF CHRIST TROUPIS
TROUPfS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMIl\t:
LIMlli'E
AFFlDAVIT
RE: STATE BAR COMPLAPH AND DAMAGES - Pg 2
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SUBSCRIBED A~D
A~D SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, this
'Li2 day of January, 2011.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
;:
'\ ~
0 ~
th
~,/.t
,"CERTIFY That on this 20 day of January, 2011, I caused a true and correct
cop~M.,,@~going
cop~M.,,@~goingAFFIDAVIT OF CHRIST TROUPIS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN
LIMINE RE: STATE BAR to be delivered, addressed as follows:

,

~_,..

Connie W. Taylor
Henderson Law Firm
900 Washington St. Suite 1020
Vancouver, \Vashington 98660
Facsimile: (360) 693-2911

( ))
(
(X)
( ))
(
(
( ))

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Ovemight Delivery

Mark Stephen Prusynski
PO Box 829
Boise, In 83701
Phone: (208) 345-2000
Facsimile: (208) 385-5384

( ))
(
(X)
( ))
(
( ))
(

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

Thomas G. Maile, IV.
380 W. State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616

()
()
(X)
()

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

Facsimile: (208) 939-1001

'l

I

----~
-

CHRIST T. TROUPI ,
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants

AFFIDAVIT OF CHR1ST TROUPIS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE
RE: STATE BAR COMPLAINT AND DAMAGES - Pg 3
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DEl\"NIS M. CHARNE,Y, ISB #4610
Attorney at Law
951 East Plaza Drive, Suite 140
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 938-9500
Facsimile: (208) 938-9504
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Defendants!Counter-Clalmants
Attorney for Defendants/Counter-Claimants

f.\l THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, and
R. JOHN TAYLOR,
PlaintiffslCotmter-Defendants,
PlaintiffsiColmter-Defendants,

v.
THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN
MAILE,
MAll...E, husband and wife, THOMAS MAILE
REAL ESTATE C011PANY and
BERKSHIRE INVEST1t1ENTS, LLC,
Defendants/Counter-Claimants.

THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUST,
Plaintiffi'Counter-Defendant,
v.

THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN
I\1A.ILE,
h1A.ILE, husband and wire, and BERKSHIRE
INVEST:\1ENTS, LLC,
Defendants/Counter-Claimants.

)
)
) Case No. CV OC 04-00473D
)
)
) MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION
) PURSUANT TO IRCP S4(b)
54(b)
) RE: JUDGMENT ON
) BENEFICL-\RIES' CLAIMS
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION PURSVANT TO IRCP 54(b) RE: Jl7DGMENT ON
BENEFICIARIES' CLfUMS - 1
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The Defendants/Counter-Claimants, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b),
request that the Court enter its Judgment dated June 7, 2006, based upon the Coun's
Memorandwn Decision and Order entered May 15,2006, and the subsequent Order Denying the
Defendants' .\1otion to Reconsider, dated June 20, 2006, containing the language, as provided,
to wit:

\Vith respect to the issues determined by the above judgment or
order it is hereby CERTIFIED, in accordance with Rule 54(b),
I.RC.P.,
LRC.P., that the court has determined that there is no just reason
for delay of the entry of a final judgment and that the court has and
does hereby direct that the above judgment or order shall be a final
judgment upon which execution may issue and an appeal may be
taken as provjded
provided by the Idaho Appellate Rules.

This Motion is based on the grounds set forth above and the record and file herein, and
the accompanying Memorandum Brief filed herewith.
DATED this

d'6 _day of June, 2006.

DENl\IS M. CHARNEY
Attorney for Defendants/Counter-Claim~U1ts
Defendants/Counter-Claim~U1ts

i\-[OTION FOR CERTH'TCATION PURS1:ANT TO IRep 54(b) RE: JLDGMENT
JCDGMENT ON
1\:[OTION
BENEFICIARIES' CLAIMS - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
thisQ:X" day of June, 2006, I caused a true and correct
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thisQ:X'
copy of the foregoing document to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to
the following:
Connie W. Taylor
Paul Thomas Clark
Clark and Feeney
1229 Main Street
P.O. Drawer 285
Lewiston, ill 83:501
Fax: (208) 746-9160

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(yJ Facsimile
(y)

Thomas G. Maile:, IV
Attorney at Law
380 West State Street
ID 83616
Eagle, ill
Fax: 939-1001

Mail., Postage Prepaid
( ) U.S. Mail,
(C ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
('f)
CYJ Facsimile

Jack S. Gjording
Gjording & Fauser, PLLC

(C ) U.S. ),1ail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
Cf) Facsimile

P.O. BDx 2837
Boise, ID 83701··2837

Fax: 336-9177

Dennis M. Chanley

PURSUA~T TO IRCP 54(b) RE: JUDGMENT ON
MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION PURSUA='fT
CLAIMS - 3
BENEFICIARIES' CLAIMS·
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July 10, 2006

IDAHO STATE BAR

Mr. Brad Andrews, Bar Counsel
Idaho State Bar
Box 895
Boise, ID 83701
Re: Grievance

again~
again~ Thomas

G. Maile IV

Dear Mr. Andrews:
I am enclosing an ISB Complaint Fonn Cover sheet relating to a grievance against Thomas Maile
on behalf of the Theodore Johnson Revocable Trust and the beneficiaries of that trusrt.
This grievance is based on conduct relating to Maile's representation of the trust on an offer to
pcrchase real property, which Maile ultimately purchased himself on terms which were: extremely
tmfavorable
lmfavorable to his client. tris conduct included self-dealing, failure to inform of the need for
independent legal counsel, breach of fiduciary duty, and lack of candor amounting to dishonesty.
I believe he has, and continues to abuse the legal system to barass and annoy by filing frivolous
counterclaims, refiling the same motions over and over, and deposing his former client ex parte after
he had been infonned that. opposing counsel was unavailable and had filed a m060n
motion for protective
order.
nle facts are set forth in the following documents, which are included for your review:

].

Correspondence leading up to Maile's purchase of the property;

2.

Earnest Money Agreemen1
Agreement which Maile drafted;

3.

Affidavjt
Affidavit of Sam Rosti;

4.

Affidavit of Rick Zamzow;

5.

Sununary of Facts and Exhibits, briefing, and transcripts;

6.

Affidavits of Dan Grober;
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:Mr. Brad Andrews, Bar Counsel
July 10, 2006
Page 2

7.

Memo re request for punitive damages;

8.

Documents: relating to our motion for summary judgment on counterdaims and
opinion granting summary judgment;

9.

Supreme Court opinion; and

10.

Briefing on MSJ for Beneficiaries' claims and Court opinion granting: summary
judgment.

I will look forward to working with you on this matter.
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OFFICE OF BAR COUNSEL
IDAHO STATE BAR
P.O. BOX 895
BOISE, ID 83701
(208) 334-4500
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IDAHO STATE BAR

CO~LAINT FORM
CO~LAINT

COVER SHEET

RECEIVED

(Please read attached information before completing.)

JU l 1.

Date 07'06/06

a 20!J5

IDAHO STATE BAR
Beneficiaries of 'l1:teodore Johnson Trust
Your Name John Taylor on behalf of Trustees and Beneficiari.es
Please Print Legibly

_PO_-:"R_o_x-,-_5_3--:8,--~_ _ _ _ _Le----:w:-:-i_s_t_o_n_ _----:I:-:-d_ah_o
----::I:-:-d_ah_o_ _ _--:8=:-3_5_0_1__
--:8=-3_5_0_1__
Mailing Address _PO_..,.R_o_x....,..._5_3-:8,..-~
No_
City
Zip
Street or Box No.
State

208-799-9lO0 May we call you at work? Yl=-
Yl=-Home Phone 208-743-7536 Work Phone 208-799-9100
·)') Add ress ________________________________________________
jtaylor@aiainsurance.com
jtaylor@aiainsuranceocom
_
E mal
r~s

Attorney's Name Thomas Mail_e_I_V_______________________
attomey this complaint
comptaint is directed against. (If you are complaining about mOrE'
mOrE! than one
Name of attorney
attorney, please copy this complaint form and complete a separate complaint for each attome l'{, we must
have an attorney
attomev name to process your compla;nt. not theJ name of the law finn.)

Mailing Address 380 W State Street
Street or Box No,
No.

Eagle
City

Idaho
Slate
State

83616
Zip

Date You Hired Attorney A_p--=p_r_o_x_o_l_9_9_6
A~p~p~r_o_x_._l_9_9_6_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _,
(If applicable)

Amount Initially Paid Attorney _N_I_A_ _ _ _ _ Total Amount Paid _N_'_A_______
(If applicable)

Did You Sign a Fee or Retainer Agreement?_N_o
Agreemeot?_N_o________________________
(If applicable)

Do You Presently Owe The Attorney Any Fees?

-'N~o~
--'N!!.o~____________________

(If applicable)

Type Of Legal
Lega] Problem Attorney Was Hired To Handle: Sale of Real Pr~perty
Pr~perty wh:lch
(U applicable)

AtLbrney then bought personally.
'.'
'o',

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY
Intake Number:
District & A#:
Updated I!J3/06
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08/06/01I Deed of Reconveyance Instrument No. 20013] 865
08/06/0
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Documents Relating to Our Motion for Summary Judgment on Counterclaims and Opinion
Granting Summary Judgment

8

•
•

Notice of Hearing on Amended Motion for Summary Judgment - 09129/05
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

2

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

3

4
5

6
7

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,

Case No. CV-OC-2007-23232

8

Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,
9

10
11

12
13

14

15

16

SUMMARY ORDER
RE MOTIONS IN LIMINE

vs.
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR,
f/k/a CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual;
DALLAN TAYLOR, an :individual;
R. JOHN TAYLOR, an individual;
CLARK and FEENEY, a partnership;
PAUL T. CLARK, an ind.ividual;
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUST, an Idaho revocable trust;
JOHN DOES I-JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS n~ POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO POSSESSION,

17

Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
Defendants/CoU11ter-Claimants.
18
19

This matter is before the Court on pretrial motions in limine filed by the Counterclaimant

20

and Counter-defendant. The trial is set to begin on January 31, 2011. The Court heard oral
21

argument on the motions on January 18,2011. At that time the Court ruled on record regarding
22
23

24
25

the majority of the motions and took the remaining two issues under advisement.
The remaining issues are: 1) whether an ethics complaint against Mr. Maile pending with
the Idaho State Bar is admissible to show that the motivation for filing this suit and whether other

26

SUMMARY ORDER RE MOTIONS IN LIMINE - PAGE 1
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actions taken in the

cours~:

of this litigation and the earlier litigation was to delay the bar

1

2

proceedings; and 2) whether the late disclosed expert appraisal report of Sam Langston should be

3

excluded from trial. At the hearing on the motion Counterclaimant proffered as evidence of the

4

motive to delay the fact that Mr. Maile requested bar proceedings be delayed pending outcome of

5

this litigation. While it is marginally possible a jury could infer an improper motive from this,

6

the probative value is outweighed by the potential unfair prejudice. The fact that a bar complaint

7

was filed, absent additional corroborating evidence, will be excluded on grounds the probative
8

value is minimal and outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
9

The Court's Order for Scheduling Conference dated November 16,2009 states that

10
11

"experts may be prohibited from testifying to any opinions or foundation for such opinions that

12

have not been the subject of timely and proper disclosure." For good cause, the Court can

13

modify these deadlines in its discretion. There is no question here that the report was not timely

14

disclosed. The Counterclaimant has offered as cause to extend the deadline the fact that

15

preparation of the report took longer than anticipated by the expert. This is not a sufficient

16

showing to overcome the prejudice to Counter-defendant who is faced with a 100 page expert
17

report less than 60 days before trial. The opinions of expert Sam Langston will be excluded
18
19

20

except to the extent any portion of it was disclosed before the deadline imposed by the pre-trial
Order.

21

IT IS SO ORDERED.

22

Dated this ~_ day of January

-d.1---

23
24

eenwood
25

Di rict Judge

26
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
1

2

3

I hereby certify that on the

dI

J
day of January 2011, I mailed (served) a true and correct

copy of the within instrument to:

4
5
6
7

8
9
10
11

12
13
14
15
16

CHRIST T. TROUPIS
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE
1299 E IRON EAGLE, STE 130
PO BOX 2408
EAGLE, ID 83616
MARK S. PRUSYNSKI
MOFF ATT THOMAS BARRETT ROCK
MOFFATT
& FIELDS, CHARTERED
] OTH FL
101 S CAPITOL BLVD, ]OTH
PO BOX 829
BOISE, ID 83701-0829
CONNIE W. TAYLOR
HENDERSON LAW FIRM PLLC
I 900 WASHINGTON ST., SUITE 1020
WA
: VANCOUVER, W
A 98660
PAUL L. HENDERSON
HENDERSON LAW FIRM PLLC
900 W ASHn~GTON ST., SUITE 1020
VANCOUVER, WA 98660

17

18
19
20

THOMAS G. MAILE
LAW
LA W OFFICES OF
THOMAS G. MAILE IV, PA
380 W STATE STREET
EAGLE, ID 83616

21
22
23
24
25

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk 0f
uf the District Court

ByAd)i=-:
ByAd)i=

~

Deputy C
Cl
kr
rlf
tu
rk
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JAN 21
2 1 2011
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH,
RICH. Clerk
By KATHY JOHNSON
OS'UTV

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV OC 0723232

ORDER FOR LIMITED ADMISSION

vs.
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, et a1.
Defendants.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that pursuant to the Motion for Limited Admission filed in
this above-entitled matter, and good cause appearing therefor; PAUL L. HENDERSON shall be
admitted for limited admission as co-counsel for the Counterclaimants in the above matter.

~
24 ' day of ~

lhis
DATED this

ORDER FOR LIMITED ADMISSION

002232

......
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

~-Sf

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 0_'_ day of January, 2011 I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed
to the following:
Thomas G. Maile, IV
380 West State Street
Eagle, ID 83616

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001

Mr. Christ Troupis
Attorney at Law
PO Box 2408
Eagle, ID 83616

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 938-5482

Mark Prusynski
MOFF
ATT THOMAS
MOFFATT
101 S Capitol Blvd., 10
lothth Floor
PO Box 829
Boise, ID 83701

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 385-5384

Connie W. Taylor
Henderson Law Firm, PLLC
900 Washington, Suite 1020
Vancouver WA 98660

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 938-5482

Paul L. Henderson
Henderson Law Firm, PLLC
900 Washington, Suite 1020
Vancouver WA 98660

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 385-5384

ORDER FOR LIMITED ADMISSION

2
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130
PO Box 2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone:
208/938-5584
Facsimile:
208/938-5482
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com

OHRlst{)PHER D.
O. RICH, Clerk
OHRlst-oPHER
By KATHY BIEHL
0IIpuIJ
DlIPUlr

Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF lEE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

.------------------

- - - - - - , - _ .. _-_. .
------,-_._--_.
---------~.

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH
BIRCH· MAILE, IV.
MAILE, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Count4~r- Defendants,
Plaintiffs/Count4~r-

· v.

CV -OC-0723232
Case No. CV-OC-0723232

MOTION AND :MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
COVNTERPROHIBIT COUNTER
CLAIMANTS FROM CALLING
THOMAS MAILE AS A WITNESS
IN THEm CASE IN CHIEF

CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR,
TA YLOR, £'k/a
£'kla
TA YLOR, an individual; DALLAN
CONNIE TAYLOR,
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
CLARK. and
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
· trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS ~ POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RlGHT TO
POSSESSION.

Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
COMES NOW, Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, by and through their co-counsel of record,

Christ T. Troupis, and move for an order prohibiting Counterclaimants from calljng
calling Thomas
Maile as a witness in their case in chief. This motion is supported by the following Memorandum

002234
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of Points and Authorities.

Summary of the Motion
Counterclaimants have listed Thomas Maile as one of their witnesses. Mr. Maile has been
identified by Counterdefendants as one of their expert witnesses as well as a fact witness.
Counter-elaimants,
Counter-claimants, in their motion in limine and at the hearing on the motion in limine:,
acknowledged that Mr. Maile may provide expert testimony in this case. (1) Counterclaimants
disc10sures or discovery responses as thdr lay or
have not disclosed Mr. Maile in their witness disclosures
Counterc1aimants to attempt to elicit testimony in their case
expert witness. (2) It is improper for Counterclaimants
in chief from one ofCotmterdefendants' expert witnesses.
As we have previously noted in our other motions in limine, the Order for Scheduling
required Counterdefendants' timely disclosure of all of their witnesses 90 days prior to trial.
'I.vith this Order with respect to disclosing Mr. Maile as their witness.
They have not complied '"vith
Counterdefendants' expert witnesses] 20 days
Further, the Order required disclosure of Counterdefendants'
:v1aile as
prior to trial. They have not complied with this Order with respect to disclosing Mr. :vIaile
their expert witness.
On January 10, 2010, the first inclination that the counter-claimants were intending to

call Thomas :Maile appear(~d in their Amended Witness List. The disclosure was 20 days before
trial. Thomas Maile had been listed in Counter-defendants' Certification to Opposing Counsel of
Expert & Lay Witnesses as both a lay witness and as an expert witness.

I.
ARGUMENT

A. Counter-elaimants should be prohibited from calling Thomas Maile as a witness in their
COUNTERCLAIMANTS FROM CALLING mOMAS MAILE AS A WITNESS
MOTION TO PROHIBIT COUNTERCLAlMANTS
IN THEIR CASE IN CHIEF- Pg 2
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case in chief because they failed to comply with the Court's Scheduling Order.
The counter-claimants' disclosures have been previously provided to the Court as
attachments to the Affidavit of Christ Troupis filed December 31, 2010. The counter-claimants'
initial disclosure was filed on October 27,2010. The counter-defendants' supplemental
disclosure was served on December 10,2010. The counter-claimants failed to list Mr. Maile in
their initial discovery responses either as a lay witness or an expert witness. The counterc1aimants
claimants failed to supplement their discovery responses with any reference to Mr. Maile as
either a lay or expert witness as required by the Scheduling Stipulation.

B. Counterclaimants should be prohibited from calling Thomas Maile as a witness in their
case in chief because be lis designated as one of Counterdefendants' expert witnesses.
Mr. Maile has been properly identified as an expert for the counter-defendants. An
expert witness disclosed by one side cannot be called as a witness by the other side at trial. White
v. lvlock,
Jvlock, 140 Idaho 882, 104 P.3d 356 (Idaho 2004)

The discovery ruh$ contain no provision directly addressing whether the plaintiff
plain1iff
can one ofthe
of the defendant's experts at trial. In that the rules do not allow for
may call
depositions of a party's expert who is not expected to be called as a witness at
trial, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B), it follows that expert cannot be called by
the opposing party during trial unless a proper showing of exceptional
circumstances is made. In keeping with the policy behind the discovery rules thc~n,
thc~n,
and based upon White's failure to name Dr. Beaulieu as his expert, we conclude
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in barring the testimony of the
w(~
defense's expert to establish White's prima facie case against the defendants. W(!
also hold that a general "reservation of rights" to call the other party's witnesses is
not the type of disclosure envisioned by the rule, in that it does not apprise the
opposing party of the identity of the specific expert to be relied upon and does not
reveal the general substance of that testimony or its relation to the legal theory of
the plaintiff. SeeGallo v. Peninsula Hospital, 164 Cal. App.3d 899, 903-904, 2It
caU the other
Cal. Rptr. 27, 30 (1'985) (holding general reservation of rights to caD
party's witness is not the type of disclosure envisioned by the rule).

MOTION TO PROHIBIT CODNTERCLAIMANTS FROM CALLING THOMAS MAILE AS A WITNESS
IN THEIR CASE IN CIllEF-})g 3
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Counterclairnants: did not list Mr. Maile as their expert, or include in their
discovery responses a general reservation of a right to cal It the other party's v·:itnesses.
Based on the foregoing, the Counterclaimants should be precluded from calling Mr.

Maile in their case in chid.
DATED this 26 th day of January, 2011.

CHRIST T. TROUP ,
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants

MOTION TO PROHIBIT COUNTERCLAlMANTS FROM CALLING THOMAS MAILE AS A
WITNESS IN THEIR CASE IN CffiEF- Pg 4
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CERTIFICATE
OF SERVICE
CERTDnCATEOFSERVICE
th

1I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 26 day of January, 2011, I caused a true and comect copy of
the foregoing PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION AND MEMORA1'.-OUM
MEMORAl'.-OUM
IN S1.J-PPORT
SlJ-PPORT OF MOTION TO PROHIBIT COUNTERCLAIMANTS FROM CALLING
THOMAS MAILE AS A WITNESS IN THEIR CASE IN CHIEF. to be delivered, addressed as
follows:

IComrie
IConnie W. Taylor
Paul Henderson
Henderson Law Firm
900 Washington St. Suit,~ 1020
Vancouver, Wasrnngton
Washington 98660
Facsimile: (360) 693-291
693-29111
Mark Stephen Prusynski
PO Box 829
Boise. ID 83701
Phone: (208) 345-2000
Facsimile: (208) 385-5334
Thomas G. Maile, IV.
380 W. State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001

( )

U. S. Mail

(Z:;)
(:h)

( )
( )

Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

( )

U. S. Mail
u.

. ()o:..)

(

)
( )
( )
( )
(~)

( )

Facsimile Transmission
Deli very
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
..

--~-~-._--~
_~
--~---.---~.--~

..

_

--

SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PROHIBIT COUNTERCLAIMANTS
MOTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SuPPORT
Pg 5
FROM CALLING THOMAS MAILE AS A WITNESS IN THEIR CASE IN CHIEF
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH. Clerk
CHILD
By EMILY CHILO

Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130
POBox 2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone:
208/938-5584
Facsimile:
208/938-5482
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com

[IEPIJN
[JEPIJN

Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

BERKSHIRE INVESTIvIENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
fvIAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,

CV -OC-0723232
Case No. CV-OC-0723232
MOTlION
COUNTERDEFENDANTS' MOTJION
AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF

MOTION TO PROHIBIT
COUNTERCLAIMANTS FROM
INTRODUCING OR REFERRIN(; TO
v.
NOVEMBER 2006 ORDER, C-C
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, £IkIa
£!k!a
EXHIBIT 11 AND 2005 PURCHASE AND
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN LAND SALE AGREEMENT, C-C
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN TAYLOR, EXmBIT 5,
RAl[SED
5~ OR THE ISSUES RAJlSED
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a
THEREIN
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, an individual;
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUST, an Idaho revocable trust; JOHN
, DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND ALL
. PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,

I

I

Defendants/Counter-CLaimants.

MOTION AND MEMORANIJUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PRECLUDE COUNTERCLAIMANTS
FROM USE OR REFERENC[ TO EXHIBITS 11 AND 5, OR ISSUES RAISED THEREIN - Pg 1
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COMES NOW, the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, by and through their co-counsel of
record, Christ T. Troupis, and present the following Objection and Motion to Preclude the
ants' Exhibits 11
II and 5, and to make any reference to the matters set
introduction of Counterclaim
Counterclaimants'
out in those exhibits.

1.
Counterclaimants'
Counterclaimants t Exhibit 11 is inadmissible
Under mE Rule 402 and 608
The Counter-Claimants have listed as a proposed exhibit the Memorandum Decision and
Order Denying Counterclaimant's Claim for Damages Grounded on the Theory of Unjust
Enrichment entered November 29,2006 by Judge Wilper. The exhibit offers at least two
fundamental problems that the counter-claimants cannot overcome.
First, the exhibit is irrelevant and inadmissible under IRE Rule 402. Counterc1aimants
referred to comments made in Exhibit 11 by Judge Wilper about "sharp practices" and "self
dealing." Those comments are offered solely to make the inference that the Maile was untruthful
or untrustworthy as an attack upon his character.
Judge Wilper's comments, quoted by Counterclaimants' counsel in her opening
statement, are not compewnt evidence that is relevant and material to the issues in this case.
Moreover, they were entirely dicta and not used to support his conclusion that the improvements
did not benefit the Theodore Johnson Trust, which was the specific finding made by the Court. It
relevant to these proceedings.
cannot be cited as a finding of the Court reJevant

P .2d 1283 (1998), a statement not necessary
As noted in State v. Sherrod, 131 Id. 56, 951 P.2d
to support the prior judgment does not constitute a settled issue of fact or law
Jaw that would raise
MOTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PRECLUDE COUNTERCLAIMANTS
FROM USE OR REFERENCE TO EXHIBITS 11 AND S.
S, OR ISSUES RAISED THEREIN - Pg 2
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collateraJ estoppel. That case states that collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, "means simply
collateral
that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that
lawsuit. Such a
issue cannot agaln be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsult.

determination of a factual issue will preclude its

r~litigation if the
r~litigation

resolution of that issue

was necessary to support the prior judgment (emphasis added)". This principle of issue
appJies in criminal as well as civil cases.
preclusion appEes
The comments of Judge Wilper were not findings because he made his decisior.. without
reference to his beliefs about Mr. Maile's purported conduct during the sale transaction with the
decedent. On page 5 of his decision, he stated: "Nevertheless, the Court believes that this case
can be decided on its merits by analyzing the elements of the unjust enrichment claim, without
proclaiming that Mr. Maile is barred from seeking equitable relief based on the doctrine of
unclean hands",
hands".

The dicta in Judge Wilper's ruling is therefore not relevant nor mateJial to any

issue in this case.
The Taylors attempted use of the November 2006 Decision is a maneuver to put before
the jury two statements about \fr. Maile's character, "self dealing" and "sharp practices", that
are not probative, but are int1ammatory and prejudicial. These tenus were used in reference to
of the contract between Ted Johnson
Mr. Maile's relationship with Ted Johnson and his drafting ofthe
and himself. Those issues were litigated and resolved in Taylor 1. When he makes a comment
that is not incorporated into a specific finding necessary to the judgment, Judge Wilper has no
different standing than any other third party called as a witness to impeach a party's character.
His statements must comply with IRE Rule 608 to be admissible.

MOTION AND MEMORANUUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PRECLUDE COUNTERCLAIMANTS
REFERENC:E TO EXHIBITS 11 AND 5, OR ISSUES RAISED THEREIN - Pg 3
FROM USE OR REFERENCE
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The Taylors are not trying to take such an opinion and interject the same into the abuse of
process and interference of business advantage claims, inferring the same behavior applied to
asserting counterclaims in response to Taylors' complaint or pursuing the appeal in Taylor v.
Maile 2 or in filing the perjury complaint. The actions referenced by Judge Wilper had nothing
to do with the appeal process, the counterclaims, or the perjury complaint. In fact Judge Wilper
after making such comments went on to allow the Mailes to maintain the lis pendens during the
appeal of Taylor v. Maile 2 because he found that it was proper, and not frivolous, unreasonable,
or without foundation. The counter-claimants are attempting to interject these comments for an
improper purpose.
Second, this proposed use of Judge Wilper's statements about Mr. Maile to attack his
character and conduct in the initjal sale transaction is not permitted under the Idaho Rules of
Evidence. I.R.E. Rule 608 provides:

Evidence of character and conduct of witness
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The credibility of a witness may be
attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subj eet to
these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness, and (2) evidence oftruthful character is admissible only after the
character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation
evidence or otherwise.

(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the
purpose of attacking or supporting the credibility, of the witness, other than conviction of
crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may,
comi, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be
however, in the discretion of the cowi,
inquired into on cross-examination of the witness concerning (1) the character of the
witness for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) the character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined
has testified.
MOTION AND MEMORANUUM. IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PRECLUDE COUNTERCLAIMANTS
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The introduction of the exhibit would violate the above rule of evidence. There is no
evidence, nor will there be any evidence presented, that any opinions regarding truthfulness or
untruthfulness of Tom Maile were raised before Judge Wilper.
Counterclaimants" other proposed use of the document is also irrelevant. They infonned
the jury that this document establishes the value of property in October 2006. lfthat is relevant
and material to any issue in this case, the court can take judicial notice of the finding without
offering Exhibit 11 into evidence. However, Counterdefendants object to the introductl.on of that
finding as well as the Exhibit on the grounds that Counterclaimants cannot establish that the
value of the property in October 2006 is relevant and material to any issue in this case, until they
establish that Counterdefendants engaged in Vlfongful conduct that constituted either abuse of
process or intentional interference that preceded that date. The sole purpose of establishing value
is to prove that the value has declined and argue that Mailes are liable for the

differenc<~

because

of their alleged Vlfongful conduct.
After the District Court entered its order on November, 2006, the case was appealed to
the Idaho Supreme Court. The decision was rendered on January 30, 2009. A notice of lis
pendens was properly recorded during the entire appeal. Although the 'peljury complaint' was
2008, th~: parties stipulated to a stay of proceedings until the Supreme Court
served in March, 200&,
ruled in Taylor 2. The filing of the 'perjury complaint' did not cause any delay in the rendering
of the Supreme Court's opinion, and its Notice of Lis Pendens was only operative after the
Supreme Court issued its remittitur in April, 2009.
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The elements of intentional interference require proof that the interference was wrongful
by some measure beyond the fact of the interference itself. Moreover, Counterclaimants in their

opening advised the jury that Mr. Maile was represented by six attorneys at various times during
the litigation history and at some times was acting as his own attorney. To the extent that the sole
conduct Counterclaimants intend to present as evidence of tortious conduct occurred during the

course of the litigation and consisted of filing pleadings and presenting claims, that conduct
would be subject to a litigation privilege.
Although Thomas Maile filed certain motions pro se before the Supreme Court in
attempting to augment the record, the Supreme Court appellants briefs were submitted by the

Office of Dennis Charney and the Law Offices of Thomas Maile on behalf of a corporate client,
Berkshire Investments, LLC as well as the individuals, Tom and Colleen Maile. A corporation
cannot represent itself but must be represented by an attorney, acting in his capacity as "ffi
<:ffi
prc:viously ruled that the litigation privilege applied to attorneys and not
attorney. This court has previously
parties. The Litigation privilege should apply to any allegations, facts, statements, etc., which are

contained in the briefmg before the Supreme Court in Taylor v. Maile 2.
The Court is aware that Judge Wilper entered an order allowing the Lis Pendens to be

recorded and maintained tlu-oughout the appeal process, and denied Taylors' motion for

attorneys fees finding that the Mailes' actions in litigating their claims throughout that
proceeding were not frivOlOlllS,
friv010lllS, unreasonable or without foundation. The Court is also aware that
the Supreme Court in Taylor 2 denied Taylors' motion for attorneys' fees on the same basis and
affirmed the finding of the District Court in that regard. Taylors' contention that Mailes abused
affi.rmed
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the process of the court and intentionally interfered with Taylors' economic interests solely by
assel1ing these legitimate counterclaims in the trial court and on appeal in the case brought by the
Taylors, is not tenable. The case of Carter v. Carter, 143 Idaho 373, 146 P.3d 639 (2006)

provides at p. 648 of 146 P.3d: It is not a tort where one acts to protect her own economic
interests, even if there is interference with the contract expectancy of another, so long as the acts
of the intervenor are not independently \VTongful.
\vyongfuI. In Highland Enterprises, Inc.

)1.

Barker, 133

Idaho 330, 338, 986 P.2d 996, 1004 (1999), the elements of that claim are listed as follows:
"( 1) The existence of a valid economic expectancy; (2) knowledge of the expectancy on

the part of the interferer; (3) intentional interference inducing tennination oftht:
tht: interference was "vrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the
expectancy; (4) tht!
interference itself (i.e. that the defendant interfered for an improper purpose or improper
means) and (5) resulting damage to the plaintiff whose expectancy has been disrupted."

As noted above, the Court in Taylor 2 has already ruled that the MaiJes properly brought
their counterclaims and properly pursued them on appeal, and that the filing of a Notice'
Notice, of Lis
Pendens during the appellate process through the remittitur of Taylor 2 in April, 2009 was
proper. The orders of Judge Wilper and the Supreme Court denying Taylors' requests for
attorneys fees as a sanction for bringing claims that were "frivolous, unreasonable, or without
foundation" conclusively establish that Mailes used proper means, and had a proper pur::)ose (i.e.

they had legitimate claims that they had a right to prosecute in the District Court and on appeal).
Any verdict in favor of the Taylors based upon the claim that :\1.ailes were not entitled to
pursue their counterclaims prior to issuance of the final decision in Taylor 2 would necessarily
contradict the prior ruling of Judge Wilper and the Idaho Supreme Court in Taylor 2, and violate
the doctrine of res judicata
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Counterdaimants' Exhibit 5 is inadmissible
Under IRE Rule 402
Counterclaimants propose to introduce a 2005 offer to purchase the property involved
invoIved in
the prior lawsuit. The offer preceded the date of issuance of the Supreme Court's decision in

Taylor 1 in December, 2005. At the time that the offer was made, the District Court had
dismissed
cJismissed the TayJors'
Taylors' beneficiaries claims, which were on appeal, and had ruled that the trust

could
ofthi5
this offer is apparentty
coulcJ not rescind the sale ofthe property to the Mailes. The evidence of
intended for the inference that Mailes did not pay fair market value for the property when they

purchased it in 2002. That issue is foreclosed based on the final judgment in Taylor 1. In opening
statement, counsel informed the jury that this value fixed the amount of the countercl aimants'
aim ants '
damages based on a reduction in value from that date. Until they present evidence that Mailes
engaged in some tortious 'wrongful conduct that preceded that date, the offer is irrelevant.

counter-c]aimants should be prohibited from referencing the November 2006 Order
The counter-claimants
or introducing the same into evidence. The Counterclaimants should also be precluded from

introducing Exhibit 5 or any other evidence of the purported 2005 offer.
of Feb:mary, 2011.
DATED this 151 day ofFeb:ruary,

/"/ ..:t.:-,-.
;~----;Y-;-'
/ .
CHRIST T~ TRatffiS,
CHRIST
TRatYPrs,
..

~'>

~)

Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 151 day of February, 2011, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION AND
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PROHIBIT
COUNTERCLAIMANTS FROM USE OR REFERENCE TO EXHIBITS II AND 5, to
be delivered, addressed as follows:
----._

t

i

i

Connie W. Taylor
Paul Henderson
Henderson Law Firm
900 Washington St. Suitc~ 1020
Vancouver, Washington 98660
Facsimile: (360) 693-2911
Thomas G. Maile, IV.
380 W. State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001

( )
( )
( )

u. S. Mail

(X)

Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email

, ()
()
(X)
()

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

( )

. . ll_._~_
__~~

CHRIST T. TRotrPIS,
Co-counsel for Plainti ffs/Counter-Defendants
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FEB 0 1 2011
Christ T. Troupis, 1SB # 4549
TROUP1S LAW OFFICE
l299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130
1299
POBox 2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone:
208/938-5584
Facsimile:
208/938-5482
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com

CHRISTOPHER D, RICH. Clerk
By

U.RAJ\r,~ES

'JEPlIT"

Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

'an

'BERKSHIRE INvESTMENTS, LLC,
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.

Case No. CV-OC-0723232

MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,

COUNTERDEFENDANTS' M0110N
AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO PROHIBIT
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,
COUNTERCL~TSFROM
COUNTERCLAIMANTS
FROM
INTRODUCING
OR
REFERRING
TO
v.
ORDE~ C-C
NOVEMBER 2006 ORDE~
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR.
TAYLOR, fIkIa
f/kIa
EXlDBIT 11 AND 2005 PURCHASE AND
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN LAND SALE AGREEMENT, C-C'
C-C
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN TAYLOR, EXHIBIT 5,
5~ OR THE ISSUES RA1SED
THEREIN
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, an individual;
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUST, an Idaho revocable trust; JOHN
: DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND ALL
, PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
. POSSESSION.

I

I

Defendants/Counter-CLaimants.
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COMES NOW, the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, by and through their co-counsel of
record, Christ T. Troupis, and present the following Objection and Motion to Preclude the
Counterc1aimants' Exhibits 11 and 5, and to make any reference to the matters set
introduction of Counterclaimants'
out in those exhibits.

I.
~ounterclaimants'
~ounterclaimants' Exhibit 11 is inadmissible
Under IRE Rule 402 and 608
The Counter-Claimants have listed as a proposed exhibit the Memorandum Decision and
Order Denying Counterc1aimant's
Counterclaimant's Claim for Damages Grounded on the Theory of Unjust
Enrichment entered November 29,2006 by Judge Wilper. The exhibit offers at least hvo
fundamental problems that the counter-claimants cannot overcome.
Counterc1ajmants
First, the exhibit is irrelevant and inadmissible under IRE Rule 402. Counterclaimants
referred to comments made in Exhibit 11 by Judge Wilper about "sharp practices" and "self
dealing." Those comments are offered solely to make the inference that the Maile was untruthful
or untrustworthy as an attack upon his character.
Judge Wilper's comments, quoted by Counterclaimants' counsel in her opening
compelent evidence that is relevant and material to the issues in this case.
statement, are not compet.ent
Moreover, they were entirely dicta and not used to support his conclusion that the improvements
did not benefit the Theodore Johnson Trust, which was the specific finding made by the Court. It
cannot be cited as a finding of the Court relevant to these proceedings.
P.2d 1283 (1998), a statement not necessary
As noted in State v. Sherrod, 131 [d. 56, 951 P.2d
to support the prior judgment does not constitute a settled issue of fact or law that would raise
MOTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PRECLUDE COUNTERCLAIMANTS
FROM USE OR REFERENC8E TO EXHIBITS 11 AND S, OR ISSUES RAISED THEREIN - Pg 2
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collatera1
collateral estoppel. That case states that collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, "means simply
that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been detennined by a valid and final judgment, that
issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit. Such a

ofthat
determination of a factual issue will preclude its re-litigation if the resolution of
that issue
was necessary to support the prior judgmen1 (emphasis added)". This principle of issue
preclusion applies in criminal as wel1
well as civil cases.
The comments of Judge Wilper were not findings because he made his decision without
reference to his beliefs about Mr. Maile's purported conduct during the sale transaction with the
decedent. On page 5 of his decision, he stated: "Nevertheless, the Court believes that this case
can be decided on its merits by analyzing the elements of the unjust enrichment claim, without

Mr, Maile is barred from seeking equitable relief based on the doctrine of
proclaiming that Mr.
unclean hands".
hands",

The dicta in Judge Wilper's ruling is therefore not relevant nor material to any

issue in this case.
The Taylors attempted use of the November 2006 Decision is a maneuver to put before
the jury two statements about Mr. Maile's character, "self dealing" and "sharp practices", that
jnfiammatory and prejudicial. These tenns were used in reference to
are not probative, but are inflammatory

",..i th Ted Johnson and his drafting oftbe contract between Ted Johnson
Mr. Maile's relationship ""ith
and himself. Those issues were litigated and resolved in Taylor 1. When he makes a comment
that is not incorporated into a specific finding necessary to the judgment, Judge Wilper has no
different standing than any other third party called as a witness to impeach a party's character.
His statements must comply with IRE Rule 608 to be admissible.
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The Taylors are not trying to take such an opinion and interject the same into the abuse of
process and interference of business advantage claims, inferring the same behavior applied to
asserting counterclaims in response to Taylors' complaint or pursuing the appeal in Taylor v.
Maile 2 or in filing the perjury complaint. The actions referenced by Judge Wilper had nothing
to do with the appeal proeess, the counterclaims, or the perjury complaint. In fact Judge Wilper
commc:~nts went on to allow
anow the MaBes
Mailes to maintain the lis pendens during the
after making such commc:~nts

appeal of Taylor v. Maile 2 because he found that it was proper, and not frivolous, unreasonable,
or without foundation. TIle counter-claimants are attempting to interj ect these comments for an
improper purpose.
Second, this proposed use of Judge Wilper's statements about Mr. Maile to attack his
character and conduct in the initial sale transaction is not permitted under the Idaho RuJes of
Evidence. I.R.E. Rule 608 provides:

Evidence of character and conduct of witness
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The credibility of a witness may be
attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to
these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness, and (2) evidence oftruthful character is admissible only after the
character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation
othen.vise.
evidence or othenvise.
of the conduct of a witness,
witness. for the
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances ofthe
purpose of attacking or supporting the credibility, of the witness, other than conviction of
crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may,
however, in the discretion of the court,
court. if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be
inquired into on cross-examination of the witness concerning (1) the character of the
untruthfulness. or (2) the character for truthfulness or
witness for truthfulness or untruthfulness,
untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined
has testified.
MOTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PRECLUDE COUNTERCLAIMANTS
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The introduction of 1he
the exhibit would violate the above rule of evidence. Then~ is no
evidence, nor will there be any evidence presented, that any opinions regarding truthfUllness or
untruthfulness of Tom Maile were raised before Judge Wilper.
Counterclaimants' other proposed use of
the document is also
aJso irrelevant. They informed
ofthe
value of property in October 2006. If that is relevant
the jury that this document establishes the va1ue
and material to any issue in this case, the court can take judicial notice of the finding

~rithout
~.rithout

offering Exhibit 11 into evidence. However, Counterdefendants object to the introduction of that
finding as well as the Exhibit on the grounds that Counterclaimants cannot establish that the
value of the property in October 2006 is relevant and material to any issue in this case, until they
establish that Counterdef~~ndants
Counterdef~~ndants engaged in wrongful conduct that constituted either abuse of
process or intentional interference that preceded that date. The sole purpose of establishing value
is to prove that the value has dec1ined
Hable for the differenc1e
differencl(! because
declined and argue that Mailes are liable
of their aJleged
alleged wrongful conduct.
After the District Court entered its order on November, 2006, the case was appealed to
the Idaho Supreme Court. The decision was rendered on January 30, 2009. A notice of lis
pendens was properly recorded during the entire appeal. Although the 'peIjury complaint' was
served in March, 2008, the parties stipulated to a stay of proceedings until the Supreme Court
the 'perjury complaint' did not cause any delay in the n:ndering
ofthe
ruled in Taylor 2. The filing of
of the Supreme Court's opinion, and its Notice of Lis Pendens was only operative after the
Supreme Court issued its :remittitur in April, 2009.
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The elements of intentional interference require proof that the interference was wrongful
by some measure beyond the fact of the interference itself. Moreover, Counterclaimants in their
opening advised the jury that Mr. Maile was represented by six attorneys at various times during
the litigation history and at some times was acting as his own attorney. To the extent that the sole
conduct CountercIaimants intend to present as evidence of tortious conduct occurred during the
course of the litigation and consisted of filing pleadings and presenting claims, that conduct
would be subject to a litigation privilege.
Although Thomas Maile filed certain motions pro se before the Supreme Court in
attempting to augment the record, the Supreme Court appellants briefs were submitted by the
Office of Dennis Charney and the Law Offices of Thomas Maile on behalf of a corporate client,
Berkshire Investments, LLC as we)]
well as the individuals, Tom and Colleen Maile. A corporation
cannot represent itself but must be represented by an attorney, acting in his capacity as an
attorney. This court has previously ruled that the litigation privilege applied to attorneys and not
parties. The Litigation privilege should apply to any allegations, facts, statements, etc., which are
contained in the briefIng before the Supreme Court in Taylor v. Maile 2.
The Court is aware that Judge Wilper entered an order allowing
al10wing the Lis Pendens to be
recorded and maintained throughout the appeal process, and denied Taylors' motion for
attorneys fees finding that the Mailes' actions in litigating their claims throughout that
proceeding were not frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation. The Court is also aware that
the Supreme Court in Taylor 2 denied Taylors' motion for attorneys' fees on the same basis and
affiooed the finding of the District Court in that regard. Taylors' contention that Mailes abused
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the process of the court and intentionally interfered with Taylors' economic interests solely by
asserting these legitimate counterclaims in the trial court and on appeal in the case brought by the
Taylors, is not tenable. The case of Carter v. Carter, 143 Idaho 373, 146 P.3d 639 (2006)
provides at p. 648 of 146 P.3d: It is not a tort where one acts to protect her own economic
interests, even if there is interference with the contract expectancy of another, so long.as the acts
\VTongful. In Highland Enterprises, Inc.
of the intervenor are not independently \Vl'ongful.
Jnc. v. Barker, 133
Idaho 330, 338, 986 P.2d 996, 1004 (1999), the elements of that claim are listed as follows:
""( 1) The existence of a valid economic expectancy; (2) knowledge ofthe
of the expectancy on

the part of the interferer; (3) intentional interference inducing tennination ofth(~
expectancy; (4) the interference was v..Tongful by some measure beyond the fact of the
interference itself (i.e. that the defendant interfered for an improper purpose or improper
means) and (5) resulting damage to the plaintiff whose expectancy has been disrupted."
MaBes properly brought
As noted above, the Court in Taylor 2 has already ruled that the Mailes
their counterclaims and properly pursued them on appeal, and that the filing of a Notice of Lis
Pendens during the appellate process through the remittitur of Taylor 2 in April, 2009 was
proper. The orders of Judge Wilper and the Supreme Court denying Taylors' requests for
~lithout
attorneys fees as a sanction for bringing claims that were "frivolous, Wlfeasonable, or ~lithout

foundation" conclusively establish that Mailes used proper means, and had a proper purpose (i.e.
they had legitimate claims that they had a right to prosecute
prosecnte in the District Court and on appeal).
Any verdict in fave)r of the Taylors based upon the claim that MaiJes were not entitled to

pursue their counterclaims prior to issuance of the final decision in Taylor 2 would necessarily
contradict the prior ruling of Judge Wilper and the Idaho Supreme Court in Taylor 2, and violate
the doctrine of res judicata.
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Counterclaimants' Exhibit 5 is inadmissible
UDder IRE Rule 402
Under

Counterclaimants propose to introduce a 2005 offer to purchase the property involved in
the prior lawsuit. The offer preceded the date of issuance of the Supreme Court's decision in
Taylor 1 in December, 2005. At the time that the offer was made, the District Court had

wlrich were on appeal, and had ruled that the trust
dismissed the Taylors' beneficiaries claims, which
could not rescind the sale of the property to the Mailes. The evidence of this offer is apparently
Mailes did not pay fair market value for the property when they
intended for the inference that MaBes
purchased it in 2002. That issue is foreclosed based on the final judgment in Taylor 1. In opening
statement, counsel infomled the jury that this value fixed the amount of the cOlU1terclaimants'
damages based on a redw:tion in value from that date. Until they present evidence that Mailes
engaged in some tortious \\Tongfu]
\\Tongful conduct that preceded that date, the offer is irrelevant.
The counter-claimants should be prohibited from referencing the November 2006 Order
or introducing the same into evidence. The Counterc1aimants should also be precluded from

introducing Exhibit 5 or any other evidence of the purported 2005 offer.
DATED this 1st day of February, 2011.

.~\

/.-'t.:,'-.

l)

I.·

CHRIST T~
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defend~Ults
Co--counseI for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defend~Ults
Co--counsel

TRODPiS,
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51
February, 2011, I caused a true and correct
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 1 day of Febmary,
copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION AND
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PROHIBIT
COUNTERCLAIMANfS FROM USE OR REFERENCE TO EXHIBITS 11 AND 5, to
COUNTERCLAIMANTS
be delivered, addressed as fonows:
I

i
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u. S. Mail

()
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()
(X)

Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email

(
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(
( ))
. (X)
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U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

Connie \V. Taylor
Paul Henderson
Henderson Law Firm
900 Washington St. Suite 1020
Vancouver, Washington 98660
Facsimile: (360) 693-2911

Thomas G. Maile, IV.
380 W. State Street
, Eagle, Idaho 83616
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001
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CHRIST T. TRoUPIS,
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
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DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

Case No. CV
-OC-0723232
CV-OC-0723232
JURY INSTRUCTIONS
HON. RICHARD D. GREENWOOD
District Judge
Presiding

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability, and
THOMAS G. MAILE, IV and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,
vs.
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR,
f/k/a
file/a CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual;
DALLAN TAYLOR, an individual;
R. JOHN TAYLOR, an individual;
CLARK and FEENEY, a partnership;
PAUL T. CLARK, an individual; and
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE TRUST,
an Idaho revocable trust,
Defendants/
Counter-Claimants.
Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
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INSTRUCTION NO.1
These instructions explain your duties as jurors and define the law that applies to this
case. It is your duty to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in these instructions to those
facts, and in this way to decide the case. Your decision should be based upon a rational and
objective assessment of the evidence. It should not be based on sympathy or prejudice.
It is my duty to instruct you on the points of law necessary to decide the case, and it is

your duty to follow the law as I instruct. You must consider these instructions as a whole, not
picking out one and disregarding others. The order in which these instructions are given or the
manner in which they are numbered has no significance as to the importance of any of them. If
you do not understand an instruction, you may send a note to me through the bailiff, and I will try
to clarify or explain the point further.
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this trial. This

evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits admitted into evidence, and any
stipulated or admitted facts. While the arguments and remarks of the attorneys may help you
understand the evidence and apply the instructions, what they say is not evidence.

If an

attorney's argument or remark has no basis in the evidence, you should disregard it.
The production of evidence in court is governed by rule of law. At times during the trial,
I may sustain an objection to a question without permitting the witness to answer it, or to an
offered exhibit without n:ceiving it into evidence. My rulings are legal matters, and are solely
my responsibility. You must not speculate as to the reason for any objection, which was made, or
my ruling thereon, and in reaching your decision you may not consider such a question or exhibit
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or speculate as to what the answer or exhibit would have shown. Remember, a question is not
evidence and should be considered only as it gives meaning to the answer.
There may be occasions where an objection is made after an answer was given or the
remark was made, and in my ruling on the objection I will instruct that the answer or remark be
stricken, or direct that you disregard the answer or remark and dismiss it from your minds. In
your deliberations, you must not consider such answer or remark, but must treat it as though you
had never heard it.]
The law does not require you to believe all of the evidence admitted in the course of the
trial. As the sole judges of the facts, you must determine what evidence you believe and what
weight you attach to it. In so doing, you bring with you to this courtroom all of the experience
and background of your lives. There is no magical formula for evaluating testimony. In your
everyday affairs, you determine for yourselves whom you believe, what you believe and how
much weight you attach to what you are told. The considerations you use in making the more
important decisions in your everyday dealings are the same considerations you should apply in
your deliberations in this case.

2
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INSTRUCTION NO.2
These instructions explain your duties as jurors and define the law that applies to this
case. It is your duty to detennine the facts, to apply the law set forth in these instructions to those
facts, and in this way to decide the case. Your decision should be based upon a rational and
objective assessment of the evidence. It should not be based on sympathy or prejudice.
It is my duty to instruct you on the points of law necessary to decide the case, and it is

your duty to follow the law as I instruct. You must consider these instructions as a whole, not
picking out one and disregarding others. The order in which these instructions are given or the
manner in which they are numbered has no significance as to the importance of any of them. If
you do not understand an instruction, you may send a note to me through the bailiff, and I will try
to clarify or explain the point further.
In detennining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this trial. This
evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits admitted into evidence, and any
stipulated or admitted facts. While the arguments and remarks of the attorneys may help you
understand the evidence and apply the instructions, what they say is not evidence.

If an

attorney's argument or remark has no basis in the evidence, you should disregard it.
The production of evidence in court is governed by rule of law. At times during the trial,
I may sustain an objection to a question without pennitting the witness to answer it, or to an
offered exhibit without receiving it into evidence. My rulings are legal matters, and are solely
my responsibility. You must not speculate as to the reason for any objection, which was made, or
my ruling thereon, and in reaching your decision you may not consider such a question or exhibit
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or speculate as to what the answer or exhibit would have shown. Remember, a question is not
evidence and should be considered only as it gives meaning to the answer.
There may be occasions where an objection is made after an answer was given or the
remark was made, and in my ruling on the objection I will instruct that the answer or remark be
stricken, or direct that you disregard the answer or remark and dismiss it from your minds. In
your deliberations, you must not consider such answer or remark, but must treat it as though you
had never heard it.]
The law does not require you to believe all of the evidence admitted in the course of the
trial. As the sale judges of the facts, you must determine what evidence you believe and what
weight you attach to it. In so doing, you bring with you to this courtroom all of the experience
and background of your lives. There is no magical formula for evaluating testimony. In your
everyday affairs, you determine for yourselves whom you believe, what you believe and how
much weight you attach to what you are told. The considerations you use in making the more
important decisions in your everyday dealings are the same considerations you should apply in
your deliberations in this case.

2
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INSTRUCTION NO.3

During your deliberations, you will be entitled to have with you my instructions
concerning the law that applies to this case, the exhibits that have been admitted into evidence
and any notes taken by you in the course of the trial proceedings.
If you take notes during the trial, be careful that your attention is not thereby diverted
from the witness or his testimony; and you must keep your notes to yourself and not show them
to other persons or jurors until the jury deliberations at the end of the trial.

002262

INSTRUCTION NO.4
Any statement by me identifying a claim of a party is not evidence in this case. I have
advised you of the claims of the parties merely to acquaint you with the issues to be decided.
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INSTRUCTION NO.5
When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use the expression "if
you find" or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded that the proposition is more probably
true than not true.
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INSTRUCTION NO.6

Certain evidence may be presented to you by deposition. A deposition is testimony taken
under oath before the trial and preserved in writing or upon video tape. This evidence is entitled
to the same consideration you would give had the witness testified from the witness stand.
You will only receive this testimony in open court. Although there is a record of the
deposition testimony, this record will not be available to you during your deliberations.
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INSTRUCTION NO.7
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. Direct evidence is evidence that directly
proves a fact. Circumstantial evidence is evidence that indirectly proves the fact, by proving one
or more facts from which the fact at issue may be inferred.
The law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence as to the degree
of proof required; each is accepted as a reasonable method of proof and each is respected for such
convincing force as it may carry.
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INSTRUCTION NO.8
It is important that as jurors and officers of this court you obey the following instructions

at any time you leave the jury box, whether it be for recesses of the court during the day or when
you leave the courtroom to go home at night.
Do not discuss this case during the trial with anyone, including any of the attorneys,
fj-iends, or members of your family. "No discussion" also means no
parties, witnesses, your fi-iends,
emailing, text messaging, tweeting, blogging, posting to electronic bulletin boards, and any other
form of communication, electronic or otherwise.
Do not discuss this case with other jurors until you begin your deliberations at the end of
the trial. Do not attempt to decide the case until you begin your deliberations.
I will give you some form of this instruction every time we take a break. I do that not to
insult you or because I don't think you are paying attention, but because experience has shown
this is one of the hardest instructions for jurors to follow. I know of no other situation in our
culture where we ask strangers to sit together watching and listening to something, then go into a
little room together and not talk about the one thing they have in common:

what they just

watched together.
There are at least two reasons for this rule. The first is to help you keep an open mind.
When you talk about things, you start to make decisions about them and it is extremely
important that you not make any decisions about this case until you have heard all the evidence
and all the rules for making your decisions, and you won't have that until the very end of the
trial. The second reason for the rule is that we want all of you working together on this decision
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when you deliberate. If you have conversations in groups of two or three during the trial, you
won't remember to repeat all of your thoughts and observations for the rest of your fellow jurors
when you deliberate at tht~ end of the trial.
Ignore any attempted improper communication. If any person tries to talk to you about
this case, tell that person that you cannot discuss the case because you are a juror. If that person
persists, simply walk away and report the incident to the bailiff.
Do not make any independent personal investigations into any facts or locations

connected with this case. Do not look up any information from any source, including the
11cts of this
Internet. Do not communicate any private or special knowledge about any of the 11ctS
case to your fellow jurors. Do not read or listen to any news reports about this case or about
anyone involved in this case, whether those reports are in newspapers or the Internet, or on radio
or television.
In our daily lives we may be used to looking for information on-line and to "Google"
something as a matter of routine. Also, in a trial it can be very tempting for jurors to do their
own research to make sure they are making the correct decision. You must resist that temptation
for our system of justice to work as it should. I specifically instruct that you must decide the case
only on the evidence received here in court. If you communicate with anyone about the case or
do outside research during the trial it could cause us to have to start the trial over with new jurors
and you could be held in contempt of court.
While you are actually deliberating in the jury room, the bailiff will confiscate all cell
phones and other means of electronic communications. Should you need to communicate with
me or anyone else during the deliberations, please notify the bailiff.

2
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INSTRUCTION NO.9
You have now heard all the evidence in the case. My duty is to instruct you as to the law.
You must follow all the rules as I explain them to you. You may not follow some and
ignore others. Even if you disagree or don't understand the reasons for some of the rules, you are
bound to follow them. If anyone states a rule of law different from any I tell you, it is my
instruction that you must follow.
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INSTRUCTION NO.1 0

On the claim of abuse of process, the Counterclaimants have the burden of
proof on each of the following propositions:
(1)
(l) The Counter-defendants committed a willful act in the use of
legal process not proper in the regular course of the proceeding

(2) The act was committed for an ulterior, improper purpose

You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form:
Did the Counter-defendants commit an abuse of process?
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence in the case that each
of the propositions contained in this instruction has been proved, you should
answer the jury question "yes." If you find that any of these propositions has not
been proved, you should answer the question "no."
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INSTRUCTION NO. 11

On the claim of intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage against
the Counter-defendants, the Counterclaimants have the burden of proof on each of the following
propositions:
1) The existence of a valid economic expectancy;
2) knowledge of the expectancy on the part of the interferer;
3) intentional interference inducing termination of the expectancy;
4) the interference was wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the mterference
itself; and
5) resulting damage to the Counterclaimants whose expectancy has been disrupted.
You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form:
Did the Counter-Defendants intentionally interfere with a prospective economIC
advantage?
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has
been proved, then you should answer this question "yes." If you find from your consideration of
all ofthe evidence that any of these propositions has not been proved, then you should answer
this question "no."
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INSTRUCTION NO. 12

To establish that the intentional interference resulting in injury was wrongful, a party may
offer proof that either: "(1) the defendant had an improper objective or purpose to harm the
plaintiff; or (2) the defendant used a wrongful means to cause injury to the prospective business
relationship. "
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INSTRUCTION NO. 13
Intent may be established by inference as well as by direct proof.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 14

By giving you instructions on the subject of damages, I do not express any opinion as to
Counterclaim ants are entitled to damages.
whether the Counterclaimants
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INSTRUCTION NO. 15

If the jury decides the Counterc1aimants are entitled to recover from the Counter
defendants, the jury must determine the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly
compensate the plaintiffs for any of the following elements of damages proved by the evidence to
have resulted from the defendants' conduct:
1. As to the interference with a prospective economic advantage, any diminution in
value of the real estate or expenses related to the real estate in issue from the time of the
commencement of the interference to the time the interference ended. You are instructed that any
wrongful interference with Counterc1aimants' prospective advantage could not commence before
January 30,2009, the date the decision was rendered by the Idaho Supreme Court in the second
appeal of the case of Taylor vs. Maille.
2. As to the abuse of process, any cost of defending against the conduct found by you to
be an abuse.
Whether any of these elements of damage has been proved is for you to determine.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 16

In deciding this case, you may not delegate any of your decisions to another or decide any
question by chance, such as by the flip of a coin or drawing of straws. If money damages are to
be awarded you may not agree in advance to average the sum of each individual juror's estimate
as the method of determining the amount of the damage award.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 17

If it becomes necessary during your deliberations to communicate with me, you may send
a note signed by one or more of you to the bailiff. You should not try to communicate with me
by any means other than such a note.
During your deliberations, you are not to reveal to anyone how the jury stands on any of
the questions before you, numerically or otherwise, unless requested to do so by me.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 18

I have given you the rules of law that apply to this case. I have instructed you regarding
matters that you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the facts. In a few minutes
counsel will present their closing arguments to you and then you will retire to the jury room for
your deliberations.
Each of you has an equally important voice in the jury deliberations. Therefore, the
attitude and conduct ofjurors
of jurors at the beginning of the deliberations are important. At the outset of
deliberations, it is rarely productive for a juror to make an emphatic expression of opinion on the
case or to state how he or she intends to vote. When one does that at the beginning, one's sense
of pride may be aroused and there may be reluctance to change that position, even if shown that it
is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates, but you arc judges. For you, as for
me, there can be no triumph except in the ascertainment and declaration of the truth.
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views. Deliberate with the objective of
reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual judgment. Each of
you must decide this case for yourself; but you should do so only after a discussion and
consideration of the case with your fellow jurors.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 19
On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a foreman, who will preside
over your deliberations.
An appropriate form of verdict will be submitted to you with any instructions. Follow the

directions on the verdict form, and answer all of the questions required of you by the instructions
on the verdict form.
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. As soon as
nine or more of you shall have agreed upon each of the required questions in the verdict, you
should fill it out as instructed, and have it signed. It is not necessary that the same nine agree on
each question. If your verdict is unanimous, your foreman alone will sign it; but if nine or more,
but less than the entire jury, agree, then those so agreeing will sign the verdict.
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdictl, you will notify the bailiff, who
will then return you into open court.

002279

-"

NO.
FIlED (J:, C:::O
A.M,_ _ _,---P.M l )
.N

FEB 04 2011
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk

ADAByt(AT~p~~NSON
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADAByt(AT~p~~NSON

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE
husband and wife,

Case No. CV OC 0723232

Plaintiffs / Counter-Defendants,
vs.
WRIGHT
TAYLOR,
f/k/a
CONNIE
CONNIE TA
YLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR,
TAYLOR,
an individual;
R. JOHN
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK AND
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I - JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING
ANY
RIGHT
TO
POSSESSION.

VERDICT

Defendants / Counterc1aimants.

We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows:
Question No. 1: Did the Counter-Defendants commit an abuse of process?
Answer to Question No. 1:: Yes [ ~

cfOR\G\NAL

No[_]
No[_J
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Question No.2: Did the Counter-Defendants intentionally interfere with a prospective economic
advantage?

v1
[v1

Answer to Question No.2: Yes [

No[_]
No
[_]

If you answered "Yes" to either or both of questions 1 and 2, answer Question No.3.

Question No.3: What is the total amount of damage sustained by the Counterclaimants as a
result of the conduct of the Counter-Defendants?
No . .3: We assess Counterclaimants' damages as follows:
Answer to Question No.

-M;;.
-M;;-

_

~1;:;--- day of February 2011.
DATED this ~-£;:;--.
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A.M.

Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130
PO Box 2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone:
208/938-5584
Facsimile:
208/938-5482
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com

P.M.

1 1 2011
FEB 11
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By ELYSHIA HOLMES
DEPUTY

Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCHBIRCH
MAILE, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,

Case No. CV-OC 07-23232

PLAINTIFFS/COUNTERPLAINTIFFS/COUNTER
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT NOT
WITHSTANDING THE VERDICT

v.
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a
TAYLOR,
YLOR, an individual; DALLAN
CONNIE TA
TAYLOR,
individual; R. JOHN
TA
YLOR, an individual;.
TAYLOR,
individual; CLARK and
TA
YLOR, an individual;.
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
COMES NOW the Plaintiffs/Counter-defendant by and through their undersigned co
cocounsel of record, Christ Troupis, and moves this Honorable Court for an entry of a Judgment
Not Withstanding the Verdict, relating to the jury verdict which was returned on February 4,
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2011.

The requested reli(~f is based upon the grounds that Counter-Claimants, R. John Taylor
and Dallan Taylor, individually should be stricken from any Judgment as the court in its
comments on the directed verdict motion indicated that said individuals were acting on behalf of
the trust as trustees and not as individuals. That in addition, the counter-claimants failed to
provide any evidence beyond the allegation that the mere filing of the perjury complaint was an
abuse of process and that the counter-claimants failed to demonstrate that there was any
independent wrongful interference which could have given rise to any claim for any inference
with a prospective business advantage. The Counter Claimants failed as a matter of law to
provide evidence to support the jury's verdict and failed to demonstrate that the mere filing of a
Complaint and the filing of a lis pendens gave rise to an abuse of process claim and/or the failed
to provide proof of an interference to a prospective economic expectancy as a matter of law
and/or failed to prove that litigation privilege did not apply to all counter-defendants.
This Motion is made pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 50 (a)(b), and is further made based upon
the record and file contained herein, and the Memorandum Brief in Support of the Motion, filed
concurrently herewith.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants requests this Honorable Court enter its
Judgment Not Withstanding the Verdict.
ORAL ARGUMENT is requested upon the motion.
th
11th
DATED this 11
day of February, 2011.

_

~J-o
IS, Co-counsel for
CHRIST T. TRO
TR~o-counsel
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants

002283

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 11th
11 th day of February, 2011, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing (1) PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT NOT WITHSTANDING THE VERDICT, together with (2) MEMORANDUM
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOT WITHSTANDING THE
VERDICT to be delivered, addressed as follows:
I
i Connie W. Taylor

i ( )

I

I (X)

!

!

(

)

I

(

)

Henderson Law Finn
900 Washington St. Suite 1020
.• Vancouver, Washington 98660
Facsimile: (360) 693-2911

Thomas G. Maile, IV.
380 W. State Street
.• Eagle, Idaho 83616
. Facsimile: (208) 939-1001

( )
(X)
( )
( )

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

l,
I
i

U. S. Mail
u.

Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

--'-----------------~

~=--~

Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130
PO Box 2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone:
208/938-5584
Facsimile:
208/938-5482
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com

lto Q FILI~D

NO.
AM. _ _
_
D.I...-I'.M _ _ ___
A.M._
_--'-'D.L...-I'.M

FEB 1 'I 2011
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By ELYSHIA HOLMES
DEPUTY

Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUJ'JTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCHBIRCH
MAILE, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,

Case No. CV-OC 07-23232

MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT
OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR J.N.O.V.

v.

CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, flkla
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, em Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND

ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
COMES NOW the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants by and through their undersigned
counsel of record, Christ Troupis, and provides this Honorable Court with the following

BRIE."' IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
MEMORANDUM BRIE."
J.N.O.V. - Pg 1
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memorandum brief in support ofPlaintiffs/Counter-Defendants' Motion for Judgement Not
Withstanding the Verdict, as follows.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When an appellate court reviews a motion for J.N.O.V. under LR.C.P. 50(b), the motion
is treated as a delayed motion for a directed verdict and the same standard for both is applied.
Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 763, 727 P.2d 1187, 1191 (1986). When ruling on a motion for
J.N.O.V. the trial court must determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the jury's
verdict. Lanham v. Idaho Power Co., 130 Idaho 486, 495,943 P.2d 912,921 (1997). "Upon a
motion for J.N.O.V. the moving party, admits the truth of all the adverse evidence and all
inferences that can be drawn legitimately from it." ld. (citations omitted). It is not a question of
no evidence on the side of the non-moving party, but rather, whether there is substantial evidence
upon which ajury could find for the non-moving party. Quick, III Idaho at 763, 727 P.2d at
1191.

LEGAL ARGUMENT
1.
The Verdict entered by the Jury was improper based upon the counter··
ofproOf
claimants' lack of
proof on any individual claim of the Taylor Brothers & the Trust.
A motion for a judgment not withstanding the verdict is found under Rule 50(b) LR.C.P.
I.R.C.P.
Rule 50(b). Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict shall be served not later than
fourteen (14) days after entry of the judgment and may be made whether or not
the party moved for a directed verdict; or if a verdict was not returned a motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict shall be served not later than fourteen
(14) days after discharge of the jury.
In determining whether a motion for a judgment not withstanding the verdict ... should
have been granted, an appellate court applies the same standard as the court that originally
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
J.N.O.V. -Pg. 2
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passed on the motion." Vendelin v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 140 Idaho 416, 430,95 P.3d 34, 48
(2004). An appellate court exercises free review and does not defer to the findings of the trial
court. When doing so, the court determines whether there was sufficient evidence to justify
submitting the claim to the jury, viewing as true all adverse evidence and drawing every
legitimate inference in favor of the party opposing the motion for a directed verdict. A directed
verdict is proper only where the evidence is so clear that all reasonable minds would reach only
one conclusion-that the moving party should prevail." Gillingham Constr., Inc. v. NewbyWiggins Constr., Inc., 136 Idaho 887, 892,42 P.3d 680, 685 (2002).
1. The counter-claimants' have failed to demonstrate that R. John Taylor and/or Dallan
Taylor incurred any damages. The evidence submitted to the jury related only to damages
L. Johnson Revocable Trust. Counterclaimants admitted to the Court
claimed by the Theodore 1,.

that there were no individual claims by the Taylor brothers. However, the jury was never so
informed.
2. The claims of the Theodore 1,.
L. Johnson Revocable Trust likewise must fail and a
judgment not withstanding the verdict must be entered as a result of failure to provide proof of
the two claims presented by the counter-claimants.
The Court determined that the Counterclaimants could not state a claim for the actions of
the Counterdefendants in the first lawsuit, concluded in January, 2009. The notice of lis pendens
in that lawsuit was in place until August 3, 2009, a month after the release of the notice of lis
pendens in the "perjury lawsuit." Counterclaimants did not present any evidence of damages
sustained by the trust solely by reason of the notice oflis pendens filed in the "perjury lawsuit."
In fact, R. John Taylor testified that because of the Notice of Lis Pendens filed properly in the
MEMORANDUM BRIEF' IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
J.N.O.V. - Pg 3
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first lawsuit that the property could not be marketed, and that the addition of another Notice of
Lis Pendens in the 'perjury complaint' did not alter that fact. He testified that "0 is 0".
The remaining claim was that the filing and prosecution of the perjury complaint was an
abuse of process and resulted in intentional interference. As noted above, there was no proof that
any damage resulted from the perjury complaint. Damages are an essential element of the tort of
intentional interference. There was likewise no testimony and no expert opinion that the
maintenance of the lis pendens in the first case until August 3,2009, when it was removed and
replaced with a Vendee's Lien, was wrongful. As a result, there was no evidence submitted that
supported a verdict on the intentional interference claim because there was no proof of any
damage resulting from wrongful conduct.
With respect to the filing and prosecution of the perjury complaint, there was substantial
evidence that Mailes filed the perjury complaint to protect their economic interests, and included
in that complaint a claim to quiet title to the real property. A notice of lis pendens could properly
be filed with the perjury complaint, given the nature of its claims. As we have previously argued,
the decision in Carter v. Carter, 143 Idaho 373, 146 p.3d 639 (2006) established the right of a
party to institute legal action to protect her economic interests, even if it resulted in interference
with an economic expectancy of another. An abuse of process claim requires proof that the
Defendants filed process not proper in the course of the proceedings. The fact that this Court
dismissed the perjury complaint does not alter the fact that the Notice of Lis Pendens was
properly filed in conjunction with the Complaint seeking to quiet title to the real property.
propeIty. There
had been no demonstration that the counter defendant's did anything wrong beyond resorting to
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the legal process in an attempt to set aside an earlier Judgment and/or advancing a complaint
seeking damages.
The Court in Badell v. Beeks,

115 Idaho 101, 104, 765 P.2d 126, 129 (Idaho 1988),

dismissed an abuse of process claim, noting: "Even assuming, arguendo, that a factual issue
exists with regard to an ulterior, improper purpose, there is no evidence of subsequent misuse of
process after it was lawfully issued." Idaho courts have not extensively discussed the fact that
the "improper" element of the tort of abuse of process requires a subsequent wrongful act, but
the Court in Badell, supra, cited the decision in Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F.Supp. 1376, 1382
(N .D.Iowa 1978) for this proposition. In that case, the Court stated:

"Abuse of process, ... , is the intentional use of legal process for an improper purpose
incompatible with the lawful function of the process by one with an ulterior motive in
doing so, ... The improper use which is the essence of the tort is ordinarily an attempt to
secure from another some collateral advantage not properly includable in the process
fa form of extortion' in which a lawfully used process is
itself, and is, in Prosser's words, 'a
perverted to an unlawful use. (Citation)."
In clarifying the often confused and confusing nature of "abuse of process'" the court
continued:
"Malicious use of process. The fundamental distinction between malicious use ,md
malicious abuse of process is that the first is an employment of process for its ostensible
purpose, although without probable cause, whereas the second is employment of process
for a purpose not contemplated by law. Another distinction is that, in case of malicious
use, it must be shov.'ll that the action in which the process was used has terminated
favorably to plaintiff in the suit at bar, whereas this is unnecessary in an action for
malicious abuse." 72 C.J.S. Process s 119, p. 1188.
Prosser states:
Abuse of process differs from malicious prosecution in that the gist of the tort is not
commencing an action or causing process to issue without justification, but misusing, or
misapplying process: justified in itself for an end other than that which it was designed to
accomplish.
Prosser, Law of Torts, 4th Ed. s 121 (1972)
Abuse of process requires an improper purpose which "usually takes the form of coercion
to obtain a collateral advantage, not properly involved in the proceeding itself ... "Id. at
857."
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As courts have dedared in many other jurisdictions, an abuse of process requires more
than the mere filing of a lawsuit. Seidner v. 1551 Greenfield Owners Assn. (1980) 108 Cal.
App.3d 895 at p. 904. See also, Tellefsen v. Key System Transit Lines 198 Cal. App.2d 611,
615, 17 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1961), which held that the mere filing of an appeal does not qualify as an
abuse of process (Tellefsen, supra, 198 Cal. App.2d at pp. 615- 616 some definite act or threat
not authorized by the process, or aimed at an object not legitimate in the use of the process, is
required before a party can sue for abuse of process). Oren Royal Oaks Venture v. Greenberg,
1157, 1169; Friedman v. Stadum (1985) 171
Bernhard, Weiss & Karma, Inc. (1986) 42 Ca1.3d
Cal.3d 1157,1169;
Cal.App.3d 775, 779-780; Drasin v. Jacoby & Meyers (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 481, 485; Seidner
v. 1551 Greenfield Owners Assn. (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 895, 904-905; Christensen v. Younger
(1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 613, 617.) S & I Investments v. Payless Flea Market, Inc., 35 Fla. L.
Weekly D1308, 36 So.3d 909 (Fla. App. 4 Dist. 2010)
A process is not abused unless there is a definite act or threat beyond the scope of the
process. As a result, the mere filing of a complaint, regardless of the motive, cannot serve as the
basis for an abuse of process cause of action. Abraham v. Lancaster Community Hospital (1990)
217 Cal. App.3d 796, 826. The overwhelming majority of states, that the mere filing of the
complaint is insufficient to establish the tort of abuse of process. Laxalt v. McClatchy, 622 F.
Supp. 737, 752 (D. Nev.1985).
In this case, there was no proof that subsequent to the filing of the perjury complaint and
lis pendens associated with it, that there was any subsequent misuse of process by the Mailes.
Thus, there was no basis in law or fact supporting the jury's verdict on the abuse of process
claim.
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Likewise, there was no proof that Mailes did anything "independently wrongful" that
supported the jury's verdict on the intentional interference claim. As the Court noted in Highland
Enterprises, Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 338,986 p.2d 996, 1004 (1999), that tort re:quires
proof that "(4) the interference was wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the
interference itself (i.e. that the defendant interfered for an improper purpose or improper
means)."
There was a complete lack of evidence from the counter-claimants that the lis pendens in
either case were independently wrongful. There can be no damages connected to any 'Nfongful
act stemming from the lis pendens. No one opined the filing of the lis pendens were fi'ivolous or
wrongful. The record contains that the perjury complaint sought a quiet title action and a
constructive trust, both of which allow as a matter of law the filing of a lis pendens.
No one testified on behalf of the counter-claimants that the lis pendens before Judge Wilper was
wrongful or improper, in light of the fact that the counter-claimant trust continues to owe
$400,00.00 to the counter-defendants.
There was no testimony by the counter-claimants to show that the lis pendens in Judge
Wilper's case remained of record for any improper time or purpose. The Lis Pendens was
released in August 2009, but no expert or lay opinion indicated the Judge Wilper's lis p,endens
was a wrongful act after January 30, 2009.
The issue of whether or not the actions complained of are or are not "wrongful" in this
context was for the court to determine in defining the issues, and would normally have been
included in the instructions. The issue for the jury to determine is whether or not the alle:ged
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tortfeasor acted in the manner alleged. As a matter of law there was no proof that the actions of
the counter-defendants were independently wrongful. There was no showing of the same nor

could any inference be drawn.

2.
The Verdict entered by the Jury was improper based upon the Litigation
of the perjury complaint
Privilege underlying the
flling ofthe
theflling
Although this Court rejected Counterdefendants Motion in Limine with respect to the

application of the litigation privilege to this case, the evidence presented by the Counterc1aimants
Counterclaimants
and their argument to the jury throughout the case was directed at Tom Maile's actions as an

attorney, representing Berkshire Investments, LLC and Colleen Maile. R. John Taylor testified
that he did not think that Colleen Maile did anything wrong. That testimony was not recanted or
amended. Dr. Lewis' expe11 opinion was not that no reasonable person would have filed the
complaint, but that "no reasonable attorney" would have done so. Thus, the case of Taylor v.
McNichols, 36130, 36131 (IDSCCI) (2010), is on point and applicable to the facts in this case.
Based on that ruling, this Court should have determined that the litigation privilege applies to the
present action. The filing of the perjury complaint and notice oflis pendens was subject to a
litigation privilege, does not justify the jury verdict and the same should be set aside.
CONCLUSION
The Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants respectively request the Court to enter its Judgment
Not Withstanding the Verdict.
th
11th
DATED this 11
day of February, 2011.
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Attorneys for Defendants/Counterclaimants
Connie Wright Taylor fka Cormie
Carmie Taylor,
Clark and Feeney, and Paul T. Clark

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,

Case No. CV-OC-0723232

MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND
ATTORNEY FEES

Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,
vs.
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, fka CONNIE
TAYLOR,
T
AYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR,
TAYLOR,
AYLOR,
T
AYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN T
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a
pa11nership; PAUL T. CLARK, an individual;
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUST, an Idaho revocable trust; JOHN
DOES I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL
PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR CLAIMING
ANY RIGHT TO POSSESSION,
Defendants/Counterclaimants.
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Pursuant to Rule 54(d)(5) and Rule 54(e)(1) of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure, defendants Connie Wright Taylor, fka Connie Taylor, Clark and Feeney, and Paul T.
Clark, hereby claim costs and attorney fees incurred in this action brought by plaintiffs. To the
best of defendants' knowledge and belief, the items claimed herein are correct, and the costs
claimed are in compliance with this rule.
Defendants seek attorney fees pursuant to said rules and as provided in Idaho
Code Sections 12-121 and 12-123 on the ground that the lawsuit was brought frivolously in an
attempt to merely harass or maliciously injure these defendants and their clients and was not
supported in fact or warranted under existing law and could not be supported by a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. This memorandum is also
based upon the Affidavit of Mark S. Prusynski, setting forth the costs and attorney fees incurred
herein.
552, 768 P.2d 815 (Ct. App. 1989), the Idaho Court
In Cole v. Kunzler, 115 Idaho 552,768
of Appeals affirmed an award of attorney fees on the basis that the plaintiffs case was pursued
unreasonably or frivolously. The plaintiff had filed an action in Cassia County and lost. Rather
than appeal the result, plaintiff filed another lawsuit alleging slightly different theories, but
involving the same issues. That lawsuit was dismissed on res judicata grounds. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the district court's determination that the second lawsuit was frivolous because
the plaintiffs appropriate remedy would have been to appeal the first decision, rather than file a
new action in another county and the res judicata defense was "blatantly apparent." Id at 558.
Similarly, plaintiffs herein were engaged in litigation in Judge Wilper's court in
which they were unsuccessful. Although they appealed, they also filed this lawsuit involving the
same property dispute, but argued that the claims and the parties were different, because they
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sued their opponent's attorneys. The res judicata defense was also "blatantly apparent." Yet,
plaintiffs strenuously resisted the motion for summary judgment, by re-arguing the issues that
they lost before Judge Wilper. They fIled a motion to reconsider the summary judgment and
subpoenaed defendants' paralegal and defendant.
Finally, the recent jury verdict in which the jury found that plaintiffs were liable
for abuse of process supports, ifnot mandates, a finding that plaintiffs' pursuit of this action was
based upon frivolous conduct.
DATED this / l-tlday of February, 2011.
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED

BYM~;i!~m
BYM~~!1&f~

Attorneys for Defendants/Counterclaimants
Connie Wright Taylor fka Connie Taylor,
Clark and Feeney, and Paul T. Clark
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this Ilflday of February, 2011, I caused a true
and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES to
be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Thomas G. Maile IV
LA W OFFICES OF THOMAS G MAILE IV, P.A.
380 W. State St.
Eagle, ID 83616-4902
Facsimile (208) 939-100
939-1001I

({U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
({US.
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Christ T. Troupis
TROUPIS LA W OFFICE, PA
P.O. Box 2408
Eagle,ID 83616
Facsimile (208) 938-5482

(-{U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(-{US.
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

John C. Mitchell
CLARK & FEENEY
1229 Main St., Suite 201
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston,ID 83501-0285
Facsimile (208) 746-9160
COlmie W. Taylor
HENDERSON LA W
900 Washington, Suite 1020
Vancouver, WA 98660
Facsimile (360) 693-2911

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(1'US.
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

(--1U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Mark . PruSynSkl
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Attorneys for Defendants/Counterclaimants
Connie Wright Taylor fka Connie Taylor,
Clark and Feeney, and Paul T. Clark
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,

Case No. CV-OC-0723232

AFFIDAVIT OF MARK S. PRlJSYNSKI
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND
ATTORNEY FEES

VS.

CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, fka CONNIE
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR,
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN T
AYLOR,
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, an individual;
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUST, an Idaho revocable tmst; JOHN
DOES I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL
PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR CLAIMING
ANY RIGHT TO POSSESSION,
Defendants/Counterclaimants.
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STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss.
)

Mark S. Prusynski, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am one of the attorneys of record for the Defendants/Counterclaimants

Connie Wright Taylor fka Connie Taylor, Clark and Feeney, and Paul T. Clark in the aboveentitled action.
2.

I am a partner in the law firm Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock and Fields,

Chartered, and am engaged in the general practice of law in Boise, Idaho. As such I am
personally familiar with the facts and circumstances stated herein. I am acquainted with the
costs and fees generally incurred by attorneys defending civil cases in Ada County.
3.

I am personally aware of the professional services rendered in this action,

of time expended by
the costs incurred in preparing the defense of this case, and the amount oftime
attorneys of this firm in the defense of the claims brought by the plaintiffs as set forth in Exhibit
A to this affidavit. The rate of $165 per hour is below the partner rates charged by attorneys in
this area with similar experience. The rate of $130 per hour for my associate is within the range
of hourly rates charged for associates in this area.
4.

The amount of costs expended by these defendants are $63.81 as of right

0[$278.61, and is attached hereto as ExhIbit B.
and $214.80 in discretionary costs for a total of$278.61,
5.

That the computed sums for costs are set forth in the computer printouts

attached hereto as Exhibits A and B. These costs constitute reasonable costs that were
necessarily incurred in the preparation and prosecution of this matter, and said costs are correct
and in compliance with Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
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Further your affiant sayeth naught.

Mark . Prusynski
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

~t.f1Jayy of February, 2011.
.l.7..-tftJa

Residing at Boise, Idaho
'f-Zl)/(;,
My Commission Expires la-I 'f-zt)/t:,

AFFIDA VIT OF MARK S. PRUSYNSKI IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'
AFFIDAVIT
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
/l-dday of February, 2011, I caused a true
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 17.dday
and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF MARK S. PRUSYNSKI IN SUPPORT
OF DEFENDANTS' MICMORANDUM OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES to be served
by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

(1u.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(1us.

Thomas G. Maile IV
LA W OFFICES OF THOMAS

G MAILE IV, P.A.

380 W. State St.
Eagle, ID 83616-4902
Facsimile (208) 939-1001
Christ T. Troupis
TROUPIS LA W OFFICE, PA
P.O. Box 2408
Eagle,ID 83616
Facsimile (208) 938-5482

( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

-rU.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( -rUS.
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

John C. Mitchell
CLARK & FEENEY
1229 Main St., Suite 201
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, ID 83501-0285
Facsimile (208) 746-9160

YU.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( YUS.
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Connie W. Taylor

( {'US.
{'U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

HENDERSON LA W

900 Washington, Suite 1020
Vancouver, WA
W A 98660
Facsimile (360) 693-2911
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MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES - 4

Cient19335131
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17136.0306 - Zurich - Berkshire Investments, LLC, et al v. Clark & Feeney, et al
Date

Initials

Hours

Amount

Description

4/25/2008

MSP

0.1

16.50

Correspondence from insured regarding notice of
appearance;

4/25/2008

MSP

0.2

33.00

Receive and review complaint;

4/25/2008

MSP

0.1

16.50

Correspondence to insured regarding appearance;

4/2512008
4/25/2008

MSP

0.2

33.00
3300

Telephone conference with G. Schmidt regarding
answer to complaint;

/2008
4/28/2008
4/28

MSP

0.1

16.50
1650

Receive and review correspondence from insured
regarding substitution of attorney;

4/29/2008

MSP

0.3

49.50
4950

Telephone conference with Christine Miller
regarding defense strategy;

4/29/2008

MSP

I.5

247.50

Analyze amended complaint;

4/29;2008

MSP

1.2

198.00

Research regarding previous case against same
parties;

4/2912008
4/29/2008

MSP

0.9

148.50

Telephone conference with Connie Taylor
regarding facts;

4/29/2008

MSP

0.5

82.50

Receive and review brief from insured;

4/29/2008

MSP

0.1

16.50

Prepare Notice of Appearance;

4/30/2008

MSP

1.5

247.50

4/30/2008

MSP

0.2

33.00

Receive and review retention letter;

4/30/2008

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review letter from client regarding
disqualification;

4/30/2008

MSP

0.2

33.00

Correspondence to client regarding
disqualification;

4/30/2008
4/3012008

MSP

0.4

66.00

Begin preparation of answer to complaint;

4/30/2008

MSP

08
0.8

132.00

5/2/2008

MSP

0.3

49.50

Prepare notice of substitution of counsel;

5/2/2008

MSP

0.2

33.00

Letters to clients regarding notice of
substitution of counsel;

5/2/2008

MSP

0.2

33.00

Receive and review response to correspondence
regarding notice of substitution of counsel;

5/2/2008

MSP

1.4

231.00

5/2/2008
5/212008

MSP

0.1

16.50

5/6/2008

MSP

1.2

198.00

5/6/2008

MSP

0.5

82.50

Receive and review amended complaint with
exhibits;

Research regarding corporate status of
l3erksh ire;

Analyze appeal brief to deteI1uine
detelluine basis for
possible motion to dismiss;
Correspondence to co-counsel regarding
substitution;
Research waiver of defenses of other action
pending;

aflirrnative defenses;
Draft atlirrnative
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17136.0306 - Zurich - Berkshire Investments, LLC, et al v. Clark & Feeney, et al
Date

Initials

Hours

Amount

Description

5/6/2008

MSP

0.8

132.00

5/6/2008

MSP

0.5

82.50

51712008
5/712008

MSP

1.0

165.00
16500

51712008
5/7/2008

MSP

0.2

3300

Correspondence to client regarding Supreme
Court brief and possible motion to dismiss;

5/7/2008

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review notice of substitution;

517:2008

MSP

0.4

66.00

Telephone
Telcphone conference
confercnce with insured regarding
motion to dismiss;

5/8/2008

MSP

0.6

99.00

Initial conference with claims handling
regarding case management;

5/8/2008

MSP

0.1
0.\

16.50

Receive and review notice of intent to take
default;

5/8/2008

MSP

0.3

49.50

Telephone conference with insurcd
insured regarding
response
notice of intent to take default and rcsponse
to motion to dismiss;

5/8/2008

MSP

OJ

49.50

Correspondence to insured regarding
counsel;
substitution of counscl;

5/8/2008

MSP

1.8

297.00

5/8/2008

MSP

0.2

33.00

Finalize substitution of counsel;

5/9/2008

MSP

0.2

33.()0
33.ll0

answcr;
Finalize answer;

5/9/2008

MSP

0.2

33.()0
33.00

Corrcspondence to clicnt
Correspondence
client regarding filing
answer;

5/9/2008

MSP

0.1

16.50

Continue analysis of complaint and comparison
to pending case;
Research racketeering statutes cited in
complaint;
COUJ1 brief;
Receive and review Suprcme
Supreme Coul1

Draft answer;

rcview corrcspondence
Receive and review
correspondence from client
regarding notice of substitution and

answeI"~
answeI"~

5/13/2008

MSP

0.4

66.00

Receive and review co-defendant's motion to
dismiss, affidavit and exhibits;

5/13/2008

MSP

0.1

16.50

Correspondence to client regarding
co-defendant's motion to dismiss;

5/13/2008

MSP

1.5

247.50

5/13/2008

MSP

0.4

66.00

5/13/2008

MSP

0.7

115.50

5/14/2008

MSP

0.2

3300

Receive and review plaintiffs
plaintiff's motion to
strike;

5/14/2008

MSP

0.1

16.50
\6.50

Receive and review correspondence trom client
regarding possible recusal of judge;

5114/2008

MSP

0.2

3300
33.00

Correspondence to client regarding possible
recusal of judge and motion to dismiss;

Rescarch regarding dismissal of parties if
Research
idcntical action;
identical

Prepare motion to dismiss;
List claims decided by summary judgmcntto
judgment to
compare to complaint;
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17136.0306 - Zurich - Berkshire Investments, LLC, et al v. Clark & Feeney, ct al
Date

Initials

Hours

Amount

Description

5/21/2008

MSP

0.3

49.50

Receive and review amended affidavit and
exhibits;

5/2912008
5/29/2008

MSP

0.1

16.50

Telephone conference with Zurich regarding case
management plan;

6/12/2008

MSP

0.3

49.50

Prepare case management plan;

6/24/2008

MSP

0.3

49.50

Conference with client regarding strategy lor
status conference;

6/24,'2008
6/24/2008

MSP

0.3
03

49.50

Attend Court's status conference;

6/24/2008

MSP

0.4

66.00

Analyze pleadings to prepare for status
con ference;

6/25/2008

MSP

0.2

33.00

Telephone conference with client regarding case
management plan;

6/25/2008

MSP

2.8

462.00

6/25/2008

MSP

0.3

49.50

Prepare budget;

6/26/2008

MSP

0.3

49..50

Finalize case management plan and budget;

7/24/2008

MSP

1.2

198.00

Receive and review discovery request from
plaintiff;

7/24/2008

MSP

1.0

165.00

Receive and review earlier deposition
transcript of Helen Taylor;

7/25/2008

MSP

0.3

49.50

Correspondence to insured regarding preparing
discovery responses;

7/28/2008

MSP

0.6

99.00

Prepare responses to requests lor admissions;

7/28/2008

MSP

1.5

247.50

Analyze pleadings from prior case to prepare
responses to requests for admissions;

7/29/2008

MSP

0.3

49.50

Continue preparation of responses to Requests
lor Admissions;

7/29/2008

MSP

0.3

49.50

Correspondence from insured regarding
deposition of Helen Taylor;

7/29/2008

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review correspondence from insured
regarding deposition (duplicate?);

7/29/2008

MSP

0.1

16.50

Correspondence to insured regarding deposition
of Helen Taylor;

7/30/2008

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review correspondence from client
regarding depositions;

7/30/2008

MSP

0.1

16.50

Correspondence to client regarding depositions;

7/3112008
7/31/2008

MSP

0.2

33.00

Ilum client regarding responses
Correspondence llum
to requests for admissions;

7/31/2008
7/3112008

MSP

1.0

165.00

Prepare case management plan;

Continue analysis of pleadings from prior case
to detennine grounds for dismissal;
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Date
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8/4/2008

MSP

0.1

16.S0

Receive and review correspondence from client
regarding deposition;

8/4/2008

MSP

0.3

49.S0

Correspondence to client regarding deadlines
for requests for admissions and documents from
first case;

81412008
8/412008

MSP

0.1

16.S0
16S0

Correspondence to client regarding deposition;

8/4/2008

MSP

O. I
0.1

16.S0
16S0

Correspondence from client regarding documents;

8/4/2008

MSP

0.2

3300

Receive and review pleading index from first
case;

8/4/2008

MSP

0.1

16.50

Correspondence from client regarding discovery
from plaintiff;

8/4/2008

MSP

OJ

49.S0

Correspondence to clients regarding discovery
from plaintiff's counsel;

8/S12008

MSP

0.2

33.00

Correspondence to client regarding pleading
index and key documents;

8/S12008

MSP

0.6

99.00

Receive and review deposition transcript of
Doug Crandall;

8/6/2008

MSP

0.8

132.00

Receive and review Tom Maile's deposition
transcript;

8/6/2008

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review correspondence from client
regarding additional depositions;

8/6/2008

MSP

0.1

16.S0

Correspondence to client regarding additional
depositions to be taken;

8/7/2008
8/712008

MSP

0.7

IIS.50

Receive and review deposition transcript of B.
Harwood;

8/7/1008
81711008

MSP

2.2

363.00

Receive and review deposition transcript of B.
Rogers;

8/712008
81712008

MSP

1.5

247.50

Receive and review deposition transcript of B.
Knipe;

8/7/2008
81712008

MSP

0.8

132.00

Receive and review deposition transcript of S.
Sherer;

8/7/2008
81712008

MSP

OJ

49.S0
49.50

Receive and review volume 2 of deposition
transcript ofT. Maile;

8/8/2008

MSP

0.2

33.00

Receive and review deposition transcript of D.
Wishney;

8/8/2008

MSP

0.5

82.50

Receive and review deposition of S. Johnson;

8/8/2008

MSP

0.7

115.S0

Receive and review deposition transcript of I.
Hetherington;

8/1112008

MSP

0.3

49.50

Continue preparation of responses to requests
for admissions;

8/1212008

MSP

2.S

412.50

Continue analysis of two volumes of deposition
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Date

Initials

Hours

Amount

Description
transcripts of T. Maile;
Receive and review deposition transcript of II.
Fisher;

8/12/2008

MSP

0.4

66.00

8/14/2008

MSP

1.5

247.50

8/14/2008

MSP

0.2

33.00
3300

8/2 U2008
)/2008

MSP

1.4

23100

8/21/2008

MSP

0.6

9900

Telephone conference with C. Taylor regarding
discovery responses;

8/21/2008

MSP

0.5

82.50

Receive and review draft responses;

8/22/2008

MSP

0.5

82.50

Finalize discovery responses;

8/22/2008

MSP

0.3

49.50

Letters to client regarding approving and
signing discovery responses;

8/25/2008

MSP

0.2

33.00

Correspondence to plaintiffs counsel regarding
Helen Taylor's deposition;

8/26/2008

MSP

0.2

33.00

Correspondence to client regarding rescheduling
deposition of Helen Taylor;

8/27/2008

MSP

0.3

49.50

Lellers to client regarding Helen Taylor's
Letters
depos ition;

8/27/2008

MSP

0.2

33.00

Correspondence to plaintiffs counsel regarding
deposition of Helen Taylor;

8/29/2008

MSP

0.1
01

1650
16.50

Receive and review cOlTespondence from client
regarding deposition of Helen Taylor;

8/29/2008

MSP

0.1

16.50

Prepare responses to requests for admissions
and answers to interrogatories;
Correspondence to client regarding responses to
requests for admissions and answers to
interrogatories;
Continue preparation of discovery responses;

Correspondence to client regarding deposition

of Helen Taylor;
9/2/2008

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review amended notice and subpoena
for Helen Taylor;

9/2/2008

MSP

0.2

33.00

Correspondence to client regarding amended
notice and subpoena for Helen Taylor;

9/2/2008

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review responses from client
regarding amended notice and subpoena for Helen
Taylor;

9/8/2008

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review correspondence from client
regarding deposition of Helen
lIelen Taylor;

9/16/2008

MSP

0.5

82.50

Receive and review correspondence from
plaintiffs counsel regarding objections to
discovery and motion to compel;

9117/2008

MSP

0.2

33.00

Correspondence to client regarding plaintiffs
threat of motion to compel;

9117/2008

MSP

2.5

412.50

Research regarding exceptions to
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Initials

Hours

Amount

Description
attorney-client privilege to defend objections
to discovery;

9/18/2008

MSP

1.5

247.50

9118/2008
9/18/2008

AJS

0.3

39.00

Conference to discuss research assignment
regarding attorney as attesting witness and
possible waiver of attorney-client privilege;

9/22/2008

AJS

0.2

26.00

Research the rules of evidence with regard to
the attorney-as-witness exception to the
attorney-client privilege;

9/22/2008

AJS

0.2

26.00

Review letter correspondence from opposing
counsel asserting attorney-as-witness as waiver
of the attorney-client privilege;

9/22/2008

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review correspondence from client
regarding discovery responses;

9/22/2008

MSP

0.2

33.00

Telephone conference with plaintiff regarding
discovery responses;

9/22/2008

MSP

0.2

33.00

Telephone conference with client regarding
discovery responses;

9/22/2008

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review letter from client regarding
res judicata;

9/22/2008

MSP

0.4

66.00

Research regarding res judicata;

9/22/2008

MSP

0.1

16.50

Correspondence to client regarding res
judicata;

9/23/2008

MSP

0.3

49.50

Research regarding attorney-client privilege;

9/23/2008

AJS

2.2

286.00

Continue research regarding plaintiff's claims
of an exception to attorney-client privilege;

Continue to research state law from multiple
jurisdictions regarding scope and application

of attorney as attesting witness exception to
the attorney-client privilege;
9/2412008

MSP

0.4

66.00

Telephone conference with client regarding
plaintiffs threat of motion to compel;

9/24/2008

MSP

0.2

33.00

Receive and review brief in support of motion
for summary judgment;

9/26/2008

MSP

0.3

49.50

Correspondence to plaintiff's counsel regarding
motion to compel;

9/26/2008

MSP

0.4

66.00

Continue analysis of co-defendant's brief on
res judicata;

9/26/2008

MSP

0.5

82.50

Research regarding res judicata;

9/26/2008

AJS

1.9

247.00

Continue to research state and federal law
regarding scope and application of attorney as
attesting witness exception to the
thc
attorney-client privilege;

9/29/2008

AJS

1.1

143.00

Research state and federal law regarding fraud
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Initials

Hours

Amount

Description
as exception to attorney-client privilege in
preparation for drafting motion for summary
judgment;

9/29/2008

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review letter from client regarding
deposition;

9/3012008

MSP

0.2

33.00

Correspondence to client regarding deposition
and motion for protective order;

9/30/2008

AJS

1.8

234.00

Research state and federal law regarding issue
of res judicata, particularly with regard to
privies of party to prior suit, in preparation
for drafting motion for summary judgment;

9/30/2008

AJS

0.4

52.00

Review complaints as necessary to direct
research regarding issue of res judicata;

9/30/2008

AJS

0.3

39.00

Continue to research state and federal case law
regarding crime-fraud exception to
attorney-client privilege;

101Ii2008

AJS

0.5

65.00
6500

Continue to research Idaho and Ninth Circuit
law regarding crime-fraud exception to the
attorney-client privilege;

10/1/2008

AJS

1.3

169.00

Continue research regarding application of res
judicata, specifically with regard to parties
and their privies;

10/112008

AJS

0.2

26.00

Review co-defendants' summary judgment
memorandum in preparation for drafting own
summary judgment motion and memorandum;

10/1/2008

MSP

2.0

330.00

10/1/2008

MSP

0.4

66.00

10/1/2008

MSP

1.2
I.2

198.00

Receive and review motion for summary judgment,
affidavit and brief from co-defendants;

10/1/2008

MSP

0.8

132.00

Research regarding res judicata issues for
summary judgment;

10/2/2008

MSP

0.4

66.00

Continue preparation of brief in support of
motion for summary judgment;

10/2/2008

MSP

06
0.6

99.00

Analyze complaint and decisions in prior case
to prepare motion for summary judgment;

10/2/2008

MSP

0.4

66.00

Telephone conference with client regarding
deposition of Helen Taylor;

10/2/2008

MSP

2.2

363.00

Continue analysis of prior deposition to
prepare for deposition of Hclen Taylor;

10/2/2008

AJS

1.4

182.00

Continue to review plaintiffs complaint in
preparation for drafting memorandum in support
of motion for summary judgment;

Analyze first Helen Taylor deposition to
prepare for second deposition;
Review letters from client regarding deposition
of Helen Taylor and possible conflict;

Page 7 of 30

Exhibit 1\
A
002308

'-"'

"""
""'"

17136.0306 - Zurich - Berkshire Investments, LLC, et al v. Clark & Feeney, et al
Date

Initials

Hours

Amount

Description
Review Idaho Supreme Court case Taylor v. Maile
to further develop case understanding and
strategy in preparation for drafting memorandum
in sUppOl1 of summary judgment;

10/2/2008

AJS

0.4

52.00

10/212008

AJS

1.4

182.00

Review pleadings regarding prior summary
judgment proceedings in this matter;

10/2/2008

AJS

0.8

104.00
\04.00

Continue research of case law regarding
attorney as in privity with client for purposes
of res judicata;

10/3/2008

AJS

0.8

104.00

Outline memorandum in support of motion for
summary judgment;

10/3/2008

AJS

0.3

39.00

Review case law research and case file as
necessary to complete
completc memorandum in sUpp0l1 of
motion for summary judgment;

10/3/2008
\0/3/2008

AJS

0.3

39.00

Review case law research and case file as
necessary to complete outline memorandum in
support of motion for summary judgment;

10/3/2008

AJS

2.1

273.00

10/312008

MSP

0.4

66.00

Conference with client regarding Helen Taylor
deposition;

10/3/2008

MSP

0.2

33.00

Conference with Helen and DaHan Taylor
regarding deposition;

10/3/2008

MSP

2.6

429.00

10/3/2008

MSP

0.3

49.50

Conference with client regarding motion for
summary judgment and analysis of plaintiff's
strategy;

IO/S/2008
\0/5/2008

AJS

2.5

32S.00
325.00

Continue to draft memorandum in support of

Draft memorandum in support of motion for
summary judgment;

Attend deposition of Helen Taylor;

motion for sUffilnary judgment in preparation for

review by supervising attorney;
10/6/2008

AJS

2.6

338.00

10/6/2008

AJS

0.3

39.00
3900

Review complaint for additional facts relating
to plaintiffs' claims as necessary to complete
revisions to memorandum in support of summaty
sum III aly
judgment;

10/6/2008

MSP

0.5

82.50

Revise brief in support of motion for summary
judgment;

10/6/2008

MSP

0.3

49.S0
49.50

Receive and review amended motion for
appointment of trustees;

101712008

MSP

0.9

148.50
148.S0

101712008

AJS

0.5

6S.00
65.00

Revise and edit memorandum in support of motion
for summary judgment;

Receive and review redraft of brief in support
of 1Il0tion
motion for summary judgment;
Continue to review plaintiffs' complaint as
necessary to complete revisions to memorandum
in support of motion for summary judgment;
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Initials

Hours
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Description
DescriEtion

101712008

AJS

B

377.00
37700

Continue to revise and edit memorandum in
support of motion for summary judgment to
include additional references to plaintiffs'
complaint and revise and edit generally;

10/S/200S
10/8/2008

MSP

3.3

544.50

Revise motion for summary judgment;

10/S/200S
10/8/2008

MSP

0.7

115.50

Analyze brief filed by co-defendants;

10/S/200S
10/8/2008

MSP

0.6

99.00
9900

Research regarding dismissal while other action
is on appeal for brief;

10/S/200S
10/8/2008

MSP

0.4

66.00
6600

Analyze claims made in complaint for brief;

10/9/200S
10/9/2008

MSP

1.2

19S.00
198.00

Finalize brief and motion for summary judgment;

10/9/200S
10/9/2008

MSP

1.5
l.5

247.50

Receive and review plaintifrs response to
motion to dismiss with affidavits and exhibits;

10/9/200S
10/9/2008

MSP

0.2

33.00

Correspondence to client regarding briefing in
previous case;

10/1O/200S
10/10/2008

MSP

3.3

544.50

Receive and review reply brief in opposition to
motion for summary judgment, supplemental memo
regarding motion for summary judgment and brief
in support of motion to reconsider;

1011
IOII 0/200S
0/2008

AJS

1.4

IS2.00
182.00

Research and review case law from state and
federal jurisdictions and secondary sourccs
sources
regarding dismissal offraud-based claims by
doctrine of res judicata in preparation for
drafting reply brief in support of motion for
summary judgment;

10/14/2008
10/14/200S

AJS

0.3

39.00

Continue to research and review case law
discussing application of res judicata to fraud
based claims derived from prior litigation in
preparation for drafting reply brief in support
of motion for sumlnary judgment~
judgment~

10/20;2008
10/20;200S

AJS

0.9

117.00

Research Idaho and other jurisdiction case law
regarding application ofres judicata to
independent actions based on fraud
Iraud in
preparation for drafting reply memorandum in
support of summary judgment;

10/20;2008
10/20;200S

MSP

1.0

165.00

Receive and review motion to compel, brief and
affidavit;

10/20/2008
10/20/200S

MSP

0.2

33.00

Letters to clients regarding motion to compel,
brief and affidavit;

10/20;2008
10/20;200S

MSP

0.2

33.00

Receive and review motion to continue motion
for summary judgment;

10/22;2008
10/22;200S

MSP

1.2

198.00
19S.00

10/22/2008
10/22/200S

MSP

0.4

66.00

Conference with client regarding plaintiffs
plaintifTs
brief in support of motion to compel;

10/22/2008
10/221200S

MSP

2.4

396.00

Research regarding attorney-client privilege

Analyze plaintiffs brief in support of motion
to compel;
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and exceptions for fraud claim;
10/23/2008

MSP

3.5

577.50

10/23/2008

MSP

0.2

3300

Correspondence to client regarding plaintiffs
arguments on motion to compel;

10/23/2008

MSP

0.5

82.50
8250

Outline issues for objection to motion to
compel;

10/23,'2008
10/23/2008

MSP

1.3

214.50

10/23/2008

AJS

0.2

26.00

10/23/2008

AJS

1.1

143.00

10/23/2008

AJS

0.4

52.00

Review plaintiffs' summary judgment and motion
molion
to compel briefing in preparation for
responding to same;

10/23/2008

AJS

0.3

39.00

Review secondary sources regarding crime-fraud
exception to attorney-client privilege;

10/24/2008

AJS

0.2

26.00

Review correspondence from client regarding
prior probate proceedings and statements made
regarding the status of beneficiaries;

10/24/2008

AJS

0.6

78.00

Research state and federal case law regarding
the reliance element of fraud with respect to
an attorney's potential reliance on statements

Research regarding elements offraud for motion
for summary judgment and motion to compel;

Review plaintiffs brief regarding motion for
summary judgment;
Research Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure to
determine when response to motion to compel
and/or motion for continuance due;
Research Idaho and Ninth Circuit case law
regarding crimelfraud
crime/fraud exception to
attorney-client privilege in preparation for
responding to opposing counsel's motion to
compel and/or in support of our motion for
summary judgment;

made by opposing

counsel~
counsel~

10/2412008
10/24/2008

AJS

1.7

221.00

Continue to research state and federal case law
on issue of whether allegation regarding status
as beneficiary is a legal conclusion and not a
material fact for purposes of evaluating
plaintiffs' fraud claim;

10/24/2008

MSP

0.2

33.00
3300

Review correspondence from client regarding
amended pleadings;

10/24/2008

MSP

0.2

33.00
3300

Review amended petition for appointment of
beneficiary;

10/24/2008

MSP

1.5

247.50

10/27/2008

MSP

0.3

49.50

Correspondence to plaintiff's attorney
regarding vacating hearings;

10/27/2008

MSP

0.2

33.00

Correspondence to client regarding vacating
hearings;

Outline issues for response to plaintiffs
motion to compel and reply brief regarding
motion for summary judgment;
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10/27/200S
10/27/2008

MSP

0.1

16.50

Review correspondence from client regarding
vacating hearings;

10/27/2008

MSP

0.2

33.00

Correspondence to client regarding motion to
compel and vacating hearing regarding motions
for summary judgment;

10/27/200S
10/27/2008

MSP

0.4

66.00

Outline brief regarding motion to compel;

10/27/200S
10/27/2008

AJS

0.7

91.00

Review plaintitTs' motion to compel briefing in
preparation for drafting response brief;

10/27/200S
10/27/2008

AJS

0.2

26.00

Analyze issues regarding content of plaintiffs'
motion to compel briefing response brief;

10/2S/200S
10/28/2008

MSP

0.1

16.50

Review correspondence from plaintiffs attorney
regarding postponing hearings;

10/29/200S
10/29/2008

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review notices of vacating motion
for summary judgment hearing;

10/29/200S
10/29/2008

MSP

0.1

16.50

Prepare notice to vacate our motion for summary
judgment hearing;

10/29/200S
10/29/2008

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review notice of vacating motion to
compel hearing;

1I/6/200S
11/6.'2008

MSP

0.4

66.00

Receive and review research regarding response
to motion to compel;

1111 8/2008
S/200S

MSP

0.3

49.50

Conference with client regarding postponement
of hearing on motion for summary judgment;

11/18/2008
11/1S/2008

MSP

OJ

49.50

Analyze pleadings regarding correction to case
management plan;

11121/2008

MSP

0.8

13200
132.00

12/1/2008
12/t/2008

MSP

0.2

3300
33.00

Conference with client regarding outcome of
Idaho Supreme Court argument;
Receive and review correspondence from client

regarding motion for summary jUdgment;
judgment;
/2008
1211 12008

MSP

0.2

3300
33.00

Correspondence to client regarding motion for
summary judgment;

1211/2008
I 211 1200S

MSP

2.8
2.S

46200

Research cases on res judicata for motion for
summary judgment;

12/2/2008
12/2/200S

MSP

2J

379.50
37950

Continue research regarding fraud exception to
attorney-client privilege and elements of fraud
claim;

12.'2/2008
12/2/2008

MSP

0.6

9900
99.00

Continue research regarding res judicata;

12/3/2008
12/3/200S

MSP

0.3

49.50

Correspondence to client regarding motion for
summary judgment and motion to compel;

12/4/2008
12/4/200S

MSP

1.8
I.S

297.00

Analyze plaintiffs brief in opposition to
motion for summary judgment;

12/5/2008
12/5/200S

MSP

1.6

264.00

Continue analysis of briefs on motion to compel
and motion for summary judgment;
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Description
Continue research regarding motion for summary
judgment;

12/812008
12/8/2008

MSP

0.8

132.00

12/1512008
12/15/2008

MSP

0.2

33.00

12/2412008
12/24/2008

MSP

1.0

165.00

Receive and review recent decision on standing
to sue lawyers;

12/24/2008

MSP

0.5

82.50

Research regarding recent decision on standing
to sue lawyers;

12/24,'2008
12/24/2008

MSP

0.6

99.00

Letters to client regarding results of research
regarding standing to sue lawyers;

1/2/2009

MSP

0.9

148.50

Research regarding allegations of fraud on
court as defense to rcs judicata claim;

1/8/2009

MSP

2.2

363.00

Receive and review plaintitl's motion for stay,
affidavit, exhibits and supplemental
memorandum;

1/8/2009
118/2009

MSP

0.3

49.50

Correspondence to client regarding response to
motion for stay;

1/8/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review response regarding motion to
stay;

1/12/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Correspondence from client regarding motion to
stay;

1112/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Correspondence to plaintiff's counsel regarding
motion to stay;

1114/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review notice of non-opposition to
motion to stay;

1/19/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review correspondence from
plaintiffs
plaintifl's counsel regarding motion to stay;

1/19/2009

MSP

0.3

49.50

Prepare notice of non-opposition to motion for
stay;

2/2/2009

MSP

0.2

33.00

Receive and review Supreme Court opinion in
Taylor v. Maile;

2/3/2009

MSP

0.4

66.00

Continue analysis of Supreme Court decision;

2/3/2009

MSP

0.2

33.00

Telephone conference with client regarding
Supreme Court decision;

2/3/2009

MSP

0.2

33.00

Correspondence to client regarding summary
judgment strategy;

2/3/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review response from client
regarding summary judgment strategy;

2/5/2009

MSP

2.2

363.00

Telephone conference with client regarding
motion for summary judgment;

Analyze prior motion for summary judgment
briefing and pleadings regarding motion to lift
stay and obtain hearing on motion for summary
judgment;
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Initials

Hours

Amount

Description

2/5/2009

MSP

0.4

66.00

Correspondence to client regarding strategy for
summary judgment motion;

2/5/2009

MSP

0.2

33.00

Receive and review response from client
regarding strategy for summary judgment motion;

2/6/2009

MSP

0.2

33.00

Receive and review affidavit of C. Taylor
regarding recent case in support of summary
judgment motion;

2110/2009

MSP

0.2

33.00

Receive and review letters from client
regarding possible dismissal;

2110/2009

MSP

0.3

49.50

Correspondence to client regarding possible
dismissal;

2/13/2009

MSP

0.9

148.50

Receive and review supplemental memorandum
regarding Supreme Court Opinion;

2/13/2009

MSP

2.7

445.50

Receive and review affidavit in support of
supplemental memo and attachments to motion for
summary judgment;

2/17/2009

MSP

0.2

33.00

Receive and review correspondence from client
regarding hearing on motion for summary
judgment and counterclaim;

2/18/2009

MSP

0.2

33.00

Receive and review answers and counterclaim;

2/18/2009

MSP

0.3

49.50

Correspondence to Zurich regarding
counterclaim;

2/23/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review correspondence from client
regarding hearing on motion for summary
judgment;

2/23/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Correspondence to client regarding hearing on
motion for summalY judgment;

3/2/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Telephone conference wilh client regarding

counterclaim;

3/3/2009

MSP

0.2

33.00

Correspondence to insured regarding
counterclaim and answer to complaint;

3/3/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Correspondence from insured regarding
counterclaim and amending answer;

3/5/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Correspondence to insured regarding answer to
complaint;

3/512009
3/5/2009

MSP

0.2

33.00

Receive and review plaintiffs reply to amended
answer and counterclaim;

3/6/2009

MSP

0.2

33.00

Receive and review counterclaim;

3111/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Finalize amended complaint;

3/18/2009

MSP

1.8

297.00

3/18/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment, brief and affidavit;
Correspondence to client regarding response to
motion for partial summary judgment;
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Initials

Hours
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Description

3/18/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review correspondence from client
regarding hearing on summary judgment motions;

3/18/2009
3/1812009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Correspondence to client regarding hearings on
summary judgment motions;

4/2/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Correspondence to client regarding response
brief;

4/8/2009

LCH

0.6

99.00

Review pleadings regarding joinder to objection
to summary judgment;

4/13/2009

MSP

0.2

33.00

Receive and review correspondence from client
regarding reply briefs;

411312009
4/13/2009

MSP

0.5

82.50

Receive and review defendants' reply brief;

411312009
4/13/2009

MSP

0.3

49.50

Receive and review plaintiffs' reply brief
regarding counterclaim;

4/14/2009

MSP

0.7

115.50

4/14/2009

MSP

0.5

82.50

4/14/2009

MSP

1.4

231.00

Review plaintiffs' two other supplemental
briefs, five affidavits and brief in opposition
to summary judgment motion to prepare our reply
brief;

4114/2009
4/14/2009

MSP

1.0

165.00

Research regarding res judicata for our reply
brief;

4/14/2009

MSP

1.8

297.00

Draft reply brief in support of summary
judgment motion;

411
5/2009
4/15/2009

MSP

1.4

231.00

Receive and review plaintiffs' supplemental
reply brief regarding summary judgment motion;
Receive and review plaintiffs' reply brief
regarding counterclaim;

Revise and finalize reply brief in support of

summary judgment motion;
4/15/2009

MSP

0.5

82.50

Receive and review plaintiffs
plaintitTs reply brief and
motion to strike regarding counterclaim;

4115/2009
4/15/2009

MSP

03
0.3

49.50

Correspondence to insured regarding strategy
for handling and argument on summary judgment
motion;

4/16/2009

MSP

0.2

33.00

Receive and review correspondence from insured
regarding strategy for hearing;

4117/2009
4/17/2009

MSP

1.6

264.00

Prepare argument for summary judgment motion
hearing;

4/20/2009

MSP

1.5
15

247.50

Analyze pleadings from prior case to locate
statements to be used as res judicata for
summary judgment motion;

4/20/2009

MSP

2.8

462.00

Analyze plaintiffs' motion to compel and brief;

4/20/2009

MSP

1.2

198.00

Draft response brief to motion to compel;
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Initials

Hours

Amount

Description

4/2 Jl2009

MSP

5.2

858.00

4/21/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

4/22/2009

MSP

3.2

528.00

Analyze Supreme Court briefs to obtain proof of
claims barred by res judicata;

4/22/2009

MSP

1.5

247.50

Continue preparation for argument of three
motions for summary judgment;

4/22/2009

MSP

2.3

379.50

Attend hearing on motions for summary judgment
and motion to compel;

4/22/2009
4122/2009

MSP

0.2

3300

Conference with client regarding hearing on
motions for summary judgment;

4/29/2009

MSP

0.2

33.00

Correspondence to client regarding hearings on
motions for summary judgment;

4/29/2009

MSP

1.5

247.50

Research cases cited by plaintiffs at the
hearings on motions for summary judgment;

511/2009
51112009

MSP

2.3

379.50

Attend hearing on plaintiffs
plaintitrs motion to dismiss
counterclaim;

5/19/2009

MSP

0.2

33.00
3300

Receive and review Judge Wilper's order denying
ofjudgment
payment of
judgment and interest;

6/1/2009
6/112009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review correspondence from client
regarding decision on motion for summary
judgment;

6/1/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Correspondence to client regarding decision on
motion for summary judgment;

6/1/2009

MSP

0.5

82.50

Analyze trial transcript filed
tiled by plaintiffs
and Supreme Court brief to identify issues
previously litigated;
Correspondence to client regarding strategy for
hearing;

Research regarding case alleging fraud on the
court;

717/2009

MSP

0.8

132.00

717/2009

MSP

0.3

49.50

717/2009

MSP

0.7

115.50

Analyze issues regarding certifying decision as
final and dismissal of counterclaim;
tinal

7/8/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review correspondence from client
regarding the Court's memorandum decision on
our motion for summary judgment;

7/9/2009

MSP

0.3

49.50

Receive and review settlement offer and
proposed satisfaction of judgment;

7/13/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review correspondence from insured
regarding settlement;

7/13/2009

MSP

0.2

3300

Correspondence to insured regarding settlement
amount;

Receive and review memorandum decision on
summary judgment;
Letters to clients regarding memorandum
decision received regarding summary judgment:
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Description
Receive and review correspondence from insured
regarding settlement and Bar complaint against
Maile.

7/13/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

7/14/2009

MSP

1.2

198.00

7/14/2009

MSP

0.2

33.00

Correspondence to insured regarding plaintiffs'
motion for permissive appeal and certified
order as final;

7/14/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review correspondence from insured
regarding settlement;

7/14/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review correspondence from insured
to plaintiff regarding settlement;

7/15/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review proposed judgment and order;

7/15/2009

MSP

0.9

148.50

7/15/2009

MSP

0.2

33.00

Receive and review notice of scheduling
conference;

711512009
7/15/2009

MSP

0.2

33.00

Correspondence to insured regarding strategy
for response to motion for pennissive appeal;

7/16/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review notice of hearing on motion
for pennissive appeal;

7/16/2009

MSP

1.2

198.00

7/16/2009

MSP

0.2

33.00

Receive and review plaintiffs motion to
certify order as final and for permissive
appeal, affidavit and brief in support of
motion;

Telephone conference with insured regarding
costs and fees, permissive appeal and strategy
for response to motion for permissive appeal;

Research regarding which costs should be
requested after partial summary judgment;
Correspondence to insured regarding request for
costs~

7/16/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review correspondence from insured
regarding settlement offer;

7/21/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review correspondence from
plaintiffs counsel regarding settlement;

7/21/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review supplemental affidavit
regarding certification for appeal;

7/22/2009

MSP

0.4

66.00

Receive and review plaintiffs first and second
set of discovery to Connie Taylor;

7/24/2009

MSP

0.1

1650
16.50

Correspondence to client regarding discovery
responses;

7/27/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review correspondence from client
regarding discovery responses;

7/28/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review correspondence from client
regarding settlement;

8/3/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review correspondence from
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Description
co-counsel to plaintiffs counsel regarding
proposed litigation plan;

8/3/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review amended motion for
certification for appeal;

8/3/2009

MSP

0.2

33.00

Receive and review correspondence from
plaintiffs counsel regarding lis pendens;

8/3/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review notice of lien;

8/5/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review correspondence from client
regarding litigation strategy;

8/5/2009

MSP

0.2

33.00

Correspondence to client regarding
certification for appeal and withdrawal from
case;

8/5/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Correspondence from client regarding
certification for appeal and withdrawal from
case;

8/5/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Correspondence to client responding to client's
response regarding certification for appeal;

8/12/2009

MSP

0.2

33.00

Receive and review second supplemental
affidavit regarding pennissive appeal;

8/14/2009

MSP

0.3

49.50

Attend status conference with Judge,
plaintiffs counsel and counsel for
co-defendant;

8/17/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review correspondence from client
regarding pennissive appeal;

8/17/2009

MSP

0.3

49.50

Correspondence to client regarding pcnnissive
appeal;

8/2112009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review notice of non-opposition to
certificate for appeal;

8/21/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review order governing proceedings;

8/28/2009

MSP

0.2

33.00

Receive and review discovery responses to
plaintiff;

8/3112009

MSP

0.3

49.50

Receive and review responses to plaintiffs
discovery regarding counterclaim;

9/4/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review correspondence from
plaintiff regarding non-opposition to motion to
certify;

9/4/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Correspondence to plaintiff regarding our
position concerning his motion to certify;

9/9/2009

MSP

0.6

99.00

Analyze pleadings regarding motion to certify
appeal;

9/9/2009

MSP

1.3

214.50

Attend hearing on motion to certify appeal;

9/912009
9/9/2009

MSP

0.3

49.50

Correspondence to client regarding appeal;
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Hours
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9/15/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review proposed order certifying
appeal;

9/16/2009

MSP

0.2

33.00

Conference with client regarding proposed order
granting motion to appeal;

10/1/2009

MSP

0.3

49.50

Receive and review signed order authorizing
appeal;

10/1/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Correspondence to client regarding authorizing
appeal;

10/2/2009

MSP

0.3

49.50

Research regarding new Idaho Supreme Court
decision on res judicata;

10/2/2009
101212009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Correspondence to client regarding new Idaho
Supreme Court decision on res judicata;

1015/2009
10/5/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review correspondence from client
regarding interlocutory appeal;

10/5/2009

MSP

0.2

33.00

Correspondence to client regarding
interlocutory appeal;

10/6/2009

MSP

1.2

198.00

Receive and review plaintiffs motion for
permissive appeal with brief and affidavit and
relevant pleadings;

10/6/2009

MSP

0.5

82.50

Research regarding applicable appellate rules;

10/6/2009

MSP

0.2

33.00

Correspondence to insured regarding plaintiffs
brief regarding pennissive appeal and
IlJles;
applicable rules;

10/9/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review notice of non-opposition to
appeal;

10/912009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review notice from court regarding
handling ofpennissive appeal;

11/10/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review order denying pennissive
appeal;

11/10/2009

MSP

0.3

49.50

Correspondence to client regarding order
denying pennissive appeal;

11/11/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review correspondence from client
regarding withdrawing;

11/11/2009

MSP

0.2

33.00

Correspondence to client regarding probable
date of final judgment;

11/16/2009
11116/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review offer ofjudgment;
of judgment;

11/17/2009
11117/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review scheduling order;

11/1712009

MSP

0.3

49.50

Correspondence to client regarding stipulation
stipUlation
to withdraw or substitute counsel;

11/17/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review response from client
regarding stipulation to withdraw or substitute
counsel;
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Description

11/17/2009
11/17 /2009

MSP

0.2

33.00

Draft notice of substitution of counsel;

12/3.'2009
12/3/2009

MSP

0.2

33.00

Receive and review motion to reconsider;

12/3/2009

MSP

0.4

66.00

Letters to insured regarding renewed motion to
reconsider;

121l7/2009
12/17/2009

MSP

0.1
0.\

16.50

Receive and review notice of appearance of
counsel;

12/17/2009

MSP

0.3

49.50

Correspondence to Zurich regarding request for
reconsideration, scheduling conference and
withdrawal;

12/17/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review notice of scheduling
conference;

12/17/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review correspondence from
plaintiffs counsel regarding new attorney;

12/21/2009
12121/2009

MSP

0.4

66.00

Reeeive and review objection to renewed motion
Receive
to certify with affidavit;

12/22/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review correspondence from insured
regarding court's scheduling conference;

12/22/2009

MSP

0.2

33.00

Analyze court's scheduling order;

12/22/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Correspondence to co-defendant regarding
court's scheduling order;

12/22/2009

MSP

0.3

49.50

Receive and review proposed stipulation
regarding scheduling order;

12/22/2009

MSP

0.2

33.00

Receive and review leiters
letters from insured
regarding proposed stipulation regarding
scheduling order;

12/23/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review correspondence from insured

regarding scheduling stipulation;
12/28/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review correspondence from client
regarding revised stipulation;

12/29/2009

MSP

0.1

16.50

Correspondence to insured regarding stipulation
for trial;

12/29/2009

MSP

0.2

33.00

Receive and review revised stipulation for
trial;

12/30/2009

MSP

0.2

33.00

Receive and review revised stipulation for
scheduling and correspondence from other
counsel regarding vacating scheduling
conference;

1/5/2010

MSP

0.2

33.00

Correspondence to client regarding status
conference and hearing on second motion to
certify for appeal;

1/6/2010

MSP

0.3

49.50

Receive and review court's scheduling order;

1/6/2010
116/2010

MSP

0.2

33.00

Correspondence to client regarding court's
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Description
scheduling order;

11712010
1/7/2010

MSP

0.3

49.50

Receive and review brief in support of renewed
motion to certifY for appeal;

1/7/2010
117/2010

MSP

0.2

33.00

Receive and review supplemental affidavit
regarding renewed motion to certify for appeal;

1112/2010

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review correspondence from client
regarding response to renewed motion to cel1ify
for appeal;

1112/2010

MSP

0.2

33.00

Correspondence to client regarding renewed
motion to certifY for appeal;

1/12/2010

MSP

1.0

165.00

1112/2010
1/12/2010

MSP

0.1

16.50

judge;
Receive and review motion to disqualifY judgc;

1/25/2010

MSP

0.1

16.50

counsel
Receive and review correspondence from counscl
for co-defendant regarding attending hearing by
telephone;
telcphone;

1/27/2010

MSP

0.5

82.50

Review pleadings on renewed motion to certify
case for appeal;

1/27/20 I0
I0

MSP

0.3

49.50

Telephone conference with client regarding
hearing on motion to certify case for appeal;

1127/2010

MSP

1.0

165.00

Attend hearing on motion to certifY case for
appeal (no charge for travel);

1/27/2010

MSP

0.5

82.50

Letters to clients regarding status following
hearing on motion to certify case for appeal;

1/27/2010

MSP

0.2

33.00

Correspondence to Zurich regarding denial of
motion, substitution of counsel and settlement;

2/12/2010

MSP

0.1

16.S0
16.50

Correspondence to client regarding substitution
of counsel;

2/12/2010

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review response from client
regarding substitution of counsel;

2112/2010

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review notice of substitution;

2117/2010

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review order of disqualification;

2/25/20 I0
I0

MSP

0.1

16.50

tl·om client
correspondence II·om
Receive and review corrcspondencc
regarding substitution of counsel;

2/25/2010

MSP

0.1

16.50

Correspondence to client regarding substitution
of counsel;

2/26/20 I0
I0

MSP

0.2

33.00

Correspondence to co-counsel regarding
substitution of counsel and mediation;

2/26/2010

MSP

0.1

16.50

Correspondence to client regarding substitution
of counsel and mediation;

I0
9/30/20 I0

MSP

1.2

198.00

brief
Receive and review motion to reconsider bricf

Analyze prior pleadings and orders to prepare
for hearing on renewed motion to certifY for
appeal;

Page 20 of 30

Exhibit II
002321

~

17136.0306 - Zurich - Berkshire Investments, LLC, et al v. Clark & Feeney, ct al
Date

Initials

Hours

Amount

Description
in support and affidavits;

9/30/2010

MSP

1.0

165.00

Research recent case used as basis for motion
to reconsider;

9/30/2010

MSP

0.7

115.50

Analyze order on motion for summary judgment
that plaintiff is asking court to reconsider;

9/3012010

MSP

0.3

49.50

Letters to clients regarding plaintin's motion
to reconsider;

10/1/2010

MSP

0.2

33.00

Receive and review correspondence ITom insured
regarding brief on motion to reconsider;

10/1/2010

MSP

0.1

16.50

Correspondence to insured regarding motion to
reconsider;

10/1/2010

MSP

2.8

462.00

10/1/2010

MSP

0.2

33.00

Correspondence to insured regarding briefing
strategy;

10/4/2010

MSP

0.5

82.50

Continue analysis of briefs on motion for
summary judgment to respond to motion to
reconsider;

10/5/2010
1015/2010

MSP

0.4

66.00

Letters to insured regarding notice of
substitution of counsel;

10/5/2010

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review response from insured
regarding substitution of counsel;

10/5/2010

MSP

1.0

165.00

Analyze summary judgment decision to prepare
brief in opposition to motion to reconsider;

10/6/2010

MSP

4.5

742.50

Research regarding res judicata Rule 60(b)
motions and fraud claims to prepare brief in

Analyze briefs in support of motion for summary
judgment to prepare brief in opposition to
motion to recons ider;

opposition to motion to reconsider summary

judgment; (approved by claims examiner)
10/6/2010

MSP

1.5

247.50

101712010

MSP

0.5

82.50

Outline memorandum in opposition to motion to
reconsider;

101712010

MSP

5.4

891.00

Further draft memorandum in opposition to
motion to reconsider, argument, sections (I)
TAYLOR V. MCNICHOLS does not affect the
analysis of this court's summary decision, (II)
TAYLOR V. MCNICHOLS supports this court's
decision and (III) recent cases provide
additional support for the court's memorandum
decision and order;

10/11/20 II0
10/11120
0

MSP

0.8

132.00

Edit and finalize memorandum in opposition to
motion to reconsider including preparation of
conclusion section;

Analyze court's order and plaintiffs motion to
reconsider to prepare response to plaintiffs
motion;
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10/12/2010

MSP

0.5

82.50

Correspondence with insured regarding motion to
reconsider and counterclaim for attorney fees;

10/13/2010

MSP

0.3

49.50

Letters to insured regarding memorandum in
opposition to motion to reconsider and argument
for hearing;

10118/2010
10/18/2010

MSP

0.5

82.50

Prepare argument for hearing on motion to
reconsider;

10/1912010

MSP

0.5

82.50

Letters to insured regarding issues for
argument on motion to reconsider;

10/19/2010

MSP

2.5

412.50

10/20/2010

MSP

0.2
02

33.00

Receive and review plaintiffs reply brief
regarding motion to reconsider;

10/20/20 II0
0

MSP

0.3

49.50

Continue analysis of Supreme Court decision
relied upon by plaintiff in motion to
reconsider;

10/21120
I0
10/21/20 I0

MSP

0.3

49.50

Continue analysis of plaintiffs reply brief
regarding motion to reconsider;

10/21/2010

MSP

0.8

132.00

Letters to insured regarding additional summary
judgment strategy for argument on motion to
reconsider;

I0
10/21/20 I0

MSP

1.2

198.00

Continue research regarding authorities cited
by judge for motion to reconsider;

10/2112010

MSP

1.2

198.00

Analyze plaintiffs briefs to prepare for
hearing on motion to reconsider;

I0
10/22/20 I0

MSP

4.0

660.00

Draft argument for hearing on motion to
reconsider;

10/26/2010

MSP

0.5

82.50

Research regarding citations on judge's order
that is subject of motion to reconsider;

COlTespondence to client regarding Illotion to

reconsider and brief;
10/26/2010

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review plaintiffs correction to
reply brief;

10/26/2010

MSP

0.3

49.50

Correspondence to insured regarding corrections
received from plaintiff as to reply brief;

10/26/2010

MSP

0.3
03

49.50

Continue preparation of argument for motion to
reconsider;

10/28/2010

MSP

1.5

247.50

10/28/2010

MSP

0.5

82.50
8250

1012812010

MSP

0.8

132.00

Continue drafting notes for argument on motion
to reconsider;

10/2912010

MSP

1.0

165.00

Continue drafting of argument for hearing on
motion to reconsider;

Analyze briefs to prepare for argument on
motion to reconsider;
Research regarding case relied upon by
plaintiff for motion to reconsider;
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Initials

Hours

Amount

Description

Attend hearing on motion to reconsider; (no
travel time)

10/29/2010

MSP

1.2

198.00

10/29/2010

MSP

0.3

49.50

Correspondence to clients regarding ruling on
motion to reconsider;

10/29/2010

MSP

0.5

82.50

Receive and review motion to amend reply to
counterclaim, affidavit in support of motion
and proposes amended reply;

1111/2010
111112010

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review correspondence from client
regarding motion to reconsider;

11/1/2010

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review correspondence from insured
regarding motions filed last week;

11/2/2010

MSP

1.2

198.00

111212010

MSP

0.2

33.00

Correspondence to insured regarding receipt of
motion to amend reply to counterclaim,
counterclaim.
affidavit.
affidavit, brief and proposed reply;

11/3/2010

MSP

0.3

49.50

Correspondence to clients regarding plaintiffs
attempt to obtain finn's files;

11/3/20 II0
0

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review correspondence from insured
regarding protective order;

11/3/2010

MSP

0.2

33.00

Receive and review correspondence from insured
regarding possible summary judgment motion;

11/3/2010

MSP

0.6

99.00

Correspondence to insured regarding strategy
for summary judgment motion, motion in limine
and motion to amend;

11/3/2010

MSP

1.8

297.00

Receive and review motion to amend reply to
counterclaim, affidavit, brief and proposed
reply;

Analyze past discovery J-cqucsts
r-cqucsts and motion to

compel to see if issues of discovery of finn
files were addressed;
Correspondence to insured regarding whether
past discovery requests and motion to compel
addressed discovery issues;

11/3/2010

MSP

0.1

16.50

11/4/2010

MSP

1.0

165.00

Continue analysis of prior discovery and motion
to compel to detennine basis for protective
order;

11/4/2010

MSP

0.6

99.00

Correspondence to insureds regarding protective
order;

1114/2010

MSP

0.7

115.50

11/4/2010

MSP

0.1

16.50
\6.50

Receive and review correspondence from insured
regarding protective order for Reed Taylor;

11/4/2010

MSP

0.5

82.50

Research regarding protective order;

11/5/2010

MSP

0.3

49.50

Analyze Reed Taylor's deposition notice duces

Correspondence to Zurich regarding need for
protective order and continued defenses;
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Initials

Hours

Amount

Description
DescriEtion
tecum for requests for privileged infonnation;
Analyze motion to compel and prior responses to
prepare motion for protective order;

11/5/2010

MSP

1.2

198.00

11/5/20 II0
0

MSP

0.2

33.00

11/8/2010

MSP

1.2

198.00

Draft motion for protective order;

11/8/2010

MSP

1.5

247.50

Draft affidavit in support of motion for
protective order;

11/8/2010

MSP

0.1

16.50

Correspondence to insured regarding hearing on
protective order and opposition to motion to
amend;

11/8/2010
1118/2010

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review response from insured
regarding hearing on protective order and
motion to amend;

11/9/2010

MSP

0.1

16.50

Revise affidavit in support of motion for
protective order;

11/9/2010

MSP

0.2

33.00

Receive and review letters from insured
regarding subpoenas and witness fees;

11/9/2010

MSP

0.2

33.00

Return correspondence to insured regarding
subpoena and witness fees;

11/9/2010

MSP

0.2

33.00

Receive and review correspondence from insured
regarding conversation with plaintiffs counsel
regarding dismissal of counterclaim;

11110/2010

MSP

0.4

66.00

Correspondence to insured regarding strategy
for hearing on motion to amend and protective
order and dismissal of counterclaim;

11/10/2010

MSP

0.1

16.50

Correspondence to insured regarding strategy
for motion for protective order;

Receive and review return correspondence from
insured regarding counterclailn;

11/10/2010

MSP

0.1

16.50

Correspondence to insured regarding dismissal
of counterclaim and claim for fees;

11/1012010

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review response from insured
regarding dismissal of counterclaim and claim
for fees;

11110/2010
11/1012010

MSP

0.2

33.00

Correspondence to insured regarding plaintit1's
attorney's strategy for hearing;

11110/2010

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review response from insured
regarding plaintiffs
plaintifi's attorney's strategy for
hearing;

1111 1/2010
11/l1/2010

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review correspondence from insured
regarding dismissal of counterclaim;

11116/2010

MSP

0.2

33.00

Receive and review draft stipulation to dismiss
counterclaim;

11116/2010
11/16/2010

MSP

0.2

33.00

Correspondence to insured regarding draft
stipUlation to dismiss counterclaim:
stipulation
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Initials

Hours

Amount

Description

11117/2010

MSP

0.5

82.50

Letters to insured regarding obtaining
signatures on stipulation to dismiss
counterclaim;

11/17/2010

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review signed stipulation to
dismiss counterclaim from insured;

11/18/2010

MSP

1.1
1.I

181.50

Receive and review plaintiffs brief in
opposition to motion for protective order;

11/18/2010

MSP

0.2

33.00

Correspondence to plaintiffs counsel regarding
his opposition to motion for protective order
and stipulation to dismiss counterclaim;

11/18/2010

MSP

0.2

33.00

Correspondence to insured regarding plaintiffs
arguments against protective order;

11/18/2010

MSP

0.5

82.50

Receive and review plaintiffs witness
designation;

11/19/2010

MSP

0.5

82.50

Conference with insured regarding testimony of
attorneys as witnesses;

11119/2010

MSP

0.3

49.50

Correspondence to Zurich regarding motion for
protective order and plaintiffs response;

11/19/2010

MSP

1.1

181.50

11119/2010

MSP

0.4

66.00

11/22/2010

MSP

1.8

297.00

Research and draft reply brief regarding motion
for protective order;

11123/2010

MSP

4.2

693.00

Draft reply brief regarding motion for
protective order;

1 112312010
1123120 I0

MSP

1.9

313.50

Continue analysis of plaintift's
plain tift's brief in
opposition to protective order;
Outline argument for response to plaintiffs
brief in opposition to protective order;

Research regarding exceptions to attorney

client privilege;
11/24/20 I 0
11/24/2010

MSP

2.2

363.00

Finalize reply brief regarding motion for
protective order;

11/24/2010

MSP

0.8

132.00

Receive and review plaintiffs reply brief
regarding amended reply to counterclaim;

11/24/20 I0
I0

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review correspondence from insured
regarding joinder in opposition to motion to
dismiss;

11/29/2010

MSP

0.2

33.00

Correspondence to insured regarding response to
motion to dismiss;

11/29/2010
1l/29/2010

MSP

1.8

297.00

Analyze reply brief and prior correspondence
regarding response to motion to dismiss;

11/29/2010

MSP

0.8

132.00

Draft joinder in opposition to motion to amend
and to dismiss;

11/30/2010

MSP

1.0

165.00

Draft argument for motion for protective order;
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Initials

Hours

Amount

Description

11/30/2010

MSP

1.1

181.50
J81.50

Attend hearing on motion to amend reply to
counterclaim, motion to dismiss and motion for
protective order;

11/30/2010

MSP

0.4

66.00

Correspondence to clients regarding protective
order;

11/30/2010

MSP

1.8

297.00

Receive and review prior deposition of Reed
Taylor;

11/30/2010

MSP

1.5

247.50

Receive and review prior duces tecum request
and compare to present one for Reed Taylor;

12/1/2010

MSP

0.2

33.00

Correspondence to insured regarding possible
protective order or motion to quash;

12/1/2010
12/1/20 10

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review correspondence from insured
regarding witnesses at trial;

12/112010

MSP

0.2

33.00

Correspondence to insured regarding witnesses
at trial;

121112010
1211/2010

MSP

0.8

132.00

121112010

MSP

0.2

33.00

Correspondence to insured regarding research
regarding attorney testifYing
testifying at trial;

12/1/2010

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review correspondence from insured
regarding testimony at trial;

12/1/2010

MSP

1.5

247.50

Research regarding possible protective order or
motion to quash;

121112010
12/1120 I0

MSP

0.2

33.00

Receive and review subpoenas of attorneys for
trial;

12/2/2010

MSP

0.2

33.00

Research regarding ethical rules regarding
attorney testifying
testifYing at trial;

Finalize motion to dismiss attorneys'
counterclaim;

12/2/2010

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review stipulation to dismiss;

12/2/2010

MSP

0.1

16.50

Correspondence to insured regarding dismissal
of attorneys' counterclaim;

12/3/2010

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review correspondence from insured
to Plaintiffs attorney regarding deposition;

12/6/20
0
12/6120 II0

MSP

0.1

16.50

Letter to client regarding review of subpoena
and production of documents for deposition;

12/6/2010

MSP

1.5

247.50

12/6/2010

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review letter from client regarding
R. Taylor deposition;

12/6/20 II0
0

MSP

0.2

33.00

Letters to client regarding representation at
deposition and privilege log;

12/6/2010

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review response from client;

Analyze prior R. Taylor and H. Taylor
depositions for discussion of privileged
documents;
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12/6/2010
12/6/20 to

MSP

0.2

33.00

Receive and review Property Agreement;

12/15/2010
12/15/20 to

MSP

0.4

66.00

Correspondence to client regarding issues and
strategy concerning Reed Taylor's deposition;

12/16/2010

MSP

0.9

148.50

Conference with client in defense of Reed
Taylor deposition and strategy for objections;

12/16/2010

MSP

OJ

49.50

Draft proposed protection order;

12/16/2010

MSP

0.1

16.50

Correspondence to other counsel regarding
approval of proposed protection order;

1212212010
12122/2010

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review correspondence from insured
regarding deposition of defendant's expert;

12/22/2010

MSP

0.1

16.50

Correspondence to plaintiff regarding
deposition of Reed Taylor and subpoena;

12127/2010
1212712010

MSP

0.5

82.50

Receive and review correspondence from
plaintiffs counsel regarding cancellation of
Reed Taylor deposition;

12/27/2010

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review correspondence from insured
regarding cancellation of Reed Taylor
deposition;

12/28/20 II0
0

MSP

0.3

49.50

Correspondence to client regarding cancellation
of deposition and representation issues for
trial;

12128/20 II0
12128120
0

MSP

0.1

16.50

Correspondence to insured regarding
representation at trial;

12/2812010

MSP

0.5

82.50
8250

Receive and review draft motion in limine;

12/3012010

MSP

0.3

49.50

Receive and review defendant's supplemental
discovery responses and expert witness
disclosure;

12/30/2010

MSP

0.5

82.50

12/3012010

MSP

0.8

132.00
J32.00

1/3/2011

MSP

0.3

49.50

Receive and review plaintiffs motion in limine
and brief regarding damages;

1/3/20 II
113/2011

MSP

0.4

66.00

Receive and review plaintiffs Motion in Limine
re Relevance of Prior Allegations;

1/3/20 II

MSP

1.2

198.00

113120
1/3120 II

MSP

0.2

33.00

Receive and review plaintiffs Motion in Limine
re Idaho State Bar Complaint;

113/2011
1/3/2011

MSP

1.0

165.00

Receive and review plaintiffs motion regarding
testimony of four witnesses;

Receive and review defendant's motion in limine
and brief in support;
Conference with insured regarding expert
witness disclosures;

Receive and review Plaintitl's Motion to
Exclude Experts & Lay Testimony Re: Claims
Against Counter-Defendants;
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1/4/2011

MSP

1.2
12

198.00

Research regarding permissible expert testimony
for trial in response to motion in lim ine;

115/20
1/5/20 II

MSP

1.8

297.00

Continue research regarding permissible
testimony of experts;

115/20
1/5/20 II

MSP

0.3

49.50

Letters to insured regarding research on
permissible testimony of experts;

1/6/2011

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review correspondence from insured
regarding pre-trial conference;

1/6/20 II

MSP

0.2

33.00

Correspondence to insured regarding strategy
for pretrial conference and attendance at trial;

116/2011
1/6/2011

MSP

0.5

82.50

Receive and review proposed jury instructions
and special verdict;

1/6/2011

MSP

0.2

33.00

Receive and review witness and exhibit list;

1/6/20 II

MSP

0.2

33.00

Receive and review affidavit regarding
replacement witness;

117120 II
1/7/2011

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review correspondence from opposing
counsel regarding pretrial conference;

11712011
1/7/20\1

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review correspondence from client
regarding witnesses at trial;

11712011
1/7/2011

MSP

OJ

49.50

Correspondence to Zurich regarding defense of
insured if called as a witness;

117120 II
1/7/20

MSP

0.4

66.00

Conference with insured regarding being called
as a witness;

11712011
1/7/2011

MSP

2.8

462.00

Research regarding motion in limine to prohibit
calling adverse attorney as witness;

J/IO/2011
1/10/2011

MSP

0.3

49.50

Hours

Amount

Descri ption

Receive and review insured's final witness
list;

1110/20 II
1/10/20

MSP

1.2

198.00

1110/2011

MSP

0.2

33.00

Correspondence to client regarding defending
insured at trial;

1/10/20 II

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review correspondence from insured
regarding defense at trial;

1/10/20 II

MSP

0.7

115.50

Attend pretrial con ference;

111012011
1110/2011

MSP

1.0

]65.00
165.00

Conference with insured regarding reply brief
on motion in limine, jury instructions and
trial strategy;

1/10/2011

MSP

OJ

49.50

1110/2011

MSP

1.5

247.50

Receive and review response to motion in limine
by counterdefendants;

Correspondence to client regarding pretrial
conference;
Begin draft of reply brief regarding testimony
of counsel;
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Description

1/1112011
1/11/2011

MSP

0.6

99.00

Receive and review opposing party's proposed
jury instructions;

1/1112011
1/11/2011

MSP

0.3

49.50

Conference with insured regarding opposing
party's proposed jury instructions;

1/1112011
1/11/2011

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review jury instruction chart
from insured;

111112011
1/11/2011

MSP

0.4

66.00

Receive and review reply brief regarding motion
in limine;

1/1112011
1/11/20 II

MSP

3.8

627.00

Continue draft of reply brief regarding motion
in limine on counsel's testimony at trial;

1/12/20 II

MSP

1.1

181.50

Continue drafting of brief in support of motion
in limine to preclude Connie Taylor's
testimony;

1113/2011
1/13/2011

MSP

0.1

16.50

Conference with client regarding brief on
motion in limine;

1/13/201
1/13/2011I

MSP

0.2

33.00

Receive and review revised jury instructions;

1/14/2011

MSP

0.3

49.50

Conference with insured regarding Berkshire's
proposed exhibits;

1114/2011

MSP

0.2

33.00

Correspondence from insured regarding
admissibility of bar counsel investigation;

1/17/2011

MSP

0.3

49.50

Telephone conference with opposing counsel
regarding stipulation to agree not to call
client as witness;

1/17/2011

MSP

0.4

66.00

Conference with client regarding conference
with opposing counsel regarding stipulation to
not call client as a witness at trial;

1/17/2011
1/1712011

MSP

0.7

115.50

Receive and review correspondence from opposing
counsel with exhibit list
lisl regarding proposed
stipulation;

\/17/2011
1/17/2011

MSP

0.9

148.50

Telephone conferences with client regarding
plaintiff's exhibit list and foundation for
exhibits;

1/18/2011

MSP

0.3

49.50

Telephone conference with client regarding
proposed stipulation on motion in limine;
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Hours
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Description

1/1812011

MSP

0.5

82.50

1/18/2011

MSP

0.8

132.00

1118/2011

MSP

0.3

49.50

Correspondence to client regarding hearing on
motion in limine and withdrawal from case;

1119/20 II

MSP

0.2
02

33.00

Conference with insured regarding withdrawal
from case;

1/20/2011

MSP

0.2

33.00

Receive and review supplemental brief regarding
motion in limine;

1121120
1/21120 II

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review judge's order on motion in
limine;

1/21/2011

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review correspondence from insured
regarding judge's order on motion in limine;

1126/2011
1126/201 I

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review pretrial memorandum;

1126/2011
1126/201 I

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review Berkshire's memo in support
of motion to preclude attomey
attorney from testifying;

1/27/2011

MSP

0.1

16.50

Receive and review correspondence from court
requiring attendance at trial;

1/31/2011

MSP

0.4

66.00

Attend court regarding removal of attomeys
attorneys
from caption, jury instructions and verdict;

1/31/2011

MSP

0.4

66.00

retum from court regarding
Travel to and return
attomeys from caption, jury
removal of attorneys
instructions and verdict;

217/20 II
217120

MSP

0.2

33.00

Correspondence to insured regarding special
verdict from abuse or process case;

217/20 II
II
217120

MSP

0.2

33.00
3300

Prepare arguments on motion in limine to
preclude client's testimony;
Attend hearing on motion in limine;

Receive and review correspondence from insured
regarding special verdict

frOltl

abuse of process

case and collection of attorney fees from
plaintiffs;
217/2011
21712011

MSP

0.3

49.50

Correspondence to Zurich regarding potential
recovery of attorney fees;

2/8/2011

MSP

0.3

49.50

Telephone conference with claim handler
regarding expected judgment, post-trial issues
and request for costs and fees;

2/8/20 II

MSP

0.1

\6.50
16.50

Correspondence to insured regarding verdict and
judgment;

349.8

56,502.50

Attomeys
Attorne~s
Associate
Pal1ner
Paltner
Pal1ner
Paltner

TOTALS

Initials
AJS
LCH
MSP

Hours
34.7
0.6
314.5

Rate Amount
130 4,511.00
165
99.00
165 51,892.50

TOTAL

349.8

56,502.50
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Description

5/7/2008

0.20

2 Photocopies

5/7/2008

0.10

1 Photocopies

5/7/2008

4.60

Long distance telephone call to LEWISTON, ID

5/8/2008

0.80

8 Photocopies

5/8/2008

1.10

11 Photocopies

5/9/2008

0.70

7 Photocopies

5/9/2008

1.50

15 Photocopies

5/9/2008

0.70

7 Photocopies

5/9/2008

0.10

1 Photocopies

5/14/2008

0.30

3 Photocopies

5/19/2008

6.40

64 Photocopies

5120/2008

0.20

2 Photocopies

5/20/2008

0.20

2 Photocopies

5/20/2008

0.20

2 Photocopies

6/24/2008

2.00

Long distance telephone call to LEWISTON, ID

8/4/2008

0.20

2 photocopies

8/4/2008

0.10

1 photocopies

8/6/2008

2.60

26 Photocopies

8/6/2008

6.60

66 Photocopies

8/6/2008

0.10

1 photocopies

8/6/2008

2.20

22 Photocopies

8/6/2008

2.00

20 Photocopies

8/6/2008

1.90

19 Photocopies

8/6/2008

3.20

32 Photocopies

8/6/2008

0.30

3 photocopies

8/6/2008

0.40

4 photocopies
Page 1 of9

002333
Exhibit B

-

........'

...

17136.0306 - Berkshire Investments, LLC et al v Clark & Feeney, et al
Date

Amount

Description

8/6/2008

0.30

3 photocopies

8/6/2008

0.20

2 photocopies

8/6/2008
8/612008

0.80

8 photocopies

8/6/2008

1.00

10 photocopies

8/6/2008

1.00

10 photocopies

8/6/2008

0.80

8 photocopies

8/6/2008

0.40

4 photocopies

8/6/2008

1.60

16 Photocopies

8/6/2008

1.70

17 Photocopies

8/6/2008

2.90

29 Photocopies

8/6/2008

5.60

56 Photocopies

8/2l/2008
8/2112008

0.20

Long distance telephone call to Lewiston, Idaho

8/22/2008

3.00

30 Photocopies

8/2212008
8/22/2008

0.30

3 photocopies

8/22/2008

0.20

2 photocopies

8/25/2008

0040
OAO

4 photocopies

8/27/2008

0.30

3 photocopies

9/17/2008

0.60

6 photocopies

9/22/2008

0040
OAO

Long distance telephone call to Lewiston, Idaho

9/24/2008

2040
2AO

Long distance telephone call to Lewiston, Idaho

9/26/2008

0.60

6 photocopies

9/3012008
9/30/2008

4.80

48 Photocopies

9/3012008
9/30/2008

0.60

6 photocopies

9/30/2008

1.20

12 Photocopies

9/30/2008

1.50

15 Photocopies
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Date

Amount

Description

10/1/2008
1011/2008

0.50

5 photocopies

10/1/2008
1011/2008

0.30

3 photocopies

10/1/2008
1011/2008

2.20

22 photocopies

10/1/2008
1011/2008

0.20

2 photocopies

10/1/2008
1011/2008

0.90

9 photocopies

10/1/2008

0.80

8 photocopies

10/1/2008
1011/2008

0.90

9 photocopies

101112008
10/112008

0.60

6 photocopies

10/1/2008
1011/2008

0.80

8 photocopies

10/1/2008

0.50

5 photocopies

10/2/2008

OAO

Long distance telephone call
can to LEWISTON, ID

10/212008

1.50

15 photocopies

10/3/2008

0.70

7 photocopies

1017
12008
1017/2008

l.l0
1.10

11 photocopies

101712008

1.10

11 photocopies

1017
12008
1017/2008

1.20

12 photocopies

10/912008
10/9/2008

3.40

34 photocopies

10/9/2008

3AO

34 photocopies

10/9/2008

0.30

3 photocopies

1011012008

OAO

4 photocopies

10/1 0/2008

0.80

8 photocopies

10110/2008
10/10/2008

2.00

20 photocopies

10110/2008
10/10/2008

0.10

1 photocopy

10/10/2008
10/ I0/2008

1.30

13 photocopies

10/10/2008

63.81

VENDOR: Burnham Habel & Associates - copy of
deposition transcript of H. Taylor taken 10/03/08
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Date

Amount

Description

10129/2008

0.90

9 photocopies

10/29/2008

0.30

3 photocopies

10/29/2008

0.10

1 photocopy

111412008
11/4/2008

1.20

12 photocopies

11/7/2008

0.10

1 photocopy

12/4/2008

0.20

2 photocopies

111212009
1/12/2009

0.10

1I photocopy

1119/2009
1/19/2009

0.30

3 photocopies

2118/2009
2/18/2009

0.10

1 photocopy

3/3/2009

1.20

12 photocopies

3/3/2009

0.30

3 photocopies

3/12/2009
3112/2009

2.80

28 photocopies

4/8/2009

0.30

3 photocopies

4/9/2009

0.60

6 photocopies

4/9/2009

0.80

8 photocopies

4/13/2009
4113/2009

3.90

39 photocopies

4/15/2009
4115/2009

0.80

8 photocopies

4/20/2009

0.60

6 photocopies

4/20/2009

0.90

9 photocopies

5/1/2009
51112009

0.20

2 photocopies

7/14/2009

0.20

2 photocopies

7/1412009

0.10

1 photocopy

7/14/2009

0.20

2 photocopies

7/15/2009
711512009

0.10

1 photocopy

7/15/2009
711512009

0.10

1 photocopy
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Date

Amount

Description

7/15/2009

9.60

Telephone call to LEWISTON, ID

7116/2009

0.20

2 photocopies

7116/2009

0.20

2 photocopies

7/20/2009

0.10

1 photocopy

7/21/2009

0.20

2 photocopies

7/22/2009

0.20

2 photocopies

7/22/2009

0.10

1 photocopy

7/2212009
7/22/2009

0.10

1 photocopy

7/22/2009

0.20

2 photocopies

7/28/2009

0.10

1 photocopy

712812009
7/28/2009

0.20

2 photocopies

7/30/2009

0.10

1 photocopy

8/312009
8/3/2009

0.10

1 photocopy

8/3/2009

0.20

2 photocopies

8/3/2009

0.20

2 photocopies

8/4/2009

0.10

1 photocopy

8/4/2009

0.20

2 photocopies

8112/2009
8/12/2009

0.20

2 photocopies

8120/2009
8/20/2009

0.10

1 photocopy

8/20/2009

0.50

5 photocopies

8/2112009

0.10

1 photocopy

8/2812009
8/28/2009

1.70

17 photocopies

8/31/2009

0.10

1 photocopy

8/31/2009

0.10

1 photocopy

8/31/2009

0.20

2 photocopies

8/31/2009

0.20

2 photocopies
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Date

Amount

Description

9/4/2009

0.10

1 photocopy

9115/2009
9/15/2009

0.20

2 photocopies

1011/2009
10/1/2009

0.10

1 photocopy

10/6/2009

0.10

1 photocopy

10/612009
10/6/2009

0.20

2 additional photocopies

101612009
10/612009

0.20

2 additional photocopies

101712009

0.10

1 photocopy

10/912009

0.10

1 photocopy

10/19/2009

0.10

1 photocopy

11110/2009
11/10/2009

0.10

1 photocopy

11116/2009
11/16/2009

0.10

1 photocopy

11/17/2009
11117/2009

0.10

1 photocopy

11/1712009
1111712009

0.10

1 additional photocopy

11/17/2009
11117/2009

0.10

1 additional photocopy

11/17/2009
11117/2009

1.20

12 additional photocopies

11/1712009
1111712009

1.20

12 additional photocopies

11/1812009

0.40

4 photocopies

11/18/2009
1111812009

0.10

1 additional photocopy

12/3/2009

0.20

2 photocopies

12/3/2009

0.10

1 additional photocopy

12/3/2009

0.10

1 additional photocopy

12/16/2009
12116/2009

0.10

1 photocopy

12/17/2009
12117/2009

0.10

1I photocopy

1212112009

0.10

1 photocopy

] 2/22/2009
12/22/2009

0.10

1 photocopy
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Date

Amount

Description

12/22/2009

0.10

1 additional photocopy

12/31/2009
12/3112009

0.10

1 photocopy

12/31/2009

0.20

2 additional photocopies

12/31/2009
12/3112009

0.20

2 additional photocopies

1/6/2010
116/2010

0.10

1 photocopy

1/7/2010
11712010

0.20

2 photocopies

1/7/2010
11712010

0.20

2 additional photocopies

4/27/2010

3.20

32 photocopies

4/27/2010

2.80

28 additional photocopies

9/30/2010
9/3012010

l.20
1.20

12 photocopies

9/30/2010

0.30

3 additional photocopies

9/30/2010

0.20

2 additional photocopies

9/30/2010

7.00

70 additional photocopies

9/30/2010

0.30

3 additional photocopies

10/5/2010
10/512010

0.30

3 photocopies

10/8/2010

0.10

1 photocopy

10/12/2010
10/12/20 I0

3.30

33 photocopies

10/12/2010
10112/2010

0.10

1I additional photocopy

10/29/20
I0
10/29/2010

1.70
l.70

17 photocopies

11/2/2010

2.00

20 photocopies

11/2/2010
1112/2010

1.80
l.80

18 photocopies

11/9/2010
1119/2010

3.60

36 photocopies

11/9/2010

5.70

57 photocopies

11/9/2010
1119/2010

3.10

31 photocopies

1119/2010
11/9/2010

1.10

II
11 photocopies

11/9/2010
11/912010

0.90

9 photocopies
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Date

Amount

Description

11118/2010

0.10

1 photocopy

11118/2010

7.80

78 photocopies

11/18/2010

3.90

39 photocopies

1112412010

2.l0
2.10

21 photocopies

1112912010

1.40
lAO

14 photocopies

1112912010

0.10

1 photocopy

11/29/2010

0.20

2 photocopies

11129/2010

0.60

6 photocopies

11/29/2010

0.20

2 photocopies

11/2912010
] 1/2912010

0.30

3 photocopies

1211120]0
121112010

2.20

22 photocopies

121112010

0.30

3 photocopies

12/1/2010
1211/2010

0.30

3 photocopies

12/2/2010

0.60

6 photopies

12/2/2010

0.10

1 photocopy

12/2/2010

0.50

5 photocopies

12/912010

0.20

2 photocopies

12113/2010

1.00

10 photocopies

1211612010

1.00

10 photocopies

12/17/2010
12117/2010

0.20

2 photocopies

12/22/2010

0.20

2 photocopies

12/2712010

0.20

2 photocopies

115/2011

2.70

27 photocopies

1/6/2011

0.10

1 photocopy

1/6/20]1
1/6/2011

0.30

3 photocopies
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Date

Amount

Description

116/2011
1/6/2011

0.30

3 photocopies

1/612011

0.20

2 photocopies

1/6/2011

0.30

3 photocopies

11612011
1/612011

0.40

4 photocopies

1/6/2011

0.30

3 photocopies

1/6/2011

0.20

2 photocopies

1/6/2011

0.10

1 photocopy

1/612011

0.10

1 photocopy

1/6/2011

0.10

1 photocopy

11612011
1/612011

0.30

3 photocopies

116/2011
1/6/2011

0.10

1 photocopy

116/2011
1/6/2011

0.10

1 photocopy

1110/2011
1/10/2011

0.30

3 photocopies

1110/2011

2.10

21 photocopies

1111/2011
1/11/2011

1.70

17 photocopies

111312011

2.90

29 photocopies

1117/2011
1/17/2011

0.20

Telephone call to LEWISTON, ID

1/17/2011

0.20

Telephone call to LEWISTON, ID

111812011

0.40

4 photocopies

1118/20J
1118/20111

2.00

Telephone call to LEWISTON, ID

1/20/20
II
1/20/2011

1.50

15 photocopies

1126/2011
1/26/2011

0.60

6 photocopies

278.61

TOTAL

002341
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THOMAS G. MAILE, IV.
Attorney at Law
380 West State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 939-1000
Idaho State Bar No. 2378

FEB 1 B 2011
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By STEPHANIE VIDAK
DEPLTY

Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STA
TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,

Case No. CV-OC-0723232

AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV. RE: OFFER OF'
JUDGMENT

v.
CONNIE WRIGHT TA
YLOR, flkla
TAYLOR,
f/kla
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss:
)

THOMAS G. MAILE, IV., being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

Your Affiant is the co-counsel of record for Counter-Defendants in the above captioned

AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS G. MAILE, IV. RE: OFFER OF JUDGMENT - Pg 1

002342

-,
matter. That the information and facts set forth herein are based upon your affiant's
personal knowledge and/or observations and can testify as to the truth of the matters
asserted herein if called upon as a witness at the trial of this matter.
2.

That attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of the Offer of Judgment
dated November 16, 2009 together with the fax transmittal confirmation sheet. The Offer
of Judgment was served as indicated on the 16th day of November, 2009.

3.

That attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy of the Motion to Dismiss
Counterclaim of Clark and Feeney Defendants which states that any and all claims of
Clark and Feeney are derivative of Counter-Claimants damages.

4.

That attached hereto as Exhibit "c" is a true and correct copy of the Stipulation to
Dismiss Counterclaim of Clark and Feeney Defendants.
DATED this ~ day of February, 2011.

~IV"

Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants

\ 0..
~

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, this

day of February, 2011.

1\1·rN1t> M~~~~~
MICHELE C. MATTSON
PubliC
Notary Public

State of Idaho

~

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at Boise, Idaho
My Commission Expires August 4,2016

_

AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS G. MAILE, IV. RE: OFFER OF JUDGMENT - Pg 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

122

I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this
day of February, 2011, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS G. MAILE, IV. RE: OFFER OF JUDGMENT
to be delivered, addressed as follows:
Connie W. Taylor & Paul Henderson
Henderson Law Finn
900 Washington St. Suite 1020
Vancouver, Washington 98660
Facsimile: (360) 693-2911

()
(X)
()
()

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

Mark Stephen Prusynski
PO Box 829
Boise, ID 83701
Phone: (208) 345-2000
Facsimile: (208) 385-5384

()
(X)
()
()

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

Christ T. Troupis
LA W OFFICE
TROUPIS LAW
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130
PO Box 2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Facsimile: (208) 938-5482

()

u. S. Mail

()
(X)
()

Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

THOMAS G. MAILE, IV.,
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants

AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS G. MAILE, IV. RE: OFFER OF JUDGMENT - P:g 3
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THOMAS G. MAILE, IV
Attorney at Law
380 West State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 939-1000
Idaho State Bar No. 2378
Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,

Case No. CV-OC-0723232

OFFER OF JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,

v.
flk/a
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/kla
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
Defendants/Counter-claimants.

TO:

THE DEFENDANTS/COUNTER-CLAIMANTS ABOVE NAMED, THEIR
ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, CONNIE TAYLOR and MARK PRUSYNSKI AND
THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT
Pursuant to Rule 68 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants

002346

herein, by and through their attorney of record, Thomas G. Maile, IV, hereby offer to allow
Judgment to be taken against them in the principal amount of FIFTY FIVE THOUSAND
DOLLARS ($55,000.00) for the claims relating to the counter-claims of Defendants/CounterClaimants, which sum includes payment for all claims against said Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
including any and all attorneys
attomeys fees and costs which could be ordered relating to the complaint in
the pending action pursued by Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants. Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants do
not waive their right to ultimately appeal the current dismissal of their complaint in the above
captioned matter.
This Offer of Judgment is made for the purpose specified in Rule 68 of the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure and is not to be construed as either an admission that Defendants/CounterClaimants herein have a lawful claim against Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants.
DATED this ffiay of November, 2009.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I&'

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of November, 2009, I served the
foregoing(1) OFFER OF JUDGMENT by having a true and complete copy personally delivered,
by facsimile and/or by depositing the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid thereon,
and addressed as follows:

002347

Mark Stephen Prusynski
PO Box 829
Boise, ID 83701
Phone: (208) 345-2000
Fax: (208) 385-5384

( ))
(
(X)
(( ))
(( ))

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Deli very
Overnight Delivery

Connie W. Taylor
CLARK and FEENEY
P.O. Drawer 785
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160

( )
(X)
(( ))
(( ))

()

u.
U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
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'~-"r-----------.-'
'~-'r-----------'-'
TRANS~·lISSIOH
TRANS~·lISSIOH

VERIF I CATIOt,j REPORT
TIME
NAME
FAX
TEL
SER.#

DATE,TIME
NO. /NAME
FAX NO./NAME
DURATION
PAGE(S)
RESULT
tvlODE
fvl0DE

11/15 09:37
3:355384
00:0[1:45
00:00:45
83
03
0[(

STANDARD
ECM

11/15/2009 09:37
THQro.·IAS r··1A
THm.·IAS
f··1A I LE

120:393':H881
120:393':HOOl
120:393~11 000
000H5J4:34204

-
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'''''-1
•'''''-1
TRANSMISSION VERIFICATION. REPORT

"-1
"-1
TIME
~lAr"1E
~lAr"'E

FAX
TEL

sm.#

DATE, TH1E
F14>< HD.!
F14><
HD. I t'-lAME
DURATIDtl
DURATIDtJ
PAGE(S)
RESULT
rvlDDE
rv1DDE

11/16!:::'(HJ'3 0'3: ]'3
11/16/:;:'(HJ'3
THDrvlAS r'~A I LE
1208'33':i1001
1208'33':il00l
1208'3]':1000
000H5J<184204

11/15 09: 38
12087459160
120874E.91E.0
00:00:50
03
DK
STAHDARD
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12/02/2010 15:55 FAX

2083855~84
2083855~84

-'
"\

I4J 002/004

MOFFATT THOMAS

1

PrusYllski, ISB No. 2349
Mill'k S. Prusyllski,
MOFFI\TT, TIlOMAS,
THOMAS, HA1~IU~TI',
HA1~IU~TI', I{()el(
I{()('l(
MOFF/\TT,

&

FIELDS,
FJELDS, Cl !.i\RTERED

J01 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
()flicG Box S2()
Post ()fficG

Boise, Idaho 8370 [
Tl.:lcphollC (20S) 345-2000
Tl:lcphonc
Facsirnile (208) 31)5-5384
31::5-5384
msp@)JlloJEtll.cOlll
17136.03()()
17136.0:W()

Attorneys rl)l' Ddt:ndants
Dd(:ndants Conlli(~ Wright Taylor'
Taylor Ib
Allorncys
Cunnie Taylor, Clark and Feeney, and Palll 'I'. Clark
Connie
JU])ICIAL DISTRICT
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TIlE FOURTH JUDICIAL
D[STRICT

TUE COUNT'( (JF ADA
OF THE STATE OF IDAlIO. IN AND r:o/\
]:0/\ Tl./E

IH::RKSJlIRE
Br~:RKSJlIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
luaho limited liability. ann TllOMAS
TJIOMAS G.
MAILE, IV, and C:OLLl?EN BIRCH·MAILE,
Il\lsbnnd
Il\lshnlld and wi fl\
Plain[iffs,

CaSG No. C'Y -()('-072323 2

MOTION TO DISMISS
COUNTERCLAIM OF CLARK AND
FEENEV DEFENDANTS

VS.

CONNIE WRICJIlT TAYLOR, fka C01\TNIE
'fA YLOR, an individual; DAI.I.AN
R. .I01-IN
JOf-IN 'fA YLOR,
TAYLOR,
TAYLOR. an individual:; R.
CLA[,K and FEENEY. n
an individual; CLAI,K
PAt)!, T. CLARK,;1I1 individual;
partnership; PAl)!.
TIIEODORE L.
L J()IINSON REVOCABLE
TRUST, all Idaho rlevocablc
r\Cyocablc trust;
trusl; JOHN
ALL
DOES I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALl.
Pf)SSESSION OR CLAIMING
PERSONS IN P()SSESSION
R1GHT TO POSSESSION,
ANY RIGHT
[kf"cndants.
[kf'cndants.

MOTION TO DiSMISS COLJN'fERCLAIM OF CLARK AND
JlEENEY DEFENDANTS - 1
lIEENEY

(;Ii"'ll:
lIlb:HklG. 1
eli"'ll: lIlb'Hk)(j.l
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MOFFi',TT THOMAS

Come now the defendants, Clark and Feeney, Connie
Conni(; Taylor.
Taylor, ami Paul
CI~lrk

'1'110111-1S

(the "Clark and Feeney Defendants") by and through their
tlH;ir coullSel,
counsel, Mark S. Prusynski.
Prusynski, and
alld

pursliantlo
ofvolul1tary dismissnl of"the
of"thc Clnrk Jnd
pursuanllo I.R.C,P,
I.R.C.P. 41(a)(2), and move for an order O]'vo]ulltary

Fcen<.:y Defendants' counterclaims in the above malLer,
maller, wilh
with and witllout fees or costs.
This l1lotion
Jo[' the reasons
motion is m:.u1c
matlc 011
on the groUl1Js
grounJs and Jor

Ul~lI
Ul~ll

FCL.JIlCY
the Clark Hnd Feeney

Defendants'
olher ddcndanls, nnd Ow on
only
dnmages
DefemIanls' claims arc derivati
del'ivati vc of 111(:
01(: dai
clai rns
tnS of lhe Olher
ly dn.mages

unique
unjque 1.0
10 the Clark and f\:cncy [kfclldanls
[kfclldanLs arc
nrc t/leir
their

rc~~s for
rC(~S

the claims of the
defending lhe

plaintin:
plainlin: which can Iw ;ldeCJl1ately
~ldequately addressed in a post-trial motion to the courl pursuant to
l.R.C,J), 54(d)( 1).
[kfcn(\;mls do not intend to l'(,~quest
briel,
l'<.~qucst oral argument or 10 file a briel.

DATED this 2nd day of])cccmber,
2010,
orrkccmbcr, 2010.

B/\ RRFTr, Ih)Ci:( ('\t.,
13/\
FII~LDS, ()IAR'I'FRr:o
FIFLDS,
CIIAR'I'FRr:J)

MOFFA'fT. TIIOMAS,

8y~1~~~-~OY~1~e~~
Allorm.:ys
Attorneys fiJr
f<Jf Dr..:kndallts Connie Wright
Taylor Ika Connie Taylor. Clark ,emu
"mu
Fecncy, WId
alld Paul 'I', Clark

COlJNTERCI ,AIM OF (:LAR.K AND
MOTION TO nlSI\HSS COUNTERCI

FEENEY IlEFENf);\NTS - 2

C/... ",11/1';:lO,)(11
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CERI'IFI(.'ATE OF SERVICE
CERrIFI(.'ATE
!I II EIU:B Y CER'ITFY thaI on [hi::;
2nd Jay of December, 2010, I CallHed
CatlHcd a true
thi:,; 21lt!
and ('orrecl
DJS1'1 ISS COONTERCLAIM
correcl copy of the foregoing MOTION TO DJSM
COUNTERCLAIM OF CLARK
AND FEENEY DEFENDANTS to be served by the melhod
l11elhod indicall:;d below, and addressed 10
1i1l;
the following:

Tholllas G. Maile IV
Thomas
LA \V OFFICES OF THOMAS G MAlLE
MAILE IV, P.A.
LAW

3S0 W. Stnh~ St.
r;'lgk. II) 83(l]h-4(}02
83(l!h-4(}02

( ) U.S,
U,S, Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
() Ovcmight Mail
(x) Facsimik;

Facsimile (20R) 939-1001
Chrjst
Christ

T. Troupis

LA W OrFIC'!::, PA
1',0,
P.O. Box 240S
240~
Eagk,ID 8361 (i
Facsimile (208) 938-5482
'rR()l!PIS
'rR(ll!pIS

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) U,S.
( ) rfand Delivcred
Delivered
( ) Ovcmight Mnil
(x) Facsimile

John C. Mitchell
& FEENEY
1229 Main S1.. Suite 201
P,O.
P.O. 130x 2S5
Lewiston, If) 83501-0285
Facsimile (208) 74()-i)160
74(i-i)160

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
l)divcrcd
( ) Hand [)divcl'cd
( ) ()vt~rnjght
()vt~rnjghl Mail
(x) Facsimile

C'onni\:
C'onnie W,
W. T'ayhl!
T'ayh.ll·

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Ibncl Dclivclwl
( ) Overnight M,lil
(xl Facsimile

('LARK

IIFNDERSON LA W

900 Washington, Suite 1020
Vancollv~r.
WA
Vancollv~r, W
A CJS(i(iO
CJSMiO
Fn~~simiJc
(;93-29111
Fn~~similc (3()O)
(J()O) 693-29!

MOTION T(l
Ttl DISMISS COUNTERCLAIM OF CLARK AND
IlICFENDANTS - 3
FEENEY I.lICFENDANTS
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15:~9
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THOM~,S
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~
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~1AILE
~1AILE

S. F'rusyn:;ki,
M:lrl<, S
F'rus'yl1:>ki. I::;H No, 2349
Mm"J'An. THOM.\I';, BARRJ:n"I.
BARRfn"l. R()<
i{()( 'I-: &
MOl"J,,,n.
CIIM,TCREn
FIEU)~" CIIM,TcREn

CHpil\.,l Blvd, rOlh FlpOi
)01 S. Cllpil\.,l
F/POI
I>o~l
i>o~l

Office B~)x

~29

1I1.Iho 837(H
o37(l[
1Ibho
'r\:1L.'1hN~~ (2WI) :\45·2000
'r\:1L.11hN~l:
FUC$;mile (208) 3S5·~:l~4
3S5·~:l~4
FUC$irnile
B\li~e.
Bl;li~e.

til sp(a,ln1() (f;.t\I,
rf:.tl J. r:l"111l
r:n!ll

J(i.()306
17 J30.0306

AltC1J.1]CY:::
Al!C1!.1lCY:::

(Qf

Dc!'Cn(!i1!llS Cmlllic Wri!)hl.
Wri!)hl, 'I'llylor
T)IVior 11\;)
Dcl'cndi1!llS
Ik;l
Fc~ilOy. :I.IU\
~md Fc~IlOY.

T:.aylQr, 1,,".Ii:lrl;
(.''\i:lr!;
Connie T:.aylQr.

IN THE

T. C)'lrk
CJ.lrk
Palll T,

OIS'I'l~ I(T COURT OF Tll P. FOUWI'/"I
f.)ISTI{lCl
OIS'I'J~
FOUWI'I"I ,1l.1DrCIAL
,1tID/CIA.L I,)ISTI{lCl

or

[,HF: STAT[
OF rHF:
sTAT[ or rDAHO. IN ANI) rOR TilE COONTY 01" AD,!\

13ERKSLlIll,f, INVESTMEN'rs.
13ERKSIlIll,f,
INVESTMENTS. LLC.
L1..C. ,In
'\I.l
1(l:Ihl1 limiteo li,lhlJity, mld THOMAS G.
1(I:lhn
MAILE. IV. ;md COLLEr.;N
umCH·MAI.U:"
COLLEJ::N ,UIRCH·MAI.Li:"
STWlJI.A1'JON
STWlJI.ATJON TO OISMISS
COllNTERCI,i\TM
COllNTERCLt\TM 01' CLARK ANI)

hllsbal\U !md
imd wi 1'(;.
hllsbanu

"I;:I\,NJ~V
"1;:l\.NJ~V

ORF'ltNDAN'I'S
ORF'ltNDANTS

.....

\ ". ,

CONNT(£ W RlCtTf
tka CON'NlE
RlCt!"]' '1'.0\ V LOR. Ika
T.I\ Y1..0tt
Y1.,0 It :.11'
individlltll; DAJ..LAN
T.i\
:.1 1' lndividlltll;
lIl"I
lIl"/ irlUl\lidllal:
inul\1idllal: R, JOHN TAYLOR,
mdividtlnJ: CL/Il1,K
CL/I11,K Bnt! H~J;NI':'Y.:,I
HldividunJ:
H~t;N(':'Y.!J
p'lr(tIl.ll':;h;~I;
T, CLARK
Oi jrtdi~'idll:\l:
p'lr(ntll':;h;~l; 1'001!L T.
CLARK.••,\Ii
jrtdi~'idll:\l:

T/\ Y.l.OR.
Illl
1111

THI~OI)()RS
Tl'II~OI)()RS L JO,HNSON
JO.HNSON REVOCJ\I.1L.lS
REVOC.I\BL..lS
TI~UST, 110 ldllh'II'I~v(H:ablt:
ldllh,II'I~v(H:ablt: llUSl;
hu::a; JOHN
"'1~UST,

nOES 1·.IOr'IN
I·JOHN DOES X; AND AU.
PERSONS IN I'(")S~ESSION
I'(")S~ESSION OrtC'LAIMING
ORC'LAIMING

AN"{
AN".!:" rUCHT TO rOSSESS10N.

-----,,-_

Dt~fmdllnt:;,
Dt~fmdIlCl\:;,

"'-----

......•

~llPtJLt\TWN
~lIPtJLt\TWN TO Ol$MISS COUi\:TlmCl.AJM Of'CL/\RK
Of'CI,i\RK

ANn

{)f.rl~~NnANTS. I
JiF.F.NEY l>f.FENIlANTS.
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MOFFA TT THOM,o,S

)
!?ARg?(JlI1AI
1?ARg?cJlI1AI
~.
~
~

~111(.1
Birch.Made:. by ~111(J

.;:.
'.;,: .;:,

..' ::.'
:.:.' v'
..'

.

THOMAS MAILE

,\.1 ,

(hrOllgh
cIHIMd Chrisl
IhrOllgh rheir
their CIHtMd

-'

@ 003/005

·r.
Trnupis. 4\11<1
4111<1 (3r.:rkshj)'r~
'r, Trnuflis.
(3I.:rkshj,.r~ IJly\;t.lrn :!nls,
;:nls, LU,::.
t

LA'N (WFlCES or
I.A'N
THOMAS (i MM.;
MM,;,).::
..!.:: IV, ?t\.
?A.

BJSi11/J~tCL~._"'''''''.
Thnmll~ G. Ma~"V':"prn ,Se amI

Altom!;;), rClt Ph'inrjfi~~, Berk~:llir", InvL:stmc·Il!.~

ilnd en) ken Birch-!'''1,lite
.{....

DATED Uli; }()~_" d;,y ()fNov(;mbcr. Jmn.

STH'Ul.AHON TO Im:;Ml~S
n;":NIW DEFENlMNTS • '2

C:OUNTf~n.CI,ArM
C:OUrfff~n.CI,ArM

Of CLARK ANI)
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F't,Cit

[).'I/(I~)

..;h
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DA
TEl) chis
DATEl)
chit;

i2...2Q J0,
iJ...- d~lY of Novc:mber,
Nowmber, 20

DATED
'DATED titlr. _

tilly
tillY of November.

2010.

M(')FI:AIT, TI"OMAS,
M(,)FI:AIT,
TI'IOMAS. t>1\n.l'tETT,
6A1'I.l'tETT, !\OCYRocY- &
FrtiW3, CHARTER.IW
Frtil.03,

l)y..~__
~__
--',_OY..
..... _ _ _--',_
th(! Firm
Mark S. Pnl:{ynski .'" Of th~
De(cndl)nt5 Connie
Connic Wrigh l.
Atlomcys fol' De(cndl)1'!t5
TJylot'tka
T(IY,OI, Clark and
T:lylor
tka Cormie T(lylOl,
FC~I1CY. and l)oul T. ClllTk
Clork
FC~I1CY.

$TU'ULATION TO IHSM{SS COUNTERCLAIM OF CLARK ANI)
•3

F'~ENEY
F'~ENEY Dli:n;:NDAN'l'S
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THOWIS W\ HE
lI.E

DATED thi.;. __..__._ <!:.lY uI'No\'cmhel', 10l().

B
Ii Y.•_..
'Y .._..
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...~_·
•, ,··_••
_•• ,,"o·"'...·
""o·"'''.·.··~_·

.
._
.
.•.- -_
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CI)'I1nil: Wright'!';lY)!)/'
Wright'I';lykn'
CI)'I1nit:
Allt'l/'IlI::YS fcw
few .1ohl1
.1o]m 'I':Jylrll',
'I':Jytrll', l)alli:Hl
l)al!;:Hl Iii
Taylol'
Allt'lI'Il~YS
yinI'
lh~~ 'I'lll.;o(lon::
TllcodOn:: J<il\l1S(l1l
J(;ilI1S(l1l Trust
Trust
and lht~

f.)/\TED
D/\TED

thi~; , 1t';::'~!ilIr
It';::'~lillr
(11" NO"'l~mbcr,
NO"'l~mbcr, 20 r 0
....
.. (1f'
.. _'.'\,

-..

TIr()M,\S. BII
1~1~1:'rr. l{o<,:K
!{()(:K
MOF'IWrT. TJrOM/\S.
B!\ 1~1~1:'rr.

&

CII/\lrn~I{I·m
PIL'U):), CII/\lrn~!Hm

/.-;,?
,/-;.'
1 ~L·1 ~~'~h5~/~
By.~·1
B'!.~~L~~.:::L
__.. .-<£:2~'7./.A' '.,. __..-_
'/

. 1l1"''/'

,__..__
'
"
.
:
rirm

,t" l'ruSyll:iki
l'ruSYII:iki " Of'tllt'
M~lrk .t"
D~lcn("'I'h C~lnl1ic
C~lnJ1ic Wrig.ht
Wright
A.llorn.;;.ys fill' D~lcn("'I'h
fka CU!lnic
Cunnic T:'lylm",
'l':.'ylf'f\", O:lrk
CI:lrk and
'raylol' fk,a
FCI.:t\.;:y.
FCl.:t\.;:y,

_

.... ,.... _.. ""-.-..._-

Oar!,
:md Palll "1',. Clar!,

STIf'ULt\TfON
CI,AfU< ANI)
STlf'ULt\TfON TO D1~MISS
D1~MISS COtJN'J'ERCI.ATM
COtJN'I'ERCI.ATM OF (LAfU'
r.'KF.NI·;VDTr,FEt'lJ)ANTS
r.KF.:NI·;YDTr,FE~J)ANTS -~ ~~
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THOMAS G. MAILE, N.
Attorney at Law
380 West State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 939-1000
Idaho State Bar No. 2378

1 8 2011
FEB 18
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, CieiK
By STEPf-IANiE VIDAK
DEPUTY

Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, N. and COLLEEN BIRCH
BIRCHMAILE, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,

Case No. CV-OC 07-23232

PLAINTIFFS/COUNTERPLAINTIFFS/COUNTER
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM
OF COSTS

v.
f/k/a
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, flk/a
CONNIE l'AYLOR,
T AYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
l'AYLOR,
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss.
)

THOMAS G. MAILE, N., being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

That I am co-counsel for the above-referenced Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants and

PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF COSTS - Pgl

002360

make this Affidavit pursuant to Rules 54 & 68, of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. To the
best of my knowledge the items stated herein are correct and the costs claimed are in compliance
with Rule 54 (d).
2.

The costs incurred by the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, relative to the claims

filed by the counter-claimants in this action are itemized in Exhibit "A" attached hereto and by
reference incorporated herein. Relative to the costs which were incurred the same are Sl~t forth in
Exhibit "A" a total cost bill of $2,174.01 for costs, of which $164.00 are mandatory costs which
have already been paid or which are due and owing to the providers for their fees, (mandatory
costs are marked with "M" to denote mandatory costs pursuant to LR.C.P.
I.R.C.P. Rule 54). The costs
are reasonable and were necessary to the defense of this matter and the discretionary costs
should be awarded to the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants as the same were necessary for the
proper preparation for the various motions and/or the ultimate trial.
3.

Relative to the discretionary costs, your affiant states that the various costs were

undertaken for the benefit of the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants in the defense of the claims
advanced by the counter-claimants. Mr. Chaffin was retained during the period of time the
counter-claimants were making a claim for money damages in excess of a $1,000,000.00, and he

was retained to dispute the claims regarding the alleged loss of value associated with thl~ real
property. Had not those claims been advanced by the counter-claimants his fees would not have
been incurred which amount to $600.00. The copy charges, binder charges for exhibits were
necessarily incurred given the scope of the claims of the counter-claimants and the same are
reasonable.
The Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants' claim for cost is made pursuant to LR.C.P.
I.R.C.P. Rules 54
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES - Pg 2

002361

& 68. In addition the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants incorporate by reference their

Memorandum in Support of Counter-defendants' Motion for Costs and Opposition to Counterclaimants' Motion for Costs and Attorneys Fees (Rule 68) as if set forth in full herein.
WHEREFORE, your affiant requests this Court to award the Plaintiffs/CounterDefendants their costs as set forth in this Memorandum and the accompanying Memorandum of
Christ Troupis regarding additional costs filed herein.
DATED this \~ day of February, 2011.

~~-------Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants

STATE OF IDAHO

)
) ss.

County of Ada)
10..

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, this
JJL day of February, 2011.

MrCHElE C. MATTSO:)
MATTSO:]
MICHelE
Notary Public

State of Idaho

~ ~C\tIDOO,--__

Notary Public for

Residing at Boise, Idaho
My Commission Expires: August 4,2016

PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-UEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES - Pg 3

002362

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

lf6

day of February, 2011, I caused a true and correct
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this
copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF
COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES to be delivered, addressed as follows:

Connie W. Taylor & Paul Henderson
Henderson Law Finn
900 Washington St.
S1. Suite 1020
Vancouver, Washington 98660
Facsimile: (360) 693-2911

( )
()
(X)

Mark Stephen Prusynski
PO Box 829
Boise, ID 83701
Phone: (208) 345-2000
Facsimile: (208) 385-5384

( )
()
(X)

Christ T. Troupis
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130
PO Box 2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Facsimile: (208) 938-5482

( ))
(
(( ))

(( ))
(( ))

( )
()
(X)
(())
(())

U. S. Mail
u.

Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

u.
U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
U. S. Mail
u.

Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

.,
Co-Counsel for P1aintiffs/CounterDefendants

PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-J)EFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES - Pg 4
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Law Offices of Thomas G. Maile
Slip Listing

Page

Selection Criteria
Slip.Date
11/16/2009 - 3.123/2012
3/23/2012
Open
Slip.
Classification
Slip.Classification
Include: Berkshire Inv/C&F
Acco.Selection
Slip.
Transaction Ty 2-2
Slip.Transaction
Rate Info - identifies rate source and level
Slip ID
10
Dates and Time
Posting Status
--=D::.Description
.;:e;. =s""cr:.;.Jip=-:t:. =;io.:. .;.n_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
27887
EXP

12/24/2009
WIP
Maurice Chaffin real estate market analysis

28952
11/1/2010

EXP

WIP
Sheriffs fee for service of process on
depositions

28953
11/1/2010

EXP

WIP
Witness fee for Reed Taylor

28954
11/1/2010

EXP

WIP
Witness fee for Tamara Crane

29201
12/31/2010

EXP

WIP
Postage for mailing Pleadings associated
with motions in limine.

29208
1/10/2011

EXP

WIP
Certified copy from Secretary of
State-Tamara Crane record.

29209
1/10/2011

EXP

WIP
Postage for mailing jury instructions and
pre-trial matter.

User
Activity
Account
Reference
Mickey
$expert service
Berkshire Inv/C&F

Rate
Slip Value
Units
DNB Time
Rate Info
Est. Time
Bill Status
Variance _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___

1

300.00

300.00

Mickey
$Sheriffs fee
Berkshire Inv/C&F

120.00

120.00/T)

Mickey
$witness fee
Berkshire Inv/C&F

22.00

22.00/(\
22.00fY\

Mickey
$witness fee
Berkshire Inv/C&F

22.00

22.00m

Mickey
$postage
Berkshire Inv/C&F

10.95

10.95

Mickey
$exhibit fee
Berkshire Inv/C&F

10.00

10.00

Mickey
$postage
Berkshire Inv/C&F

11.10

11.10

002364
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Law Offices of Thomas G. Maile
Slip Listing

Page

Slip 10
Dates and Time
Posting Status
Description
Descri~tion
EXP
29245
1/12/2011
WIP
Binders, index sheets and labels for exhibit
binders.

User
Activity
Account
Reference
Mickey
$exhibit fee
Berkshire Inv/C&F

Units
ONB Time
Est. Time
Variance
1

Rate
Rate Info
Bill Status

Slip Value

217.96

217.96

29275
EXP
1/31/2011
WIP
Copy charges related to trial preparation,
exhibits, jury instructions, pleadings
01/31112011).
(12/1/2010 thru 01/31/12011).

Mickey
$copies
Berkshire Inv/C&F

5800

0.20

1160.00

300.00

300.00

29306
Mickey
EXP
$expert service
2/3/2011
Berkshire Inv/C&F
WIP
Maurice Chaffin real estate market analysis
and preparation for trial testimony
Grand Total
Billable
Unbillable
Total

I~

__""--'''-'

.._ -....- _. . .- ,

"'_~"'I"I!"".I~"

0.00
0.00
0.00

2174.01
0.00
2174.01
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THOMAS G. MAILE, IV.
Attorney at Law
380 West State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 939-1000
Idaho State Bar No. 2378
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By STEPHANIE VIDAK
DEPUTY

Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,
v.

Case No. CV-OC-0723232

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR COSTS AN])
OPPOSITION TO COUNTER
COUNTERCLAIMANTS' MOTION FOR
COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES

CONNIE WRIGHT TA
YLOR, flk/a
TAYLOR,
f/k/a
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
~JOHN DOES X; AND
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
The counter-defendants by and through their undersigned co-counsel of record, and
provides this Memorandum Brief in support of their Motion for Costs and in opposition to

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR COSTS
AND OPPOSITION TO COUNTER-CLAIMANTS' MOTION FOR COSTS ANn
ATTORNEYS FEES- Pg 1
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counter-claimants' motion for costs and attorneys fees:

LEGAL ARGUMENT
1

The Counter-defendants Properly Served an Offer of Judgment Which thE: Counter
Counterclaimants Failed to Meet.
The counter-defendants' offer of
judgment is annexed to the Affidavit of Thomas G.
ofjudgment

Maile IV., re: Offer of Judgment, filed concurrently herewith. The affects of the service of an
judgment are set forth in Rule 68 of the I.R.C.P., which provides:
offer of
ofjudgment
Rule 68. Offer of Judgment
(a) At any time more than 14 days before the trial begins, a party defending
against a claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to be
taken against the defending party for the money or property or to the effect
judgment shall be deemed to include all
specified in the offer, which offer of
ofjudgment
claims recoverable, including any attorneys fees awardable under Rule 54(e)(1),
and any costs awardable under Rule 54(d)(1), which have accrued up to the date
of the offer of judgment. The offer of
judgment shall not be filed with the court,
ofjudgment
except as stated herein. Ifwithin 14 days after the service of the offer the offeree
serves written notice that the offer is accepted, either party may then file the offi~r
and notice of acceptance together with proof of service thereof, and thereupon the
judgment shall be entered for the amount ofthe offer without costs.
If the adjusted award obtained by the offeree is less than the offer, then:
(i) the offeree must pay those costs of the offeror as allowed under Rule 54(d)(
54(d)( 1),
incurred after the making of the offer;

(ii) the offeror must pay those costs of the offeree, as allowed under Rule 54(d)(1),
incurred before the making of the offer; and
(iii) the offeror shall not be liable for costs and attorney fees awardable under
54(d)(1)
54(e)(1)
Rules 54(
d)(1) and 54(
e)(1) of the offeree incurred after the making of the offer.
If the adjusted award obtained by the offeree is more than the offer, the offeror
must pay those costs, as allowed under Rule 54(d)(1), incurred by the offeree both

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR COSTS
AND OPPOSITION TO COUNTER-CLAIMANTS' MOTION FOR COSTS ANn
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before and after th~: making of the offer.
After a comparison of the offer and the adjusted award, in appropriate cases, th~:
district court shall order an amount which either the offeror or the offeree must
ultimately pay separate and apart from the amount owed under the verdict. A total
judgment shall be entered taking into account both the verdict and the involved
costs.
A defendant who has made an offer of
judgment should not lose the benefits of Rule 68
ofjudgment
merely because the defendant has completely prevailed. A defendant should at least receive the
)(i) provision making an award of allowable post-offer costs incurred by
benefit of the Rule 68(b
68(b)(i)
the defendant mandatory rather than discretionary as would otherwise be the case under 1.R.c.P.
I.R.c.P.
54(d)(1).
54(d)(l). A defendant could be penalized for being "too successful" by losing the mandatory
entitlement ofI.R.C.P. 68(b)(i). Stewart v. McKamin, 141 Idaho 930, 120 P.3d 748 (Idaho App.
2005).
ofjudgment
judgment was served on the counter-claimants on
In the present matter the offer of
November 16, 2009. The amount of $55,000.00 was offered to all of the counter-claimants. The
counter-claimant Clark & Feeney has admitted that its claims are derivative of the claims
advanced by the Taylor Brothers. Clark & Feeney entered into a contingent fee agreement with
1/3 of the property or money obtained. The admission by Clark &
the Taylor Brothers to recover 113
Feeney in its motion to dismiss dated December 2, 2010 that its claims are derivative is a judicial
admission. To be a judicial admission a statement must be a deliberate, clear, and unequivocal
statement of a party about a concrete fact within that party's knowledge. Strouse, 129 Idaho at
619, 930 P.2d at 1364 (et. App. 1997). A judicial admission is a statement made by a party or

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR COSTS
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of judicial proceedings, for the purpose, or with the effect, of dispensing
attorney, in the course ofjudicial
with the need for proofby the opposing party of some fact. Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v.
Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 761, 765, 86 P.3d 475, 479 (2004).
The offer ofjudgment
of judgment was a combined offer ofjudgment
of judgment to all counter-claimants. The
case of Wiese v. Dedhia, 354 N.J. Super. 256, 806 A.2d 826 (N.J. Super. A.D. 2002) provides:
Although there is no known requirement that plaintiffs settle their claims
individually, a defendant may still gain the benefits of the offer-of-judgment rul(~
by responding to the joint offer of plaintiffs. Contrary to the trial court's intimation
in this case, a defendant does not lose the right to settle part of the case and
therefore limit its exposure when a joint offer is presented. Rather, a defendant
may make an offer to each claimant individually to allow judgment to be taken
against it, irrespective of a claimant's offer. R. 4:58-1, -3. In any event, there
appears to be no greater difficulty in evaluating a joint offer representing the total
value of plaintiffs' claims where one is largely derivative of the other than when
separately presented.
We discern no prejudice to defendant by the rule's application to the joint
offer tendered by plaintiffs in this case. Consistent with its policy and purpose, we
conclude that R. 4:58-1 authorizes spousal plaintiffs with interrelated claims and
of judgment for
no real or apparent conflict of interest to submit a joint offer ofjudgment
resolution of the entire case.
of judgment. Clark & Feeney's
The principle has equal application to the present offer ofjudgment.
claims on their counter-claim were derivative of the Taylor Brothers' claims. In a similar fact
pattern the case of Short v. Petty, 213 Ariz. 103, 139 P .3d 621 (Ariz. App. Div. 1 2006) dealt
of judgment to multiple parties. The Short, case held:
with a joint offer ofjudgment
the policy of this State is to avoid, rather than promote, litigation. A blanket
prohibition against joint offers puts a burden on the offeror--whether plaintiff or
defendant--that cuts against this policy. When given a choice, we should construe
the rules, whether common law or statutory, consistent with this policy.
of judgment which the counter-claimants
The counter-defendants properly served an offer ofjudgment
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failed to accept and the jury award failed to meet the dollar amount of the offer ofjudgment.
of judgment.
Pursuant to Rule 68 the counter-defendants are entitled to their costs as prevailing parties
consistent with Rule 68 for costs since November, 16,2009.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above cited the counter-defendants are entitled to their costs as of
November 16, 2009 to the present. The counter-claimants are only allowed their costs prior to
November 16,2009 relating to their claims set forth in their counter-claims.
ORAL ARGUMENT is requested upon the motion.
DATED this \

0 day of February, 2011.

~JziIV"
~&fIV"

Plaintiffs/CounterCo-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter
Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this \~ day of February, 2011, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR COSTS AND OPPOSITION TO COUNTER-CLAIMANTS' MOTION FOR
COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES, to be delivered, addressed as follows:
Connie W. Taylor & Paul Henderson
Henderson Law Firm
900 Washington St. Suite 1020
Vancouver, Washington 98660
Facsimile: (360) 693-2911

()
()
(X)
()
()
()
()

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

Mark Stephen Prusynski
PO Box 829
Boise, ID 83701
Phone: (208) 345-2000
Facsimile: (208) 385-5384

()

u. S. Mail

(X)
()
()
()
()

Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

Christ T. Troupis
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130
PO Box 2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Facsimile: (208) 938-5482

()
()

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

(X)
()
()
()

~N.,

Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter
Plaintiffs/CounterDefendants
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130
PO Box 2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone:
208/938-5584
Facsimile:
208/938-5482
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com

,;:
c: ,::

Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
, MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH
BIRCHMAILE, husband and wife,
I
I,

Case No. CV-OC-0723232

OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR
COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES

Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,
v.
, CONNIE WRIGHT l'
AYLOR, f/k/a
TAYLOR,
flkla
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
'ITAYLOR,
! l'
T AYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
, FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
-JOI-IN DOES X; AND
trust; JOHN DOES I -J01-IN
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
!

'I

Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
COMES NOW, the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, by and through their attorney of
record, Thomas G. Maile, IV., and enters an objection to the application for attorney fees and
costs and moves this Honorable Court pursuant to l.R.C.P.
I.R.C.P. Rule 54(d)(6), for an entry of it's

002372
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Order denying the costs and attorney's fees as set forth in the Memorandum of Attomeys Fees
and Costs submitted by the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, Clark & Feeney, Connie Taylor and
Paul T. Clark, upon the grounds and for the reasons that there exists no basis in law or in fact for
such an award, the amounts claimed are unreasonable and not allowed by rules of this Court.
The appropriate standard for a court to detennine an award of attorneys fees is set forth in
I.R.C.P. Rule 54(e)(3) which states:
That, in the event the court grants attorney fees in a civil action, it must consid,er
consid'er
the following factors in detennining the amount of such fees:
(A) The time and labor required.
(B) The novelty and difficulty of the questions.
(8)
(C) The skill requisite to perfonn the legal service properly and the experience
and ability of the attorney in the particular field of law.
(D) The prevailing charges for like work.
(E) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
(F) The time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of the
case.
(G) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(H) The undesirability of the case.
(I) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
(1) Awards in similar cases.
(K) The reasonable cost of automated legal research.
The recent case of Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Id. 761,
fc;::e award
765,86 P.3d 475,482 (2004), has explained, that the "reasonableness" of an attorney fc;:e
LR.C.P. 54(e)(3) citing, Irwin Rogers
is based on the trial court's consideration of the factors in I.R.C.P.
Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Murphy, 122 Id. 270, 277,833 P.2d 128, 135 (Ct. App. 1992). The factors of
54(e)(3) include: time and labor; difficulty; skill required; prevailing charges; fixed or
Rule 54(e)(3)
contingent fee; time limitations; amount and result; undesirability of the case; relationship with
the client; awards in similar cases; costs of automated research; and any other factors. The
Defendants/counter-claimants' attorneys fees were unreasonably incurred.
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That additional reasons for said objections are set forth in the Plaintiffs/CounterDefendants' Memorandum Brief in Opposition to Motion for Costs and Attorneys Fees and the
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants Memorandum in Support of Counter-Defendants' Motion for
Costs and Opposition to Counter-claimants' Motion for Costs and Attorneys Fees filed herein
and made a part hereof as if set forth in full herein.
Hearing upon this objection is requested. Oral argument is requested.

,.J
_ day of February, 2011.
DATED thisJ-5 _day

~~0

TRO-&frr, Co-counsel for
CHRIST T. TRO-twrr
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
Plaintiffs/
Counter-Defendants
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CERTIFICA TE OF SERVICE
CERTIFICATE
T
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this ~ day of February, 2011, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing (1) OBJECTION TO COUNTER-CLAIMANT'S MEMORANDUM OF
COUNTERCOSTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES and (2) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR COSTS AND OPPOSITION TO COUNTER-CLAIMANTS'
MOTION FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES to be delivered, addressed as follows:
Connie W. Taylor & Paul Henderson
Henderson Law Firm
900 Washington St. Suite 1020
Vancouver, Washington 98660
Facsimile: (360) 693-2911

()
( )
(X)
( ))
(
(( ))

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

Mark Stephen Prusynski
PO Box 829
Boise, ID 83701
Phone: (208) 345-2000
Facsimile: (208) 385-5384

( )
()

U.
u. S. Mail

(X)
( ))
(
( ))
(

Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

Thomas G. Maile, IV.
380 W. State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001

(
( ))
(X)
(
( ))
(
( ))

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter
Plaintiffs/CounterDefendants
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130
PO Box 2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: 208/938-5584
Facsimile:
208/938-5482
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com

C.l

Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF' THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
------------------

~
I

BERKSIDRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCHBIRCH
MAILE, husband and wife,

CV-OC-0723232
Case No. CV-OC-0723232
AFFIDAVIT OF CHRIST TROUPIS '
RE: MEMORANDUM OF COSTS

Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,

v.
flkJa
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/kJa
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual;
DALLAN TAYLOR, an individual; R.
JOHN TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK
and FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T.
CLARK. an individual; THEODORE L.
JOHNSON REVOCABLE TRUST, an
Idaho revocable trust; JOHN DOES I -
JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSONS IN
POSSESSION OR CLAIMING ANY
I RIGHT TO POSSESSION.
I

Defendants/Counter-Claimants.

------------_
1
'-------1
----------------- - - - - -

State of Idaho
County of Ada

)
) ss.
)

Christ Troupis, being first duly sworn, deposes and states:

002376

-'
1. I am the attorney for the PlaintiffsiCounterdefendants in this action. Each of the
matters set forth herein are known to me of my own personal knowledge and if
sworn as a witness in this matter, I could testify competently thereto. This Affidavit
is submitted in support ofPlaintiffs/Counterdefendants' Motion for Costs.
2. On November 16,2009, Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants served an offer of
judgment on all Defendants/Counterclaimants in the amount of$55,000. The
jury verdict in this case was $28,437.36. Because this verdict was substantially
judgment, the Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants are the
less than the offer of
ofjudgment,
prevailing parties on the Counterclaimants' claims.
3. The Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants incurred and paid costs for John Runft's expert
witness testimony in the sum of$13,789.33 as shown on the attached invoices.
4. Expert witness fees are allowed as a mandatory allowable cost in the amount of
$2,000. The additional amount should be allowed in this case as a discretionary
cost because Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants were required to incur substantial
Counterclaimants'
additional cost for expert testimony as a direct result of the Counterc1aimants'
complex, general, unspecified and overly broad claims. A significant amount of
work was done by John Runft in preparation to testify on ethical issues that
related to claims made against Thomas Maile as an attorney, that were
subsequently dropped by the Counterclaimants. These discretionary costs were
necessary because Counterdefendants did not know until trial the specific claims
that Counterclaimants intended to pursue.
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002377

'-'
Dated: February 23,2011

Christ T. Troupis
State of Idaho

)
) ss.

County of Ada)
Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public in and for the State of Idaho
and County of Ada on this day of February, 2011.

tJjLJ{,;{j \/ LOcdJ/\'fV'L10
LOcdJ/\'fV'L10'
_tJjLJ{)j

Notary Public t
My commission expires:

101Z0\ Le
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 24th
24 th day of February, 2011, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Christ Troupis re: Memorandum of Costs to be delivered,
addressed as follows:

:-r--
Connie W. Taylor
i Henderson Law Firm
900 Washington St.
S1. Suite 1020
i Vancouver, Washington 98660
Facsimile: (360) 693-2911

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

'I

I

Mark Stephen Prusynski
PO Box 829
POBox
Boise, ID 83701
Phone: (208) 345-2000
Facsimile: (208) 385-5384

(
( ))
~
(
( ))
I

(
)
(
)

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

!

" Thomas G. Maile, IV.
i ()
U. S. Mail
I ()
i 380 W. State Street
Facsimile Transmission
I Eagle, Idaho 83616
I~
Hand Delivery
;~acsimile:
,~acsimile: (208) 939-1 00_1____ ~_~I_u_~vernight
~_~I_u_~vernight Delivery _ _ _ ~

~~~--/

TR~,

CHRISTT. TRPIS,
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
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Runft & Steele Law Offices
1020 W. Main Street
Suite 400
Boise, ID 83702
Ph:

208-333-8506
Fax:
208-343-3246
www.runftsteele.com

Christ Troupis
PO Box 2408
Eagle, Idaho
83616

July 30,2010
30, 2010

File #:
Inv #:

Attention:

RE:

00410-0002
6264

Expert Witness - Maile Matters

DATE

DESCRIPTION

Jun-04-10

HOURS

AMOUNT

LAWYER

Telephone call from Christ Troupis message
re: possible expert witness testimony re: Rule
11 issues on behalf of Tom Maile (no charge).

0.10

0.00

JLR

Jun-06-10
Jun-06-lO

E-mail to Christ Troupis re: possible expert
testimony re: Rule 11 (no charge).

0.10

0.00

JLR

Jun-07-10

E-mail from Christ Troupis re: meeting re:
expert testimony (no charge).

0.10

0.00

JLR

Jun-08-l0
Jun-08-10

E-mail to Christ Troupis (no charge).

0.10

0.00

JLR

Jun-09-10

E-mail from Christ Troupis (no charge).

0.10

0.00

JLR

Jun-12-l0
Juu-12-l0

E-mail exch,mge with Christ Troupis with
plans for proceeding with expert testimony,
documents, etc. (no charge)

0.20

0.00

JLR

Jul-Ol-l0
Jul-01-10

Telephone call from Christ Troupis re:
meeting and documents requested (no charge).

0.10

0.00

JLR

Jul-02-l0
Jul-02-10

Meeting with Christ Troupis re: case and
issues, nature of testimony needed, review of
docurrients,
documents, files furnished.

1.50

487.50

JLR

Jul-06-10
Jul-06-lO

Review of notes, reviewofTaylor
review of Taylor v. Maile
files, tlrst case, Supreme Court Decision,
assignments by trustees, second case,
consolidated Supreme Court decisions on

3.50

1,137.50

JLR

002380

Invoice #:

Page 2

6264

July 30, 2010

".....

remand, related facts, review of cases cited,
and review of Rule 11 issues arising from case.
Jul-08-10
JuI-08-IO

Review of notes, review of Berkshire v. Taylor
file and related facts, cases cited, relate to
Taylor cases.

2.80

910.00

JLR

Jul-l
Jul-I 0-1 0

Further review of case files and cases cited as
relate to Rule 11(a)(1);
11(a)(l); research Rule 11 cases
re: standards, possible distinction between
standards for threshold motions as
distinguished from standards on merits of case
brought, including Code of Conduct cases.

5.00

1,625.00

JLR

Jul-20-10
Jul-20-IO

Further research re: Rule 11 standards.

1.20

390.00

JLR

Jul-24-10
JuI-24-IO

Research re: standards for expert testimony,
preparation, proof of expertise by a lawyer on
special area of the law.

2.00

650.00

JLR

Jul-28-10
Jul-28-IO

Review of file and notes preparatory to
meeting; meeting with Christ Troupis re: case
and re: initial strategy.

1.30

422.50

JLR

18.10

$5,622.50

Totals

Total Fee & Disbursements
Trust Transferred at Billing
Interest Accrued

Balance Now Due

$5,622.50
5,000.00
$0.00

$622.50

PAYMENT DETAILS
Jul-30-IO
Jul-30-10

Payment for invoice: 6264

$5,000.00

Total Payments

$5,000.00

002381

Invoice #:

6264
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July 30, 2010

TRUST STATEMENT
Disbursements

Jul-29-10

PA
Received From: Troupis Law Office PA
Retainer

Jul-30-10

Paid To: Runft & Steele Law Offices

Receipts
5,000.00

5,000.00

Payment for invoice: 6264
Total Trust

Trust Balance

$5,000.00

$5,000.00

$0.00

002382

Runft & Steele Law Offices
1020 W. Main Street
Suite 400
Boise, ID 83702
Ph:

208-333-8506

Fax:

208-343-3246

www.runftsteele.com
Christ Troupis

September 16,2010

PO Box 2408
Eagle, Idaho
83616

Attention:

RE:

File #:

00410-0002

Inv #:

6317

Expert Witness - Maile Matters

DATE

DESCRIPTION

Jul-26-10

HOURS

AMOUNT

LAWYER

Telephone call with Christ Troupis re:
progress with analysis of issues and Rule 11
ramifications - ready for meeting before going
further.

0.30

97.50

JLR

Jul-29-10

Prepare for mtg; meeting with Christ Troupis
review facts of case, issues, theory of defense,
Discussed strategy of separating rhe threshold
issues from the merits under rule 11, in order
to give appropriatre weight to each element
and avoid a creshendoing effect of allegations.

1.50

487.50

JLR

Aug-24-10

E-mail to Troupis re: status of legal
preparation and follow through on strategy.

0.20

65.00

JLR

Totals

2.00

$650.00

Total Fee & Disbursements

$650.00

Previous Balance

622.50

Interest Accrued

$3.68

$6,276.18

Balance Now Due
The minimum retainer balance for the matter is

$5,000.00

002383

Invoice #:

6317
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PLEASE RE:t'ft1T IN TRUST

Septem ber 16, 2010
September

....., $5,000.00

to maintain your minimum trust retainer balance

002384

Offices-........ Runft & Steele Law Offices-
1020 W. Main Street
Suite 400
Boise, ID 83702
Ph:

208-333-8506

Fax:

208-343-3246

www.runftsteele.com
Christ Troupis

October 11,2010

PO Box 2408
Eagle, Idaho
83616

Attention:

RE:

File #:

00410-0002

Inv #:

6350

Expert Witness - Maile Matters

DATE

DESCRIPTION

HOURS

AMOUNT

LAWYER

Sep-17-10

Telephone call with Christ Troupis re: status
of matter and plans going forward.

0.20

60.00

JLR

Totals

0.20

$60.00

Total Fee & Disbursements
Previous Balance

$60.00
1,272.50

Interest Accrued

Balance Now Due
The minimum retainer balance for the matter is
PLEASE REMIT IN TRUST
to maintain your minimum trust retainer balance

$8.83

$6,341.33
$5,000.00

$5,000.00

002385

..........

Runft & Steele Law Offices
1020 W. Main Street
Suite 400
Boise, ID 83702
Ph:

208-333-8506

Fax:
208-343-3246
www.runftsteele.com

Christ Troupis
PO Box 2408
Eagle, Idaho
83616

January 6, 2011

File #:
Inv #:

Attention:

RE:

00410-0002
6491

Expert Witness - Maile Matters

Total Fee & Disbursements
Previous Balance

$0.00
910.00

Interest Accrued

$0.00

Previous Payments

910.00

Balance Now Due

$5,000.00

The minimum retainer balance for the matter is

PLEASE REMIT IN TRUST

$5,000.00
$5,000.00

to maintain your minimum trust retainer balance
PAYMENT DETAILS

Jan-03-ll
Jan-03-11

ROA

$910.00

Total Payments

$910.00
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Runft & Steele Law Offices
1020 W. Main Street
Suite 400
Boise, ill 83702
Ph:208-333-8506
Fax:208-343-3246
www.nmftsteele.com
www.runftsteele.com
Chlist Troupis
PO Box 2408
Eagle} Idaho
83616

February 9, 2011

File #:
Iny #:

Attention:

RE:

ExpertWitnes~
ExpertWitnes~ - Maile

00410-0002
6502

Matters

FINAL BILL
HOURS

AMOUNT

LAWYER

Receipt and review of modified cert of expelt
from Christ Troupis; telephone conference
with Christ Troupis re: status of litigation,
narrowing the issues of litigation and possible
testimony following the dropping of
professional malpractice claims as reflected in
revised cert; outlined revised areas to review
per cert.

0.70

245.00

JLR

Jan-l 8-11

E-mail fi:om Christ Troupis re: deposition
schedule, etc.
schedule.

0.20

70.00

JLR

Jan-19-ll
Jan-19-11

Telephone call with Christ Troupis re:
deposition.

0.30

105.00

JLR

Jan-20-l1

Receipt and review of e-mail from Christ
Troupis outlining testimony; compare to
previous revised celt.

0.30

105.00

JLR

Jan-21-11

Review of pleadings, file, briefs and
memorandum from Christ Troupis; Meeting
with Christ Troupis and Mr. and Mrs. Tom
Maile re: deposition, review ofrecord, issues,
and proposed testimony and legal opinions to
be offered.

4.80

1,680.00

JLR

Jan-24-l1
Jan-24-11

Review of files, notes, briefs, certain cases in

6.50

2,275.00

JLR

DATE

DESCRIPTION

Jan-17-11

002387

Invoice #:

Page 2

6502
""I':"'
""':"'

February 9,2011
'...,1.

preparation for deposition; e-mail from Christ
Troupis re: deposition time change; testified in
deposition; post deposition meeting with
Christ Troupis and review deposition
testimony, and strategy.
Jan-26-11

Review of deposition notes against recall of
deposition re: issues and scope of testimony;
telephone call with Christ Troupis re: above
and re: trial timing, etc

0.80 .

Feb-02-11

Review file and notes from my deposition and
focus on Disclaimer Agreement and timing of
peljury complaint, review Scott's Abridgment
on Trusts re: analysis of distinctions between
proprietmy interests trustees and beneficiaries;
telephone call with Chris Troupis re: status at
trial and re: issues for testimony; further
preparation for testimony next day; meeting
with Christ Troupis and review of Prof. Lewis'
testimony and my proposed testimony - issues
- facts; explained my further trust analysis of
reserved interest of the Taylors in the
Disclaimer Agreement as being only first
interpreted by Sup. Ct. in Taylor IT to the effect
that the reserved interest was that of a trustee.
trustee,
not a beneficial interest; ergo Taylors reserved
nothing as "beneficiaries" and had no interest
to proceed on as beneficiaries. The status of
this reserved interest was not clear until the
Ruling in Taylor II; ergo Mailes could not be
held to have knowledge sufficient to bring an.
action until the ruling in Taylor 11;
II; further
preparation for testimony.
Final preparations and review of
pleadings for
ofpleadings
testimony; attendance at court and testimony
as expert witness.

Feb-03-11
Feb-03-Il

Totals

280.00

JLR

4.50

1,575.00

JLR

4.00

1,400.00

JLR

22.10

$7,735.00

DISBURSEMENTS
Feb-D3-ll
Feb-03-li

Parking for Court Appearance
Totals

Total Fee &
& Disbursements

3.00
$3.00
$7,738.00

002388

Invoice #:

6502

.......,....
Retainers Applied
Interest Accrued

Balance Now Due

Page 3

".-

February 9,2011

.....

1,450.00
$0.00

$6,288.00

PAYMENT DETAILS
Jan-24-11
Jan-25-11

retainer
Expert Deposition Fee
Total Payments

$750.00
$700.00

$1,450.00

002389

Invoice #:

6502

Febluary 9,2011
February

Page 4

TRUST STATEMENT

Disbursements
Jan-24-11

Jan-27-11

PA
Received From: Troupis Law Office PA
Retainer
Received From: Troupis Law Office PA
Retainer - Void
Total Trust
Trust Balance

Receipts
750.00
-750.00

$0.00

$0.00

$0.00

002390

..,
Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130
PO Box 2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone:
208/938-5584
Facsimilasfsafe:
208/938-5482
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com
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Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
,----------
!

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCHBIRCH
MAILE, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,
v.

I

CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, flkla
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR,
TA
YLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.

Case No. CV-OC-0723232

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR COSTS ANID
COUNTEROPPOSITION TO COUNTER
ANI)
CLAIMANTS CLARK ANn
FEENEY/CONNIE TAYLORS'
MOTION FOR COSTS ANn
ANI!>
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS

Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
The counter-defendants by and through their undersigned co-counsel of record, and
provides this Memorandum Brief in support of their Motion for Costs and in opposition to
counter-claimants' motion for costs and attorneys fees:

002391

,,-

''THE ESSENTIAL FACTS

1.

Defendant Connie Taylor drafted a letter to Bart Harwood on April 14, 2004 which
stated, "The Taylors are not willing to give up theft rights as beneficiaries of the trust
unless Beth will affirm her prior factual statements in the form of an affidavit ,md agree
to cooperate in the action against Mr. Maile. If we aren't able to reach an agreement on
that, they will seek a full accounting of the trust and a copy of the trust and estate tax
returns". (Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part One deposition of Beth Rogers Exhibit "B"
referencing deposition exhibit 39).

2.

In response to the motion before Judge Wilper, the Taylors filed their verified petition in
the probate court on November 12,2004, requesting the probate court to appoint them as
trustees of the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust. The petition was executed by R.
John Taylor as a verification of the facts contained in the petition. Page 2 of the verified
petition states under oath, "the petitioner's 88-year-old mother, Helen Taylor,. is the sole

of this trust by virtue ofthe
of the terms ofa
of a Disclaimer, Release and
rellUlining benefICiary ofthis
Indemnity Agreement." (Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part Two Exhibit "I") (emphasis
added).

3.

At the probate hearing Mr. R. John Taylor was sworn under oath and provided testimony
before the Honorable Judge Beiter on May 2, 2005 and testified: page 14, In 4:
Q. Will you explain to the court just briefly why it is that you want to serve?
A. "Well, primarily, to pursue the claim for the trust. We have always thought it was a
valid claim because I think that, for the benefit -- my mother is the beneficiary of the
trust, and we expect that we will eventually win on this claim." During that same hearing
Mr. Clark provided in his closing argument before Judge Beiter on June 5, 2005
provided: page 17, In 12:
MR. CLARK: "Yes. Just briefly, Judge. It seems to me that, based upon, first, the
agreement of the beneficiaries -- they have all indicated that the Taylors should serve as
co-trustees. The Taylors, pursuant to that same agreement, have a guarantee in the
disclaimer. So they have some interest in the proceeding. Their mother stands to gain
and, thereby, they have an interest in the proceeding."
(Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part One transcript of probate court hearing Exhibit "A").

4.

The deposition of Reed Taylor provided the following testimony under oath:
Q. Through this lawsuit, if the jury ultimately finds in favor of the plaintiffs in this
matter, is your mother going to get anything? Do any of the proceeds from any Judgment
that's entered in this lawsuit - A. She will probably get it all.
Q. My question is: In that first lawsuit, although you are a named plaintiff, if that were
to -- if the Supreme Court were to reverse the Summary Judgment that was entered, and it
goes to trial and you prevail, ifI'm understanding what you've told me -- all right? ---

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR COSTS
AND OPPOSITION TO COUNTER-CLAIMANTS' MOTION FOR COSTS AND
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS- Pg 2
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quote, your understanding is you don't get anything; everything goes to your mother?
A. My intent is -- I'm not going to say exactly how it's going to be disbursed. My intent
would be for my mother.
Q. In the second lawsuit, the one with the Trust, who gets the money if you prevail?
A. Well, like I said, as far as, uh -- I haven't talked to, specifically, the ones that are out
of town. As far as John and I are concerned, uh, we're doing it for our mother, so ...
Q. SO you and your brothers are not going to get anything?
A. We're not looking for money out of it, if that's where you're going (pages 132, 133,
134, of the deposition of Reed J. Taylor, taken on January 31, 2005 (Affidavit of Thomas
Maile Part One transcript of probate court hearing Exhibit "A").
5.

The deposition of Dallan Taylor provided the following testimony under oath:
Q. What was the purpose, then, of you executing the signature page on Exhibit 24 that
relate to the "Disclaimer, Release & Indemnity Agreement"? Could you just explain to
me, in your own words, what Exhibit 25 accomplishes?
A. We are the disclaimer of all interests. It is being signed by -- 1, dash, 2, dash, 1 by
Fishers, which disclaims all the interest in the Trust in favor of their mother, Helen (sic)
Fisher, so that they will distribute the money in the Trust to Hazel Fisher. 1.2, dash, 2,
Seeley, is so the money, uh -- the children are released (inaudible) -
THE COURT REPORTER: I'm sorry. "The children are released" what? Spt::ak up.
THE WITNESS: -- their interest in the Trust so that the money can be distributed to
Joyce Seeley. And Taylor, all children are disclaiming interest in favor of their mother,
Helen Taylor, so that she can get the remainder of her assets in the Trust.
(pages 74, 75 of the deposition of Dallan Taylor, taken on September 9,2004 (Affidavit
of Thomas Maile Part One)

6.

The deposition of John Taylor provided the following testimony under oath:
Q. Exhibit 26 of Beth Rogers' deposition, that's the Complaint and Demand for Jury
Trial. That's signed by your brother and your wife; is that correct.
A. Yes.
Q. And did you have a chance to review that document?
A. I did.
Q. Before it was actually filed?
A. I did.
Q. Did you concur in the language of the Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial?
A. Yes.
Q. And what is it that the plaintiffs want out of this litigation; what is it they seek?
A. We want the difference in -- well, the difference in the value of the property and the
amount that it was sold for. And we believe that is $6 to $800,000.
Q. Okay. You've also sued for damages. Is that the damage claim that you're wanting?
A. Yes, essentially.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR COSTS
AND OPPOSITION TO COUNTER-CLAIMANTS' MOTION FOR COSTS ANI)
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS- Pg 3

002393

Q. Is that you want out of this lawsuit?
A. 6- to 800,000. Yes.
Q. Anything else you want out of this litigation?
A. We would -- we would like to see that, uh -- uh, punitive damages are added to that.
Q. Now, there is an allegation that you want a recision of the contract?
A. As an alternative. Yes.
Q. But you want the money first?
A. It would be easier. It goes to my mom.
Pages 81-82 of the deposition ofR. John Taylor, taken on December 14, 2004 (Affidavit
of Christ Troupis filed December 31, 2010)
7.

On March 9, 2006, the Verified Amended Complaint was filed by the Taylors" and
prepared by the co-defendant attorneys. Page 1 of the Verified Amended Complaint
states under oath, "Reed and R. John Taylor are residents of Nez Perce County, Idaho;
of the plaintiffs are resilrlual
Dallan Taylor is a resident of Ada County Idaho. All ofthe
beneficiaries of
the Theodore L. Johnson Trust." (The verified amended complaint is
ofthe
annexed to Amended complaint and Demand for Jury Trial as Exhibit "B") (emphasis
added).

8.

The district court entered the "Judgment on BenefICiaries' Claim" on June 7, 2006 (The
Judgment is annexed to Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial as Exhibit "C")
(emphasis added).

LEGAL ARGUMENT

1.
The Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants Claims were based upon their reasonable
interpretation of the facts and law.
a. Mailes presented evidence that Taylors, as officers of the Court:,
perpetrated a fraud on the Court.
Connie Taylor and her husband John Taylor at all relevant times were licensed Idaho
attorneys and as such were officers of the court. Vol 12 Moore's Federal Practice § 60-21 (4)(b)
provides:
One of the distinguishing facts in the leading Hazel-Atlas case was the
participation of a lawyer for one of the party's in the creation as well as the
presentation of the fraudulent evidence relied on by the Patent Office and the
Third Circuit. As a result, subsequent courts have stated that the participation of

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR COSTS
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''
an officer of the court in the fraud is either an essential element of fraud on the:
court contributing to the subversion of the adjudication process or an alternative
basis for finding fraud on court.
The Sixth circuit has quoted, with approval, a definition of fraud on the court that
(1) conduct on the part of an officer of the court; (2) that
consists of five elements: (l)
is directed to the "judicial machinery" itself; (3) that is intentionally false, wilfully
blind to the truth, or is in reckless disregard of truth or falsity; (4) that is a positive
avennent or is a concealment when one is under a duty to disclose; and (5) that
deceives the court. Thus, misconduct of an officer of the court is an essential
element of fraud on the court; but there is fraud on the court only if this
misconduct precludes proper adjudication by the court.
The Ninth Circuit apparently treats misconduct by an officer of the court as an
alternative basis for finding fraud on the court; an alternative to the definition
involving subversion of the adjudication process. as discussed in [a], above. The
Ninth Circuit has quoted Moore's for the proposition that fraud on the court is a
"species of fraud which does or attempt to, defile the court itself or is a fraud
perpetrated by officers of the court" (emphasis added)
The Fourth Circuit: has agreed.
"Although perjury of a witness will not suffice, the "involvement of an attorney,
as an officer of the court, in a scheme to suborn penury should certainly be
considered fraud on the court"
As has the Second Circuit and the Sixth Circuit:
"Since attorneys are officers of the court, their conduct, if dishonest, would
constitute fraud on the court.

The factual record is overwhelming. The Taylors made a prima facie case against
themselves based entirely upon their own testimony and verified pleadings. The recent case of

NC-DSH, Inc. v. Garner, 218 P.3d 853 (Nev. 2009) states:
The most widely accepted definition, which we adopt, holds that the concept
embrace
[s] only that species of fraud which does, or attempts to, subvert the
embrace[s]
integrity of the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR COSTS AND OPPOSITION TO COUNTER-CLAIMANTS'
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the judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual manner its impartial task of
adjudging cases ... and relief should be denied in the absence of such conduct.
In addition to his duties to his clients, a lawyer also owes a duty of" loyalty to the
court, as an officer thereof, [that] demands integrity and honest dealing with the
court. And when he departs from that standard in the conduct of a case he
perpetrates fraud upon the court." [W]e lawyers, judges, and practitioners alike
are very ... concemed about how our profession is perceived. We're very proud of
what we believe is an honorable profession and we're very concemed when
something like this happens. It hurts us all. It really does.

b. Mailes presented evidence that they suffered damages solely as a result of
Taylors' fraud on the Court and entry of the Judgment on Beneficiaries'
Claims.
Mailes were denied the right before Judge Wilper to apply equitable principles of quasi
estoppel involving the claims to title and possession between the trust and the plaintiffs. Judge
Wilper refused to allow any further proceedings involving title or possession as he reasoned that
the "Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims" resulted in a constructive trust being imposed on the
property. That ruling was based upon the misrepresentations made that the Taylor Brothers were
still beneficiaries of the trust. The truth was they were not. The plaintiffs were denied the right to
address the equitable principles between the trust and themselves. "Fraud on the court" is a
claim that exists to protect the integrity of the judicial process, and therefore a claim for fraud on
the court cannot be time-barred. See 12, Moore's Federal Practice § 60.21 [4][g] & n. 52 (3d
ed.2009) (citing Lockwood v. Bowles, 46 F.R.D. 625, 634 (D.D.C.1969)).
(D.D.C.l969)).

c. The perjury complaint alleged claims that if properly brought under Rule
60(b), were not barred by res judicata.
This Court ultimately determined that Mailes' perjury claims were barred by res judicata
and could not be brought under Rule 60(b). But the issue presented in this motion is not resolved

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR COSTS AND OPPOSITION TO COUNTER-CLAIMANTS'
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solely by reference to this Court's subsequent order. The issue is whether Mailes, at the time they
filed and pursued the complaint, could reasonably believe that their claims were not barred by res
judicata. The evidence presented at trial establishes that Mailes had reasonable grounds in fact
and law to make these claims, whether ultimately successful or not.
Mailes advanced their claims for the sole purpose of imposing liability on the Taylors for
their fraudulent misconduct. Mailes sought the equitable aid of the court to set aside the
Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims.
Mailes advanced both claims for equity and damages. As established during the course
of the jury trial, Idaho has no reported cases regarding the affects of a "fraud upon the court"
based upon alleged criminal conduct on the part of "officers of the court". Counterclaimants'
expert, Craig Lewis, testified that Connie Taylor and her client and then husband, R. John Taylor
were at all relevant times "officers of the court".
Craig Lewis primary opinion was that it was unreasonable for Mailes to file the perjury
complaint because a reasonable attorney would know that it was barred by res judicata. His
reasoning for that opinion was that the perjury complaint did not qualify as an independent
action under Rule 60(b). He said it did not qualify because the perjury complaint did not attempt
to set aside the judgment obtained by fraud. However, as John Runft testified, the perjury
complaint did qualify as an independent action under Rule 60(b) because it sought to quiet title
against the fraudulently obtained judgment.
Mr. Lewis' admitted that the Taylors acted as "officers of the Court" and acknowledged

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR COSTS
AND OPPOSITION TO COUNTER-CLAIMANTS' MOTION FOR COSTS AND
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that an action under Rule 60(b) can properly be brought for fraud on the Court perpetrated by an
officer of the Court. Given these admissions, and the facts established at trial, it was not
unreasonable for Mailes to file the perjury complaint.
As stated in State Alarm, Inc., v. Riley Industrial Services (No. 92760 Court of Appeals
of Ohio, Eighth District), "where the motion involves a misrepresentation made by an officer of
the court, e.g., an attorney, which misrepresentation perpetrates a fraud upon the court, the
motion is properly brought pursuant to Civ. R. 60(B)(5)." As is further stated in Okros v.

Angelo Iafrate Construction Company (No. 07-1455 United States Court of Appeals, Sixth
Circuit), "Thus, counsel is entitled to rely on opposing counsel to be forthright, and is not
obligated to ferret out the truth of opposing counsel's statements or satisfy due diligence in
protecting against an opposing counsel's hoax".

The status as "officers of the court" provides

that misconduct on their part amounts to a "fraud upon the court" regardless of the action and/or
non-action on the other party litigants.
A fraud on the court by an officer of the court provides for an independent act:ion
action in
equity. People v. Zajic, 88 Ill. App.3d 477, 410 N.E.2d 626 (1980). Whenever any officer of the
court commits fraud during a proceeding in the court, he/she is engaged in "fraud upon the
court". In Bulloch v. United States, 763 F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir. 1985). "Fraud upon the court"
has been defined by the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals to "embrace that species of fraud which
does, or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers ofthe court so that
the judicial machinery can not perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases
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that are presented for adjudication." Kenner v. CIR.,
C.IR., 387 F.3d 689 (1968); 7 Moore's Federal
Practice, 2d ed., p. 512, ,-r 60.23. A decision produced by fraud upon the court is not in essence a
decision at all, and never becomes final.
John Taylor testified that he signed a petition under oath verifying that his mother, Helen
Taylor, was the sole beneficiary of the trust by virtue of the Disclaimer Agreement terms. He
admitted that he testified to this fact at the probate court hearing. Mr. Taylor also admitted that
he could not present any evidence to show that Judge Wilper was ever apprised of his prior
admissions under oath that Helen Taylor was the sole remaining beneficiary of the trust. Tom
Maile testified that these facts were never presented to Judge Wilper prior to entry of the
Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims.
A "fraud upon the court" makes void the orders and judgments of that court null and
void. An attempt to commit "fraud upon the court" vitiates the entire proceeding. The People of
ofIllinois
the State of
Illinois v. Fred E. Sterling, 357 Ill. 354; 192 N.E. 229 (1934). The maxim that fraud
vitiates every transaction into which it enters applies to judgments as well as to contra.cts and
other transactions. Allen F Moore v. Stanley F Sievers, 336 Ill. 316; 168 N.E. 259 (1929), In re
ofWillowbrook,
Village of
Willowbrook, 37 Ill. App.2d 393 (1962).
As stated in Campbell v. Kildew, 141 Idaho 640, 115 P.3d 731 (Idaho 2005), fraud upon
the court "is more than mere interparty misconduct. It is a "tampering with administration of
justice" which suggests "a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the
public". In Campbell, the parties informed the Court that they had resolved a dispute in
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arbitration and wanted a judgment entered on the arbitration decision. They didn't tell the Court
that the arbitration was a hoax engineered by the parties to obtain a decision that could be
presented to the Court as a valid arbitration award. As in the present case, Campbell involved a
party who had stated one set of facts before one tribunal and a different set of facts to a second
tribunal, as well as concealment of the true facts from the second tribunal. The Taylor Brothers
signed a verified amended complaint in January 2006 that was completely opposite to their
sworn testimony in prior proceedings, prior depositions, and a prior verified pleading. The co
codefendants' actions as "officers of the court" constituted a good faith argument that their action
was in fact a "fraud upon the court" that warranted the equitable powers of the court to set aside
the Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims.
Further support that the plaintiffs were justified in bringing their amended complaint is
36130, 36131 (lDSCCI)
found in the case of Taylor v. McNichols, 36130,36131
(IDSCCI) (2010).
The Taylor, supra, decision provides:
As in cases for legal malpractice based on conduct occurring during the courSt::
courst::: of
a trial, in order to bring a malicious prosecution claim there must be damages ,md
it must be determined that the suit was groundless, neither of which is possible
prior to resolution of the case.

Therefore, we conclude that a cause of action against one party's opponent's
attorney in litigation, based on conduct the attorney committed in the course of
that litigation, may not be properly instituted prior to the resolution of that
litigation, even where the allegedly aggrieved party believes that the attorney in
question has been acting outside the legitimate scope of representation and solely
for his own benefit. Under this same reasoning, the allegations of aiding and
abetting in the commission of tortious acts, although marginally pled, must await
resolution of the Underlying Case. Until the Underlying Case is resolved a court
cannot determine whether any tortious act was committed, let alone acts
constituting the aiding and abetting of those alleged tortious acts.
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The Tay/or,
Taylor, supra, decision, clearly provides law that res judicata does not apply to the
present matter when there are allegations of fraud and/or criminal behavior in obtaining a
judgment. There could be no cause of action ripe for judicial determination until the underlying
case was resolved and the plaintiffs sustained damages. In the present case, the plaintiffs
sustained damages directly related to the tortious conduct of the defendants when the

I~ourt

entered its "Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims". As Mr. Runft testified the actions of the
plaintiffs was reasonable in not filing an action until the plaintiffs sustained damages.
The plaintiffs' legal theories were justified and were properly made under existing law
and/or were made for a good faith extension of new law relating to an independent action to set
aside a judgment, negligence, negligence per se, abuse of process, tortious interferenoe with
prospective business advance and Idaho Racketeering violations.
d. Attorneys fees should not be awarded because the expert testimony
establishes the fact that Mailes had support in law and fact for their
claims.
An award of attorney fees under Idaho Code §§, 12-121 & 12-123, is not a matter of
right to the prevailing party, but is appropriate only when the court, in its discretion, is left with

the abiding belief that the case was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or
without foundation, see generally, Nampa & Meridian Irrigation Dist. v. Washington Fed.

Savings, 135 Id. 518, 20 P.3d 702 (2001). When a district court trial judge, decides whether the
case was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation, the
entire course of the litigation should be taken into account. If there is a legitimate, triable issue
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of fact, attorney fees may not be awarded under I.C. § 12-121 even though the losing party has
asserted factual or legal claims that are frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. Although
an award of attorney fees under the statute is discretionary, the award must be supported by
findings, and those findings, in turn, must be supported by the record. Wait v. Leavell Cattle,
Inc., 136 Id. 792, 41 P.3d 220 (2002).
An action is not deemed to have been brought frivolously simply because it ultimately

fails. Edwards v. Donart, 116 Idaho 687, 688, 778 P.2d 809,810 (1989). Idaho appellate law has
held that in deciding whether an award of attorney's fees is proper, "the sole question is whether
the losing party's position is so plainly fallacious as to be deemed frivolous, unreasonable or
without foundation." Sun Valley Shopping Ctr.,
Or., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 92, 803
P.2d 993,998 (1991), quoting Severson v. Hermann, 116 Idaho 497, 777 P.2d 269 (1989). A
mis-perception by a party of the law is not, by itself, unreasonable conduct. Automobile Club Ins.
Co. v. Jackson, 124 Idaho 874, 865 P.2d 965 (Idaho 1993), Wing v. Amalgamated Sugar Co.,
106 Idaho 905, 911,684 P.2d 307, 313 (Ct. App.1984), overruled on other grounds by NBC
Leasing Co. v. R & T Farms, Inc., 112 Idaho 500, 733 P.2d 721 (1987).
The motions for attorney fees and costs pursuant to I.C. §§, 12-121 & 12-123, should
therefore be denied.

2.
The Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs Should Be Denied as Th.~re Were
Multiple Claims Between the Parties and the Action Was Not Unreasonable Nor
Undertaken for an Improper Purpose.
The Court in Magic Valley Radiology Associates, P.A. v. Professional Business Services,
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Inc., 119 Idaho 558, 808 P.2d 1303 (1991) stated that where there are multiple claims and

multiple defenses, it is not appropriate to segregate those claims or defenses for the purpose of
awarding attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121. As the Court stated:
Where as in this case there are multiple claims and multiple defenses, it is not
appropriate to segregate those claims and defenses to determine which were or
were not frivolously defended or pursued. The total defense of a party's
proceedings must be unreasonable or frivolous.
In Turner v. Willis, 116 Idaho 682, 778 P.2d 804 (1989), this Court stated:
The frivolity and unreasonableness of a defense is not to be examined only in the
context of trial proceedings. The entire course of the litigation will be taken into
account. Id. 116 Idaho at 685, 778 P.2d at 807.
The competing claims of the parties had significant overlap with the issues of daim
preclusion and issue preclusion. All claims had elements involving the interpretation of the law
regarding res judicata and the application of the doctrine on their respective claims. At trial, the
expert testimony was conflicting as to whether the Mailes' claims were reasonably pursued.
Notably, Mr. Lewis admitted he did not understand trust law and therefore could not testify as to
whether the Supreme Court's ruling on Taylor's standing related to their position as Trustees, or
their claimed position as Beneficiaries of the Trust. John Runft testified as an attorney with 45
years experience in complex trust law that Taylor's standing was predicated solely on their

position as Trustees who had a right to prosecute the Trust 'chose in action.' His testimony was
unrebutted.
Additionally, Mr. Lewis failed to examine the Maile's perjury complaint closely enough
to see that it contained a claim for equitable relief from the Taylor's judgment. His opinion that
the perjury complaint didn't qualify as an independent action under Rule 60(b) was therefore
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suspect, and properly challenged by John Runft.
The Mailes presented a proper and logical argument supporting their allegations of "fraud
upon the court." The merits ofthe Mailes' factual claims were not seriously challeng~:d
challeng~!d by
Taylors at trial. Instead, Taylors relied solely upon the fact that the claims were barred by res
judicata and that therefore Mailes were not entitled to have them tried on the merits.

3. The motion for attorneys fees should be denied because Clark & Feeney
voluntarily dismissed their Counterclaim, but seek fees for prosecuting it.
The itemized attorneys fees submitted by Mark Prusynski includes services rendered on
all of the parties' claims both in defense and in prosecution of Clark & Feeney's counter-claim.
Central to the issue was res judicata on both sides ofthe parties' respective claims. Clark &
Feeney had to demonstrate that the plaintiffs' claims were pursued for an improper purpose for
them to pursue their counter-claim. Clark & Feeney ultimately dismissed their countt:r-claim
shortly before trial, with each party bearing their own costs and attorneys fees. However, now
Clark & Feeney are attempting to recover attorneys fees undoubtedly incurred relating to their
counter-claim.
The jury verdict on abuse of process does not warrant a conclusion that the underlying

perjury case was brought without foundation or factual or legal merit. The jury did not have
benefit of all facts surrounding the perjury case, as the counter-defendants' proof was limited by
the various orders involving the motions in limine.
Clark & Feeney request attorneys fees based upon the jury's findings alone as supporting
a right to attorney fees pursuant to I.C. §§, 12-121 & 12-123. Such is not the case. The case of
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Technical Computer Servs., Inc. v. Buckley, 844 P.2d 1249 (Colo. Ct. App.1992) recognized the
" general rule" that" a claimant in a malicious prosecution or abuse of process action Gan recover
attorney fees incurred in defending against the prior wrongful litigation" but cannot recover
attorney fees incurred in bringing the malicious prosecution or abuse of process action itself, and
applying the same rule where" the abuse of process claim is brought as a counterclaim to
wrongful litigation rather than as a later separate action. Sternberg v. Johnston, 582 F.3d 1114
(9th Cir. 2009) see also C. McCormick, Damages § 66 (1935); see also 54 C.J.S. Malicious
Prosecution § 97 (1987); A1illennium Equity Holdings, LLC v. Mahlowitz, 925 N.E.2d 513, 456
Mass. 627 (2010). The jury findings have no bearing upon the application of an award of
attorney fees and costs pursuant to I.C. §§, 12-121 & 12-123, and the request for attorneys fees
and costs should be denied.

4. Clark & Feeney's claim for attorneys fees, if predicated solely upon the jury's
verdict, should have been brought in that trial. Their voluntary dismissal bars
their claim.
Taylors submitted the Trust billing for attorneys fees as an element of their claimed
damages in their counterclaim, and the jury considered that billing in rendering its verdict. Clark
& Feeney elected not to present their attorneys' fee claim to the jury by voluntarily dismissing

their Counterclaim. By voluntarily dismissing their Counterclaims, Clark & Feeney are not
prevailing parties in the lawsuit. Mailes prevailed on Clark & Feeney's counterclaims.
Additionally, this Court in ruling upon the counter-defendants' motion for directed
verdict during the trial indicated that there could be no abuse of process prior to January 2009
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since the appellate court did not rule upon the appeal until that date. After the Supreme Court
issued its ruling all that was litigated before this court was the legal effect of res judicata. The
arguments addressed in opposition to res judicata are set forth above and do not demonstrate any
unreasonable action justifying the imposition of attorneys fee. There is nothing in the record to
demonstrate the actions of the plaintiffs before January 2009 or after warrant the imposition of
attorneys fees under I.C. §§, 12-121 & 12-123. The motion for attorneys fees and costs should
be denied.

3.
The Request for Attorneys Fees and Costs should be denied based upon Rule
68 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Mailes properly served their offer of
judgment on the defendants on November 16,
ofjudgment
2009. The effect of service ofan Offer of Judgment is set forth in Rule 68 ofI.R.C.P.
ofl.R.C.P.
ofjudgment
judgment was served on the counter-claimants on
In the present matter the offer of
November 16,2009. The amount of $55,000.00 was offered as to all of the counter-claimants'
claims. Counter-claimant Clark & Feeney has admitted that its claims were derivative of the
& Feeney obtained a stipulation for dismissal of
claims advanced by the Taylor Brothers. Clark &
their counter-claim with all parties agreeing to a dismissal with all parties agreeing to bear their

own costs and attorneys fees. Clark & Feeney is not the prevailing party and cannot now argue
for its costs and attorneys fees.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons above cited the motion for costs and attorneys has no basis under I.C. §§,
12-121 & 12-123. The motion for attorneys fees and costs should be denied.
DATED this 23 rd day of February, 2011.

8t~/~

CHRIST
CHRIST T.
T. TRO~=IS=,-C-o--c-o-un-s-e--l-fo-rTRO~ Co-counsel for
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,

Case No. CV OC 0723232

JUDGMENT

vs.
WRIGHT
TAYLOR,
f/k/a
l'
AYLOR,
f/k1a
CONNIE
TAYLOR,
CONNIE
l'
AYLOR,
an
individual;
DALLAN TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual, THEODORE
THEODORI~ L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable

trust; JOHN DOES 1 - JOHN DOES X; and
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMAING
ANY
RIGHT
TO
POSSESSION
Defendants/ Counter-claimants.
Defendants/Counter-claimants.

The claims of Thomas G. Maile, IV, Colleen Birch-Maile, and Berkshire Investments,
LLC were dismissed in their entirety by Judgment dated July 16, 2009.

The counterclaims of

JUDGMENT
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......
The Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, by and through its trustees Dallan Taylor and R. John
Taylor came before the court for a jury trial on January 31, 2011 and continued through February
4,2011.
Based upon the special verdict returned by the jury on February 4, 2011, the Court now
enters the following Judgment.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that The Theodore L.
Johnson Revocable Trust, by and through its trustees Dallan Taylor and R. John Taylor, are
awarded Judgment against Thomas G. Maile IV, Colleen Birch-Maile, and Berkshire
Investments, LLC, in the sum of $28,437.36, as determined by the jury, together with such
interest and costs as are provided by law.
DATED this

(),2 day of February, 2011.
{),2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

thea~ay

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on
of February, 2011 I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed
to the following:
Thomas G. Maile, IV
380 West State Street
Eagle, ID 83616

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001

Mr. Christ Troupis
Attorney at Law
PO Box 2408
Eagle, ID 83616

u.s. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 938-5482

Mark Prusynski
MOFFATT THOMAS
101 S Capitol Blvd., 10 th Floor
PO Box 829
Boise, ID 83701

u.s. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 385-5384

Connie Taylor and Paul Henderson
HENDERSON LAW FIRM, PLLC
900 Washington, Suite 1020
Vancouver WA 98660

u.s. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 385-5384
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CONNIE W. TAYLOR
HENDERSON LAW FIRM, PLLC
900 Washington Street, Suite 1020
Vancouver, W
A 98660
WA
360.699.1530
ISBA No. 4837
Attorneys for Counter-defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO l IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LtC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS O.
G.

Case No. CV OC 0723232

MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE
husband and wife,
Plajntjffs/Counter~Defendanl~,
Plajntjffs/Counter~Defendanl~,

03/09

OBJECTION TO MAILES'
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS

vs.
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, et al.
Defendants/Counter-claimants
Defendants/Counter-claimants..

The Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, by and through its trustees DaHan Taylor and
R. John Ta.ylor, pursuant to l.R.C.P. 54(d)(6) file this objection to the Mailes' mem01'2Lndum
memOf2Lndum of

costs.

1. The Mailes' request for costs pursuant to l.R.C.P. 68 js premature.
The Mailes arc seeking an award of costs solely because the jury's verdict on the Johnson

Trust's counterclaims did not exceed the $55,000 offer of judgment dated November 16,2009.
16; 2009.
The problem with this position is that the jury verdict related solely to the counterclaims, while
OBJECTION TO MAILES'
MEMO OF COSTS
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their offer also included "any and all attorneys fees and costs which could be ordered r,elating to
the complaint in the pending action pursued by Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants."
The Johnson Trust's attorney fees in defending against the Mailes' Complaint were an
element of damage which was a.ddressed in the trial, but the issue of fees owing to the Clark and
Feeney defendants (which alone exceed the amount of the offer of judgment) was reserved by
1

agreement of all the parties]
parties and remains to be decided.

The merits of that claim will be

addressed by counsel for the Clark and Feeney defendants, Mark Prusynski.
Because T.R.C.P. 68 requires that the court take any costs and fees into aC:COl.mt in

detennining whether the "adjusted award" exceed5 the offer, a ruling on the Clark and Feeney
Defendants' requests for costs and fees for its defense of the Mailes' claims is a prerequisite to
mechanis.rt1 of Rule 68 applies in this case.
detennining whether the cost-shifting mechanis.rrI

n.
II.

The Mailes' offer of .judgment
,judgment was invalid because it did not l"eso)ve all daims
claims

The offer of judgment submitted by the Mailes was invalid because it proposed to settle only
lssue of fees and costs on the dismissal of the Mailes'
Ma.iles' Complaint, but
the countercl.a.ims and the issue

reserved the Mailes' right to appeal the dismissal of their complaint.
The reservation of the light to appeal renders the offer of judgment invalid, as it does not
I.R.C.P. 68, which states that an offer of judgment "shall be
comply with the clear language of l.R.C.P.
aU claims recoverable .... which have accnled up to the date of the offer of
deemed to include all

judgment."
The purpose of the rule allowing an offer of judgment is to encourage settlement, promote

the efficient resolution of the entire case, and avoid litigation. In recognition of this purpose, the

of judgment which fails
majority of courts which have looked at this issue have held that an offer ofjudgment
to resolve the entire ca.se in ineffective. See, for example, the following cases:
1. Progressive Corp. v. Peter ex rei. Peter, 195 P.3d 1083 (Alaska 2008). Automobile
insurer's offer of judgment in action brought by insured seeking UIM benefits was not
valid because it did not include every claim and would not have ended the entire
litigation.

1I

Clark and Feeney Defendants, Novembe:r 30,
Stipulation to Dismiss Counterclaim of
ofGlark

2010.
OBJECTION TO MAILES'

MEMO OF COSTS
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2. Frenandes v. Portwine, 56 P.3d 1I (Alaska 2002). The Alaska Supreme Court held that

the defendant's offer of judgment was not sufficient under Alaska R. Civ.
ClV. P. 68 where it
only addressed the legal claim against it but did not propose a resolution of a claim for

injunctive relief. Given that Rule 68's goal is to encourage settlement, the

C01.lrt
C01.1rt

found

that it would have served little purpose for the plaintiffs to have accepted the de:fendant's
offer on the damages claim without also settling the injunction claims. Both :Iegal and
equitable claims were based on the same set of facts, and settling only the legal claims
would not have avoided litigation.
3. In Jones v. City of Norwalk, 25 Conn. L. Rptr. 106 (Conn. Super. Ct.
ct. 1999), the court
held that a plaintiffs offer of judgment to resolve only one claim of her complaint was
invalid. Relying on Blakeslee Arpnia
Consfructors, Inc.,
Inc ... 239 Conn
Arpaia Chapman. Inc. v. Ed Constructors,
708, 687 A.2d 506 (1997), the court stated that an offer of judgment is an offer to settle
the entire case, including claims both known and unknown, and both certain and
uncertain. No mention is made in the statute to partial judgments, such as would result
from an offer to take judgment on a particular count or one of severa.l causes of action.

The court consequently determined that the plaintiffs offer was invalid since it was
1'IOt operate to settle her entire claim against this defendant.
framed in a manner that did l'IOt

4. Gionfriddo v. Avis, 192 Conn. 301,472 A.3d 316 (1984), held that an offer of judgment

must be an offer to settle the case on all counts because the statute's purpose of

encouraging settlements would be eroded by piecemeal offers ofjudgment.
of judgment.
5. Tn Bayley Products, Inc. v. Cole" 720 So.2d 550 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
ct. App. 44thth Dist. 1998), the
ofjudgment
court held that an offer of
judgment was insufficient where it would not have resolved all

claims if accepted. The defendant filed a four---<:ount
four--<:ount counterclaim, and the plaintiff
extended an offer of judgment that was limited to two of these counts. The court found
of judgment statute, which does not authorize
that this offer did not comply with the offer ofjudgment
offers that, if accepted, would resolve less than all claims.
cla.ims.
the MaiIes did not, by its very terms, propose to be a
Because the offer which was made by theMailesdidnot.byits

final settlement all outstanding claims, it is invalid and the Mailes are not entitled to claim
reimbursement for costs incurred after the date of the offer.
OBJECTION TO MAILES'
MEMO OF COSTS
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III. The Manes' offer
offe.l" of judgment is invalid because it failed to apportion the amount
offered to each of the Defcndants/Counterciaimants.
The Mailes' offer of judgment stated a single lump sum offered
Defendants/Counterclaimants.

to alii of the

This also renders the offer invalid, as it is not sufficiently

cla.im.
definite to allow anyone party to evaluate his, her, or its respective claim,

To trigger the application of an offer of judgment statute, courts across the nation have
JD\.lst be sufficiently definite to allow
anow each offeree to weigh
uniformly recognized that the offer In\.lst
the risks and benefits of the offer against the judgment that may be obtained. See, for ,example,
P.3d 458 (Colo. App. 2008); Mews v. Beaster, 694 N.W.2d 476
Yeiser v. Ferrellgas, inc.,
Inc., 214 P,3d

(Wis. Ct. App. 2005); Haddock v. Woodland Park Homes, Inc., 90 P.3d 594 (Okla. Civ. App.
mUltiple plaintiffs prevents each plaintiff from evaluating
Div. I, 2004) (unapportioned offer to multiple

the settlement offer against the value of his or her claim and would lead to confusion.)
Lump sum offers to multiple parties have been held to be invalid as "offers of judgment" in

many states. Offers to multiple plaintiffs are only valid if they expressly apportion the payment
to each .individual and are not conditioned on acceptance by all of them. Nelson v. Pearson Ford
Co., 112 CaLRptr.3d 607 (CaI.App.4.Dist.,2010).
Co.)

This rule applies even if one party's alleged

liability was purely vicarious. Lamb v. Matetzschk, 906 So.2d 1027 (Fla. 2005). A joint offer
which is conditioned on the mutual acceptance of all the joint offerces is inV;llid and

unenforceable because it prevents each offeree from independently evaluating or settling his or
her respective claim. Attorneys' Title Ins. Fund,
Fund. Inc. v. Gorka, 36 So.3 646 (Fla. 2010).

A statutory settlement offer made to multiple parties is valid only if it is

e~xpressly
e~xpressly

apportioned among them and not conditioned on acceptance by all of them; a single, lump sum
offer to multiple plaintiffs which requires them to agree to apportionment among themselves is
not valid, and a lump sum offer by a plaintiff to multiple defendants may be invalid for the same
reasons.
rc:asons. Westamerica Bank v. MBG industries,
Industries, [nc..
Inc., 70 Ca1.Rptr.3d
Cal.Rptr.3d 125 (Cal.App.5.Dist. 2007),
v. Children's Hospital of Orange County Thrift Stores. [nc.,
Inc., J35 Cal.Rptr.2d 404
Burch v,

(Cal.App.4.Dist.)2003).
The MaiJes'
Mailes' offer of judgment was directed to all of the Defendants/Counterclc:.imaints,
and offered a single lump sum to all which was to apply not only to the counterclaims, but also to
OBJECTION TO MAILES'
MEMO OF COSTS
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The failure to

apportion the offer amongst the various defendants renders the offer invalid under Rule 68.

IV. The costs requested should be disallowed.
Even if the Mailes

were entitled to an award of costs, the items of cost they are

requesting are not allowable under the JUles.

The determination of costs is left to the sound

discretion of the district court. Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Sout~fork
Sout~fork Lumber

Co., 123 Idaho 146, 149, 845
R45 P.2d 5(4) 567 (1993).
1. Costs as a matter of right:

Mailes claim as "mandatory" only three items - $120 for

sheriff's fee for service of process on depositions, and $22 witness fees for Reed Taylor and
Tamara Crane.

Under Rule 54(d)(1)©(3), witness fees are allowed only for a witness who

testifies at a deposition or in the trial of an action. Because the
theMailesvacatedthedepos.itions
Mailes vacated the depositions
of both Reed Taylor and Tamara Crane)
allowed,
Crane, these costs should not be allowed.
2.

Discretionary costs: Mailes ask that they be awarded $2,010.01 as discretionary

costs under Rul.e 54(d)(1)(D), which grants a court the discretion to award "necessary and
exceptional costs reasonably incurred.
of justice be assessed against the
incurred, and should in the interest ofjustice
adverse party." Id..
The applicability of that rule to cases in which there was a Rule 68 offer of judgment was
discussed in Stewart v. McKarnin, 141 Idaho
(Ct. App. 2005).
IdahO 930, 120 P.3d 748 (el.

In that case,

judgment an ~lward
~lward of
the Idaho Court of Appeals held that cven in cases involving an offer of judgment,
j

discretionary costs must still be based upon specitlc findings that the requested costs were
necessary, exceptional, and reasonably incurred. The district court, "in ruling upon objeetions to
such discretionary costs contained in the memorandum of costs, shall make express findings as
to why such specific item of discretionary cost should or should not be allowed." I.R.c.P.
54(d)(1)(D); Sr.ewart, id.. See also Masters v. De:wey,
576 580, 709 P.2d 149,
149) 153
Dr::wey, ] 09 Idaho 576,
j

(Ct.App. 1985) (holding that the district court should explicitly state which costs are recoverable
(Ct.App.1985)
under Rule 68 and Rule 54(d)(I)(D), together with a statement of reasons supporting the award
of any discretionary costs under Rule 54(d)(1)(D».
None of the items of discretionary cost which the Mailes have requested meet the
requirements of Rule 54(d)(l)(D).
OBJECTION TO MAILES'
MEMO OF COSTS
5

002415

03/02/2011

11:02

a.

35059'

.......'39

HORENSTEIN LAlli

-

PAGE

$600 fOf
ex,~eptional
for Maur.ice Chaffin should not be allowed; there is nothing eXI~eptional
about hiring a potential expert witness who does not end up testifying at trial. More
importantly.

the Counter-defendants'
Counter-defe.lldants' witness disclosure 2 did not even disclose a

"Maurice Chaffin" as a potential expert witness.
b.

$22.05 in postage is not exceptionaL

c.

$10.00 for obtaining a certified copy of Tamara Crane's notary certificate is not
~~vidence.
exceptiona.l and was not necessary. The certificate was not admitted into ~~vidence,

and this expense was paid on January 10, 2011,
2011. well after the issuance of this Court's
protection order relating to any testimony by Tamara Crane.
d.

$217.96 for binders, index sheets and labels for exhibit binders, plus $1,160 for
exp(~nse, nor
copying exhibits, jury instructions, and pleadings is not an exceptional exp(~nse,

was it even remotely necessary.
necessal)'.

In spite of this Court's very clear rulings in limine,

virtually all of the requested instructions and proposed exhibits were a blatant attempt
to have a trial on the MaBes' claims which were dismissed.

Few, if any, of the

requested instructions were actually given, and very few of the proposed exhibits
were even offered, let alone admitted into evidence.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Counterclaimants respectfully request that this Court

enter an order specifically disallowing the costs requested in Thomas Maile's Memorandum of
Costs dated February 18,2011.

DATED this 211d day of March, 2011.

2

Certification to Opposing Counsel of Expert and Lay Witnesses dated Novembe:r 18,

2010.
MAILI3S'
OBJECTION TO MAILES'
MEMO OF COSTS
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that 011 the 2nd day of March, 2011 I caused to be served a true
and correct copy ofthe foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:

Thomas G. Maile, TV

U.S, Mail

380 West State Street

Hand Delivered

Overnight Mail

Eagle, ID 83616

(208)939.1001
FAX (208)
.939·/00!

Mr. Christ Troupis
Attorney at Law
PO Box 2408

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered

Eagle.
Eagle, ID 83616

Overnight Mail
938-5482
FAX (208) 938·5482

Mark Prusynski
MOFFATT THOMAS
101 S Capitol Blvd., 10 th Floor

u.s. Mail
U.S.
Hand Delivered
Ovemight Mail
FAX (208) 38$-538.1

PO Box 829

-.e~
-.e~

Boise.
Boise, ID 83701

Connie Taylor
Attorney tor Counterc1aimall

OBJECTION TO MAILES'
MEMO OF COSTS
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By SUSAN MASSEY
DEPUTY

CONNIE W. TAYLOR
HENDERSON LAW FIRM, PLLC
900 Washington Street. Suite 1020
Vancouver. WA 98660
360.699.1530
ISBA No. 4837
Attorneys for Counter-defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability. and THOMAS G.
MAILE. IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,

Case No. CV OC 0723232

SUPPLEMENTAL OBJECTION TO
MAILES' MEMORANDUM OF COSTS

V$.
vs.

CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, et al.
Defendants/Counter-claimants.

The Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, by and through its trustees Dallan Taylor and

R. John Taylor, pursuant to I.R.c.P. 54(d)(6) file this SUPPLEMENTAL objection to
to. the costs
addressed in the Troupis Affidavits dated February 23,
23. 2011 and March 1,
1. 2011. The arguments

that the Mailes are not entitled to any costs at all, which are contained in the Objection to Mailes'
Memorandum of Costs, are incorporated by reference.

1. The costs requested in the Troupis affidavits should be

di~allowed.
di~allowed.

The determination of costs is left to the sound discretion of the district court. Idaho
SUPPLEMENTAL OBJECTION TO
MAILES'MEMO OF COSTS
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Department of Health and Welfare v. SoutJ1jork Lumher Co., 123 Iclaho 146, 149, 845 P.2d 564,

567 (1993).
1. Costs

as a matter of right: Troupis claims $145 for service
servjce of process on witnesses

for the trial, and $125 for witness fees. Under Rule 54(d)(1)(©)(3), witness fees an~ allowed
only for a witness who testifies at a deposition or in the trial of an action. Troupis acknowledges
that none of the witnesses were called to testify; these costs should not be allowed.

The amount

of $2,000 for expert witness fees for John Runft should not be allowed, as the MaiJes were not
the prevailing party and the offer of judgment was ineffective for the reasons discussed in the
prior brieftng.
2.

Discretionary costs: Troupis seeks an award of additional expert witness fees for

John Runft in the amount of $11,789.33 as discretionary costs under Rule 54(d)(I)(D), which
grants a court the discretion to award "necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred, and
justice be assessed against the adverse party,"
should in the interest of
ofjustice
Troupis' affidavit statements which support this request have no merit. Contrary to the
assertions raised by Mr,
Mr. Troupis, the counterclaims were not "complex, general, unspecified and
overly broad," and the ethical issues were not "subsequently dropped by the Counterclaimants,"
but were precluded by the Courts order in limine.
unrc::asonable
Expert witness fees must be reasonable. The amount of Mr. Runft's fees is unrc;:asonable
and excessive, particularly in light of his quality of his testimony at the trial, which was
confusing, circuitous, and tortured, at best. About the only thing Mr. Runft said that made any
sense at all was his unequivocal statement that none of the assertions raised by the MaBes in their
Complaint would have had any impact whatsoever on the fact that the contract to purchase Ted
Johnson's farm was void ab initio.

A review of the expert disclosure on Mr. Runft shows that the overwhelming m,tiority of
his anticipated testimony was an effort to have a trial on the dismissed claims of the: Mailes,
which this Court long before the trial date made abundantly clear would not be allowed.
Mr. Runft's fees were not exceptional costs reasonably incurred, and it would not servc
justice for those costs to be assessed against the Johnson Trust.
the interest of
ofjustice

SUPPLEMENTAL OBJECTION TO
MAILES'MEMO OF COSTS
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Counterclaimants respectfully request that this Court
enter an order spccificaUy
specifically disallowing the costs requested in Christ Troupis' affidavits dated
February 23 and March 1, 2011.

oAATED
TED this 2nd day of March, 2011.
" LAW FIRM, PLLC

..----...-T_--------'
----..-+_--------'

By:
Conn c Wright Taylor, Attomc s for~
Counterclaiman ts

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2nd day of March, 2011 I caused to be served a tme
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and address,~d
address,~d to the
following:
Thomas G. Maile, IV
380 West State Street
Eagle, ID 83616

U.S, Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
FAX (208) 939·J001
939·.1001

Mr. Christ Troupis

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
FAX (208) 938-5482

Attorney at Law

PO Box 2408

Eagle,ID 83616

U.S. Mail

Mark Pmsynski
MOFFAIT
MOFF
AIT THOMAS
101 S Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor

Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Ma.il
FAX (208) 385-5384

PO Box 829
Boise, ID 83701

Sl/PPLEMENTAL OBJECTION TO
MAlLES'MEMO OF COSTS
MATLES'MEMO
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4.a County Clerk
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130
PO Box 2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: 208/938-5584
Facsimile:
208/938-5482
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By LARA AMES
OEPUTY

Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT Olr THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IBERKSHIRE
I;ERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCHBIRCH
MAILE, husband and wife,

I

Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,

CV-OC-0723232
Case No. CV-OC-0723232
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF
CHRIST TROUPIS RE:
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS

v.
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, fIkIa
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual;
DALLAN TAYLOR, an individual; R.
JOHN TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK
and FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T.
CLARK, an individual; THEODORE L.
JOHNSON REVOCABLE TRUST, an
Idaho revocable trust; JOHN DOES I -
JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSONS IN
POSSESSION OR CLAIMING ANY
RIGHT TO POSSESSION.
'--

Defendants/Counter-Claimants.

I

J-------

,

~----------------------------~--------------------------- ~

STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF ADA

~

)
) ss.
)

Christ T. Troupis, being duly sworn on oath, deposes and states:

Supplemental Affidavit of Christ Troupis Re Memorandum of Costs

1
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I. I am the attorney for the Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants in this action. Each of the
matters set forth herein are known to me of my own personal knowledge and if
sworn as a witness in this matter, I could testify competently thereto. This
Supplemental Affidavit is submitted in support ofPlaintiffs/Counterdefendants'
Motion for Costs.
2. Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants incurred costs for service of subpoenas on
witnesses for the trial ofthis action, and witness fees for those witnesses. The
subpoena costs are allowable as a mandatory cost, and the witness fees should be
allowed as a discretionary cost.
3. Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants incurred the sum of $145.00 for service of
subpoenas on witnesses for the trial of this action.
4. Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants incurred the sum of $125.00 for witness fees for the
subpoenaed witnesses for the trial of this action.
5. These costs were necessarily incurred because at the time that the witnesses were
subpoenaed, Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants did not know the nature and extent of
the evidence that would be presented at trial by Defendants/Counterc1aimants
and were required to compel the attendance of witnesses to rebut potential
testimony. The Court's subsequent limine rulings resulted in these witnesses not
being called to testify, which could not have been anticipated by
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants.
Dated:·March 1,2011

Christ T. Troupis

,.

Supplemental Affidavit of Christ Troupis Re Memorandum of Costs
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-,'
_.'
State of Idaho

County of Ada

)
) ss.
)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public in and for the State of Idaho
and County of Ada on this 1st day of March, 2011.
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My commission expires:

i0\1.0\ U

~:-~

1111 1 .11"'\'
111"11""\'

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 1st day of March, 2011, I caused a true and Icorrect
copy of the foregoing Supplemental Affidavit of Christ Troupis re: Memorandum of Costs to be
delivered via facsimile as follows:
,-i Connie W. Taylor
------~i -)--U-.-S-.M-a-il---
U. S. Mail
i Connie W. Taylor

-(( )

----------~-------------------

)

I. Henderson Law Firm
I
I
I!

900 Washington St. Suite 1020
Vancouver, Washington 98660
Facsimile: (360) 693-2911

(X)

I
II

(
( ))

I.

(

I

(

)

)

Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

I

Mark Stephen Prusynski
PO Box 829
"., Boise, ID 83701
Phone: (208) 345-2000
I Facsimile: (208) 385-5384
i

I

I

Thomas G. Maile, IV.
380 W. State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
I Facsimile: (208) 939-1001
i

II (( ))
I (X)
I (
II (

~
)

i

)

(

)

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

I
I
I,I,

(X)

____JJH( )
( )

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

I

I

.~JJ

I

CHRIST T. TROUPI
TROUP I ,
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants

Supplemental Affidavit of Christ Troupis Re Memorandum of Costs
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EXlllBIT A
12/1/2010

Witness Fee

Bart Harwood

$25.00

12/112010

Witness Fee

Beth Rogers

$25.00

12/112010

Witness Fee

Phillip 1.
J. Collaer

$25.00

1211/2010
12/1/2010

Witness Fee

Tim Williams

$25.00

12/1/2010

Witness Fee

Bradford Knipe

$25.00

1118/2010
1/18/2010

Service of Subpoena Knipe

$45.00

1118/2010

Service of Subpoena Rogers

$25.00

1118/2010
1/18/2010

Service of Subpoena Collaer

$25.00

111812010
1118/2010

Service of Subpoena Williams

$25.00

1118/2010
1/18/2010

Service of Subpoena Harwood

$25.00

Total

$270.00

Supplemental Affidavit of Christ Troupis Re Memorandum of Costs
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RECEIVED

MAR 07 2011

CHRISTOPHEH D. RICH, Clerk

Arl::l r-ountv Clerk

CONNlFW. TAYLOR
HENDERSON LAW FIRM, PLLC
900 Washington Street, Suite 1020
Vancouver, WA 98660
360.699.1530
ISBA No. 4837
Attorneys for Counter-defendants

Bv eARLY LATIMORE
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE
husband and wife,

Case No. CV OC 0723232

Counterclaimants/Counter-Counter
Counterclaimants/
Counter -Counterdefendants,

COUNTERCLAIMANTS'
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS

vs.
CONNIE
CONNIE

WRIGHT
TAYLOR,

TAYLOR,
TA
YLOR,
f/k/a
an
individual;

DALLAN TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
l'AYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
T. CLARK,
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL 1'.
an individual, THEODORE L. JOHNSON

REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES 1 - JOHN DOES X; and
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMAING
ANY
RIGHT
TO
POSSESSION
Counter-defendants/Counter
Counter
-defendants/ Counterclaimants.

COUNTERCLAIMANTS'
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS
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The Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, and its trustees Dallan Taylor and R. John

w. TAYLOR of the Henderson Law
Taylor, by and through their attorney of record, CONNIE W.
Firm, PLLC, make this Memorandum of Costs incurred in this matter.
1. THE JOHNSON TRUST IS THE PREVAILING PARTY
The Johnson Trust submits that when this Court considers all of the claims, including the
claim for fees of the Clark and Feeney defendants, it will be apparent that the Johnson Trust is
the prevailing party and is thus entitled to an award of costs. The Trust specifically incorporates
herein the argument relating to the Maile Offer of Judgment set forth in its Objection to Mailes'
Memorandum of Costs dated March 2,2011.
A prevailing party in an action is entitled to certain costs as a matter of right and may, in
some cases, also be awarded discretionary costs and attorney fees. Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(l).
54(d)(1). A
determination on prevailing parties is committed to the discretion of the trial court. Eighteen
132Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 718-19, 117 P.3d 130, 132
33 (2005). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(
d)(1 )(B) guides courts' inquiries on the prevailing
54(d)(l
party question. Id. at 719, 117 P.3d at 133. That rule provides:

In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, the trial
court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of the action in
relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. The trial court in its sound
discretion may determine that a party to an action prevailed in part and did not prevail in
part, and upon so finding may apportion the costs between and among the parties in a fair
and equitable manner after considering all of the issues and claims involved in the action
and the resultant judgment or judgments obtained.
Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1)(B).
54(d)(l)(B). In determining which party prevailed where there are claims and
counterclaims between opposing parties, the court determines who prevailed "in the action" ; that

COUNTERCLAIMANTS'
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS
2
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claimis, the prevailing party question is examined and determined from an overall view, not a claim
by-claim analysis. Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 915, 204 P.3d 1114, 1126 (2009), citing
l17P.3dat 133.
Eighteen Mile, 141 Idaho at 719, 117P.3dat
In identifying the prevailing party, the analysis requires nothing more than noting the
fact that the Mailes have not prevailed on a single matter. All of their claims were dismissed on
summary judgment, and a judgment was entered against them on the counterclaims.

They may

claim that they prevailed in part at the trial on the counterclaims because of the amount of the
jurors' verdict, but that argument fails for two separate reasons.

First, the Counterclaimants'

pleadings never sought a specific amount, but rather sought only such damages "as may be
proved at trial."

Second, the ruling on the period for which damages were available was not

made until the jury instruction conference at the end of trial, by which time the
Counterclaimants' witnesses had all testified.
of judgment was ineffective because
The Mailes' attempt to shift costs by way of an offer ofjudgment
that offer (a) did not comply with the requirements of Rule 68 that it "include all claims
recoverable .... which have accrued up to the date of the offer of judgment," and (b) was not
sufficiently definite because it did not apportion the offer amongst the multiple parties to whom
it was offered.
II. COSTS

The Johnson Trust requests an award of both costs as a matter of right (as set forth
below) and discretionary costs. Invoices supporting these costs are attached as Exhibit A to this
memorandum.
COUNTERCLAIMANTS'
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS
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54( d)(l )(D) grants a court the discretion to award "necessary and exceptional costs
Rule 54(d)(l
reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse party."
The discretionary cost requested is $1,000 in additional expert fees for D. Craig Lewis which
were incurred after the close of court on February 2 (5 hours non-court time @ $150 an hour)
and for testifying on February 3 (1 hour @ $250 an hour).

The Court will recall that the

Mailes' attorney's cross examination of this witness consisted of over 45 minutes of nothing
more than slapping case after case after case on the Elmo and asking whether Professor Lewis
agreed with the highlighted references, with no effort made to tie any of those references in to
the facts of this case. As the clock neared 2 p.m., the Court inquired ofMr. Troupis how long he
would be with the witness.

Mr. Troupis looked at the clock and said "two minutes."

At that

point, Mr. Maile audibly told his attorney that he needed to make the witness stay overnight, at
which point Mr. Troupis recanted his statement that he could finish with the witness that day. It
was necessary for the Johnson Trust to pay the additional charges to keep the witness available,
and exceptional for an opposing party to demand that an expert be kept over when his own
attorney had indicated he could finish with the witness in two minutes.

The interest of justice

requires that the Mailes be ordered to pay the additional expenses incurred.

Costs as a matter of Right
1.

Expert witness fees for an expert who testifies at a
deposition or trial.

$

3,400.00

$

568.87

D. Craig Lewis ..................................................... 2,000.00
Bob DeBolt .............................................................. 700.00
John Runft ............................................................... 700.00

COUNTERCLAIMANTS'
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS
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2.

Charges for reporting and transcribing of
depositions and Charges for one (1) copy of any
deposition taken by any of the parties to the
action in preparation for trial.

John Runft (01/24111) ............................................. 568.87

3. Travel expenses IRCP 54(d)(l)©(4)
Craig Lewis, 999 miles @ $.30 per mile ................ 299.70
John Taylor, 300 miles @ $.30 per mile ................. 90.00

DISCRETIONARY COSTS:

$
$

389.70
4,385.57

$

1,000.00

$

5,385.57

The Johnson Trust also requests an award of $1 ,000 in additional
fees for their expert witness, D. Craig Lewis, as a discretionary
cost.

Total Requested Costs

DATED this 2nd day of March, 2011.

COUNTERCLAIMANTS'
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS
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STATE OF WASHINGTON
County of Clark

)
) ss.
)

~~\)-

T

Connie W. Taylor

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ~day of March, 2011.

\J\Ct\R ~ L
~t\Ct\R
r

ft.
rr.rr
\j ,\~
f,.

Notary Public in and for the State
oJ Washington, residing (~t

WV'C(1Ht'{j
\.tlY'C(ULr{) l U: .

My commission expires:_ \\

COUNTERCLAIMANTS'
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS
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CERTIFICATE OF

SERVI~

/j

(

~

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day of February, 2011 I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed
to the following:
Thomas G. Maile, IV
380 West State Street
Eagle, ID 83616

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001

Mr. Christ Troupis
Attorney at Law
PO Box 2408
Eagle, ID 83616

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 938-5482

Mark Prusynski
MOFFATT THOMAS
101 S Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
PO Box 829
Boise, ID 83701

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 385-5384

~

Co nie Taylor
Attorney for Counterc1ai
Counterclai

COUNTERCLAIMANTS'
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS
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Exhibit A
002432

February 7, 2011

Connie W. Taylor
Henderson Law Firm
900 Washington St., Suite 1020
Vancouver WA 98660

Re: Maile v. Taylor

FOR SERVICES RENDERED during the period January 26 - February 3, 2011, including:
1/26 - 1/30 Review case materials, Runft deposition, charts in preparation for trial
testimony; email Ms. Taylor
4.2 hrs @ $ 150 hr.

$ 630.00

2/1 Travel; confer w/ counsel and client

10 hrs. @ $150 hr.

$1500.00

2/2 Court time; testimony

5 hrs. @ $250 hr.

$ 1250.00

5 hrs. @ $150 hr.

$ 750.00

1 hr. @ $ 250 hr.

$ 250.00

8 hrs. @ $150 hr.

$ 1200.00

Non-court time

2/3 Court time;
Non-·court time
Non--court

TOTAL

$ 5,580.00

EXPENSES
Airport shuttle Casa Grande/ Sky Harbor/ Casa Grande, tips
Hotel
Hotel
Thrifty car rental

$ 130.00

~~
~~
$ 108.14

002433

$ 47.00

Meals - 3 lunches, 1 dinner

7SG-L~e
fSG~
D. Craig

TOTAL EXPENSES

$574.08

BALANCE DUE

$ 6154.08

"'-......
""--....
---77
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Page 1
I of2

Timf' Charges
Gmail - Fairfield Estates Tim/"

connie taylor <conniewtaylor@gmail.com>

Fairfield Estates Time Charges
2 messages
Bob Debolt <bdebolt@live.com>
To: connie taylor <conniewtaylor@gmail.com>

Mon, Feb 7, 2011 at 10:42 AM

Hi Connie- I hope you received a favorable ruling on the Fairfield Estates lawsuit. Per your
instruction I kept track of my time on this case and submit the following:

12/8/10
Shananhan

Review email from Connie Taylor and CMA on Fairfield Estates prepan3d by Connie
1 hour

1/18/11

Meet wi
w/ Connie Taylor in my office, Eagle Idaho
1 hour

1/18/11

Prepare brief work history and qualifications
.5 hour

2/01/11

Review CMA & MLS records prior to testimony
2.5 hour

2/02/11

Travel time & waiting @ Courthouse
1 hour

2/03/11

Travel & testify

lJ1Qur
111Qur

Total

7 hours

I hope my testimony was helpful
Thank you

Bob DeBolt
Associate Broker / Eagle Sales Manager
Coldwell Banker Tomlinson Group

002435
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2/7/2011

",-& M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC~
FED ID. NO. 82-0298125

-MM·,
... " '

"Excellence in Court Reporting Since 1970"

Billed to:

Billed:

..

1/28/2011

Connie W. Taylor
Henderson Law Firm, PLLC
900 Washington Street, Ste. 1020
Vancouver, WA 98660

Job #

Invoice #

(26510B4)

Case:

Berkshire Investments v. Taylor

Witness:
Date:

John L. Runft
1/24/2011 2:36:00 PM

Claim #

36917B5

Charges:
Transcript Fee 0&1 Expert 4-Day
Attendance Fee - One-Half Day
Exhibits Attached to Transcript
Copy to deponent due to trial.
6% sales tax

$5.90
$65.00
$0.25
$0.00
$1.47

81
1
98
i
1

Sub Total
Payments
Balance Due

$477.90
$65.00
$24.50

$0.00
$1.47
$568.87
$0.00
$568.87

We appreciate your business!

(Return this section with check)

Billed to:
Invoice #
Billed:
Amount Due:

Connie W. Taylor
36917B5
1/28/2011
$568.87

SOUTHERN OFFICE

NORTHERN OFFICE

421 W. Franklin Street
P.O. Box 2636 Boise, ID 83701-2636
208-345-9611 208-345-8800 (fax)
1-800-234-961
1-800-234-9611I
email m-and-m@qwestoffice.net

816 E. Shelman Aw, Ste. 7
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814-4921
208-765-1700 208-765-8097 (fax)
1-800-879-1700
email csmith@mmcourt.com

Remit Payment

M

/'

Remit Payment []002436

Page 1 of3

Driving Directions from CaSe "rande, Arizona to Boise, Idaho
~.

There's

3 Ilew

MAPQ\JEST
~ Starting Location

Casa Grande, AZ
Total Travel Estimate:

MeJpOuest _. corne try it out!

Sorry' When printing directly from the browser your directions or map may not pnnt
print
correctly. For best results, try clicking the Printer-Friendly button.

~

Ending Location

Boise,ID

15 hours 48 minutes I 999.10 miles

Fuel Cost: Calculate

UlrectiorlS \'\iicl'
vliet' help1ful hints.
LJlrectiorlS
the nevI"

mapquest

http://classic.mapquest.com/maps?lc=Casa+Grande&ls=AZ&ly=US&11=32.879398&lg...
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THOMAS G. MAILE, N.
Attorney at Law
380 West State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 939-1000
Idaho State Bar No. 2378

..

MAR 0 7 201 1
1

CHRISTOPHER O. RICH Clerk
RANDALl. •
By JAMIE RANDAL.L
DEPUTY

Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, N. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,

Case No. CV-OC 07-23232

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiffs,
v.

CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, flkla
f/k/a
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR

CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
Defendants.

TO:

THE DEFENDANTSIRESPONDENTS ABOVE NAMED, THEIR ATTORNEY OF
RECORD, CONNIE TAYLOR and MARK PRUSYNSKI AND THE CLERK OF
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the attorney above named, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Berkshire Investments, LLC, Thomas G. Maile, IV. and Colleen Birch-Maile, by and through
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Thomas G. Maile, IV., attorney for the Plaintiffs, hereinafter referred to as "Appellants", appeal
against the above-named Respondents to the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho, from the
Memorandum Decision and Order entered on July 2,2009 and the resulting Judgment
Dismissing Plaintiff's Claims entered on July 20, 2009, and the Judgment entered on February
28, 2011 entered in the above-entitled action by Honorable Richard D. Greenwood.
1.

Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Appellate Court, from the District

Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State ofIdaho, In and For the County of Ada, and the
Memorandum Decision and Order entered on July 2, 2009 and the resulting Judgment
Dismissing Plaintiff's Claims entered on July 20, 2009, and the Judgment entered on

F,~bruary
F,~bruary

28, 2011 are appealable Orders and/or Judgments under and pursuant to Rule 11 of the I.A.R., in
that there was a Judgment Dismissing Plaintiffs' Claims and Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion
for Summary Judgment entered on July 20, 2009 as well as the Judgment entered on February
28, 2011 on the Counter-Claimants' Claims.
2.

That the parties have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme COUl1,
Com1, and the

judgment and/or orders described in paragraph 1 above are an appealable orders and/or
judgments under and pursuant to Rule 111
1(a)(2) l.A.R. That pursuant to the Idaho Appellate
Rules, jurisdiction is proper for the appeal.
3. That no order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record.
4.

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Appellants intend to

assert in the appeal, are as follows:
a.

Was the District Court correct in entering the Order dismissing the Plaintiffs/Appellants'
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial pursuant to the Defendants/Respondents' Motion

~"","b"IJIF,,,"m"\·,I"\"'''';"p",,,I.,,,",,,,,,<,,,,poJ
NOTICE OF APPEAL - Pg 2z ~"","b""IF,,,"m"\',I"\"'''';"p"'''I",,,",,,,,,<;,,.,,,,
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to Dismiss/Motion for Summary Judgment?
b.

Was the District Court correct in denying the Plaintiffs/Appellants' Motion to Reconsider
to allow the claims of the Plaintiffs/Appellants to continue to trial?

c.

Was the District Court correct in denying the Plaintiffs/Appellants' affirmative defense of
litigation privilege which would have barred the counter-claims of the
Defendants/Respondents?

d.

Was the District Court correct in denying the Plaintiffs/Appellants' Motion to Dismiss
filed 11102/2010
counter11/02/2010 as the counter-claimants failed to allege conduct against the counter
defendants which would be an exception to the litigation privilege afforded the counter
counterdefendants?

e.

Was the District Court correct in denying the Plaintiffs/Appellants' claims as set forth in
their Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial?

f.

Was the District Court correct in denying the Plaintiffs/Appellants' claims to set aside the
"Judgment based upon Beneficiaries' Claims" in the consolidated case Taylor v. Maile et.
aI, filed in the Fourth Judicial District ofthe State ofIdaho, County of Ada, case number
CV OC 04-00473D, based upon "fraud upon the court" and/or fraud upon the court by

"officers of the court"?
g.

Was the District Court correct in dismissing the Plaintiffs/Appellants' claims based upon
the criminal conduct of the co-defendants in obtaining "Judgment based upon
Beneficiaries' Claims"?

h.

Was the District Court correct in dismissing the Plaintiffs/Appellants' claims based upon
the fraudulent misrepresentations committed by the co-defendants in obtaining "Judgment
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based upon Beneficiaries' Claims"?
I.

Was the District Court correct in denying the Plaintiffs/Appellants' claims as set forth in
their Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial based upon res judicata?

J.

Did the Co-Defendants/Respondents commit criminal activity and/or fraudulent
misrepresentations that amounted to a "fraud upon the court" committed by the "officers
of the court" that should have resulted in setting aside the "Judgment on Beneficiaries'
Claims" ?

k.

Did the "fraud upon the court" committed by the "officers of the court" vitiate all
subsequent legal actions?

1.

Was the Judgment entered on February 28,2011 supported by substantial, sufficient and
competent evidence?

m.

Was the verdict finding an abuse of process and tortious interference with prospective
business advantage supported by substantial, sufficient and competent evidence?

n.

Can the filing of a complaint give rise to a finding of an abuse of process and tortious
interference with prospective business advantage?

o.

Was the verdict finding an abuse of process and tortious interference with prospective

business advantage improper as respondents failed to provide any evidence contradicting
the lis pendens were properly filed?
Is a reporter's transcript requested? Yes. The following transcript is requested, and the
Appellants request the same to be made a part of the appeal as existing transcripts, to wit:
a.

(1) 10129/2010
10/29/2010 Hearing result for Motion held on 10/29/2010 11 :30 ANI[: District

Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Leslie Anderson Number of Transcript Pages for this
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hearing estimated: less than 50 pages;
(2) 11130/2010
11130/2010 11 :30
11/30/2010 Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on 11/30/2010
AM: District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Leslie Anderson Number of Transcript Pages
for this hearing estimated: less than 50 pages;
(3) 0111812011 Hearing result for Motion in Limine held on 01/18/2011 03:00

PM: District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Leslie Anderson Number of Transcript Pages
for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages;
(4) 02/0212011 Transcript for Jury Trial held on 02/0212011 09:00 AM: District

Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Fran Morris Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 300 pages;
(5) 02/03/2011 Transcript for Jury Trial held on 02/0312011 09:00 AM: District

Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Fran Morris Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 300 pages;
(6) 02/0312011 Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 02/04/2011 09:00 AM) 4th day of

trial;
(7) 02/0412011 Transcript for Jury Trial held on 02/04/2011 09:00 AM: District

Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Tiffany Fisher Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 600 pages;
b.

The transcript is requested in standard format and not compressed.

c.

That the estimated fee for the preparation of the transcript has been paid.

That the Appellants have paid the estimated costs of the clerk's record.
5.

The Appellants request the following documents to be included in the clerk's
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record as electronic pdf files and not as hard copies:
PLEADINGS ASSOCIATED WITH ADA COUNTY CASE NO. CV OC 07-23232
1

12/31/2007 Complaint;
12/3112007

2

03/25/2008 Amended Complaint;

3

05/08/2008 Answer C Taylor for Taylor, Taylor and Johnson Trust;

4

0511212008
05/12/2008 Motion to Dismiss;

5

0511212008
05/12/2008 Affidavit In Support Of Motion to Dismiss;

6

05113/2008
05/13/2008 Answer of Connie Wright Taylor, Clark and Feeney and Paul T Clark

to Amend Complaint (Prusynski for Connie, Clark & Feeney & Paul);
7

05113/2008
andlor consider same as Motion
05/13/2008 Motion to Strike Motion to Dismiss and/or

for Summary Judgment;
8

0511912008
05/19/2008 Amended Affidavit in Support fo Motion to Dismiss;

9

10103/2008 Amended Motion to Dismiss and/or
andlor for Summary Judgment and

Sanctions;
10

10103/2008
10/03/2008 Second Affidavit in Support of Motion to Dismiss;

11

10/0312008 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary

Judgment and Sanctions;
12

1010812008
10/0812008 Statement of Facts in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment

and Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions;
13

10108/2008
10/08/2008 Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part One;

14

10/08/2008 Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part Two;

15

10108/2008
DismisslSummary
10/08/2008 Memorandum Brief in Opposition to Motion Dismiss/Summary
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Judgment and Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions;
16

10109/2008
10/09/2008 Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment;

17

10109/2008
10/09/2008 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment;

18

10/20/2008 Affidavit of Thomas G Maile, IV;

19

10120/2008 Affidavit in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel/Motion for

Attorney Fees and Costs;
20

1012012008 Memorandum Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to

Compel/Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs;
21

10123/2008 Motion to Continue All Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss

Hearings Set for 11/6/08;
22

1012312008
10/2312008 Affidavit In Support Of Motion to Continue Summary Judgment

Hearing Filed by Defendants Connie Wright Taylor, Clark and Feeney, and Paul T
Clark;
23

10/23/2008 Memorandum Brief in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment

Filed and In Support of Motion to Continue Hearings;
24

01/08/2009 Motion to Stay Proceedings Until Idaho Supreme Court Provides a

Decision in Companion Case and or Set Matter For Jury Trial;
25

01/0812009 Affidavit In Support Of Motion to Stay Proceedings Until Idaho
0110812009

Supreme Court Provides a Decision in Companion Case and or Set Matter For
Jury Trial;
26

01/08/2009 Affidavit of Tom Maile Part Three;
01108/2009

27

01108/2009 Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Dispositive MOlions;
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28

01114/2009 Notice of Non-Opposition to Motion for Stay;

29

01120/2009 Notice of Non Opposition to Motion for Stay;

30

02/09/2009 Affidavit in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment;

31

02/12/2009 Supplemental Memorandum Brief in Response to Supreme Court;

32

0211212009
02/12/2009 Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part Four;

33

02/13/2009 Motion for Order Removing Lis Pendens;

34

02/17/2009 Amended Answer and Counterclaim (Taylor for John and DaHan

Taylor and Johnson Trust);
35

0311012009
03110/2009 Reply to Amended Answer of John Taylor DaHan Taylor and John

Trust and Counterclaim;
36

0311312009
03/13/2009 Amended Answer and Counterclaim;

37

03117/2009 Reply to Amended Answer of Connie Taylor, Clark and Feeney and

Paul T. Clark and Counterclaim;
38

03/17/2009 Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Defendant's
03117/2009
Counterclaim;

39

03/17/2009 Affidavit of Thomas G. Maile IV;

40

03117/2009 Memorandum Briefin Support of Motion for Summary Judgment;

41

04/03/2009 Supplemental Affidavit of Connie W Taylor in Support of Motion for

Summary Judgment;
42

04/06/2009 Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part Five;

43

04/06/2009 Supplemental Memorandum Brief in Opposition to Motion for

Summary Judgment Filed by Defendants and in Response to Supplemental
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Affidavit of Connie W Taylor in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment;
44

04/08/2009 Affidavit of Helen Taylor;

45

04/08/2009 Second Supplemental Affidavit of Connie W Taylor in Support of

Motion for Summary Judgment;
46

04/08/2009 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment on

Counterclaims;
47

04/08/2009 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment on

Counterclaims;
48

04/08/2009 Third Supplemental Affidavit in Support of Motion for Summary

Judgment;
49

04/08/2009 Joinder 0411312009
04/1312009 Reply to Opposition to Motion for Summary

Judgment;
50

04/14/2009 Reply Memorandum Brief in Support of Motion for Summary
04114/2009

Judgment Relating to the Defendants Counter-Claim & in Opposition to
Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment;
51

04/15/2009 Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment;
04/1512009

52

04/20/2009 Response To Plaintiffs Motion to Compel;

53

04/20/2009 Response to Motion to Compel;

54

05/01/2009 Plaintiffs Request to Take Judicial Notice of Pleadings;

55

07/02/2009 Memorandum Decision & Order;

56

07/13/2009 Motion for Certification;

57

07/13/2009 Memorandum Brief in Support of Motion;
07113/2009
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58

07/13/2009 Affidavit in Support of Motion;

59

07/20/2009 Order Denying Plaintiffs Summary Judgment;

60

07120/2009
07/20/2009 Judgment Dismissing Plaintiffs Claims only;

61

07/21/2009 Affidavit in Support of Motion for Certification to Memorandum;

62

08/03/2009 Amended Motion Re: Judgment Dismissing Plaintiffs Claims/Motion
ClaimslMotion

for Permissive Appeal;
63

0811312009
08/13/2009 Second Supplemental Affidavit in Support of Amended Motion for

Certifi cation;
Certification;
64

08/2112009
08/21/2009 Notice of Non Opposition to Motion;

65

09128/2009
09/28/2009 Order re: Motion for Certification 1/ Motion for Permissive Appeal;

66

12/03/2009 Renewed Motion for Certification Pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 54(b) re

Judgment Entered July 20,2009;
67

12/03/2009 Affidavit In Support Of Motion;

68

12/21/2009 Objection to Renewed Motion for Certification;

69

12/2112009
12/21/2009 Affidavit of Connie W Taylor;

70

01/08/2010 Memorandum Brief in Support of Renewed Motion for Certification

Pursuant to lR.C.P. Rule 54(B) RE: Judgment Entered July 20, 2009;
71

01/08/20] 0 Supplemental Affidavit in Support of Renewed Motion for

I.R.C.P. Rule 54(B) RE: Judgment Entered July 20,
Certification Pursuant to lR.C.P.

2009;
72

03/03/2010 Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment on Defendants'

Counterclaim;
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73

03/0312010 Memorandum in Support of Motion;

74

03/0312010 Affidavit In Support Of Motion;

75

04/2712010 Affidavit of Mark Prusynski;

76

04/2912010 Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to 2nd Motion for

Summary Judgment on Counterclaims;
77

04/2912010 Affidavit ofR. John Taylor in Opposition to Second Motion for

Summary Judgment on the Defendant's Counterclaims;
78

0412912010 Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to Second Motion for Summary

Judgment;
79

0412912010 Memorandum in Opposition to Second Motion for Summary

Judgment;
80

05/04/2010 Motion to Strike;

81

05/04/2010 Affidavit of Chris Troupis in Support of Motion to Strike;

82

05/0412010 Reply Memorandum Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for

Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Counter-Claimants Motion to Amend
the Counter-Claim;

83

0612312010 Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on the

Defendants' Counterclaims;
84

06123/2010 Order Granting Motion for Leave to Amend Counterclaims;

85

06/28/2010 Amended Counterclaim;

86

08/04/2010 Reply to Amended Counterclaim;

87

09/29/20
10 Motion to Reconsider;
09/29/2010
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88

09/29/2010 Affidavit of Christ Troupis in Support of Motion;

89

09/29/2010 Memorandum Briefin Support of Motion;

90

10113/2010 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Reconsider;

91

10/2112010 Reply Memorandum Brief in Support of Motion to Reconsider;

92

10/26/2010 Correction to Reply Memorandum Brief in Support of Motion to

Reconsider;
93

10/29/2010 Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants' Motion to Reply to Counterclaim

and Demand for Jury Trial;
94

10/29/2010 Affidavit of Christ Troupis in Support of Plaintiffs/Counter-

Defendants' Motion to Reply to Counterclaim and Demand for Jury Trial;
95

11102/2010 Motion to Dismiss;

96

11102/2010 Memorandum in Support;

97

11122/2010 Objection to Counter-Defendant's Motion for Leave to Amend Reply
to Counterclaims;

98

11122/2010 Affidavit in Opposition;

99

11/22/2010 Memorandum in Opposition;

100

11/24/2010 Reply Memorandum Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss &/or

Motion in Limine RE: Litigation Privilege;
101

1112912010
11129/2010 Joinder in Co Defendants Opposition to Motion to Dismiss and or

Motion in Limine and Objection to Motion for Leave to Amend Reply to
Counterclaims;
102

12/02/2010 Stipulation to Dismiss Counterclaim of Clark and Feeney
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Defendants;

103

12/06/2010 Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim of Clark and Feeney Defendants;

104

01103/2011
01/03/2011 Motion for Limited Admission;

105

01/03/2011 Motion in Limine With Supporting Authority;

106

01/0312011
0110312011 Motion to Exclude Expert & Lay Testimony RE: Claims Against

Counter-Defendant;
107

01/03/2011 Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants' Memorandum Briefin Support of
01103/2011
Motion to Exclude Expert & Lay Testimony RE: Claims Against
Counter-Defendants;

108

01/03/2011 Motion in Limine RE: Testimony Concerning Helen Taylor;
01103/2011

109

01/03/2011 Memorandum Briefin Support of motion in Limine RE: Testimony
concerning Helen Taylor;

110

01103/2011 Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants' Motion to Exclude Testimony of Bob

Debolt;
111

01103/2011 Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants' Memorandum Brief in Support of
Motion to Exclude Testimony of Bob Debolt;

112

01/03/2011 Motion in Limine RE: Idaho State Bar Complaint;

113

01103/2011 Memorandum Brief in Support of Motion in Limine RE: Idaho State

Bar Complaint;
114

01/03/2011 Motion in Limine RE: Damages;

115

01103/2011 Memorandum in Support of Counter-Defendants' Motion in Limine

RE: Damages;
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116

Al1egations~
01103/2011 Motion in Limine RE: Relevance of Prior Al1egations~

117

01103/2011 Memorandum Briefin Support of Motion in Limine RE: Rdevance
Allegations~
of Prior Allegations~

118

Limine~
01103/2011 Affidavit of Christ Troupis in Support of Motions in Limine~

119

01110/2011 Affidavit In Support Of Motion to Exclude Testimony of Sam

Langston, Bob Debolt;
120

0111 0/2011 Requested Jury Instructions~
Instructions~

121

0111012011 Counter-Defendants' Requested Jury Instructions and Proposed
Special Verdict Form;

122

01110/2011 Memorandum in Opposition to Counter-Claimants' Motion in Limine

and Supplemental Motion in Limines;
123

0111112011 Memorandum Opposing Counterdefendants' Motion In Limines;

124

01112/2011 Affidavit of Christ Troupis in Support of Motion in Limines::

125

0111212011 Reply Memorandum Brief in Support of Motions in

126

01114/2011 BriefIn Support Of Motion In Limine To Preclude Connie Taylors

Limine~

Testimony;

127

0112012011 Supplemental Affidavit of Christ Troupis;

128

01/2112011 Summary Order Re Motions in

129

01/21/2011 Order for limited Admission~

130

0112612011 Motion and Memo in Support of Motion to Prohibit Counter-·

Limine~

claimants from Calling Thomas Maile as a Witness;
131

02/01/2011 Counter-defendants' Motion and Memorandum in Support of Motion

002451

to Prohibit Counter-claimants from Introducing or Referring to November 2006
Order, C-C Exhibit 11 and 2005 Purchase and Land Sale Agreement, C-C Exhibit
5, or the Issues Raised Therein
132

02/0112011 Motion and Memorandum in Support of Motion to Prohibit From

Referring to Order
133

02/04/2011 Jury Instructions.

134

02/0412011 Verdict Form.

135

02/1112011
02/11/2011 Motion for Judgment not Withstanding the Verdict.

136

02111/2011
02/11/2011 Memorandum Brief in Support of Motion.

137

02/28/2011 Judgment.

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20 LA.R.

DATED this

1

day of March, 2011.

Co-Counsel

0
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

7

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of March, 2011, I caused to be delivered a
APPItAL, to be delivered, addressed as follows:
true and correct co y of the NOTICE OF AP"PltAL,
Connie W. Taylor & Paul Henderson
Henderson Law Firm
900 Washington St. Suite 1020
Vancouver, Washington 98660
Facsimile: (360) 693-2911

(X)
()
()
()

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

Mark Stephen Prusynski
PO Box 829
Boise, 10 83701
Phone: (208) 345-2000
Facsimile: (208) 385-5384

(X)
()
()
()

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

Christ T. Troupis
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130
PO Box 2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Facsimile: (208) 938-5482

()
()
(X)
()

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

Leslie Anderson, Court Reporter
Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

(
( ))
(
( ))
(X)
( ))
(

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

Fran Morris, Court Reporter
Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

( ))
(
( ))
(
(X)
(
( ))

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

Tiffany Fisher, Court Reporter
Tucker & Associates, LLC
PO Box 1625
Boise, Idaho 83701

(X)
( ))
(
( ))
(
( ))
(

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
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1 0 2011
MAR 10
Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130
PO Box 2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: 208/938-5584
Facsimile:
208/938-5482
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com

CHRISTOPHEB D. RICH, Clerk
By ABBY GARDEN
DEPUTY

Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF' THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an

~

I

Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
BIRCHMAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH
MAILE, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,

- - - - - -

~~-

I

i

Case No. CV-OC-0723232
A1~
i
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAl~
AFFIDAVIT OF CHRIST TROUPIS :
RE: MEMORANDUM OF COSTS
I

I

v.
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, fIkIa
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual;
DALLAN TAYLOR, an individual; R.
JOHN TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK
and FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T.
CLARK, an individual; THEODORE L.
I

JOHNSON REVOCABLE TRUST, an
Idaho revocable trust; JOHN DOES I JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSONS IN
POSSESSION OR CLAIMING ANY
RIGHT TO POSSESSION.
Defendants/Counter-Claimants.

STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF ADA

)
) ss.
)

Christ T. Troupis, being duly sworn on oath, deposes and states:

Second Supplemental Affidavit of Christ Troupis Re Memorandum of Costs

1
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.......
1. I am the attorney for the Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants in this action. Each of the
my own personal knowledge and if
ofmy
matters set forth herein are known to me of
sworn as a witness in this matter, I could testify competently thereto. This Second
Supplemental Affidavit is submitted in support ofPlaintiffs/Counterdefendants'
Motion for Costs.
2. Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants incurred costs for the transcript ofthe deposition of
John Runft taken by the Counterclaimants,
Counterc1aimants, in the sum of$196.40, and the sum of
$369.60 for a transcript of the opening statements of counsel in the trial ofthis
action. These costs are accurately set out on Exhibit A hereto, and should be
allowed as mandatory costs.
Dated: March 9, 2011

State ofldaho
County of Ada

)
) ss.
)

Ltl.JLv)l.llft£.R)A;QUa
U1.JWjl..Dft£~
Notary Public
My commission expires:

lOt2D1 U

Second Supplemental Affidavit of Christ Troupis Re Memorandum of Costs

2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 9th day of March, 2011, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Second Supplemental Affidavit of Christ Troupis re: Memorandum of
Costs to be delivered via facsimile as follows:
~--------------I
~--------------I

I
i

Connie W. Taylor
Henderson Law Finn
900 Washington St.
S1. Suite 1020
Vancouver, Washington 98660
Facsimile: (360) 693-2911

I

, Mark Stephen Prusynski
PO Box 829
Boise, ID 83701
Phone: (208) 345-2000
Facsimile: (208) 385-5384
Thomas G. Maile, IV.
, 380 W. State Street
I Eagle, Idaho 83616
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001

I (
( ))
I (X)

.(
( ))
(
( ))

( )

u.
U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

( )
( )

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

( )

u. S. Mail

(X)

Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

(X)

( )
I (
---'----

)

I

I

I
I
I
I

Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants

Second Supplemental Affidavit of Christ Troupis Re Memorandum of Costs

3
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EXIDBITA
21112011
2/112011

M&M Court Reporting - Transcript
Deposition of John Runft

$196.40

21112011
2/112011

Frances Morris, CSR - Transcript
Of Opening Statements at Trial

$369.60

Total

$566.00

Second Supplemental Affidavit of Christ Troupis Re Memorandum of Costs

002457
4

THOMAS G. MAILE, N.
Attorney at Law
380 West State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 939-1000
Idaho State Bar No. 2378

No.~
t:/ . _ _ _
t:l

A.M.

LE

PM

---

MAR 1 12011
CHRISTOPHER 0

-

By STEPHANIE ~/CH, Clerk
DEPUTY
IDAK

Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, N. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,

CV-OC-0723232
Case No. CV-OC-0723232

OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR
COSTS BY TAYLORS AND TRUST

Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,
v.
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, flkla
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR

CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
COMES NOW, the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, by and through their co-counsel,
Thomas G. Maile, N., and enters an objection to the application for costs and moves this
Honorable Court pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 54(d)(6), for an entry ofit's Order denying the costs
as set forth in the Memorandum of Costs submitted by the Taylors andlor The Theodore L.
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Johnson Revocable Trust, upon the grounds and for the reasons that there exists no basis in law
or in fact for such an award, the amounts claimed are not allowed by the appropriate Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure.
Idaho Law provides ample authority for the court to deny any request for costs by the
Counter-claimants, The Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, Dallan Taylor and R. John
LR.C.P., which provides:
Taylor. Rule 68 of the I.R.C.P.,
Rule 68. Offer of Judgment
(a) At any time more than 14 days before the trial begins, a party defending
against a claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to be
taken against the defending party for the money or property or to the effect
of judgment shall be deemed to include all
specified in the offer, which offer ofjudgment
claims recoverable, including any attorneys fees awardable under Rule 54(e)(I),
date'
and any costs awardable under Rule 54(d)(1), which have accrued up to the date
of judgment.. ..
of the offer ofjudgment....
If the adjusted award obtained by the offeree is less than the offer, then:
54( d)( 1),
(I) the offeree must pay those costs of the offeror as allowed under Rule 54(d)(
incurred after the making of the offer;
(ii) the offeror must pay those costs of the offeree, as allowed under Rule 54(d)(l),
incurred before the making of the offer; and
(iii) the offeror shall not be liable for costs and attorney fees awardable under
Rules 54(d)(1) and 54(e)(I) of the offeree incurred after the making of the offer.
of judgment was served on the counter-claimants on
In the present matter the offer ofjudgment
November 16,2009. The amount of$55,000.00 was offered to all of the counter-claima.nts. The
jury provided a verdict considerably below the offered amount.
The appropriate standard for a court to determine an award of costs are set forth in
LR. c.P. Rule 54(d)(1
54( d) (1 ) which states:
LR.c.P.
54(d)(1). Costs - Items allowed
Rule 54(d)(1).
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(A) Parties Entitled to Costs. Except when otherwise limited by these rules, costs
shall be allowed as a matter of right to the prevailing party or parties, unless
otherwise ordered by the court.
(B) Prevailing Party. In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party
and entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the
jinaljudgment
the action in relation to the reliefsought by the
finaljudgment or result of
ofthe
respective parties. The trial court in its sound discretion may determine that a
party to an action prevailed in part and did not prevail in part, and upon so finding
may apportion the costs between and among the parties in a fair and equitable
manner after considering all of the issues and claims involved in the action and
the resultant judgment or judgments obtained.
(C) Costs as a Matter of Right. When costs are awarded to a party, such party shall
be entitled to the following costs, actually paid, as a matter of right:
1. Court filing fees.
2. Actual fees for service of any pleading or document in the action whether
served by a public officer or other person.
3. Witness fees of$20.00 per day for each day in which a witness, other than a
party or expert, testifies at a deposition or in the trial of an action.
4. Travel expenses of witnesses who travel by private transportation, other than a
party, who testify in the trial of an action, computed at the rate of $.30 per mile,
one way, from the place of residence, whether it be within or without the state of
Idaho; travel expenses of witnesses who travel other than by private
transportation, other than a party, computed as the actual travel expenses of the
witness not to exceed $.30 per mile, one way, from the place of residence of the
witness, whether it be within or without the state of Idaho.
8. Reasonable expert witness fees for an expert who testifies at a deposition or at a
trial of an action not to exceed the sum of$2,000 for each expert witness for all
appearances.
9. Charges for reporting and transcribing of a deposition taken in preparation for
trial of an action, whether or not read into evidence in the trial of an action.
10. Charges for one (1) copy of any deposition taken by any of the parties to the
action in preparation for trial of the action.
Notwithstanding the determination that a particular party is entitled to costs as a
matter of right under this subparagraph (C) in an action, the trial court in its sound
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discretion may, upon proper objection, disallow any of the above described costs
upon a finding that said costs were not reasonably incurred; were incurred for the
purpose of harassment; were incurred in bad faith; or were incurred for the
purpose of increasing the costs to any other party. The mere fact that a deposition
is not used in the trial of an action, either as evidence read into the record or for
the purposes of impeachment, shall not indicate that the taking of such deposition
was not reasonable, or that a copy of a deposition was not reasonably obtained, or
that the cost of the deposition should otherwise be disallowed, so long as its
taking was reasonable in the preparation for trial in the action.
(D) Discretionary Costs. Additional items of cost not enumerated in, or in an
amount in excess of that listed in subparagraph (C), may be allowed upon a
showing that said costs were necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred,
justice be assessed against the adverse party. The trial
and should in the interest of
ofjustice
court, in ruling upon objections to such discretionary costs contained in the
memorandum of costs, shall make express findings as to why such specific item
of discretionary cost should or should not be allowed. In the absence of any
objection to such an item of discretionary costs, the court may disallow on its own
motion any such items of discretionary costs and shall make express findings
supporting such disallowance. (Emphasis added)
judgment and the jury verdict did not come
The Counter-defendants made their offer of
ofjudgment
close to the amount offered. The Counter-defendants have previously provided their
Memorandum Brief regarding the effects of the offer ofjudgment
of judgment in the current matter and
incorporate the same herein as an additional authority for their objections to the present
Memorandum of Costs.
The case of Polk v. Larrabee, 135 Idaho 303, 17 P.3d 247 (Idaho 2000), provides
ofjudgment
judgment is one of the considerations to be taken into account in
authority that the offer of
determining who was the prevailing party. Additionally, the Counter-claimants were seeking in
excess of One Million Dollars in damages and received a verdict for $28,000.00. The counterdefendants were the prevailing parties. However, if the court determines otherwise, the
following is provided as a basis for the objection to the proposed costs. The counter-claimants
have improperly requested the following costs and the same should be denied:

OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR COSTS - Pg 4

002461

1.

Graig Lewis' expenses for airport shuttle, tips, hotel, rental car are not authorized by Rule
54 and no showing has been made that those expenses were necessary and an exceptional
costs reasonably incurred as discretionary costs.

2.

Graig Lewis' time billed is combined with travel time and preparation time which makes
it impossible to access what time is attributable to what activity some of which is not
authorized by Rule 54. Furthermore no showing has been made that it was necessary and
an exceptional costs reasonably incurred as discretionary costs.

3.

Graig Lewis' non court time is not authorized by Rule 54 and no showing has heen made
that it was necessary and an exceptional costs reasonably incurred as discretionary costs.

4.

Graig Lewis' 999 miles are not supported by affidavit or other verified pleading and
appears to be included in his billing at an hourly rate are not authorized by Rule 54 and
furthermore no showing has been made that the expense was necessary and an
exceptional costs reasonably incurred as discretionary costs.

5.

Bob DeBolt' time billed for travel and waiting of2/2/11
of2/2111 is not authorized by Rule 54 and
no showing has been made that it was a necessary and an exceptional costs reasonably
incurred as discretionary costs.

6.

Bob DeBolt' time billed for testimony is combined with travel of2/3/11
of2/3111 which makes it
impossible to access what time is attributable to what activity. Travel time is not
authorized by Rule 54 and no showing has been made that such time was necessary and
an exceptional costs reasonably incurred as discretionary costs.

7.

John Taylor's travel expenses (not allowed as a party).
That additional reasons for said objections are set forth in the Plaintiffs/Counter-
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Defendants' Memorandum Brief in Opposition to Motion for Costs and Attorneys Fees and the
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants Memorandum in Support of Counter-Defendants' Motion for
Costs and Opposition to Counter-claimants' Motion for Costs and Attorneys Fees filed herein
and made a part hereof as if set forth in full herein.
Hearing upon objection is requested. Oral argument is requested.
DATED this

P----day of March, 2011.
THOMAS G. MAILE, IV.,
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

~y

I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this
of March, 2011, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing (I)
(1) OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR COSTS to be delivered, addressed as
follows:
Connie W. Taylor & Paul Henderson
Henderson Law Firm
900 Washington St.
S1. Suite 1020
l020
Vancouver, Washington 98660
Facsimile: (360) 693-2911

()

u. S. Mail

(X)
()
()

Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

Mark Stephen Prusynski
PO Box 829
Boise, ID 83701
Phone: (208) 345-2000
Facsimile: (208) 385-5384

()
(X)
()
()

u. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

Christ T. Troupis
TROUPIS LA
W OFFICE
LAW
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130
PO Box 2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Facsimile: (208) 938-5482

()

u. S. Mail

(X)
()
()

Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

....

THOMAS G. MAILE, IV.,
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
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......",

THOMAS G. MAILE, IV.
Attorney at Law
380 West State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 939-1000
Idaho State Bar No. 2378

:. frfrlq~i;.~.
1qQ ~ILi;.~.- - - :.
MAR 1 1 2011
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By STEPHANIE VIDAK
DEPUTY

Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,
v.

CV -OC-0723232
Case No. CV-OC-0723232

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN
COUNTERSUPPORT OF COUNTER
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
COSTS AND REPLY TO
OBJECTION TO MAILES'
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS.

f/lc/a
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/kla
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR,
T
AYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR

CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
Defendants/Counter
-Claimants.
counter-defend,mts by and through their undersigned co-counsel of record, and
The counter-defendlmts
provides this Reply Memorandum Brief in support of their Motion for Costs and in reply to
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counter-claimants' Objection to Mailes' Memorandum of Costs:

LEGAL ARGUMENT
1

counterThe Counter-defendants properly tendered an offer of judgment on the counter
claimants' claims regardless of the status of the counter-defendants' claims set forth
in their complaint.
of judgment was improper
The counter-claimants content that counter-defendants' offer ofjudgment

since it did not resolve all claims. Such an argument is misplaced. The authorities cited by the
counter-claimants relate to cases involving multiple count complaints compromising the claims
of judgment on any particular
of the offeree. The counter-defendants did not limit their offer ofjudgment
claim. At the time of the offer the counter-claimants advanced three (3) theories of relief.
Sometime after the offer the counter-claimants withdrew the count relating to slander of title.
of judgment was directed entirely to the claims of the counter-claimants.
The offer ofjudgment
Rule 68 of the LR.C.P., does not require that the offeror agree to dismiss their claims.
The offer was made relating solely to the entire claims ofthe counter-claimants. The argument
of judgment must resolve the entire case is a misreading of the Rule. The Rule is
that the offer ofjudgment
directed solely to the advancing party's claims. The affects of the service of an offer of
judgment are set forth in Rule 68 of the LR.C.P., which provides:
Rule 68. Offer of Judgment
(a) At any time more than 14 days before the trial begins, a party defending
against a claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment
to be taken against the defending party for the money or property or to the
effect specified in the offer, ....
There is nothing in the Rule that requires a counter-defendant to abandon his or her
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claims in making an offer of
judgment on a counter-claim. In fact Rule 68 only provides that a
ofjudgment
adv~mcing a
"party defending against a claim" and not a party defending against a claim and/or adv~mcing

claim. The Rule does not require a dismissal of a claim as a pre-requisite to a valid oUer of
judgment by a "party defending against a claim" whether as a defendant or a counter-defendant.
The offer of
judgment was proper.
ofjudgment

2

The Counter-defendants properly tendered an offer of judgment on the counter
connterclaimants' claims.
The Taylor Brothers as counter-claimants approved and signed the stipulation for

dismissal of their co-counter-claimants' claims against the counter-defendants. The Taylor
Brothers and their counsel Connie Taylor agreed to the dismissal ofthe counter-claim advanced
by Clark & Feeney and Connie Taylor. The Taylor Brothers did so knowing that there was an
offer of
judgment which was served more than one year earlier. The Taylor Brothers did so
ofjudgment
knowing that Clark & Feeney and Connie Taylor admitted in their motion to dismiss that the
claims were derivative.
The Taylor Brothers now complain that the offer ofjudgment
of judgment was invalid because it was
made collectively to the counter-claimants as a whole. They knew ofthe existence ofthe offer of
judgment when they agreed to the dismissal of their co-counterclaimants' action in December
2010. The Taylor Brothers waived their argument by agreeing to dismiss claims that were
derivative in nature to their claims.
A stipulated dismissal with prejudice, entered before trial, acts as a final judgment just as
if the parties had proceeded to trial. See Kawai Farms, Inc. v. Longstreet, 121 Idaho 610, 613-14,
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826 P.2d 1322, 1325-26 (1992). Collateral issues that do not go to the merits of an action,
including requests for costs and attorney fees, can be determined by the district court after
termination or dismissal of the action. Inland Group of Companies, Inc. v. Obendorff, 131 Idaho
473,475,959 P.2d 454, 456 (1998); see also Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384,
394 (1990) (final judgment does not eliminate a court's jurisdiction to hear collateral issues).
(IDCCA).
Straub v. Smith, No. 31955 (lDCCA).
of judgment. The dismissal of
The amount awarded by the jury was far less than the offer ofjudgment.
the Clark & Feeney, Connie Taylor claims by stipulation bars the Taylor Brothers from asserting
of judgment.
any alleged defects in the offer ofjudgment.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above cited the counter-defendants are entitled to their costs as of
November 16, 2009 through the present. The counter-claimants are only allowed their costs prior
to November 16, 2009 relating to their claims set forth in their counter-claims.
ORAL ARGUMENT is requested upon the motion.
thisLtr day of March, 2011.
DATED thisLtrday

~E'N'

Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/CounterPlaintiffs/Counter
Defendants
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-'
CERTIFICA TE OF SERVICE
CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on thi.l () day of March, 2011, I caused a true and correct
COUNTER
copy of the foregoing REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COUNTERDEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR COSTS AND REPLY TO OBJECTION TO MAILES'
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS, to be delivered, addressed as follows:
Connie W. Taylor & Paul Henderson
Henderson Law Finn
900 Washington St. Suite 1020
Vancouver, Washington 98660
Facsimile: (360) 693-2911

()
(X)
()
()

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

Mark Stephen Prusynski
PO Box 829
Boise, ID 83701
Phone: (208) 345-2000
Facsimile: (208) 385-5384

()

u. S. Mail

(X)
()
()

Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

()
(X)
()
()

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

Christ T. Troupis
LA W OFFICE
TROUPIS LAW
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130
PO Box 2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Facsimile: (208) 938-5482

THOMAS G. AIL, N.,
Co-Counsel for
ntiffs/CounterDefendants
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MAR I 1 2011
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Cieri<
By PATRICIAA. DWONCH
DEPUTY

Mark S. Prusynski, ISB No. 2349
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK

&

FIELDS, CHARTERED

101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
Post Office Box 829
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone (208) 345-2000
Facsimile (208) 385-5384
msp@moffatt.com
17136.0306
Attorneys
Attomeys for Defendants/Counterclaimants
Connie Wright Taylor fka Connie Taylor,
Clark and Feeney, and Paul T. Clark

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,

Case No. CV-OC-0723232

REPLY BRIEF RE MEMORANDUM
OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES

Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,
YS.
vs.

COJ\Jl'fIE
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, fka C01'll'fIE
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN TAYLOR,
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, an individual;
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUST, an Idaho revocable trust; JOHN
DOES I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL
PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR CLAIMING
ANY RIGHT TO POSSESSION,
Defendants/Counterclaimants.

REPLY BRIEF RE MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND
ATTORNEY FEES - 1

Client: 1971 0581
058.1
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Feenl;:y, and
Defendants, Connie Wright Taylor fka Connie Taylor, Clark and Feen,;:y,

Paul T. Clark, filed a Memorandum of Costs and Fees, to which plaintiffs objected. In their
objection, dated February 18,2011, plaintiffs argue that the attorney fees incurred by the lawyers
are derivative of the fees incurred by the Taylors in defending themselves and pursuing their

counterclaim.
In their objection of February 24,2011, plaintiffs argue that their claims of fraud
on the court, damages and perjury were not pursued frivolously, unreasonably, or without
foundation. Plaintiffs memorandum goes on to reargue its claims that it lost, and also argues

that the Court was incorrect in granting defendants' summary judgment and denying plaintiffs'
motion to reconsider the summary judgment. Plaintiffs assert that they had a reasonable basis for
bringing an independent action against the attorneys in an attempt to set aside the "Judgment on
Beneficiaries' Claims" that had been entered by Judge Wilper.
Plaintiffs' argument is reminiscent of the argument made by the plainti ff in Burns
1'.

Baldwin, 138 Idaho 480, 65 P.3d 502 (2003). Mr. Bums had also attempted to collaterally

attack a California judgment on the basis that it was void and rendered without jurisdiction. The

fact that "Bums is a lawyer" was noted by the Supreme Court. 138 Idaho at 483. Burns' attempt
to void the judgment was rejected by the district court on the basis that the original judgment was

resjudicata.
res
judicata. The court awarded attorney fees under Idaho Code Section 12-121. The Supreme
Court affirmed the attorney fee award, citing Cole v. Kunzler, 115 Idaho 552, 768 P.2d 815 (Ct.

App. 1989), the case cited by the undersigned counsel in the Memorandum of Costs and Fees in
this case.

REPL Y BRIEF RE MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND
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Mr. Maile is also an attorney. Mr. Maile also should know that his claims were
barred by res judicata. His inability to explain with any type of cogent argument why this
lawsuit against the attorneys who represented the Taylors raised any new issues from those that
were tried to Judge Wi1per,
Wilper, justifies a finding that the case was brought without foundation.
Mr. Maile's repetition of the same claims that were rejected by Judge Wilper supports a finding
that this lawsuit was brought frivolously and unreasonably. His subpoenas of Connie Taylor and
her paralegal support a finding that the claim was brought to harass the attorneys and distract
them from their representation of their clients. Mr. Maile's repeated litigation of the same
s.ame issues,
the jury's verdict of abuse of process and the Burns v. Baldwin and Cole v. Kunzler cases all

12-12l.
support an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code Section 12-121.
At the end of their February 24 memorandum, plaintiffs claim that the attorney
fees that are being claimed are somehow barred by the prosecution of the counterclaim for abuse
of process. This argument is not supported by the facts or logic. The undersigned counsel
defended the claims against the attorneys and withdrew from the case after the summary
judgment was entered. The summary judgment decision deferred a decision on costs and fees
until the conclusion of the case. The undersigned counsel was forced to reappear in the case
when plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider the summary judgment and again when plaintiffs
subpoenaed Clark and Feeney's paralegal. Connie Taylor and Clark and Feeney dismissed their
counterclaim, so no fees were incurred in pursuit of their counterclaim against the plaintiffs.
Finally, plaintiffs argue that the attorneys were not the prevailing party because
ofjudgment
plaintiffs made an offer of
judgment in excess of the jury verdict. This argument is copied from
plaintiffs' memorandum in support of their costs and fees. The offer of judgment was made
November 16, 2009. Summary judgment had been granted July 16,2009, reserving costs and

REPL Y BRIEF RE MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND
ATTORNEY FEES - 3
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fees to the conclusion of the case. Clearly, Connie Taylor, Clark and Feeney and Paul T. Clark
prevailed on all claims against them. The offer of judgment of $55,000 specifically included all
the counterclaims and "any and all attorney fees and costs which could be ordered relating to the
complaint in the pending action ....
...."" The offer of judgment, made after the claims had been
dismissed, could not transfornl the losers into the prevailing parties. Plaintiffs clearly lost their
of judgment. The Court should exercise
claims against the attorneys before they made the offer ofjudgment.
its discretion and award attorney fees under Idaho Code Section 12-121. The award of attorney
fees should be added to the $28,000 jUdgment
judgment on the counterclaim and considered along with the
summary judgment against the plaintiffs in determining that plaintiffs were clearly not the
prevailing parties in this case.
DATED this

fI.PCday
Piday of March, 2011.
;!
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED

By

~~"1.~ ./
/

/(/

/.

"7"

Mark . Prusynski - Of the irm
Attorneys for Defendants/Counterclaimants
Connie Wright Taylor fka Connie Taylor,
Clark and Feeney, and Paul T. Clark
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of March, 2011, 1I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF RE MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND
ATTORNEY FEES to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
Thomas G. Maile IV
LA W OFFICES OF THOMAS

G MAILE IV, P.A.

380 W. State St.
Eagle, ID 83616-4902
Facsimile (208) 939-1001
Christ T. Troupis
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE,

PA

P.O. Box 2408
Eagle,ID 83616
Facsimile (208) 938-5482
John C. Mitchell
CLARK

& FEENEY

1229 Main St., Suite 201
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston,ID 83501-0285
Facsimile (208) 746-9160
Connie W. Taylor
HENDERSON LA W

900 Washington, Suite 1020
WA
Vancouver, W
A 98660
Facsimile (360) 693 -2911

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( l'Facsimile

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
Facsimile

(1

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Deli vered
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( Jlfacsimile

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(;f Facsimile
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130
PO Box 2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone:
208/938-5584
Facsimile:
208/938-5482
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com
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Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IsERKSHIRE
~ERKSHlRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
· Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
BIRCHMAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH
• MAILE, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,

Iv.
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
· TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
• REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
I trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
: ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
I
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Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
Counter-defendants, by and through their undersigned co-counsel of record, provides this

Reply Memorandum in support of their Motion for Costs and in opposition to counter-claimants'
motion for costs and attorneys fees:

002475

LEGAL ARGUMENT
1.
The Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants advanced proper legal argumellits which
were supported by the facts and law.
Counter-claimants, Connie Taylor, and Clark & Feeney are requesting costs and
attorneys fees under I. C. § 12-121 because this Court found that Plaintiffs' claims were barred by
res judicata. However, the evidence presented at the trial on the Taylor claims proved that the
Mailes had facts and legal argument supporting their claims. Even though the Court n~jected
those claims, they were not pursued frivolously
Counterdefendants asserted a claim properly raised under I.R.C.P. Rule 60(b) to set aside
the prior judgment, as well as a claim for damages, predicated upon facts that supported their
claim that Taylors engaged in criminal behavior and/or fraud in obtaining the judgment. Claims
brought under I.R.C.P. 60(b) are not barred by res judicata because they are one of thE:
recognized "avenues ... for attacking a judgment." Waller v. State, Dept. o/Health and Welfare,
146 Idaho 234,192 P.3d ]058 (Idaho 2008), Davis v. Parrish, 131
961 P.2d
]3] Idaho 595, 599, 96]
1198,
1] 98, 1202
]202 (1998). The fact that this Court disagreed with Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants'
argument and authority does not render them frivolous.
Plaintiffs also advanced the argument that they did not suffer any damages until the entry
of the "Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims" and that as a result, res judicata did not apply to bar
their lawsuit. Claim preclusion does not arise if a valid cause of action could not have been
brought because it was not ripe for adjudication during the prior action. Idaho First Nat!'
Nat!. Bank
v. Bliss Valley Foodr;, Inc., 12]
121 Idaho 266, 283-84,824 P.2d 841,858-59 (1991). In Reis v. Cox,
104
]04 Idaho 434, 438,660 P.2d 46 (1982), the Court stated:

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION
FOR COSTS AND OPPOSITION TO COUNTER-CLAIMANTS' MOTION FOR COSTS
AND ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS - Pg 2
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The time when a cause of action accrues may be a question of law or a question of
fact, depending upon whether any disputed issues of material fact exist. Where
there is no dispute over any issue of material fact regarding when the cause of
action accrues, the question is one of law for determination by the court.
The date that a cause of action accrues may be a question of fact or law. Jemmet v.
McDonald, 136 Idaho 277, 279, 32 P.3d 669, 671 (2001). Although this Court disagreed with

Plaintiffs, their argument that a cause of action had not accrued because they had not yet
sustained damages was a legitimate argument, and not frivolous.
Finally there was nothing frivolous concerning the Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants' motion
to reconsider the Court's Order regarding the entry of Summary Judgment based upon newly
(lDSCCI) (2010). The Taylor, supra,
developed case law in Taylor v. McNichols, 36130, 36131 (IDSCCI)
decision states:
Therefore, we conclude that a cause of action against one party's opponent's
attorney in litigation, based on conduct the attorney committed in the course of
that litigation, may not be properly instituted prior to the resolution of that
litigation, even where the allegedly aggrieved party believes that the attorney in
question has been acting outside the legitimate scope of representation and solely
for his own benefit. Under this same reasoning, the allegations of aiding and
abetting in the commission of tortious acts, although marginally pled, must await
resolution of the underlying case. Until the underlying case is resolved a court
cannot detennine whether any tortious act was committed, let alone acts

constituting the aiding and abetting of those alleged tortious acts.
The plaintiffs/counter-defendants advanced reasoned factual and legal arguments in light
of the Taylor, supra, decision. The Taylor decision certainly does not make the application of
res judicata blatantly apparent in the present case.
If litigants an: required to await the conclusion of an underlying case before bringing a
suit against an opposing lawyer relating to the commission of criminal behavior and/or fraud
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR COSTS AND OPPOSITION TO COUNTER-CLAIMANTS'
MOTION FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS - Pg 3
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won't all such suits be subject to res judicata? Clearly the Idaho Supreme Court could not have
intended that result in its Taylor decision. Based upon these facts, and the arguments and law
previously submitted, Defendant/Counter-claimants' motion for costs and attorneys fees should
be denied.

DATED this

11h day of March, 2011.
11
h

~'12
TROU~----TROU~

CHRIST
T.
CHRIST T.
Co-counsel for Counter-Defendants

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOT](ON
FOR COSTS AND OPPOSITION TO COUNTER-CLAIMANTS' MOTION FOR COSTS
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
h
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 1+
l+ day of March, 2011, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing (1) REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER
COUNTERDEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR COSTS AND OPPOSITION TO COUNTER-CLAIMANTS'
MOTION FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS, to be delivered, addressed as
follows:

~onnie W. Taylor

Henderson Law Finn
· 900 Washington S1:. Suite 1020
I Vancouver, Washington 98660
· Facsimile: (360) 693-2911
Mark Stephen Prusynski
PO Box 829
Boise, ID 83701
Phone: (208) 345-2000
Facsimile: (208) 385-5384

·
·

;

:

I

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

(( )

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

(;g,)
( )
)
(

I

!
I

I

i

I

I

I

~

( )
(i.)
(( )
( )

Thomas G. Maile, IV.
380 W. State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001


'---

i

(( )
( )

J(~
( )

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

-

CHRIST T. TR
PIS,
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION
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A.M. ,
--_
-_ _ P.M..a-~
P.M..a-~

1 6 2011
MAR 16
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
W\RDEN
By ABBY W\RDEf\I

CONNIE W. TAYLOR
HENDERSON LAW FIRM, PLLC
900 Washington Street,
Street. Suite 1020
Vancouver, W
A 98660
WA
360.699.1530
ISBA No. 4837
Attorneys for Counter-defendants

G!Of'UTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE n"lVESTMENTS,
an.
n~VESTMENTS, LLC,
an,
Idaho limited 1i~lbility,
li~lbility, and THOMAS O.
G.
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE
husband and wife"

Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,
vs.

Case No. CV OC 0723232

SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL OBJECTION
TO MAILES' MEMORANDUM OF
COSTS

CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, et a1
Defendants/Counter-claiman.ts.

The Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, by and through its trustees Dallan Taylor and
R. John Taylor, pursuant to LR.C.P. 54(d)(6) file this SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL objection to

datcd March 9, 2011.
the costs addressed in the Troupis Affidavit dated

The arguments that the

Mailes are not entitled to any costs at all, which are contained in the Objection to Mailes'
Ma.iles
rcference.
Memorandum of Costs, are incorporated by reference.

SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL OBJECTION
TO MATLES'MEMO OF COSTS
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The costs requested in the second supplemental Troupis affidavit
affida.vit should be
disallowed.
The detennination of costs is left
len to the sound discretion of the district court. Idaho

Department of Health
Idaho 146, 149,
149,845
Hea.lth and Welfare v. Sourlifork Lumber Co., 123 Tdaho
845 P.2d 564,
567 (1993).
Tn the Sec(md Supplemental Affidavit, Troupis claims that the cost of the transcript of
John Runft ($]
96.40) and the cost of $369.60 for a transcript of opening statements are
($196.40)
"mandatory costs.'"
The cost of the John Runft deposition transcript should not be allowed,
allowed; as the Mailes
lneffective for the reasons discussed
were not the prevailing party and the offer
offcr of judgment was ineffective

in the prior briefing.
The cost of the transcript of the opening statements is not a mandatory cost under Rule
There is no
54(d)(l)(C);
54(d)(l)(C), which aHows
allows the recovery of the cost of transcribing depositions only. Therc
refeTence to transcripts of any other kind.

CONCLUSION
above, the Counterclaimants
Countcrclaimants respectfully request that this Court
For the reasons stated above;
enter an order specifically disallowing the costs requested in Christ Troupis' affidavits datcd
dated
March 9, 2011.
DATED this 15th day of March, 2011.

SECONDSVPPLEMBNTAL OBJECTION
TO MAILES'MEMO OF COSTS
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15th day of March, 2011, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
Thomas G. Maile, IV
380 West State Street
Eagle,ID 83616

U.S. Mail
I-land Delivered
Overnight Mail
FAX (208) 939-100]

Mr. Christ Troupis
Attorney at Law
PO Box 2408

U.S. Mail

Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail

Eag1e, TD 83616
Eagle,

FAX (208) 938-5482

Mark Prusynski
MOFFATT THOMAS
lOlh Floor
101 S Capitol Blvd., lOth
PO Box,
Box. 829
Boise, LD 83701

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
FAX (108) 385-5384

email

SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL OBJECTION
TO MAILES'MEMO OF COSTS
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CONNIE W. TAYLOR
HENDERSON LAW FIRM~ PLLC
900 Washington Street, Suite 1020
Vancouver, WA 98660
360.699.1530
ISBA No. 4837
Attorneys for Cmmter-claimants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE n-.JVESTMENTS,
n-JVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE
husband and wifi~.
Plaintiffs
fCounter-Defendants ,
PlaintiffsfCounter-Defendants,

Case No. CV OC 0723232

TAYLORS' REPLY MEMORANl[)UM
RE: MEMORANDA OF COSTS

VS.

CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, et al
Defendants/Counter-claimants.

The Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, by and through its trustees Dallan Taylor and

R. Jol1n TayJor,
Taylor, fll e this responsive brief relative to the parties' memoranda of costs.
I. MAILES ARE BOUND BY THE STIPULATION
STIPULAnON RESERVING THE ISSUE OF
COSTS AND F.EES IN DEFENDING AGAINST THEIR CLAIMS
In their various briefs, the Mailes have failed to acknowledge, let alone address, the fact that
the Stipulation to Dismiss the counterclaims of the Clark and Feeney defendants specifically
stated "The parties understand and agree that this dismissal will not preclude Clark and Feeney
REPL
Y MEMORANDUM RE:
REPLY
MEMOS OF COSTS
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from requesting that the Court award fees and costs for defending the claims of the Plaintiffs at
litigation."!
the conclusion of this litigation.
"I

Mailes are not only ignoring that language, they are now

claiming that the Clark and Feeney defendants are barred from seeking a detennination on that

very issue, and that the stipulation acts as some sort of waiver by the Taylors. In essence, they
are asking that th~:ir own Stipulation not he enforced.
a.re regarded with favor by the courts and will be
Stipulations for the settlement of litigation are

enforced unless good cause to the contrary is shown. Lawrence v. Hutchinson, 146 Idaho 892,

204 P.3d 532 (Idaho App., 2009) citing Kohring v. Robertson, 137 Idaho
Jdaho 94, 99,44 P.3d 1149,
1154 (2002); Young Electric Sign Co. v. Winder, 135 Idaho 804, 808, 25 P.3d 117,121 (2001).
An agreement entered into in good faith in order to settle adverse claims is binding upon the
eith~lr at law or
parties, and absent a showing of fraud, duress or undue influence, is enforceable eith~:r

in equity. Lawrence v. Hutchinson, supra, citing Young Electric Sign Co., 135 Idaho at 808, 25
P.3d at 121; Wflson v. Bogert, 81 Idaho 535, 542, 347 P.2d 341,345 (1959).

The facts in this case are clearly distinguishable from those in Magic Valley Radiology
Associates, P.A. v.
v, ProfeSSional Businss Services, Inc. 2 In Magic Valley, the Supreme Court
reversed an order awarding fees to the plaintiff, finding the defense was not privolous
privolotls because
the defendant (PBS) had prevailed on its cross-claim, defended against the claim of punitive
damages, and obtained a reversal and remand by the Supreme Court of the initial judgment. In

this case, the Counter-defendants have not won a single issue.

I

Stipulatio!i1 to Dismiss Counterclaim of Clark and Feeney Dcfcmdants dated November 30) 2010, page 2
Stipulatio!:l
Troul';~' February 23, 2011 Memorandum, page 12-13

tdaho 558, 808 P.2d 1303 (1991), cited in
2 119
J 19 Idaho

REPLY MEMORANDUM RE:
MEMOS OF COSTS
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The Mailes must be bound to the stipulation in which they acknowledged and agreed that

the issue of fees and costs to the Clark and Feeney defendants was being reserved. Furthermore,
Mr. Maile acknowledges in his own briefing that under Idaho law, requests for costs and attorney
dismissa.l of an action.~
action.~
fees can be detennined by the district court after the dismissal

II. Offer of judgment
jUdgment
The Mailes
judgment is a prime example of the type ofpiecemeallitigatil)n Rule 68
Mailes'' offer of
ofjudgment
1S

The offer was not, as argued by the Mailes,4 limited to the

designed to prevent.

Counterclaims. The offer addressed both the counterclaims and a portion of the MaBes' action,

specifi,cally reserving the right to appeal the decision dismis.sing those
costs and fees, while specifi.cally
claims. 5 It was not a resolution of all claims.
There is no merit to

Maj]e~'
Maj]e~'

claim that the Taylors waived any argument that the offer of

judgment was invalid by agreeing to.
counterclalims. That
to the dism.issal
dismissal of the C&F defendants' counterchJlims.

ju.dgment, there is no rational argument that the two are
stipulation did not mention the offer of judgment.
connected, and Mailes cite no authority for this assertion.
Because LR.C.P. 68 requires that the court take any costs
cests and fees into account in
determining whether the "adjusted award" exceeds the offer,
offer. a ruling on the Clark and Feeney
Mailes~ claims is a prerequisite to
Defendants' tequ~!Sts
tequ~~ts for costs and fees for its defense of the Mailes'

determining whether the cost-shifting mechanism of Ri.de 68 applies in this case.

3

Maile Reply Memorandum dated March 10, 20 II, page 4

4 March 10,
10. 2010 Reply Mcmora.ndu.m,
Mcmorandu.m, page 2
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JII.Misstatements as to trial testimony and court rulings
III.Misstatements
briefulg, the Mailes and their counsel have made statements which are not accurate.
In their briefu1g,
Although those arguments go primarily to the question of whether the Clark and Feeney
defendants should be awarded attorney fees for theMailes.frivolous suit, they will be addressed
in this memorand.um because counsel for Clark and Feeney was not present at the lrial and is
thus unable to respond to those assertions.

A.

The MaBes,
Mailes, once again, fail to acknowledge, recognize, or discuss the fa::::t that the
probate petition upon which all their arguments are based was amended well over a year
prior to the filing of the Amended Complaint which they claim constituted a "fraud on
the court.'~1 John Taylor testified to this amendment at the trial, and John Runft testified
that the Mailes had not disclosed this amendment when he fonned his opinion in the case.
Runft also testified that, under the law, the amended petition completely replaced the
initial petition. Both Thomas and Colleen Maile were forced to admit that their briefing
to the Idaho Supreme Court did not disclose the amendment and that they objected to the
record incl.uding the amendment.

B. The Mailes inexplicably state that John Runft's testimony (that the Taylors' standing was
S.
predicated solely on their position as Trustees) was unrebutted. 6 In reality, John Taylor
testified at length as to the meaning of the Disclaimer Agreement, the intent of the parties
who enter,ed into that agreement, and the fact that the Taylors retained their status as
beneficiaries relating to the claim against the Mailes.

In.
In addition, Mr. Runft's tortured

effort to twist the Disclaimer Agreement in a way that would remotely support the
MaHes' conduct was inherently unbelievable. It required one to completely ignore the
Taylors as
plain language of the agreement, which contained repeated references to the 'Taylors
"beneficiaries," and to read language into the S. Ct. decision in Taylor II that simply was
not there.
jssue~, on
5 Maile filed a Notice of Appeal of the dismissal of his action, among many other issues,
Ii

M~~rch 7, 2011.

M(l1norandllm dated Febmary 23, 2011, page 13
Troupis Ml:1nOrandllm
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C. The Maile;:s point to John Runfi's opinions as the sole support for the "reasonableness" of

attomey's affidavit 7 shows that Mr. Runft was not retained
their Complaint, yet their own attorney's
until June of
of2010,
2010, nearly two and one half years after the Complaint was filed. Neither
of the Mailes testified that their Complaint was based on a theory that the rights the

Taylors retained were only as trustees, rather than as beneficiaries as clearly stated in the
Disclaimer Agreement.
D. Mailes argue that "the merits of the Mailes' factual claims were not seriously challenged
by Taylors at Trial."!! This is just blatantly false.

John Taylor testified that the Taylors

containc:,d an error
retained their rights as beneficiaries, that the initial probate petition containc:'d

which was corrected in an amended petition long before the Supreme Court decision in
Taylor I. and that he never lied to the court, committed a fraud on the court, or len gaged in

racketeering,
racketeering.
E.
'·there could be no abuse of process
£. Mailes erroneously state that the court ruled that "there

prior to January 2009 since the appellate court did not rule upon the appeali untit
until that

date,"
ru.1ed iliat the damages for wrongful interference CQrnmenced
date." In fact. this Court ru.led
on that date.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Counterclaimants respectfully
respectful1y request that this Court
finding that the Taylors were prevailing parties, granting the mandatory and
enter an order fi.nding

disaJlowing the costs requested by
discretionary costs requested by the Taylors, and specifically disaJtowing
the Mailes.
DATED this _ _ day of March, 2011.
AWFIRM,PLLC
/~-~
/~-~

(

I

Cocl,ie fight
nght

/

'

T'YIO;j,;;~~

Counterc1aimants

L~-)

7 Runft billing attached to TroupisAffidavit
Troupis Affidavit dated February 23,2011
ofTrol.lpis, page 14
8 February 23, 2011 memo ofTrol.lpts,
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TE OF SERVICE
CERTIFlCATE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2nd day of March, 2011 I caused to be served a true lind
and
the foregoing documemt by thc method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Thomas O.
G. Maile, TV
380 West State Strel~
Eagle, lD 83616

com~ct
com~ct

copy of

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
FAX (208) 939-1001
U.S,Mail
U.S. Mail

Mr. Christ Troupis
Attomey at Law

Hand Delivered

Overnight Mail
Ovemight
FAX (208) 938-5482

PO Box 2408

Eagle, TO 83616

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
FAX (208) 385-5384

Mark Prusynski
MOFFA IT THOMAS
101 S Capitol Blvd., loth Floor
PO Box 829
Boi.se,
Boise, ID 83701

-; ,---j
-~J ---. -.
-;

~

i

~..
~..

/~;,.
/~;,.

-----.~,

. onnie Tayl.;-I '
-\
Counterclai~___)
Attorney for Counterclai~
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MAR 2 ~ 2011

MAR 2 4 2011

Ada County C:e(;(

ORIGINAL

CHRi "./OPHEH D. RICH, Clerk

ny LAAAAMES
fly
DEPUTY

Mark S. Prusynski, ISB No. 2349
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT,

Roc 1<. &

FIELDS, CHP,RTERED

101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
Post Office Box 829
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone (208) 345-2000
Facsimile (208) 38:5-5384
msp@moffatLcom
msp@moffatt.com
17136.0306

Attorneys for Defendants/Counterclaimants
Defendants/Counterc1aimants
Connie Wright Taylor fka Connie Taylor,
Clark and Feeney, and Paul T. Clark
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,
Plainti ffs/Counterdefendants,

-OC-0723232
CV-OC-0723232
Case No. CV
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF
MARK S. PRUSYNSKI REGARDING
FEES AND COSTS

VS.

CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, fka CO],{]~]E
COl,{]~]E
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TA YLOR, an individual; R. JOHN TAYLOR,
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, an individual;
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUST, an Idaho revocable trust; JOHN
DOES I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL
PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR CLAIMING
ANY RIGHT TO POSSESSION,
Defendants/Counterclaimants.

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF MARK S. PRUSYNSKI
REGARDING FEES AND COSTS - 1

1983783.1
Client 19837831
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_of

-'"
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss.
)

Mark S. Pmsynski, having been duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as
follows:
1.

I am the attorney of record for the attorney defendants in this lawsuit. I

make this affidavit based upon my own personal knowledge and review of my firm's records in
support of the Memorandum of Costs and Fees I previously filed.
2.

Up until the time that plaintiffs served their Offer of Judgment on

November 16,2009, I had incurred $34,854.50 in fees. Up until November 16,2009, I had
incun·ed $193.91 in costs.
incun-ed
3.

The remaining attorney fees and costs set forth in my original

Memorandum of Costs and Fees were incurred after the Offer of Judgment in order to respond
plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's summary judgment and other issues
concerning the defense of the attorney-defendants, as set forth in my Memorandum of Costs and
Fees.
Further your affiant sayeth naught.

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF MARK S. PRUSYNSKI
REGARDING FEES AND COSTS - 2

1983783. 1
Client: 1983783.1
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me

this~ay of March, 2011.
this~ay

NOTARY UBLIC FOR IDAHO
Residing at Boise, Idaho
My Commission Expires October 14, 2016

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF MARK S. PRUSYNSKI
REGARDING FEES AND COSTS - 3

Client: 1983783.1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2.;jday of March, 2011, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF MARK S. PRUSYNSKI
REGARDING FEES AND COSTS to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed
to the following:
Thomas G. Maile IV
LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS

G MAILE IV, P.A.

380 W. State St.
Eagle, ID 83616-4902
Facsimile (208) 939-1001
Christ T. Troupis
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE,

PA

P.O. Box 2408
Eagle,ID 83616
Facsimile (208) 938-5482

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( 0Facsimile

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( -1 Facsimile
(-1

John C. Mitchell
CLARK & FEENEY
1229 Main St., Suite 201
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston,ID
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Telephone: (208) 939-1000
Idaho State Bar No. 2378
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Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/CotU1ter~Defendants
Plaintiffs/CotU1ter~Defendants

TN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,
frs/Counter- Defendants,
Plainti
Plaintifrs/Counter-Defendants,

Case No. CV-OC-0723232
MEMORANDUM BRIEFRE:
SUPPLEMENTAl.. AFFIDAVJlT
AFFIDAVllT OF
SUPPLEMENTAl..
MARK S. PRUSYNSKI
REGARDING FEES AND COSTS

v.

CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/kla.
CONNIE TA
YLOR, an lndividual; DALLAN
TAYLOR,
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK an.d
and
FEENEY, a partm!1'ship;
partn<:t'ship; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES II -JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS TI'l
TI"l POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
Defendants/Counter-ClaitnJl11ts.
Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
The Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants by and through their co-counsel ofrecord
of record provide this

Me.t:norandum BriefRe: Supplemental Affidavit
Affida.vit of Mark S. Prusynski Regarding Fees and Costs
as follows.

MEMORANDUM BRIEF RE: SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF MARK S.
PRUSYNSKI REGARDING F.EES AND COSTS - Pg 1

002493

03/28/2011

09:04

-

THOMAS MAILr

PAGE

The Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants have previously briefed and provided approprialte law
to justify the couli
court iu
in concluding the claims of the plaintiffs were not frivolous thus barring the
award of attorney fees and costs to Clark & Feeney and Connie Taylor. However, without

waiving such position;
position, the P1aintiffs/Counter-defendants
Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants provide the following.
Counter-Claimant's,
Clark; filed th(~ir
Counter-ClaImant's, Connie Taylor, Clark and Feeney and Paul T. Clark,
Amended Answer and Counter-Claim on March 13,2009. Counsel for Plaintiffs/CounterPlaintiffs/CollnterDefendants served an Offer of Judgment on November 16, 2009 in the above matter in the
amount of$S5,OOO.OO. During the time period between the filing of the two pleadings, Counter
Counter-

Claitnant's attorney asserts attorney fee;s
fee's in the amount of$8,827.50 and costs in the amount of
Clnitnant's
$25.50. A Judgment obtained in favor of the Ta.ylor Brothers as counter-claimants was in the
amount of$28,437.36.
The combination of the Judgment and fees and costs asserted for the time period prior to
the filing of the Amended Answer and Counter-Claim is $54,632.77 which is less than the
amount offer in the Offer of Judgment ($55,000.00).
Although Mark Prusynski's supplemental affidavit provides that approximately
$34,854.50 was incurred for attorney's fees up to the date of the filing of the Offer of.ludglnent
ofJudglnent

on November 16, 2009, the affidavit actually demonstrates that attorney's fee and costs 'Emm
March 13,2009, (date their Amended Answer and Cotu1ter-Claim was filed), up to the date of

Judgtmmt was in the runOtlllt
a1UOtll1t of$8\853.00.
of$8,853.00. This is importalJt for the COtlrt's analysis
the Offer of .1udgtmmt
because Clark and Feeney's counterclaim involved the same issues which related to the defense
to the perjury complaint. Clark & Feeney has to a.dvance the argument that the application of res
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judicata. was blatantly apparent. The experts who testified at trial disagreed upon that point. The
jUdicata.
Vallt':!y Radiology Associates, P.A. v. Professional Business Services, Inc., 119
case of Magic VallE:!y
Idaho 558, 808 P.2d 1303 (1991), provides that where there are multiple claims and multiple
defenses, it is not appropriate to segregate those claims or defenses for the purpose of awarding
12~121.
attorney fees under J.C. § 12-121.

There was a mixture of attorneys fees and costs related to prosecuting the counter claim and
defending the petjwy complaint. all of which involved issues of res jUdicata and collateral
estoppel, consequently the motion for costs and attorneys fees subm.itted
submitted by Clark & Feeney, and
CoD.tl.ie
CODJJ.ie Taylor must be denied.

DATED this

1/d:;, of March, 2011.
1fd;;,

r~unsclfor
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

~

I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this
of March, 2011, I caused a. true and correct
AFFIDAVJT OF
copy of the foregoing (1) MEMORANDUM BRIEF RE: SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT
MARK S. PRUSY1-.JSKI REGARDING FEES AND COSTS, to be delivered, addressed as
follows:

Connie W, Taylor·
Henderson Law Firrn
900 Washington
Washington. St. Suite 1020
Vancouver, Washington 98660
Facs.itnile:(360)
Facsitnile:(360) 693-2911
M ark Stephen Prusynski
Mark
POBox 829
Boise, lD 83701
Phone: (208) 345-2000
Facsimile: (208) 385-5384

Christ T. Troupis
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE
1299 E. Iron Eaglle,
Eagl~~, Ste 130
PO Box 2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Facsimile: (208) 938-5482

()

U. S. Mail

()
()
()

Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

()

M

U. S. Mail

Facsimile Transmission

()

I-Ia.nd Delivery
rIa.nd

()

Ovemight Delivery

f><f

()

U. S. Mail

()
()
()

Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery .

M

Co~counsel
Co~counseI

for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs, Counterdefendants
vs.

Case No. CV OC 0723232

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
COUNTERDEFENDANTS' MOTION
FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING
THE VERDICT

CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, et al.
aI.
Defendants, Counterclaimants.

The Counterclaimants respectfully request that this Court deny the Counterdefendants'
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict dated February 11, 20 II.

This motion is

based on the same arguments which have been raised and rejected by this Court's denial of the
multiple requests for summary judgment on the counterclaims.
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITH
NOTWITHSTANDING
ST ANDING THE VERDICT
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In essence, the present motion is another request that this Court find the Mailes were
entitled to dismissal of the counterclaims as a matter oflaw. If that had been the case, this Court
would have granted the previous motions for summary judgment.
There was substantial evidence in the record upon which the jury could properly find a
verdict for the Johnson Trust. Schwan's Sales Enters., Inc. v. Idaho Transp. Dep't, 142 Idaho
X26,
R26, 830, 136 P.3d 297, 301 (2006). On this motion for a J.N.O.V., the Mailes are held to admit
the truth of all adverse evidence and every inference that may legitimately be drawn from the

evidence.Id.
1.

Abuse of process and Intentional interference with prospective business
advantage.
A.

Damages to Taylors as individuals

Mailes first argue that the verdict was improper because of the lack of proof of any
damages to DaHan and John Taylor as individuals.

The verdict form itself did not distinguish

amongst the various Counterclaimants, and the Special Verdict form submitted by counsel for
the Mailes did not seek to differentiate among the Counterclaimants.
This is not a basis for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, however, because the
Judgment entered by this Court very distinctly delineated the fact that the Judgment was being
granted solely to the Johnson Trust.

The Judgment entered correctly identifies the Judgment

creditor, and the Counterdefendants have not stated a valid basis for entry of a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict.
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B.

Commencement of damages

Mailes next argue "the Court determined that the Counterclaimants could not state a
2009,"[
claim for the actions of the Counterdefendants in the first lawsuit, concluded in January, 2009."[
Their argument is not entirely clear, but if they are saying this Court ruled that no damages could
have accrued prior to January of 2009, that is not accurate.

The Court's Instruction No, 15

placed no limitation on the commencement of damages in the abuse of process claim; the
January 30, 2009 date applied solely to the damages on the claim for interference with a
prospective economic advantage.
If they attempt to argue that their conduct in the first suit cannot be considered in the
abuse of process claim, that also is inaccurate.

There was substantial evidence as to their

conduct which occurred after January of 2009, when they were attempting to get Judge Wilper's
judgment reversed in their second lawsuit at the same time they were trying to get Judge Wilper
to enforce his judgment.
Mailes next argue that that there was no testimony as to damages sustained by the Trust
solely by reason of the lis pendens filed in the second lawsuit.

Once again, the Mailes try to

pendens.
argue that the counterclaims were based solely on the filing of lis pendens,
never has been, accurate.

That is not, and

The counterclaims were based on the entire range of conduct by the

Mailes in both the Taylor v. Maile suit (after the decision in Taylor v. Maile II) and the Mailes'

1

Counterdefendants' Motion for JNOV, page 3
Memorandum Brief in Support of Counterdefendants'
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second lawsuit. 2
There was substantial evidence that the Trust did incur damages between January 30,
2009, when the first lawsuit was finally resolved, and August 3, 2009, when Mailes finally
released the lis pendens in the first suit. 3
1.

John Taylor testified as to the value of the real property at vanous times,
beginning at the time of the $1.8 million offer and encompassing the time Mailes
finally released both of the lis pendens, as well as at the time of trial.

He also

testified to the Trust's inability to either sell or obtain financing for the property
because of the lis pendens.
2.

Bob Debolt, realtor for Coldwell Banker, testified as to values for the property
from 2005 through 2009, that the real estate market had taken a downturn by January
of 2009, and that by August of 2009 it was even worse; prices had plummeted, and
there were few buyers and even fewer banks willing to finance purchases.

3.

Dallan Taylor testified that the Johnson Trust incurred legal expenses

111

defending the second suit, and also incurred over $99,000 in real property taxes
because the Maile lawsuits prevented it from accepting the $1.8 million offer in 2006.
4.

John Taylor, on rebuttal, testified to the specific amount of real property taxes
which the Trust had to pay after January of 2009. There was substantial evidence as

2 This argument is addressed more fully below, beginning at page 11
3 The Counterclaimants disagree with the Mailes' assertion that the lis pendens in the second suit was
"proper," which they argue means that there was no further damages from leaving the first lis pendens in place.
That argument is addressed at page 15,
\5, below.
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to the damages the Johnson Trust incurred between January and August of2009.
evidenc(~ and every
For purposes of this motion, the Mailes admit the truth of this evidenc(l

inference that may legitimately be drawn from the evidence. It is entirely legitimate to infer that
the Trust was damaged by both (l) incurring expenses for property taxes and (2) diminution in
the value of the real property due to the Mailes delay in releasing the first lis pendens, as well as
between the time they released the lis pendens in the second case in July of 2009 and the August
3 release of the first lis pendens.

C.

The Mailes' conduct was not limited to filing a lis pendens or a "mere
Complaint."

Mailes argue that there was no evidence they had committed "wrongful conduct" to
support the jury's verdict as to either abuse of process or intentional interference.

Whether

interference was for an improper purpose is uniformly recognized to be a question of fact. 4
First, they argue that there was no testimony that maintaining the first lis pendens for
over six months after the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court rulings that the Mailes had no
right to the Johnson Trust property was "wrongful." Because this is a question of ultimate fact,
lay testimony on that issue would have been impermissible. There was no expert testimony that
maintaining a lis pendens long after the suit had been decided could ever be proper. There was,
however, testimony from both John Runft and Thomas Maile that the purpose of a lis pendens is
to notifY that there is a lawsuit pending, which leads inescapably to the conclusion that once the

Gil/mor v. Family Link, LLC, 224 P.3d 741, 2010 WL 114814,647 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2010.; Young v.
4 Gil/mar
Allstate Ins. Co., 119 Hawai'i 403, 198 P.3d 666 (2008); Awakuni v. Awana, 115 Hawai'i 126, 165 P.3d 1027
Service. Inc. v. City of
ofBellingham.
(2007); Cascade Ambulance Service,
Bellingham, 113 Wash.App. 1054, (Wash.App. Div. 1,2002).
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Supreme Court made a final decision and the lawsuit was over, the lis pendens was no longer
proper and failing to release it was wrongful.

This is a legitimate inference, which for purpose

of this motion must be drawn in favor of the Johnson Trust.
The jurors were instructed 5 that a party may establish that intentional interference was
wrongful by offering proof that either (I)
(1) the defendant had an improper objective or purpose to
harm the plaintiff; or (2) the defendant used a wrongful means to cause injury to the prospective
business relationship.

There was substantial evidence to support a legitimate inference that the

Mailes had an improper objective or purpose to harm the Taylors and their counsel.

Wrongful

motive may be inferred from Mailes' continued attempts to get title to the property back, by any
means, whether it be duplicative lawsuits, suits with no valid basis in fact or law, continued
appeals of issues repeatedly argued unsuccessfully, or "disingenuous" attempts to foreclose on
the vendee's lien while also challenging the very judgment upon which the lien is based.
The testimony of the Mailes themselves provided substantial evidence of their improper
objective or purpose to harm the Taylors. Both John Runft and Thomas Maile acknowledged
that the Amended Petition filed in the probate court completely replaced the petition upon which
all their claims were based, and the Supreme Court in Taylor II rejected every one of the Mailes'

contentions. Nonetheless, in their trial testimony both Colleen and Thomas Maile ignored those
facts and repeatedly called the Taylors liars, perjurers, thieves, and criminals. The jurors were

5 Jury Instruction No. 12
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instructed that "intent may be established by inference as well as by direct proof,,,6 and they had
substantial evidence from which to infer that the Mailes had an improper objective to harm the
Taylors and their counsel for disclosing Mr. Maile's untruthfulness, to seek retribution by calling
the Taylors liars and thieves and frauds, to punish and humiliate the Taylors, to file a second
lawsuit that had no chance of success, and to needlessly increase the cost of litigation in an effort
to coerce the Taylors and the Johnson Trust into giving up their rights to the Johnson farm, even
though that right had been judicially confinned.
confinued.
D.

There was substantial evidence of improper use of legal process

There was also substantial evidence that the Mailes had used the legal process primarily
to accomplish a purpose for which it was not designed. Professor Craig Lewis testified that in
the second suit, the Mailes were seeking to relitigate issues which either were or could have been
litigated in the first proceeding, and that no reasonable attorney would have believed there was a
reasonable chance that the second suit would be successful. Professor Lewis testified that no
attorney could have reasonably believed that there was a legitimate legal basis for the second
lawsuit, and that filing and pursuing that action is not reasonably justifiable.

John Runft

expressed the opposite opinion, and the jurors, as the sole judges of the facts, determined that
they believed Professor Lewis.
Professor Lewis, Mr. Runft, and even Thomas Maile agreed that it is never appropriate
for a lawyer to sue somebody or pursue a legal theory unless there is a factual basis for it, and

6

Jury Instruction No. 13
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-'
that as officers of the court, lawyers have a higher responsibility than non-lawyers to follow that
rule. The jurors repeatedly heard testimony about the language of the Disclaimer agreement, the
first petition in probate court, and the amended petition in the probate court; that testimony
provided substantial evidence that the Mailes' interpretation of those documents had no basis in
fact, or even in reality, and that there was no legitimate basis for filing the second lawsuit. The
Mailes certainly can't be arguing that filing a complaint with no legitimate factually basis could
ever be a proper use of the legal system.
The ulterior, improper purpose7 or improper objective8 that underlies all of the Mailes'
conduct was an attempt to gain title to the Johnson Farm, no matter how many comts
COUIts told them
they had no right to the property and no matter what they had to do to get it back. The Supreme
Court's decision in Taylor v. Maile I pointed to the conflict of interest Beth Rogers had, and to
the statute which mandated court approval prior to entering into a contract in which the trustee
had a conflict.

Maile admitted that he had never sought court approval, and his own briefing

had raised the conflict.

Their only defense to this showing that they never had a valid contract

(which leads to the legitimate conclusion that efforts to enforce the contract or obtain the land by
any other means was not a proper use of the legal process) was that Thomas Maile didn't know
about the statute that required court approval.

The jurors could legitimately have inferred that

Mr. Maile was not being honest, particularly in light of the fact that he admitted Judge Wilper
found he had not told the truth about his dealings with Ted Johnson when he testified in the
7

Abuse of process element
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unjust enrichment trial.

Even the Mailes' own expert, John Runft, testified that nothing the

Taylors said or did could change the fact that the contract was void.

This testimony definitively

shows that the Mailes had no legitimate legal basis to support their filing of the second
complaint.
Mailes again argue that the second suit could not be an abuse of the legal process because
it was filed to protect their legitimate economic interest in the land.

There was substantial

evidence that the Mailes never had a legitimate economic interest in that land, making this case
distinguishable from the Carter v. Carter case on which the Maile rely in their briefing on this
motion.
There was substantial evidence for the jury to find that the Mailes' conduct, from filing
the second lawsuit with no legitimate basis in fact or law all the way through to th,eir efforts to
get Judge Wilper to enforce the first judgment at the same time they were trying to get it set
aside, were wrongful and were not proper in the course of the proceedings. Professor Lewis and
John Runft both testitied
testified that one of the primary purposes of the civil justice system is to resolve
disputes between people with finality, that it is never appropriate for a lawyer to sue somebody
or pursue a legal theory unless there is a factual basis for it, and that lawyers have a higher
responsibility than non-lawyers to follow that rule.
There was substantial evidence to support a finding that the Mailes' second lawsuit had
no legitimate factual basis whatsoever.

8

John Taylor testified that the Taylors had all retained

Intentional interference with prospective economic advantage element
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their rights as beneficiaries to pursue the Maile suit, and Mr. Runft's efforts to reinterpret the
clear language of the Disclaimer Agreement were so convoluted as to be inherently unbelievable.
The Mailes consistently lost credibility by their failure to acknowledge, recognize, or discuss the
fact that the probate petition upon which all their arguments are based was amended well over a
year prior to the filing of the beneficiaries' Amended Complaint which they claim constituted a
"fraud on the court."

John Taylor testified to this amendment at the trial, and John Runft

testified that the Mailes had not disclosed this amendment when he formed his opinion in the
case.

The jurors saw the April 18, 2005 Amended Petition, 9 which contained a certificate of

mailing to Mr. Maile. The testimony of Colleen and Thomas Maile that they didn't "figure out"
that a fraud had been committed until December of 2007 could well have led the jury to the
conclusion that none of their testimony should be believed.
Runft also testified (and Thomas Maile agreed) that, under the law, the amended petition
completely replaced the initial petition. Both Thomas and Colleen Maile admitted that their
briefing to the Idaho Supreme Court did not disclose the amendment and that they oqjected to the
record including the amendment. While the Mailes refused to consider the fact that the Taylors'
first probate petition was an error, Mr. Maile claimed that "we all make mistakes" in trying to
explain away his own appellate briefs acknowledgment of the conflicting interests amongst the
different classes of beneficiaries to the Johnson Trust.
When considered as a whole, with all inferences being granted to the Johnson Trust, the

9

Counterclaimants'
CountercJaimants' exhibit 4
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testimony at trial provided substantial evidence that the Mailes simply had no factual basis for
their claim that the Taylors had committed a fraud on the court, and no legal basis for believing it
could be raised in an independent lawsuit.
The Mailes put much weight on their argument that abuse of process requires more than
the "mere filing of a complaint" citing to the 1988 case of Badell v. Beeks. That case quotes
Dean Prosser's comment in Prosser & Keeton, Torts § 121, at 898 (1984), that "[t]here is no
liability [for abuse of process] where the defendant has done nothing more than carry out the
process to its authorized conclusion, even with bad intentions."
There is considerable modem disagreement with Prosser's VIew, however, that an
additional act is always required to make out the tort. See Harper, James & Gray, Torts § 4.9, at
4:90-4:91 & n.21 (3d ed.1996); Dobbs, Torts § 438, at 1239-1240 (2000). These commentators
make the point that an illegitimate purpose can often be achieved without any further act beyond
the obtaining of the process. 2 Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 438 (2001) ("[T]he advantage
need not always be collateral in the sense that it would be outside the court's power to grant.");
Harper, James, & Gray, The Law of Torts § 4.9 (stating that "the cause of action should be
available in circumstances [other than extortion-like threats] as well, so long as intentional abuse

of the legal system can be proved").
This broader view of the tort of abuse of process has been adopted by a number of states.
See, for example, the following cases:
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1. Abuse of process may be shown by proving that a lawsuit was "devoid of reasonable
factual support or arguable legal basis."

Adams v. Whitman, 822 N.E.2d 727, 730 (Mass.App.

2005).
2. When the process alleged to have been abused entailed the very filing of a lawsuit, an
additional showing that the other party's claim was devoid of factual support or had no
cognizable basis in law was required. Yandon v. Lowry, 126 P.3d 332, 337 (Colo.App. 2005),
3. Use of the court system to file a baseless legal claim may constitute an abuse of
process. Seipel v. Olympic Coast Investments, 188 P.3d 1027,1034
1027, 1034 (Mont. 2008).
4. An abuse of process claim can be based on the entire range of procedures incident to
the litigation process. See, e.g., General Refractories Co. v. Fireman's Fund. Ins. Co., 337 F.3d
297 (3rd Cir. 2003) (use of discovery proceedings, making misrepresentations to opposing
counsel and the court and filing motions); Hopper v. D,ysdale, 524 F.Supp. 1039 (D.Mont.
1981) (filing notice of deposition can be the basis for an abuse of process claim); Crackel v.

Allstate Ins. Co., 92 P.3d 882 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (a litigant may commit abuse of process
while merely defending an underlying action through conduct such as serving an unreasonable
offer in bad faith, asserting bogus defenses, exercising procedural rights, engaging in misconduct
at mandatory settlement conferences); Nienstedt v. Wetzel, 651 P.2d 876 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982)
(the entire range of court procedures incident to litigation, including the noticing of depositions,
entry of defaults and the utilizations of various motions, could be the basis for an abuse of
process claim); Food Lion, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int'! Union, 567 S.E.2d
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251, 253 (S.c. Ct. App. 2002) (process embraces full range of activities and procedures attendant
to litigation including taking discovery and filing motions).
Although the case was subsequently withdrawn, the opinion issued by the Idaho Supreme
court in Cunningham v. Jensen lO indicates that Idaho follows the modem trend that broadens the
definition of process to include a wide range of procedures related to the litigation process. The
Court in Cunningham cited the case of General Refractories Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 337
F.3d 297 (3rd Cir. 2003), which held that using a legal process primarily to harass and cause
direct injury to an adversary (similar to what occurred here) could constitute a perversion of that
process.

Supra at p. 307.

General Refractories, in tum looked to the following e:xcerpt
c:xcerpt from

the Superior Court's opinion in Shiner v. Moriarty to illustrate this concept:
The Shiners did not merely allege that the Moriartys' and the attorney defendants'
intentions were impure. They alleged that the equity action, the petitions directed toward
the confessed judgment, and the sundry motions to stay the execution on the leasehold
during the pendency of these actions were undertaken and continued in an effort to
harass and to cause them financial and emotional injury. These objectives are
Pennsylvania .... Pursuing litigation
illegitimate in the context of any civil proceeding in Pennsylvania....
primarily to harass and cause injury to the adverse party is an objective not authorized
by the equity action or the efforts to avoid the confessed judgment and constitutes a
sufficient perversion of the process employed here to support a common law claim of
process....
abuse of process
.... [T]he evidence presented was sufficient to permit a jury to determine
that the Moriartys and the attorney defendants proceeded for a primary purpose of
harassing the Shiners, and not to preserve the leasehold and avoid eviction.

Shiner v. Moriarty, 706 A.2d 1228, 1236 (1998) (citations omitted) (emphasis added);
Nienstedt v. Wetzel, 133 Ariz. 348,651 P.2d 876, 882 (1982) (cited in Shiner, 706 A.2d at
1236, and Rosen, 627 A.2d at 192) stated that the purpose of "expos[ing] the injured party to
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excessive attorney's fees and legal expenses" may support an abuse of process claim). The point
of liability is reached when "the utilization of the procedure for the purpose for which it was
designed becomes so lacking in justification as to lose its legitimate function as a reasonably
justifiable litigation procedure." Nienstedt, 651 P.2d at 882. As noted above, Professor Lewis
testified that no attorney could have reasonably believed that there was a legitimate legal basis
for the second lawsuit, and that filing and pursuing that action is not reasonably justifiable as a
litigation procedure.
In this case, there was a great deal of conduct beyond "merely filing a complaint."
Here, Mailes had filed an appeal of Judge Wilper's ruling returning the farm to the Johnson
Trust. Rather than allowing that appeal to decide the issue, as the law requires, they instead
initiated an entirely new action, in a new court, seeking a different ruling on their arguments as
to why they should have been allowed to keep the property. This provides substantial evidence
to support an inference that since the second suit had no legitimate purpose, the true primary
purpose was to harass the Taylors and to cause them to incur excessive legal fees and expenses
in defending against the claim.
The Supreme Court opinion in Taylor II completely rejected the arguments which formed

the basis of Mailes' second Complaint. Even after that decision was announced, the Mailes
repeatedly made an improper use of the legal system by pursuing their second complaint seeking
to set aside Judge Wilper's decision be set aside, and simultaneously filing motions with Judge

10

ISSCR 31332, September 14, 2005
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Wilper asking that he enforce the same judgment.

After this Court dismissed their action on

summary judgment in July, they filed a motion for an interlocutory appeal of the second suit, yet
at the same time also filed another motion with Judge Wilper seeking not only to enforce the
judgment they were (and to this day, still are) claiming was invalid, but also asking that Judge
Wilper just give them back the land. Their improper use of the legal process was not isolated to
filing a "mere Complaint," as they argue.
Given the testimony which leads to a legitimate inference that pursuing the baseless
second suit was an improper use of the legal process, it necessarily follows that the lis pendens
filed in that suit was also improper. Maintaining a "wrongful" lis pendens when there is no
legitimate claim to ownership of the property has been found to support claims for abuse of
process and intentional interference. Hewitt v. Rice, 154 P.3d 408 (Colo. 2007), Broadmoor
Apartments of Charleston v. Horwitz, 306 S.c. 482,413 S.E.2d 9 (1991); Cok v. Cok, 558 A.2d
205 (R.!. 1989), National City Bank v. Shortridge, 689 N.E.2d 1248 (Ind. 1977).
As far as the question of whether the Mailes were entitled to judgment as a matter of law
IS

concerned, it is important to remember that Idaho has recognized that wrongfulness of

intentional interference may also be shown by reason of a statute or other regulation, or a
recognized rule of common law, or an established standard of trade or profession. 11 The filing of
(a) (1 ).
the second action, with no legitimate basis in fact or law, was a violation of !.R.C.P. 11 (a)(1

11
J1

Foods, Inc., 1I 2]
21 1
daho 266, 285, X24 P.2d
P.2d ~4]
~41 , 861 (1991).
Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods.
Idaho

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT

15

002511

In looking at whether the Mailes were entitled to judgment in their favor on the
counterclaims as a matter of law, this Court should also consider the fact that the Mailes
repeatedly violated I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2).
II(a)(2). That rule provides that if a party has made application to a
judge for issuance of an order which is denied, that party may not make any subsequent

application to any other judge except by appeal to a higher court.

The Mailes had appealed

Judge Wilper's judgment returning the farm to the Johnson Trust, and they violated I.R.C.P.
11(a)(2)
II(a)(2)

by filing and pursuing the second lawsuit asking a difference judge for an order

returning the property to them.

They violated it again by seeking to have Judge Wilper quiet

title (in the guise of foreclosing on a lien) months after this Court had dismissed thei.r action and
the Supreme Court had rejected all their arguments in the first case. The Mailes were just going

from court to court to court, trying to find a judge willing to contradict the others who had
already ruled against them.

The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure establish the standard of the

legal profession, and violation of those rules is evidence that interference was wrongful.

There was substantial evidence for the jury to find that the Mailes committed a willful act
in the use of legal process not proper in the regular course of the proceeding, that the act was
committed for an ulterior, improper purpose, and that the Mailes either had an improper
objective or purpose to harm the Taylors, or that the Mailes used a wrongful means to cause
injury to the prospective business relationship.

1.

Litigation privilege

The Counterdefendants raised the Issue of the litigation privilege in their Motion to
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Reconsider of September 28, 2010, and again in their November 2, 2010 Motion to Dismiss
and/or Motion in Limine re Litigation Privilege. This Court denied those motions, and has ruled
that the privilege does not apply in this situation, and that it was not an issue that would be
presented to the jury in any event.

The Counterdefendants' requested jury instructions which

were based on the Taylor v. McNichols decision 12 were rejected by the Court. The jury was not
instructed on the privilege, and the verdict form did not address whether the privilege was
applicable. This issue is not, therefore, subject to being raised by way of a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict under I.R.c.P. 50(b).
The present motion is, in reality, just another motion to reconsider this Court's prior
rulings dismissing the Mailes' claims and denying their repeated motions for summary judgment
and motions to dismiss.
of jail free card" for every attorney
The Taylor v. McNichol/ 3 decision was not a "get out ofjail
who is a party to a lawsuit. That opinion dealt solely with the question of whether and under
what circumstances a litigant may bring an action against his opponent's attorney.

The ruling

of the court was "the litigation privilege shall be found to protect attorneys against civil actions
which arise as a result of their conduct or communications in the representation of a client,
related to a judicial proceeding.,,14 The Court specifically ruled that in Idaho, "the litigation
privilege ... only applies when ... an attorney is acting within the scope of his employment, and

12 Counterdefendants' requested jury instructions 62, 63, 95, 96 AND 97
13

IDSCCI 36130, 36131, September3, 2010.

14 IDSCCI 36130,36131, September 3,2010, page 15.
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not solely for his personal interests."

15

The cases discussed by the Supreme Court all dealt with

claims against independent attorneys who were separate and distinct from their clients; none of
the cases involved an attorney who was a party, let alone one who was representing himself.
There was no testimony at the trial which changed the fundamental facts which support
this Court's repeated refusals to apply the litigation privilege in this case. The testimony showed
that Thomas Maile was never "employed" to represent a client in this case. He acted pro se in
representing himself, his wife, and their solely-owned LLC. Colleen Maile testified that the
LLC, Bershire Investments, was just something they put together to purchase the Johnson farm.
There has never been any dispute as to the fact that the Mailes are the sole owners of the LLC.
The testimony at trial established the fact that even when Mr. Maile has been acting pro
se (on behalf of himself and his wife, as well as on behalf of their solely-owned LLC, Berkshire
Investments), he has been acting solely for his own interests and is therefore not entitled to the
immunity of the litigation privilege.
There is no basis for a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the litigation
privilege, nor is there any basis for this Court to reconsider its prior rulings on that issue.

15

IDSCCI 36130, 36131, September 3, 20 I 0, page 18.
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Conclusion
Counter-claimaints respectfully request that this court
For the reasons stated herein, the Counter-c1aimaints
deny the Counterdefendants' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict.
DATED this

-±-

day of April, 2011.
HENDERSON LAW FIRM, PLLC

By
Connie W. Taylor, a member of the firm.
Attorneys for Johnson Trust, John and Dallan Taylor
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the - ; day of April, 2011 I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
Thomas G. Maile, IV
380 West State Street
Eagle, ID 83616

u.s. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001

Mr. Christ Troupis
Attorney at Law
PO Box 2408
Eagle, ID 83616

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 938-5482

Mark Prusynski
MOFFATT THOMAS
101 S Capitol Blvd., 10 th Floor
PO Box 829
Boise, ID 83701
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Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
TeJecopy (FAX) (208) 385-5384
Telecopy
Email
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DEPUTY
I)"PUTY

Mark S. Prusynski, ISB No. 2349
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED

101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th
lOth Floor
Post Office Box 829
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone (208) 345-2000
Facsimile (208) 385-5384
msp@moffatt.com
17136.0306
Attorneys for Defendants/Counterclaimants
Connie Wright Taylor fka Connie Taylor,
Clark and Feeney, and Paul T. Clark
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,

CV-OC-0723232
Case No. CV
-OC-0723232

OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR STAY
OF EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,
VS.
YS.

CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, fka CONNIE
TA YLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR,
TA YLOR, an individual; R. JOHN TAYLOR,
TAYLOR,
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a
pm1nership; PAUL T. CLARK, an individual;
pmtnership;
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUST, an Idaho revocable bust; JOHN
DOES I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL
PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR CLAIMING
ANY RIGHT TO POSSESSION,
Defendants/Counterclaimants.
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COME NOW the defendants, Connie Wright Taylor, fka Connie Taylor, Clark
and Feeney and Paul T. Clark, by and through their undersigned counsel, and object to plaintiffs'
motion for stay of execution of
judgment on the ground that the proposed cash deposit is
ofjudgment
13(b)(15).
insufficient pursuant to I.A.R. 13(b
)(15). The cash deposit or supersedeas bond posted pursuant
to that Rule "must be in the amount of the judgment or order, plus 36% of such amount."
Nothing in the Rule states that the supersedeas bond or cash deposit need not be posted when the
judgment includes costs and fees awarded in the district court.
Plaintiffs' citation to Rule 16 of the Idaho Appellate Rules is misplaced. Rule 16
merely eliminated the requirement that a cost bond had to be filed when an appeal was filed.
The former Idaho Code Section 13-203 requiring an undertaking on appeal, also known as an
appeal bond, was repealed. The Idaho Appellate Rules replaced this jurisdictional req uirement
with the current procedure. See Erickson v. Amoth, 99 Idaho 907, 908, 591 P.2d 1074, 1075
(1978). By eliminating the requirement of an undertaking on appeal for costs, however, the
Idaho Appellate Rules did not eliminate the need for a supersedeas bond in order to stay
execution. Rule l3(b)( 15) sets forth the procedure for obtaining a stay of execution of a money
judgment by posting a supersedeas bond. Rule 16(b) allows parties to agree to a waiver of a
supersedeas bond. The cash deposit proposed by plaintiffs does not meet the requirements of
Rule 13(b
l3(b)(15)
)(15) and the parties herein have not agreed to waive a supersedeas bond. The rules,

OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION
OF JUDGMENT - 2
\

2028338.1
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prior statutes, and Idaho case law do not support plaintiffs' calculation of the amount of the
required deposit.
DATED this

:;z ~fi¥clay of April, 2011.
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK
FIELDS, CHARTERED

&

By4
Mark . Prusynski - Of the inn
Attorneys for Defendants/Counterclaimants
Connie Wright Taylor fka Connie Taylor,
Clark and Feeney, and Paul T. Clark
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this j ~.aday of April, 2011, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION OF
JUDGMENT to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Thomas G. Maile IV
LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS

G MAILE IV, P.A.

380 W. State St.
Eagle, ID 83616-4902
Facsimile (208) 939-1001

Christ T. Troupis
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE,

PA

P.O. Box 2408
Eagle,ID 83616
Facsimile (208) 938-5482

( ) US. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( v(Facsimile

( ) US. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ~Overnight Mail
(V) Facsimile

John C. Mitchell
CLARK & FEENEY
1229 Main St., Suite 201
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, ID 83501-0285
Lewiston,ID
Facsimile (208) 746-9160

( ) US. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) pvernight
j)vernight Mail
( 0'Facsimile

Connie W. Taylor

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( v(Facsimile

HENDERSON LA W

900 Washington, Suite 1020
W A 98660
Vancouver, WA
Facsimile (360) 693-2911

Mark S.tprusynski
S.'rrusynski
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MAY 09 2011
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By KATHY JOHNSON
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,

CV -OC-0723232
Case No. CV-OC-0723232

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING
THE VERDICT

vs.
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, fka CONNIE
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
T AYLOR, an indi vidual; R. JOHN TAYLOR,
l'AYLOR,
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a
partnership; PAUL 1'.
T. CLARK, an individual;
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUST, an Idaho revocable trust; JOHN
DOES I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL
PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR CLAIMING
ANY RIGHT TO POSSESSION,
Defendants/Counterclaimants.

Plaintiff/Counterderfendants filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict. The Court reviewed the briefs and heard arguments of counsel on April 14,2011. The
Court viewed the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the non-moving party

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING
THE VERDICT - 1
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and, for the reasons stated at the hearing on April 14, finds that there was substantial evidence to
support the verdict and the motion for judgment notwiths nding the verdict is denied.
DATED this

M

day of

, 2011.

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING
THE VERDICT - 2
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CLERK'S CERTIFIC~m'
CERTIFIC~lOFSERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
-' day of
'~
,2011, I caused a
true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DEN ING MOTION F
JUDGMENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT to be served by the method indl ated below, and
addressed to the following:

'ti) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

Thomas G. Maile IV
LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS

G MAILE IV, P.A.

380 W. State St.
Eagle,ID 83616-4902
Facsimile (208) 939-1001

Q() U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Christ T. Troupis
TROUPIS LA W OFFICE,

PA

P.O. Box 2408
Eagle,ID 83616
Facsimile (208) 938-5482

~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

John C. Mitchell
CLARK & FEENEY
1229 Main St., Suite 201
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston,ID 83501-0285
Facsimile (208) 746-9160

x)

Connie W. Taylor

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

HENDERSON LA W

900 Washington, Suite 1020
Vancouver, W
A 98660
WA
Facsimile (360) 693-2911
Mark S. Prusynski, ISB No. 2349
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK
FIELDS, CHARTERED

101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
Post Office Box 829
Boise, Idaho 83701
Facsimile (208) 385-5384

( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

&

~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Clerk
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MAY 09 2011
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By KATHY JOHNSON
DEPUTY

n\J THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,

Case No. CV-OC-0723232

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR COSTS
AND FEES

Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,
vs.
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, fka CONNIE
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR,
T AYLOR,
TA
YLOR, an individual; R. JOHN TAYLOR,
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, an individual;
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUST, an Idaho revocable trust; JOHN
DOES I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL
PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR CLAIMING
ANY RIGHT TO POSSESSION,
Defendants/Counterclaimants.

Defendants/Counterciaims Connie Wright Taylor, Clark and Feeney and Paul T.
Clark (hereinafter, "the law finn") filed a memorandum of costs and attorney fees under Idaho
Code Sections 12-121 and 12-123 and Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, contending
that plaintiffs filed and pursued the action frivolously. PlaintifflCounterdefendants objected to
the law firm's memorandum of costs and fees and filed a motion for costs, contending that they
were the prevailing party in the lawsuit, when the "adjusted award" as defined by Rule 68 of the

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR COSTS AND FEES - 1
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.........
of judgment made by plaintiffs on
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, was compared to the offer ofjudgment
November 16,2009. Defendants objected to plaintiffs' motion for costs.

The Court reviewed the briefs of the parties and held a hearing on April 14,2011.
The Court considered the factors outlined in Idaho Code Section 12-123 and Rule 54 of the

Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and considered the history of the case and the testimony at the
trial of the counterclaim. The Court determined that the case was brought and pursued
frivolously, as defined by Idaho Code Section 12-123 and Rule 54 and the law firm prevailed
overall and is entitled to the attorney fees requested, $56,502.50. The Court considered the
factors identified in Rule 54(e)(3) in determining the amount of the fees and finds them to be

reasonable.
The Court also awards costs as a matter of right in the amount of $63.81 to the
law firm, but declines to award any discretionary costs, because none of the discretionary costs
were "exceptional" as defined by Idaho Rules and the Idaho Supreme Court.
The Court awards costs as a matter of right in the amount of $3,295.57 to the
counterclaimants as prevailing party, both in defending the plaintiffs' claims and in pursuing
their counterclaim. The Court declines to award discretionary costs, because none oflhe

discretionary costs claimed were exceptional costs.
The Court denies plaintiffs' motion for costs, because plaintiffs were not the
prevailing party in this action. The adjusted award as defined by Rule 68, including the costs
of judgment awarded by this Order and the
and fees of defendants up to the time of the offer ofjudgment
of judgment.
verdict rendered by the jury, exceeds the offer ofjudgment.

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR COSTS AND FEES - 2
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The Judgment entered on July 20,2009, and the Judgment entered on
February 28,
28,2011,
20 II, will be amended accordingly.
DATED thisJ-JthisJ-J.- day of April, 2011.

District Judge
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _,_~_J day oh\l'~Oll, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR COSTS AND FEES to be served
by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Thomas G. Maile IV
LA W OFFICES OF THOMAS

G MAILE IV, P.A.

380 W. State St.
Eagle,ID
Eagle,
ID 83616-4902
Facsimile (208) 939-1001

~ US. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Christ T. Troupis
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE,

)<JUS. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

PA

P.O. Box 2408
Eagle, ID 83616
Facsimile (208) 938-5482
John C. Mitchell
CLARK & FEENEY
1229 Main St., Suite 201
P.O,
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston,ID
Lewiston,
ID 83501-0285
Facsimile (208) 746-9160

~) US. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(') Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Connie W. Taylor

Q0 US,
US. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Q<)

HENDERSON LA W

( ) Hand Deli
vered
Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

900 Washington, Suite 1020
WA 98660
Vancouver, WA
Facsimile (360) 693-2911

'tf.) u.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid

Mark S. Prusynski, ISB No. 2349
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK
FIELDS, CHARTERED

101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor

&

( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Post Office Box 829
Boise, Idaho 83701
Facsimile (208) 385-5384
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By KATHY JOHNSON
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,

Case No. CV-OC-0723232
CV -OC-0723232

AMENDED JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,
vs.
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, fka CONNIE
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN TAYLOR,
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, an individual;
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
TRUST, an Idaho revocable trust; JOHN
DOES I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL
PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR CLAIMING
ANY RIGHT TO POSSESSION,
Defendants/Counterclaimants.

The Judgment, dated July 16, 2009, dismissing the claims of Thomas G. Maile
IV, Colleen Birch-Maile, and Berkshire Investments, LLC, and the Judgment, dated February 28,
2011, in favor of the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, by and through its trustees, Dallan
Taylor and R. John Taylor, against Thomas G. Maile IV, Colleen Birch-Maile, and Berkshire
Investments, LLC, are amended to reflect this Court's Order on Motions for Costs and Fees as
follows:

AMENDEDJUDGMENT-l
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Judgment,
dated July 16, 2009, for Connie Wright Taylor, f/k/a Connie Taylor, Clark and Feeney., and Paul
T. Clark is amended to award $56,502.50 in attorney fees and $63.81 in costs, for a total

judgment of $56,566.31 against Thomas G. Maile IV, Colleen Birch-Maile, and Berkshire
Investments, LLC, together with interest as provided by law; and
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Judgment,
dated February 28,2011, is amended to add $3,295.57 in costs for a total judgment of
$31,732.93 in favor of the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, by and through its trustees,
Dallan Taylor and R. John Taylor, against Thomas G. Maile IV, Colleen Birch-Maile, and
Berkshire Investments, LLC, plus interest as provided by law.
DATED this

~_ _ day Of~'2011.
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CERTIFICAT~F SERVICE
CERTIFICAT~F

O·
O'

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ ayof
\.....i
true and correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED JUDGMENT to be se
indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Thomas G. Maile IV
LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS G MA[LE IV, P.A.
S1.
380 W. State St.
Eagle, ID 83616-4902
Facsimile (208) 939-1001
Christ T. Troupis
W OFFICE, PA
TROUPIS LA WOFFICE,
P.O. Box 2408
Eagle,ID
Eagle,
ID 83616
Facsimile (208) 938-5482

_,2011, I caused a
d by the method

K) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

(YJ US. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

ex)

John C. Mitchell
CLARK & FEENEY
1229 Main St., Suite 201
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, ID 83501-0285
Facsimile (208) 746-9160

US. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Connie W. Taylor
HENDERSON LA W
900 Washington, Suite 1020
W A 98660
Vancouver, WA
Facsimile (360) 693-2911

~) US. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Mark S. Prusynski, ISB No. 2349

~

MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK &
F[ELDS, CHARTERED
FIELDS,
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
Post Office Box 829
Boise, Idaho 83701
Facsimile (208) 385-5384

Deli vered
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

) u.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid

Clerk

AMENDEDJUDGMENT-3

17 426.1
Client: 20 17426.1
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THOMAS G. MAILE, IV.
Attorney at Law
380 West State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 939-1000
Idaho State Bar No. 2378
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Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
husband and wife,

Case No. CV-OC 07-23232

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiffs,
v.
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, fIkIa
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
Defendants.

TO:

THE DEFENDANTSIRESPONDENTS ABOVE NAMED, THEIR ATTORNEY OF
RECORD, CONNIE TAYLOR and MARK PRUSYNSKI AND THE CLERK OF
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the attorney above named, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Berkshire Investments, LLC, Thomas G. Maile, N. and Colleen Birch-Maile, by and through
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Thomas G. Maile, IV., attorney for the Plaintiffs, hereinafter referred to as "Appellants"', provide
their Supplemental Notice of Appeal against the above-named Respondents to the Supreme Court
of the State ofIdaho, from the Order on Motion for Costs and Fees entered May 9,200] 1, Order
Denying Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict entered May 9,200] 1, Amended
Judgment entered May 9,20011, in addition to the Memorandum Decision and Order entered on
July 2,2009 and the resulting Judgment Dismissing Plaintiffs Claims entered on July 20,2009,
and the Judgment entered on February 28,2011 entered in the above-entitled action by Honorable
Richard D. Greenwood. That the prior Notice of Appeal filed March 7, 2011 in the above
captioned matter is incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein.
1.

Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Appellate Court, from the District

Court ofthe Fourth Judicial District of the State ofIdaho, In and For the County of Ada, and the
Orders entered on May 9,2011 above referenced, in addition to the prior Orders and Judgments
previously appealed.
2.

That the parties have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

judgment and/or orders described in paragraph 1 above are an appealable orders and/or judgments
under and pursuant to Rule 11(a)(2)
1 1(a)(2) LA.R. That pursuant to the Idaho Appellate Rules,

jurisdiction is proper for the appeal.
3. That no order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record.
4.

A supplemental preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Appellants

intend to assert in the appeal, are as follows:
Supplemental A.

Was the District Court correct in entering the Order denying the
Appellants' Motion for JNOV?
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Supplemental B.

Was the District Court correct in denying the PlaintiffslAppellants'
PlaintiffslAppellants' Motion
for costs?

Supplemental C.

Was the District Court correct in awarding the Defendants/CounterClaimants Taylors and the Trust their costs?

Supplemental D.

Was the District Court correct in awarding attorneys fees and costs to the
Defendant/Counter-Claimants, Connie Taylor and Clark & Feeney pursuant
to I.C. 12-123?

Is any additional reporter's transcript requested? No.
That the Appellants have paid the estimated costs of the clerk's record.
5.

The Appellants request the following documents to be included in the clerk's

record as electronic pdf files and not as hard copies:
SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS ASSOCIATED WITH ADA COUNTY CASE NO. CV OC 07
0723232.
Supplemental A.

02118/2011 Memorandum Of Costs And Attorney Fees:

Supplemental B.

0211812011 Affidavit of Mark S Prusynski in Support of Defendants'
Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees;

Supplemental C.

02118/2011 Affidavit of Thomas Maile Re Offer of Judgment;

Supplemental D.

02118/2011 Memorandum Of Costs;

Supplemental E.

0211812011 Memorandum in Support of Counter Defendants Motion for

Costs and Opposition to Counter Claimants Motion for Costs and. Attorneys
Fees;
Supplemental F.

02/25/2011 Objection to Motion for Costs and. Fees;
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Supplemental G.

02125/201
02/25/201 ] Affidavit of Christ Troupis;

Supplemental H.

0212512011
02/25/2011 Memorandum in Support of Objection:

Supplemental I.

03/0212011
03/02/2011 Objection to Mailes Memorandum of Costs;

Supplemental J.

03/0212011
03/02/2011 Supplemental Objection to Mailes' Memorandum of Costs:

Supplemental K.

03/031201
03/03/201 ] Supplemental Affidavit of Christ Troupis Re: Memo of Costs;

Supplemental L.

03/0712011
03/07/2011 Counterclaimants' Memorandum of Costs;

Supplemental M.

03/1012011
03/10/2011 Second Supplemental Affidavit of Christ Troupis RE memo of

Costs;
Supplemental N.

03/1112011
03/11/2011 Objection to Motion for Costs;

Supplemental O.

0311112011
03/11/2011 Reply Memorandum in Support of Counter Defendants Motion

for Costs and Reply to Objection to Memorandum of Costs;
Supplemental P.

03111/2011
03/11/2011 Reply BriefRe Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees;

Supplemental Q.

03116/2011
03/16/2011 Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Costs and

Opposition to Counter Claimants Motion for Costs and Fees;
Supplemental R.

03116/2011
03/16/2011 Second Supplemental Objection to Memorandum of Costs;

Supplemental S.

03/2212011
03/22/2011 Taylors' Reply Memorandum RE: Memoranda of Costs;

Supplemental T.

0312412011
03/24/2011 Supplemental Affidavit of Mark S Prusynski Regarding Fees

and Costs;
Supplemental U.

03128/2011
03/28/2011 Memorandum BriefRe: Supplemental Affd of Mark

Prusynski;
Supplemental V.

04/0612011
04/06/2011 Memorandum in Opposition to Counterdefendants Motion for

Judgment N
otwi thstanding the Verdict.
Notwithstanding
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Supplemental w.

05/021201] Objection to Motion for Stay of Execution of Judgment.

Supplemental x.

05/09/201] Order Denying Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the

Verdict.
Supplemental Y.

05/0912011 Order on Motions for Costs and Fees.
05/091201]

Supplemental z.

05/0912011 Amended Judgment
05/091201]

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20 LA.R.
DATED this

~ay of May, 2011.
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-'-'
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

lY

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of May, 2011, I caused to be delivered a true
and correct copy of the AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL, to be delivered, addressed as follows:
Connie W. Taylor & Paul Henderson
Henderson Law Finn
900 Washington St.
st. Suite 1020
Vancouver, Washington 98660
Facsimile: (360) 693-2911

(X)
()
()
()

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

Mark Stephen Prusynski
PO Box 829
Boise, ID 83701
Phone: (208) 345-2000
Facsimile: (208) 385-5384

(X)
()
()
()

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

Christ T. Troupis
TROUPIS
LA W OFFICE
TROUP IS LAW
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130
PO Box 2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Facsimile: (208) 938-5482

()
()
(X)
()

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

Leslie Anderson, Court Reporter
Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

()
()
(X)
()

U. S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
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......
NO.

A.M.

B:e:;o

F~ _ _ __

19 2011
MAY 19
RICH,Qart(
CHRJSTOPHER 0. RICH,Qert(
THa
By BRADlEY J. THES
DEPUTY

Stephen W. Kenyon
Clerk of Supreme Court
451 W State Street
Boise, Idaho 83720

In re: Berkshire Investments v. Taylor, Docket No.

Notice is hereby given that on Friday, March 25, 2011, I lodged a
transcript of 232 pages in length for the above-referenced appeal with
the district court clerk of Ada County in the Fourth Judicial District.
The following files were lodged:
Transcript of Proceedings 2-4-2011

David Cromwell
Tucker & Associates
cc: kloertscher@idcourts.net
PDF format of completed files emailed to Supreme Court
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1

To:

Clerk cl"'r" the Court
Idahc) Supreme Court
Idaho
Boise, Idaho
83720

NO'
NO._ _ _~Il"Fr'\"----A.M.___
____
IP.M
FILED
_BlOC>
P.M _ _- _~

1 9 2011
MAY 19
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH. Clerk
By BRADLEY J. THIE:S

Docket No.
lApp)

DEPUTY

38599-2011

BERKSHIRE INVESTIMENTS,

LLC

vs.

(Res)

CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR

LODGl~D:
LODGl~D:

NOTICE OF REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT

Hearings held 10/29/10,

11/30/10,

1/18/11

Notice is hereby given that on May 17,
lodged a

transcript of 114 pages in length for

~bove-referenced
~bove-referenced

the County of Ada

appeal with the
~n

District

the Fourth Judicial

Co~r~
Co~r~

2011,

I

the
-. -fClerk of
,_, ..L

District.

L
lie Anderson, Official Reporter
829 E. Blue Heron Street
Meridian, Idaho
83646
(208) 371-2006
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-

"'A6.

~iop
AM

Fax: 334-2616

pub

R'"--------

19 2011
MAY 19
[I. RtCH.Clerk
CHRISTOPHER [I,

In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho

Berkshire Investments, et al
Plaintiff-Appellant
v

Connie Taylor, et al
Defendant-Respondent

)
)
)
)
)

Docket No.

By BRADLEY ,J. THtES
DEPUTY

38599

Notice of Transcript Lodged

Notice is hereby given that on May 19,2011,
I lodged one (1) original and three (3) copies of transcripts 388 pages in length,
as listed below, for the above referenced appeal with
the District Court Clerk of Ada County, Fourth Judicial District.

TRANSCRIPTS LODGED
Trial Day 2 - 2/2/11
Trial Day 3 - 2/3/11
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS LLC, an Idaho limited
liability, and THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN
BIRCH-MAILE, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants-Appellants,

Supreme Court Case No. 38599
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

vs.
flkla CONNIE TAYLOR, an
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/kla
individual; DALLAN TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, an individual; THEODORE
L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSONS
IN POSSESSION OR CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION,
Defendants-Counterclaimants-Respondents.

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of
the State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify:
That the attached list of exhibits is a true and accurate copy of the exhibits being
forwarded to the Supreme Court on Appeal.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this 20th day of May, 2011.

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the District Court

--~
1(1
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS
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,

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF' ADA
HONORABLE RICHARD GREENWOOD
CLERK: KATHY JOHNSON
CT REPTR: FRAN MORRIS

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENT, ETAL,
Plaintiffs,

)
)
)
)

vs.

)

CONNIE TAYLOR, ETAL,

)
)

)

Defendants.

Case No.

CVOC07.23232

EmIBIT
EXHIBIT LIST

)

------.".....-..,....------,----------)

Counsel for Plaintiff:
Counsel for Defendant:

Connie Taylor/Paul Henderson
Christ Troupis

PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBITS

1 Theodore Johns Revocable Trust Agreement
2 Johnson Trust beneficiaries Disclaimer Agreement
3 Petition for Appointment of trustees 11/15/04
4 Amended Petition for apt of trustees
6 Answer and Counterclaim dated 9/6/05
12 Appellant's/Cross-Respondent's Reply Brief (Maile)
14 Taylor v. Maile I Supreme Court Opinion
15 Taylor v. Maile II Supreme Court Opinion
16 Amended Complaint 3/25/08
37 Email about numbers of lots for sale
Deposition of John Runft

2/2/11
2/2/11
2/2/11
2/2/11
2/2/11
2/2/11
2/2/11
2/3/11
2/2/11
2/3/11

Admitted
Admitted
Admitted
Admitted
Admitted
Admitted
Admitted
Admitted
Admitted
Admitted

2/3/11
2/3/11
2/3/11
2/3/11
2/3/11
2/3/11
2/3/11
2/4/11
2/4/11
2/4/11
2/4/11
2/4/11

Admitted
Admitted
Admitted
Admitted
Admitted
Admitted
Admitted
Admitted
Admitted
Admitted
Admitted
Admitted

DEFENDANT'S EXHIBITS

110
111
112
116
117
119
122
130
131
132
133
134

Complaint & Demand of Jury Trial
Lis Pendens filed by Connie Taylor
Verified Answer & Counterclaim filed by Hoagland
Order Granting Deft's Motion to Dismiss
Disclaimer, Release & Indemnity Agreement
Notice of Appeal
Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial
Transcript front page, page 14 and 17
Memorandum Decision & Order
Motion for Leave to file Amended Complaint
MSJ on Beneficiaries' Claim
Order Regarding Plaintiff's MSJ
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138
139
147
148
150
157
159
160
161

Notice of Lis Pendens filed by Berkshire
Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim
Release of Notice of Lis Pendens
Notice of Vendee's Lien
Release of Notice of Lis Pendens
Idaho Rule 60(b)
demonstrative purposes only
Ticore v. Stanion II demonstrative purposes only
Robinson v. Robinson demonstrative purposes only
Kawai Farms v. Longstreet demonstrative purposes

2/4/11
2/4/11
2/4/11
2/4/11
2/4/11
2/2/11
2/2/11
2/2/11
2/2/11

Admitted
Admitted
Admitted
Admitted
Admitted
Admitted
Admitted
Admitted
Admitted
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTOF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS LLC, an Idaho limited
liability, and THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN
BIRCH-MAILE, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants-Appellants,

Supreme Court Case No. 38599
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

vs.
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/kJa CONNIE TAYLOR, an
individual; DALLAN TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, an individual; THEODORE
L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSONS
IN POSSESSION OR CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION,
Defendants-Counterc
laimants-Respondents.
Defendants-Counterclaimants-Respondents.

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of
the following:

CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:

THOMAS G. MAILE, IV

MARK S. PRUSYNSKI

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

EAGLE, IDAHO

BOISE, IDAHO

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the District Court

MAY 24 2011
Date of Service: ------------------------

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS LLC, an Idaho limited
liability, and THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN
BIRCH-MAILE, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants-Appellants,

Supreme Court Case No. 38599
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD

vs.
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a CONNIE TAYLOR, an
individual; DALLAN TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, an individual; THEODORE
L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
trust; JOHN DOES I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSONS
IN POSSESSION OR CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION,
Defendants-Counterclaimants-Respondents.

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing
record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true
and correct record of the pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28
of the Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as those requested by Counsels.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the
7th day of March, 2011.

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the District Court

2>

By
Deputy Clerk

CERTIFICATE TO RECORD
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